What are you most interested in?

Joe · Sep 21, 2007

What are you most interested in? Personnally im interested most in the ETO, and also the North Africa campaign.

Za Rodinu · Sep 21, 2007

I wonder what interest people may find in those sideshows to the main event.

PzJgr · Sep 21, 2007

Za, Za, Za. What would we ever do without you to set things straight. I chose the Eastern front becasue it was the longest, most brutal and we saw the introduction, changes and end of different military tactics. It was the battle of the huge tanks, and of the ground attack aircraft. Just amazing. Nothing like it since with exception of the Six Day war.

C.Evans · Sep 21, 2007

I too chose the Eastern Front. I echo what PzJgr says. Also, of all the German veterans I met, most of them served on the Eastern Front for the duration of the war.

scarface · Sep 21, 2007

I chose the Pacific, only because that seems to be where my interests (reading) have lied for the last 5 years or so....prior to that, it was Europe.

My interest in Europe was definitely due to my father's participation in the conflict, so I actively sought out anything having to do with actions that he was involved in.

To this point, I just haven't been able to generate the interest in the Eastern Front (too cold and muddy!) .... although everything that PzJgr points out is correct, as well as it being the largest front of the war in Europe.

What can I say, Za....I'm saving the best for last!

-whatever

-Lou

Za Rodinu · Sep 21, 2007

PzJgr said:

Nothing like it since with exception of the Six Day war.
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What Six Day War? The war between Mecklemburg and Upper Carinthia? If you're serious I'm sure you mean Operation August Storm!

This critical examination of the final Soviet strategic offensive operation during World War II seeks to chip away at two generally inaccurate pictures many Westerners have of the war. Specifically, Westerners seem to think that only geography, climate, and sheer numbers negated German military skill and competency on the eastern front, a view that relegates Soviet military accomplishments to oblivion. Moreover, Westerners have concluded that little worthy of meaningful study occurred in the Asian theaters of war. These impressions reflect a distinct German bias in the analyses of operations on the eastern front and an anti-Asian front bias concerning World War II in general. Both impressions are false. Yet, over the decades since World War II, they have perpetuated an inaccurate view of the war, particularly of Soviet performance in that war. This Western misconception perverts history, and that perversion, in turn, warps contemporary attitudes and thus current assessments of Soviet military capabilities past, present, and future.

Our view of the war in the east derives from the German experiences of 1941 and 1942, when blitzkrieg exploited the benefits of surprise against a desperate and crudely fashioned Soviet defense. It is the view of a Guderian, a Mellenthin, a Balck, and a Manstein, all heroes of Western military history, but heroes whose operational and tactical successes partially blinded them to strategic realities. By 1943-44, their "glorious" experiences had ceased. As their operational feats dried up after 1942, the Germans had to settle for tactical victories set against a background of strategic disasters. Yet the views of the 1941 conquerors, their early impressions generalized to characterize the nature of the entire war in the east, remain the accepted views. The successors to these men, the Schoeners, the Heinricis, the defenders of 1944 and 1945, those who presided over impending disaster, wrote no memoirs of widespread notoriety, for their experiences were neither memorable nor glorious. Their impressions and those of countless field grade officers who faced the realities of 1944-45 are all but lost.

This imbalanced view of German operations in the east imparts a reassuring, though inaccurate, image of the Soviets. We have gazed in awe at the exploits of those Germans who later wrote their personal apologies, and in doing so we have forgotten the larger truth: their nation lost the war-and lost it primarily in the east against what they portrayed as the "artless" Soviets.

Our second bias, so conspicuous in our historical neglect of the Pacific theater of World War II, has combined with our acceptance of the German interpretation of the eastern front so as to blind us to what was the pre eminent Soviet military effort in World War II-the Soviet strategic offensive of 1945 in Manchuria.

For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive was the logical by-product of their war experience, a surgically conducted offensive with almost predestined results. The fact that Japan was a seriously weakened nation by the summer of 1945 was clear. What was not clear was the prospect of an immediate Japanese surrender. The likelihood of a Japanese Götterdäm-merung on the scale of Germany's loomed large in the eyes of American and Soviet planners. The potential cost in Allied manpower of reducing Japan could be deduced from the fanatical Japanese resistance on Okinawa as late as April-June 1945, when more than 49,000 (12,500 dead) Americans fell in battle against about 117,000 Japanese troops. And the Home Islands still had more than 2.3 million Japanese soldiers; Manchuria, more than 1 million. So Allied planners expected the worst and designed operations in deadly earnest for what they believed would be prolonged, complicated campaigns against the remaining Japanese strongholds.

