Contrasting Amphibious Landings at Kota Bharu and Wake Island Atoll.

To all:

About 11/2 hours before the IJN attacks on Pearl Harbour a Japanese Army amphibious assault occurred at Kota Bharu in Malaysia on Dec. 8th, 1941.* The Commonwealth Comnand expected such an assault in either Malaysia or Thailand or both and were generally well prepared to defend Kota Bharu. The assault was conducted by about 5500 IJA landing troops and supporting troops against sand beaches and mangrove swamps separated by deep and overgrown water channels; making the landing area look more like a littoral achipelago rather than a straight-forward beach. Defending the beaches were Indian troops of the 9th Indian Division supported by dug-in 18 pdr guns, RAAF Hudson bombers X 16 and 4 Brewster fighters, plenty of pill boxes and fortified bunkers, wire entanglements, anti-personnel minefields and even some sparse anti-tank minefields, dug in mortar and gun pits, and lots of heavy and medium support weapons (HMGs and MMGs). In ready reserve were Australian troops of the 8th Division but they ended up playing a very small role supporting the Indians defending the beaches.

The Japanese Army (IJA) landed a very heavily reinforced regiment of troops against about equal numbers of well dug-in and determined Indian soldiers of the Commonwealth. The Japanese used landing boats from three transports, destroyers and cruisers delivering naval gunfire fire-support and long-range bombers to support the assault landings. The Commonwealth troops were supported by local artillery and many air sorties by the RAAF Hudson bombers over the island-beaches and to attack the ships three miles offshore.

After hard fighting for most of the day, the IJA troops managed to capture the beaches and then drove home the assault into the town of Kota Bharu by nightfall. The IJA had triumphed and Malaysia was soon in imminent peril from these and other landed forces of the IJA.

Japan's 1941 Attack On Malaya: What Happened? | HistoryExtra

Contrast and compare this operation with the IJN's rather badly organised and at first tepid amphibious assault on the Wake Island Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The atoll was defended by about 450 Marines and Army personnel. About 1100 construction workers were on the atoll too and about 440 of these participated either directly or indirectly in the fighting. The defenders were supported by six 5-inch coastal guns and a dozen 3-inch antiaircraft guns. There were 12 F4F Wildcat fighter planes stationed on the atoll although 8 were quickly destroyed in the opening air-raids launched by Japanese land-based bombers from the Marshall Islands. There were also about 45 air crew personnel from Guam in the employ of the Pan-American Airways Clipper Service.

On Dec. 11th, 1941 a Japanese naval task force including three light cruisers, six destroyers, and two troop transport attempted to land 450 Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) troops on Wake Island’s southern shore. The Japanese assault was repulsed and the IJN suffered a rude defeat from the marines’ light coastal-defense guns and the four remaining Wildcat fighters. The Japanese withdrew what troops they could save and then withdrew from the immediate area of the atoll.

After licking their wounds and regrouping their forces, the IJN continued to bomb and bombard Wake Island and eventually sent a much larger task force of approximately 2,000 troops to amphibiously assault the atoll and its determined defenders. Nine hundred Japanese SNLF shock troops stormed ashore before dawn on Dec. 23rd. After a day of bloody and hard fighting, the IJN finally overwhelmed the American defenders and forced a surrender of the US and Guamanian (?) troops and personnel garrisoning the atoll.

Battle of Wake Island | World War II

Why was the IJA's Kota Bharu amphibious so successful and why was the IJN's amphibious assault of the Wake Island Atoll so much more difficult? Let's discuss this by comparing and contrasting the two amphibious assault operations.

* International date-line differences meant some events west of the line occurring on Dec.8th actually happened before before events happening east of the line on Dec. 7th.

Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

Roughly 80 minutes, make it 1 1/2 hours.
00:30 Japanese open bombardment of beaches, while at 01:48 Pearl Harbor attack begins.

