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Defense is to attack as three is to one.

Perhaps, but there were many occasions in 1942 when Jap troops with superior morale, and already having some veteran leadership from the war in China, could and did overcome SUPERIOR numbers of enemy troops to win battles (Malaya being one example). Air support can also make a difference, as can any naval bombardment that can be managed. Such a hypothetical situation is open to all kinds of uncertainties and quirks of fate. What would the air support amount to for each side? How long would Japanese logistics last (presuming their loaded transports would also bring supplies). My question to any naysayers would be: If it were up to YOU as Jap commander, would you not plan for and try this operation? (Higher risk, but higher reward - after all, you are taking on the frickin' U.S.A. - how else are you going to win?) This is where I dispute the cut & dried formulas, like "3 to 1" which are USUALLY correct. My gut reaction is that the abruptness of the airstrikes, followed by immediate ground action would put the "green" defenders into shock. It would not have surprised me if Hawaii fell quite easily. (I suspect it would have been like Kasserine Pass, in that American ground forces would learn and adapt quickly, but not in time to win, just yet.)

 

Further to the last post, all that really mattered was Oahu. (If it falls, Hawaii falls.) Jap capture of Oahu would have denied the oil reserves of the Pacific Fleet to the Americans, so how could they reinforce the archipelago? As a bonus, the BB's resting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor would not have a chance of being repaired by the U.S. As for the U.S. carriers (if away from the port, as historically they were) would they even have been ordered back to Hawaii, if ground action was happening there? (After all, they were the only main fleet strength left, to secure the Pacific Coast and Panama Canal.) If they did return to Hawaii, Jap carriers in the vicinity had them badly outnumbered. On the other hand, if caught in Pearl during the initial air strikes, what would be left of them, in an operational state? As much as this scenario sounds pie-in-the-sky, it has a lot going for it. Of course, I freely admit it is also with the advantage of hindsight.

 

RED ALERT! RED ALERT! We have accidentally slipped into a "Japanese Invasion of Hawaii" thread. Stand by with beer and popcorn! That is all.

BTW, "Jap" and "Japs" is rather unfortunate shorthand.

 

Oh, invasion of Oahu . . . just what the CAC had been salivating over for years and years, with every square foot of ocean within range fully and completely registered.

Oh and oil reserves? They came by tanker from California and were nothing in comparison to what was available at San Pedro, San Francisco, or Puget Sound.

And just where were all the transports and cargo vessels for such an invasion supposed to come from, not to mention the troops.

And have the proponents of this concept ever looked at a terrain map of Oahu? How many beaches are satisfactory for landing troops (and please don't mention anything on the north shore, just ask the surfers). And does anyone think the Coast Artillery folks had not figured out which beaches to cover?

 

Yep.

Yep.

Oh, you missed that discussion? They simply load up a couple of ocean liners with Japanese Imperial Ninja Special Naval Landing Force Jedi Warriors and run them aground in Kaneohe. And they overrun Oahu from end to end. End of story.

Sure...just ask them, Kaneohe is perfect.

 

well, this was just food for thought. We seem to list all the Jap difficulties, and ignore some U.S. ones. (like the 7 CV's in the area.) Transports not used for Philippines, could be used here. (Meanwhile, land based air from Indo-China could still wreck the Philippine-based B-17s on the ground on Dec.7th.) Jap BB's could engage coastal batteries and whatever other U.S. art'y that had everything so perfectly covered. Beaches are always a problem in landings, yet beaches almost always give way to a landing force. (But try to avoid a Dieppe or Salerno situation, wherein the beaches directly lead to being surrounded by high ground.) My point was, that if the Jap infantry managed to close with the U.S. troops, I don't like the U.S. chances. Frankly, I don't have info on invasion beaches, but the Japs had a spy in the famous tea house that overlooked the harbor. I'd imagine that he could have reconnoitered somewhere worthwhile to land. As for the oil, it sounds like I erred here - but I would be curious for more info. (Books I have read always made much of the Tank Farm on Oahu being a key target that would have caused great difficulty should the Americans lose it or have it destroyed.)

 

BTW, "Jap" and "Japs" is rather unfortunate shorthand.

Not politically correct, but historically correct. (no offense intended - it saves a bit of typing)

 

To be fair, this thread is probably about as historically accurate as this film will be, and may well be more entertaining.

 

Um, Kido Butai was six fleet carriers, not seven. The 3d Carrier Division, with the recently completed CVL Zuiho and the aging Hosho, were assigned as cover for the battle line and remained in Japanese waters during the Pearl Harbor operation. The 4th Carrier Division's equally new Taiyo was engaged in training, while the equally aged Ryujo was committed to supporting the Philippine operations.

One Japanese difficulty that gets all too easily ignored is the very simple one that Pearl Harbor was not the objective - the Dutch East Indies and its oil was. That made the occupation of the Philippines and Malaya critical. So no, those transports could not be easily used there...even ignore the transit time issue.

