To a large extent yes. First avgas and then pretty much everything that they were importing from areas outside their control No. The IJN fuel reserve at the start of the war was predicted to last 2 years in peace time or 18 months in war time. It was really only adequate for about a year of wartime operations. Yes. No They weren't by most reasonable measures. Witness the war warnings. NO. It would be interesting to see these ??? They had a non-aggression pact with the USSR why should they consider a German one treason?
They are usually referenced in connection with the counteroffensive which began Dec 5, 1941. The Soviets were able to assemble enough reserves to take the offensive even while grinding down the German advance. As our late friend Brndirt1 reminded us, the Soviets did not denude the Far East of troops: Don’t forget this concerning the Soviet Forces in the Far east shortly before and then after Operation Barbarossa: Soviet troops in the Far East on 22 June 1941: 17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies. Soviet troops in the Far East on 1 January 1942: 19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies. Apparently, units sent west were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front. Source for the data is: http://www.tashv.nm.ru/BoevojSostavSA/ The Japanese couldn't afford to engage this Far East portion of the Red Army, especially as it was supplemented by those 80,000 Mongolian regulars. -- Happy Trails, Clint
The freeze on Japanese assets was due to their invasion of northern part of French IndoChina, setting up a base for the invasion of southern China. The Japanese were running roughshod over the foreigners in China by '41. American missionaries were harassed or bodily ejected from the country. The American's who had businesses in the areas occupied by the Japanese had to put a Japanese on the company's board of directors, with veto powers. The US didn't have enough resources to fight a two front war at that point and they were hoping to forestall a Japanese blitzkrieg for long enough to make progress with the rearmament program. Japan was talking peace and planning war, something we knew from their diplomatic correspondence. War in the Western Pacific was not going to be avoided short of granting Japan it's conquests without having fight for them.
Because it betrayed the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. The Japanese only made their nonagression pact with the Soviets after Germany had already broken the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Hitler had proven by that point that any pact he signed was worth less than the paper it was written on though.
Doesn't make the pill any less easier to swallow. The Japanese were "Honorary Aryans" after all. Besides, Germany had been quite accommodating to the Japanese in the late 1930's.
And we intercepted a message from Tokyo to Berlin reminding the Germans that Japan "had kept the US busy in the Pacific" and expected to be rewarded for that. A special prosecutor would call that collusion.
The contribution of Siberian Divisions at Moscow in '41 is overrated. They were not the - Straw That Broke the Camel's Back - sort of speak.
Would need a bit more detail on exactly what the understanding is that over rates the Siberian Divisions. I'd suggest misunderstood may be a better term for their impact on the situation around Moscow in 41.
A rather exhaustive study shows that the "Siberian Divisions appearing in the nick of time to defend Moscow in December 1941" were only nominally plural. There were four of them, the 32d, 78th, 93d, and 238th Rifle Division. Of those, only the 32d and 93d were really "Siberian" or experienced (the 238th was newly formed and the 78th had no "Siberian" personnel). The ‘Siberian’ Divisions and the Battle for Moscow in 1941-42 | Operation Barbarrosa
But didn't there existence and the use of them elsewhere impact what was available and what was needed at Moscow? I seem to recall several were used at other places along the line. Of course the effort to take Moscow would have been a whole lot more than just reaching it's western edge. That whole "saw the towers of the Kremlin" paints a picture of the Germans being much closer to a victory than it's my impression they really were. Part of the issue of course is exactly what he thinks people think "The contribution of Siberian Divisions at Moscow in '41" is. Some may believe it's as you expressed and I'd agree that's over rating their contribution on the other hand I've read that some believe that they had almost no impact ... I wouldn't call that "over rating their impact".