 

OpanaPointer:

According to Rottman, Gordon L. "Japanese Army in World War II: Conquest of the Pacific 1941-42". (Osprey Publishing: 2005), p. 21, the only source I have here, most IJA and IJN landings and assaults were night-time operations as this was standard Japanese doctrine in the pre-war and WWII periods. I haven't been able to track down any internet sources to corroborate the Osprey book. This approach was different from allied doctrine as well as other Axis powers' doctrines. I do not know the total number nor that subset of IJN night-time landings/assaults.

Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

Takao:

Yes.11/2 hrs.

Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

True, but they were not conducting landings, rather, delivering troops and supplies to Japanese forces ashore. It wasn't so much a matter of doctrine as a response to American airpower making daylight operations excessively costly.

 

I don't know much about the landings at Kota Bharu, but I wonder if the broken-up nature of the landing area might have helped the Japanese. If they got ashore at some points and were able to push inland, they might have unbalanced the defenders even if the defense was holding in other sectors. It may have been difficult for the British command to keep track of everything happening.

 

Carronade:

Here is a short video by a miniature wargamer and military history enthusiast which is a good visual primer for introduction into the Kota Bharu amphibious assault. It should give you a basic sense of how things unfolded during the battle on Badang and Sabak Beaches outside of Kota Bharu.



Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

OpaniPointer:

"The Cactus Express", later called "The Tokyo Express" operated exclusively at night as a response to American air superiority in the Solomon Islands/Guadalcanal/New Guinea area and began soon after the Battle of Savo Island AFAIK. I don't know if similar tactics were used in the Indochina/Thailand/Malaysia/Burma area to supply and replenish Japanese troops. Land supply routes may have mooted the need for risky naval supply.

Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

That is partly because the IJN was highly trained in nighttime operations and were extremely proficient in the same. It was also in order to limit a response from the opponent's aviation assets. Amphibious shipping is most vulnerable during the unloading phase. At Kota Bharu, the Japanese had about 5 1/2 hours to discharge troops and build up supply before British Commonwealth forces could effectively engage with their air and artillery (they weren't direct fire coastal guns, makes a difference). The Japanese, unlike most allied forces were quite proficient in amphibious operations and had a number of specialized craft and ships to carry out the operations, plus they had experience that allowed the xAK/xAP vessels to unload fairly rapidly.
*In fact, the original Higgins boat, the LCP(L) (the militarized version of the "Eureka Boat" lacked a ramp. Lt. Victor Krulak, USMC, serving as an intelligence officer in China, in 1937, saw the Japanese using their ramped, Daihatsu landing barges, got photos, and forwarded to the Navy with a recommendation that the square bow, front ramp design be incorporated into the Higgins boat. The Navy filed the recommendation away noting it was the work of, “some nut out in China.” Two years later he discovered his recommendation had been ignored and he got with Andrew Higgins and the bow ramp was incorporated into the "Higgins" boat as the LCP(R), this evolved into the LCV and both into the LCVP which was the most important landing boat of the war.
The US did experiment with night landings, but issues encountered during FLEX 4 (Fleet Exercise 4) in 1938, plus previous experience led US planners to determine that nighttime landings under combat conditions were impractical. Only two relatively large nighttime landings were conducted by the US in WWII, the 2d Marine Raider battalion at Makin and the Marine 1st Parachute Battalion at Tanambogo.
*Information from US Landing Craft in WWII, Vol.1 by David Doyle and The Boat that Won the War: An illustrated History of the Higgins LCVP by Charles C Roberts, and
A Few Good Men: The Fighting Fifth Marines, Ronald J. Brown (this latter book has a good deal about the post WWI development of amphibious doctrine and equipment. The late 1920's and 1930's saw a dedicated group of Marine Corps and Naval Officers develop the ships, procedures/doctrine (the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations", published by Marine Corps Schools in 1934, became the basis for US Amphibious Doctrine in WWII, in fact up until today. The US Navy adopted it as "Fleet Training Publication 167" in 1938. The US Army republished it in 1941 as, "Field manual 31-5".) and equipment despite push back from the Navy and an almost total lack of funding.
A bit of trivia: do you know why the LCVP and its predecessors the LCP(L) and LCP(R) were designed with a length of 36 feet? The Navy wanted a 30' boat, because that was the length that existing boats davits were designed to accommodate. The Navy Department were unwilling to incur the costs of changing the davit spacing on ships used for amphibious operations. The Marine Corps wanted a 40' boat but the Navy wouldn't approve it. Higgins at his own expense built a 36' boat, splitting the difference and managed to sell it to the Navy.