What, the two "fast battleships", Hiei and Kirishima? The other two from 3d Battleship Division, Kongo and Haruna, were assigned to the Malaya operation as a counter to Force Z. The rest? Too old, slow, and fuel guzzling for such a task.

Dieppe? Sure. Salerno? No, not really, except possibly for the Ranger Force and Commandos. X Corps landed six miles from the hills above Battapaglia and Eboli. VI Corps was about four miles away from the ridges east of Paestum, but the mountains there weren't the problem anyway. You may be thinking of Anzio?

In any case, the problem for a Japanese landing is that inevitably, the Americans have to be alerted, with the beach defenses manned...beach defenses that had been planned on, laid out, and surveyed for 20 years...and the American defenders badly outnumbered any likely commitment of Japanese forces.

Um, no, Yoshikawa was a naval officer and was concerned solely with ship movements, a task he could fulfill pretty easily by observing the harbor. Spying on beach defenses would be problematic for him. Then there is the problem that the concentration of coast artillery along the south coast, covering the harbor entrance, meant that only the eastern beaches at Kaneohe or the western ones northwest of Barbers Point were possibilities...and both were major military installations. Being a spy around there would be a tad more difficult. And the only thing they could really glean would be beach conditions, since the beach defenses were not fixed.

Not the Tank Farm again!

 

The problem is that you may not intend to offend, but it is offensive, especially if you are only doing it for convenience sake.

 

I wonder what this button does . . .

Are we referring to the button for like? Is this how new members are welcomed. This "new" member is 56 yrs. old, with 44 yrs. worth of studying WWII. Are we a little too much into a popularity contest here, as in how many "likes" we can collect? Lets keep it about WWII. I am happy to converse, debate, and share info. I know a lot, but I certainly don't claim to know everything. A degree of respect is in order. Have we closed our minds to new members, or am I just a "2 Likes Received" kind of guy according to the popular kids.

 

I will change from the offensive shorthand if it is that much an issue. Perhaps I am showing my age, but it didn't used to be an issue. The one place I thought it might be o.k., is a WWII site.

 

Sorry, with Midway on my mind, I mentioned 7 CV's instead of 6 at Hawaii. This idea was predicated on freeing up forces by not doing the Philippines, until later. That frees up more ships, more troops. The B-17's on Philippines would still be toast from Indo-China land-based air. At no time in earlier posts, did I suggest cancelling Dutch East Indies. Leaving Philippines for later, I am not convinced would cause that much trouble, for the JAPANESE - not every route would be interdicted, and land-based air at Indo-China would secure some routes. As for spying, it is problematic, that is the job. Surely, a suitable beach could be determined, even if from a distance. Yes, the Tank Farm again - apparently it is old hat to you guys, but I sincerely would like to know more about the fuel oil reserve situation.

I also happen to have laid out the challenge earlier, that this idea is predicated upon the idea, that knowing what you know, (which is hindsight, of course) how better would you (as JAPANESE commander) initiate the war with the U.S. in the Pacific, with any chance at long-term success? This is my answer. Imperfect I'm sure. Any better ideas?

 

Yes, I was purposely referring to Salerno, as one example of a place where the beach "directly leads" to high ground. Not as directly as at Dieppe, perhaps, but I do know that the Germans had a happy time raining art'y down on the beachhead from above. Not the kind of beach you want to assault, if you have alternatives, and the kind to be avoided, if possible, on Oahu.

 

In any case, the problem for a Japanese landing is that inevitably, the Americans have to be alerted, with the beach defenses manned...beach defenses that had been planned on, laid out, and surveyed for 20 years...and the American defenders badly outnumbered any likely commitment of Japanese forces.

I can accept that U.S. gunnery could be problematic. BB's and carrier air would have to do their best to neutralize that. But I think the "green" defenders, after the air strike shock, and facing the new (to them) phenomenon of a banzai charge, would have been anything but stalwart.

And the only thing they could really glean would be beach conditions, since the beach defenses were not fixed.

Hmm...defenses not fixed. That doesn't sound much like concrete bunkers on Bloody Omaha. As I previously stated, it was not uncommon for the JAPANESE to overcome numerically superior forces, especially early in the Pacific.

With hindsight, I don't mind rolling the dice & taking my chances, as Japan. How many times in history, has some place been deemed as being "impossible to take", only to have it fall! The biggest problem, if fuel oil is in fact NOT a U.S. difficulty, is that U.S. reinforcement would be coming. I had banked on the Tank Farm loss preventing that. What the JAPANESE would need is a quick blitzkrieg of Hawaii, (all the islands), not a long drawn-out campaign. It looks less feasible if it is going to drag on. It is a worthwhile gambit, if only for the fuel oil. Someone enlighten me on why some books make so much of the Tank Farm. (I bought it.)

 

Well, they were Super Ninja Leap Froggers(SNLF).

Robdab didn't intend on grounding the liners, they were to steam in to port and take it. He didn't realize the problem of taking a liner drawing 42 feet into a channel of 28 feet, which I so nicely pointed out, leaving his super Ninja Leap Froggers high and dry.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=1402631#p1402631