New Movie Alert! "Midway", coming November 2019!

No, it isn't a "popularity contest, but neither are you unique in your experience. For example, I'm 63, so have been studying World War II for about 50 years now, since I first picked up the "Green Book" The Lorraine Campaign in the library at Cambrai-Fritsch Kaserne, Darmstadt Germany and when I brought it home, had my Dad flip through it and tell me an unnamed officer on one of its pages was him. I also spent 19 years as an operations research analyst studying World War II and other subjects professionally for DOD, and the last ten years in further study and writing for publication on the subject. I have also conducted or have access to extensive primary source research on these subjects in various archives in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, and wasted way too much time doing research and analysis to debate another internet denizen a few years ago on various fora on this exact same subject.

Meanwhile, if you really care for a degree of respect, you might show it to R Leonard, who happens to be one of the premier authorities on American Naval Aviation in World War II.

 

Given this is the internet, with visitors from around the world, including Japanese and Japanese Americans, no, just because its a WWII site doesn't make it okay. Otherwise, we'd be okay with Kike, Wop, Hunky, Limey, and the rest too.

 

Yeah Larry, but he was referring to Richard Leonard specifically.

 

The problem with that idea is that it requires a major change in Japanese strategic thinking...such as it was. There assessment was priority one was the DEI oil fields and secure access for tankers from their to the Home Islands. Everything revolved around that, including the raid on Pearl. There is no evidence they were aware that the Philippines threat could be toasted by the Hainan air forces...to a degree the disastrous losses incurred there on 8 December were a fluke.

The issues with the tank farms - plural - is that they were a dispersed target and the Japanese had very limited resources to attack them with. Plus, every attack on the tank farm was not an attack on something else...like the naval vessels the Japanese saw as the primary target to fulfill their strategic objective, for which see above.

Well, sure, with hindsight you can come up with the perfect plan for anything...but what is the point?

 

Apparently my name is Rabdab and I back this nonsense? (the Axis History thread you are making me so painfully read.) I suggest nothing of the sort. I suggest using as much as possible of the considerable force that hit Philippines in December '41, in terms of infantry and their accompanying naval craft to execute a landing not on Luzon, but on Oahu. The entire force is not available, because following Luzon, it had other commitments for landings elsewhere, which would probably have to go as planned. But as much as possible of the Luzon units could be used, plus possibly something else improvised as far as shipping. Let's not pretend that Guadalcanal was not also partly improvised. The marines went in wet up to their armpits, rifles overhead. Not an ideal number of landing craft. Improvisation has been known to work at times. Supply would be a problem, because the CV's would be continually fighting, not just airstrikes & leave. I'm not saying I have the ideal mix, but I am working the problem.

 

Nope, I had a sneaking suspicion you were reading it, but he mentioned Richard specifically, so that is what I was replying to. Anyway, the links in your signature should have clued him in on your bona fides.

 

Well, sure, with hindsight you can come up with the perfect plan for anything...but what is the point?

I guess the point is that the exercise of re-thinking historical operations, gives you a better appreciation of the challenges and thinking that real commanders faced. It can make for a more thorough investigation of history. That just goes to the factual/counterfactual argument among history buffs. Some like it, some think it a waste. I like it some of the time.

 

Oh Dear GOD NO! Please do not try to read that mess. It still gives me nightmares. He also infected TankNet and Warships1 with that nonsense.

Sure, but you have to get them there. In transports probably capable of a sustained convoy speed of under 15 knots and they cannot use the central Pacific route to get to their objective. Remember, timing is everything in this operation.

Yep, and the Marine landing on Guadalcanal was unopposed, except for Tulagi. And total opposition consisted of a Naval Guard force and a bunch of labor troops, under 1,500 troops ill-equipped to fight a sustained battle. On Oahu you face the better part of two infantry divisions plus assorted Coast Artillery units prepared for a beach defense. Not a good comparison.

 

Wake.

Well, aside from the various fixed Panama Mount, Observation Post, and a few fixed CA battery positions, no, but against a Japanese assault the field fortifications planned were entirely adequate. The Japanese had virtually no doctrine for NGF except from patrol craft and destroyers and depended on unopposed landings for success. At Wake...and for a time at Kota Baru where it was opposed the results were disaster or near disaster...and Kota Baru eventually succeeded because there was only a single Commonwealth battalion there opposing a divisional-size landing, so the Japanese very mcuh had superiority. Ditto at Lingayen Gulf.

Um, the Japanese executed a quick bilitzkrieg of Oahu. What you are talking about is a sustained land campaign of the Hawaiian Islands.

 

The Japanese knew the strength of US industry or at least had a good appreciation for it. Look at what was already on order before 7 Dec 41. Further more they had no chance at all of taking Hawaii and attempting to would have been missing the point. Japan based her only real hope on the premise that the US would be easily discouraged by a large opening loss. The real target of PH was the American will. Staying around for another day or three wasn't going to help with that. Indeed the results of the attack as executed was better than the Japanese expected and hoped for looking at military targets. Their problem was they had just the opposite reaction with regards to the American will that they needed and wanted. Before PH Japan's actions were viewed as something that the US was going to have to address sooner or later in some way. After PH the equivocation was gone.

 

Japan didn't really have a doctrine that included such though especially with regards to cooperation between the Army and the Navy. Indeed there's a rather open question as to whether or not they had much if any HE for battleships in Dec of 41.

There's a very good chance that the word would be when you started planning it that it was impossible. Even if possible getting the IJN and IJA to agree and cooperate tot the level this would require would be a very difficult task. Then there's the question of how you maintain secrecy. That the carriers were able to approach Hawaii in secret doesn't mean that the battle fleet can much less and invasion fleet. If they are spotted ahead of time then there's no hope at all.

This is a much higher risk option with not that much greater reward. Indeed by not seizing the Dutch East Indies Japan may not be able to even keep Hawaii supplied much less take the Philippines and the Dutch oil fields.

 

Exactly 30 as it happens;
8 each of Farragut, Mahan, and Bagley classes, total 112 dual-purpose 5"/38s
2 leaders, total 16 low-angle 5"/38s

4 WWI era DDs attached to 14th Naval District for local patrol, etc.: Ward, Schley (in overhaul), Chew, Allen. Allen (DD-66) was the last of the "thousand-tonners" which preceded the flush deck class. Total 16 low-angle 4"/50

There were also eight flush-decker destroyer-minelayers (DM) and four destroyer-minesweepers (DMS).

 

Also consider that Japanese doctrine for amphibious invasions focused on landing unopposed. There first two attempts that I know of were at Wake. A landing at Hawaii would likely suffer all the deficiencies that those invasions did.

Another thing to consider was that the Midway op used more oil than the IJN had ever used in a year of peace time operation. That implies that an invasion of Hawaii would use over half the IJN fuel reserve. I think some of the Midway ships were using fuel from the Dutch fields not possible if Hawaii is first on the list.

Never seen a good explanation of how the Battle fleet and invasion fleet can make a covert approach either.