"Higgins, who offered the Eureka to the Navy in 1927, renewed his offer year after year but it received little consideration in Washington. The Marines, however, were greatly interested. Higgins visited Quantico in 1934 and discussed his boat with us. The Corps had no funds at its disposal to undertake the construction of such a boat but we did not lose interest, which Higgins appreciated. In 1937 he went to the Navy again and furnished them with drawings and complete specifications regarding the boat. After a long delay, he was informed that the Navy had only $5,200 available for an experimental boat and he agreed to build one for that sum. He also accepted the Navy stipulation that the boat should not exceed 30 feet in length.

Higgins built his boat, the first Eureka type for landing purposes. He told me it cost him $12,500 but he considered it money well spent. The Marine Equipment Board was impressed by the potentialities of the new boat. Only the length was against it; the Marines preferred a landing boat nearer 40 than 30 feet long but the Navy was adamant on this point.

Andrew Higgins, a fighting Irishman, won the opening phase of the boat battle single-handed, with loud Marine applause. The Navy placed several experimental orders with him for the 30-foot boat, which he filled more or less under protest. As he told me, he was in bad odor because he kept insisting that the boats should be longer.

During a memorable conference at the Navy Department he again brought up the question of length, which was running the Bureau of Ships ragged, and urged that the boats be built 39 or even 40 feet long. Why should the Navy stick to a 30-foot boat? he demanded.
The explanation given him, with chill naval logic, was this: boat davits already placed on a number of ships had been standardized to handle 30-foot boats.
"To hell with designing a boat to fit the davits!" Higgins roared. "Why don't you design davits to fit a proper sized boat?"

He was so exasperated that he returned to New Orleans and, at his own expense and without orders from the Navy, built a 36-foot boat and shipped it to the Norfolk Navy Yard with the demand that it be tested. When the Marines heard about this, they whooped. After passing Naval tests, the boat was sent to us at Quantico and we put it to further tests.

Through the unfathomable processes whereby the official mind finally emerges from darkness into light, the Navy eventually decided to standardize on the 36-foot Higgins boat. Higgins has always said that without Marine championship of his boat over the years, it never would have been tested."
-From "Coral and Brass", you can find it here at Hyperwar. HyperWar: Coral and Brass (Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret.) (ibiblio.org)

As for Wake, they had advance warning from Pearl Harbor before the first aerial attacks but failed to spot the initial raid. Advantage Japan.
The initial landings weren't attempted until three days later, they came near dawn (0500) and the direct fire from the naval type gun batteries were effective. This is counter to the nighttime landing parameter.
The final landing that did succeed would have in all probability have failed like the initial landing but for one of those fortunes of war incidents. The Japanese started the landing a little before 0200, so this fits the night landing parameter. Cunningham and Devereux lost communications with many of the different defensive groups when the landlines were knocked out. As was typical early war, many of the radios had spotty or nonexistent contact. The bad comms and darkness (a plus for Japanese nighttime assault doctrine) caused command to have an incomplete and incorrect idea of the defensive situation. When Cunningham and Devereux decided to surrender at 0800, the Marines on Wilkes had just eliminated all Japanese on that islet which Devereux thought had fallen. Poindexter's Marines were sweeping down the island to join the main command, a few Marine positions were hard-pressed, but most were doing well or holding their own and when ordered to surrender they were incredulous because they thought they were winning. Had Devereux understood the actual situation, it is likely the entire Japanese landing would have been repelled by early afternoon. In the long run this would have made no difference, Japanese air and naval bombardments would have further attritted the garrison. The casualties suffered by the US during the second landing attempt, the expenditure of ammunition and loss of equipment would have rendered a repulse of the second landing moot. There was no relief and Japan could come back bigger and stronger at the time of its choosing.
To answer the original query, as far as Wake was concerned, I do think the nighttime assault gave an advantage that was crucial to the success of the operation.

