Incident in which LPH was unable to launch helicopters

One of the considered shortcomings of the LPH was its inability to land its embarked troops other than by helicopter. There were two scenarios of concern:

Weather, although there would seem to be a very narrow set of weather conditions in which helicopter operations would be infeasible but landing craft could still operate safely.

Hostile air defenses which could not be avoided or suppressed; however, troops could reach the objective after a beach landing.

I've seen vague references to one of these actually happening, but I don't recall specifics - time, place, details, etc. Is anyone familiar with this?

These concerns led naturally to the idea that the helicopter carrier should be capable of operating landing craft. Norman Friedman cites a couple of examples from 1965, most notably that LPHs should include a well deck able to accommodate 12 LCVPs, able to carry troops and the sort of vehicles (jeeps etc.) that contemporary helicopters could lift.

This is often cited as the origin of the LHA, but in that design,the basic principle - providing an alternate means of landing troops and equipment that would normally go by helicopter - was abandoned. The LHA was designed to carry the Navy's largest landing craft, the LCU-1610 class, which on deployment were carried loaded with tanks, beachmaster vehicles, and other heavy equipment. The well deck extended about 1/3 of the length of the ship, and a similar volume was devoted to vehicle decks.

The LHA was designed and built by Litton Ingalls under a McNamara era process called Total Package Procurement (since abandoned). At the time, Litton was working on another project, the Fast Deployment Logistic ship, intended to carry large volumes of military cargo and offload by helicopter and landing craft. The FDL ship was going to be flat-topped except for a small superstructure, slab-sided, about 800' long, 106' beam, around 40,000 tons, with twin-screw steam turbines for about 24 knot speed, and a well deck for several LCU-1610s - sound familiar?

The FDL was cancelled, and it may just be coincidence, but the design team ended up incorporating the heavy over-the-beach cargo capacity into the aviation ship they were also contracted for.

 

Friedman also mentions a proposal for an Iwo Jima class LPH under construction to be lengthened amidships by 52', enabling it to carry 12 LCVPs and 2 LCPL command and control craft, presumably on davits. This would have meant loading troops WWII-style into LCVPs alongside, which seems a bit problematical in weather considered unsuitable for air operations.

 

The LPH was specialized for helicopter operations while the LSD (Landing Ship Dock) was specialized for landing craft operations. The combination at the time was the LPD which had a smaller well deck and flight deck than the two ships above did respectively. That is, it could carry and operate a few helicopters and landing craft, but not as many as the LPH or LSD could manage.

The LHD or LHA simply enlarged on the idea of the LPD and eliminated the need for both the LPH and LSD. Eventually, the LPD's were also taken out of service but they had more utility being smaller versions of the LHD / LHA.

 

The immediate successor to the Tarawa class LHA was the Wasp class LHD which retained the well deck, redesigned to accommodate LCACs. Then they revived the LHA designation for the America class, without well decks. However after the first two, the Pentagon decided to shove the well deck back in, but still call them LHAs, so now LHA denotes a ship which might...or might not...have a well deck. And we're back to those conflicts between flight and well deck operations.

Rather than being taken out of service, the LPD is now the most numerous amphib, with 12 San Antonio class ships in commission and more under construction and planned. There are also 10 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry class LSDs and 9 LHD/LHAs.

The San Antonio (LPD-17) class are very sophisticated ships, with extensive command and control facilities such as the SPS-48 radar seen on aircraft carriers and pre-Aegis guided missile cruisers; they're currently costing about $2 billion apiece. A more economical version called LX (R) is now in development in order to provide well deck capacity, ultimately replacing the LSDs. That would be an alternative to forcing well decks into aviation ships, if we could be assured of getting enough of them.

 

Agreed, and agreed, although the acclime room did have one amusing effect; some of the junior petty officers who made 1MC announcements that mentioned an accommodation ladder called it the "acclime ladder".

For those unfamiliar with the Largest Hotel Afloat, the acclimatization room was an exercise room in which the temperature and humidity could supposedly be made to match those of wherever our Marines were going, so they could train in the conditions they would encounter.

As mentioned earlier, the LHA was designed and built by Litton Ingalls who at the same time were design-building the Spruance class destroyers, which featured the Mark 45 5"/54 guns and the Mark 86 gunfire control system. I suspect that was why the same guns and systems appeared on the LHA. No doubt the lightweight, unmanned gun mount was appealing at a time when the Navy was trying to control manpower costs, and to be fair there were not a lot of alternatives; amphibs and auxiliaries were still being armed with WWII-era 3"/50s.

This had the interesting effect by virtue of having 5" guns, we had to be qualified in naval gunfire support, which was fun, but it did seem odd for an 800-foot-long slab-sided target full of aircraft, fuel, electronics, etc. to be closing to within gun range of the beach. One exercise, the "John Wayne", even presumed that we were suddenly taken under fire by a hostile battery and had to shoot back. Apparently the Navy come to agree; the guns were taken off the LHAs and left off subsequent classes.