 

"The Japanese, unlike most allied forces were quite proficient in amphibious operations and had a number of specialized craft and ships to carry out the operations"

They had the 14 meter Daihatsu landing craft, The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Daihatsu Class, Japanese Landing Craft (kgbudge.com).
The most impressive, very innovative ship was the Shinsu Maru, it was the world's first amphibious assault ship. She was the progenitor of the modern LHA, LHD and LSD's. She had a stern ramp and a rail system to launch landing craft. As originally configured, she was to carry and launch catapult aircraft to support the landing operation. This feature was deleted and to the best of my knowledge never used. Japanese amphibious assault ship Shinshū Maru - Wikipedia

 

USMCPrice:

Wow. An amazing, data-packed post. Thank you for making the effort and taking the time to post that. I'll be running down your many references in the post. It will take me some time to fully digest this bollus of data/analysis. I was aware of much of the story of Andrew Higgins from a European war perspective but your post was chock full details I did not know explicitly.

To answer the question posed in the OP, I think you're right. Japanese proficiency in night amphibious landings and assaults was a factor in these two assaults. But I suspect so was the branch of service which was in charge of the operation. Although I do not feel comfortable enough with my "knowledge"/ignorance of the Pacific War, I suspect/hypothesise that the IJA was better at commanding and conducting larger amphibious assaults and landings than the IJN was. When I have read enough to state this more assertively, then I will. Think of this point as a preview of what is coming, if my future research doesn't pre-emptively falsify my hypothesis.

Cheers, thank you and be well.
Evilroddy.

 

USMCPrice:

A second and very dense data-filled and reference-filled post. Thank you again. I knew something about the landing boats of the IJA/IJN as well as their lightly armoured close support boats armed with MGs and light guns. What has always puzzled me is the configuration of these boats' button hulls which on examination of albeit unclear photos seem not designed to have the lowest draught possible. They were not flat-bottomed boats but had a rather elaborate bottom with a deep double-keel projecting down under the hull. That has long confused me.

Cheers, be well and thanks again.
Evilroddy.

 

It wasn't necessarily a proficiency in night amphibious operations, I think that was secondary to an overall IJN proficiency in nighttime naval actions. Japan was always looking for ways to minimize the advantages of their most likely opponents. Proficiency in night operations was one way they hoped to gain an advantage. The same thing was going on during the recent Global War on Terror (GWOT). Our advantages in night vision devices and training, led to our conducting a large percentage of "high risk" missions at night because we had an advantage, and the enemy was handicapped. "We own the night", a smaller force that can operate against a much larger force with great effectiveness against an enemy lacking that capability. The non-proficient party suffers from disorganization, an inability to effectively control its forces, an inability to identify, target and engage the enemy rapidly and a lack of situational awareness. It wasn't just the Japanese navy that practiced night operations the IJA did as well, though they didn't enjoy quite the advantages the IJN did. They also suffered from lost units, disorganization, lack of exploiting advantages because they weren't recognized due to darkness, etc., but to a lesser degree than their western opponents. The Chinese Communist (PLA) Army carried out a lot of nighttime operations in Korea, they'd learned it from the IJA during the Sino-Japanese War. It negated the US domination in air support, artillery is less effective if targets aren't identified, fire isn't called for and adjusted before they close with friendly units, less time from being spotted until the enemy is in your lines negates much of your fire superiority. Grenades thrown at short range are a cheap, effective, casualty producer for the less materially/technologically advanced opponent.
One of the reasons the Marine Corps was particularly effective in the early part of the Korean War, while the US Army seemed ineffective and frangible, was that the Marine Corps, fighting almost exclusively in the pacific had developed tactics and doctrine for countering Japanese night-time tactics. A greater proportion of the US Army officers in leadership positions and NCO's with combat experience, had served in Europe vs the US Army in the pacific. Simple demographics, if 75% of the US Army served in Europe/Med/Africa and 25% in the Pacific/Burma, then skew it even more due to greater recognition of the former theaters over the latter, networking because you served together and knew each other, and most US Army leaders in Korea had fought Germans and Italians, not Japanese. The commander of allied forces in Korea was a problem in itself, MacArthur's ego and hubris had helped create the situation that led to the rapid fall of the Philippines (the greatest capitulation of US Forces in history), the early defeats of US Army forces in Korea and the collapse of Eighth US Army on the western side of Korea during the PLA's "Second Phase Campaign", the longest retreat in US history.

You are correct, however that is also the same factor at play in other nations amphibious doctrine. While the IJN and IJA did have their issues with each other, what many western observers fail to consider is that we had the same issues. The Navy fought with the Army over appropriations and command responsibility, the US and Britain dealt with the same as to commanders, strategy, etc. Admirals thought they knew best how to command an amphibious assault because they commanded ships, despite little or no understanding of the ground combat side. Most militaries could have cared less about amphibious operations during the interwar period, air power. control of the sea lanes and men and equipment to wage large continental land battles were the focus. Japan had to focus on amphibious operations because they were an island nation. Few envisioned making an opposed landing across hostile beach. The earlier link to "Coral and Brass" discusses these issues within the US military at length.

 

I think quite simply because someone didn't do their homework on the defences of Wake Island, no knowing there were 5-inch coastal gun batteries on the island, made a huge impact on the invasion fleet.

The Japanese in ignorance of the danger, sailed in close broadside, after dawn had broke, to provide fire support of the coming landings. The US Marines manning the guns held fire until they were 4,000 yards away, and huge credit must go to Major Deveraux, their commanding officer, to do that, it can't be easy waiting all that time, worrying you might miss the opportunity. When they did fire, at that range, even with only two guns bearing on a target, your going to have success.

The Japanese second attempt was far more successful, the attack was done at night, the Japanese were able to effect a landing inside the arc of the 5-inch batteries before the Americans realised it, and by now, successive air attacks over the previous days had eroded so much of the defences, that the Americans lacked a strong enough mobile reserve to counter it.

I highly recommend this site for info on Wake Island, see USMC Monograph: The Defense of Wake and I tip my hat to OpanaPointer

Kota Bharu was assaulted at night, but the beach defences were well prepared, with dannert wire, mines and interlocking pillbox fire zones, supported by artillery. Initially the Japanese landing was failing, despite the Indian forces being thinly spread out. However, the Kelantan River breaks up into numerous smaller rivers as it enters the South China Sea, there are numerous estuaries, creating islands, which make the movement of troops along the coastline very difficult. The Japanese had the presence of mind to shift their landings onto some of these islands, overcome the few fire points which couldn't be reinforced, and break the defensive line. Undoubtedly, there were heroes on both sides, which will remain unknown to us.

The Japanese assaulting Kota Bharu were from the 18th Infantry Division, and trained in amphibious warfare, although I think their premier force for this was the 5th Division, which landed at Singora (Songkhla now) and Pattani, so Kota Bharu was an IJA show foremost, while Wake was assaulted by the SNFL, the IJN marines, although they were a much smaller entity that the US Marines, more like the Royal Marines, is size and capability, and this was exclusively a IJN show.

The final thing I'd say, is this is early WW2, and the Japanese were probably the best equipped and trained in amphibious warfare, but when you compare this to landings made by US Marines in late war, say 1944, the progress of amphibious warfare is most startling.

 

The IJN and the IJA both trained in the interwar years to conduct amphibious landings (largely unopposed or lightly opposed amphibious operations) and amphibious assaults (very contested and vigorously opposed landings). While both types were collectively under the umbrella of amphibious operations they were very different kinds of military operations.

Both types of amphibious operations required a great deal of organization, high degrees of command and control coordination and very thorough planning and both logistical and combat support. Ironically, it seems to have been the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) which was the most experienced and proficient at these operations while the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) specialised more in supporting major landings with small contingents of specialised landing troops and with naval shore-bombardment.

As for training exercises and actual military operations experience, there were Lents of each. Joint exercises were first conducted in the mid-1920's where basic amphibious theory was created and formalised into operational doctrine. Many problems were N countered and solved and these solutions were also incorporated into Japanese military doctrine. The Japanese got their first practical experience of actual landings during a real combat situation in 1932, during the fighting in and around Shanghai. However the performance and effectiveness of the Japanese naval landing troops left much to be desired, so much so that an army infantry brigade had to be landed to assist the floundering specialised naval infantry. This dismal experience fostered more changes and improvements in IJN amphibious operations doctrine, but at the same time began a realisation in the IJA that they needed to invest more heavily in their own parallel capacity to conduct amphibious operations instead of relying on the IJN to get it right. Thus the most significant result of the 1932 Shanghai landings was that the IJA resolved to take the lead and develop their own amphibious landings/assault methods and capacity (including expanding their own landing ships and landing craft). At this point the IJA decided to become the dominant partner in this field of amphibious operations, eventually surpassing the IJN's capacity, proficiency and effectiveness.

The Japanese conducted their first true major amphibious landings in 1937 and 1938 when the war recommences with China. These operations took place at Hangchow Bay (Nov., 1937), at Ta-ya Wan near British Hong Kong (Oct., 1938) and at the entrance to the Pearl River (later in Oct., 1938). In all of these amphibious operations the IJA took the lead and learned valuable lessons about command and control during such operations. They also learned about logistics and how to support landing/assaulting troops in contested amphibious operations.

So due to a combination of a well thought out doctrine and more importantly actual amphibious operations experience the IJA was well prepared to conduct such operations at the start of WWII. But the IJN, while it had gained experience and proficiency in amphibious landings, never developed a true proficiency and capability for amphibious assaults such as seen at the Wake Island Atoll, though the main cause of the failure there was a severe underestimation of the force levels required to take the small Atoll (as @Fatboy Coxy pointed out in the post above). Most of these IJN operations would be considered "landings" and not "assaults" with the exception of the two very difficult Wake Island Atoll assaults. The IJA's proficiency was well demonstrated at Kota Bharu however which is clearly described as having seen very heavy and sustained fighting on and between the beaches so is more correctly classified as an "amphibious assault".

It is my contention that the IJA was better at commanding and executing amphibious operations than the IJN during WWII ((1937-1945). This was doubly true of amphibious assaults. What say you all?

Cheers and be well.
Evilroddy

 

I've been reading up on the Battle of Milne Bay. Another IJN landing and follow-on attacks which were a disaster in 1942 in Papua-New Guinea. No reconnaissance, no advanced scouting, poor communications and almost no naval gun fire support and going in blindly against superior numbers of Australian and a small number of US defenders with just one reinforced Special Naval Landing Regiment. 2800 hundred Japanese troops landed and about 1300 withdrawn after the drubbing. 1500 hundred dead or lost with nothing to show for the butcher's bill. More evidence that the IJN was far less competent than the IJA when conducting amphibious operations.

 

One of the strange quirks of the Japanese military was the division of responsibilities between the IJA and IJN. And I think this had a big impact on this question of the IJA being better than the IJN at amphibious landings. See Japanese amphibious assault ship Shinshū Maru - Wikipedia. Developed by the IJA, who had their own Navy, it shows who is actually interested in Amphibious warfare.