Based on proven capabilities of the Japanese High Command and the individual Japanese soldier, Soviet plans were as innovative as any in the war. Superb execution of those plans produced victory in only two weeks of combat. Although Soviet planners had overestimated the capabilities of the Japanese High Command, the tenacious Japanese soldier met Soviet expectations. He lived up to his reputation as a brave, self-sacrificing samurai who, though poorly employed, inflicted 32,000 casualties on the Soviets and won their grudging respect. Had Japanese planners been bolder-and Soviet planners less audacious-the price of Soviet victory could well have been significantly higher.

Scope, magnitude, complexity, timing, and marked success have made the Manchurian offensive a continuing topic of study for the Soviets, who see it as a textbook case of how to begin war and quickly bring it to a successful conclusion. They pay attention to the Manchurian offensive because it was an impressive and decisive campaign.
Our neglect of Soviet operations in World War 11, in general-and in Manchuria, in particular-testifies not only to our apathy toward history and the past in general, but also to our particular blindness to the Soviet experience. That blindness, born of the biases we bring to the study of World War 11, is a dangerous phenomenon. How can we learn if we refuse to see the lessons of our past for our future?
...
Moved by Allied appeals for support and wishing to cement the Soviet Union's postwar position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning a final campaign to wrest from Japan Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. The enormity of the task of conquering the vast expanse of Manchuria before a Japanese surrender rivaled the challenges of earlier operations. More than 10,000 kilometers separated Manchuria from the main area of Soviet operations in Europe. Forces and equipment destined for deployment to Manchuria had to move along a transportation network limited in capacity and fragile in its composition. Soviet estimates of force requirements necessary to undertake such an extensive campaign were correspondingly large. Thus, the anticipated campaign involved extensive planning and preparations stretching over a five-month period from April to August 1945. The results of the campaign attested to the success of the planning and the thoroughness of preparations. In nine days Soviet forces penetrated from 500 to 950 kilometers into Manchuria, secured major population centers, and forced the Japanese Kwantung Army and its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries to surrender. Thus, Soviet forces achieved their territorial objectives within a limited period of time, despite severe terrain obstacles and significant Japanese resistance. The campaign validated the experience Soviet forces had gained in the war against Germany. The Red Army applied the advanced tactical and operational techniques it had learned in the brutal school of war in the west. It also displayed the requisite degree of audacious leadership Soviet commanders had laboriously developed during the western campaigns. The Manchurian campaign represented the highest state of military art in Soviet World War Ii operations. Contemporary officers and any serious student of twentieth century warfare can benefit greatly from an understanding of the nature of this campaign.
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So there!

This can't go on like this. I'll have to shortly invite into this forum a certain person who knows something about this matters and will be able to put you into the proper perspective. More on this later.

Uraaaaaaaaa! Pobiedaaaaaaaaaaa!

scarface · Sep 21, 2007

Hey!.....how come there are six votes, and only five posters???

...... did Za vote twice?

-whatever

-Lou

PzJgr · Sep 21, 2007

You don't necessarily need to post if you vote.

Za Rodinu · Sep 21, 2007

scarface said:

...... did Za vote twice?
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Aha! You're getting into the spirit of things! Totally impossible! As a good stalinist, I apply the principle "One Man, One Vote". That is I'm the Man, and only I vote

PzJgr · Sep 21, 2007

Za Rodinu said:

Aha! You're getting into the spirit of things! Totally impossible! As a good stalinist, I apply the principle "One Man, One Vote". That is I'm the Man, and only I vote
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:bow:Za has spoken, now let it be done! :bow:

Za Rodinu · Sep 21, 2007

Wrong quote!

"So it shall be written. So it shall be done."

The Ten Commandments by Cecil B. de Mille, with Charlton Heston and Yul Brinner

Erich · Sep 21, 2007

ah how about the Yull flick the King and I, bow low-life, kneel before Zod !

personally I am always up in the air flying..........ETO, MTO, OST front

PzJgr · Sep 21, 2007

Za Rodinu said:

Wrong quote!

"So it shall be written. So it shall be done."

The Ten Commandments by Cecil B. de Mille, with Charlton Heston and Yul Brinner
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I did not want to infringe on other people's work

Herr Oberst · Sep 21, 2007

Za Rodinu said:

Wrong quote!

"So it shall be written. So it shall be done."

The Ten Commandments by Cecil B. de Mille, with Charlton Heston and Yul Brinner
Click to expand...

Duna nana nana nana nana nana nana nana.....Cat man

(reference popular television series vitange 1960s Batman)

Oh, all of the above theatres.

Skipper · Sep 22, 2007

I voted ETO

Jaeger · Sep 22, 2007

I find it hard to put down a pet for my interests. Since I work with development and application of doctrine I have studied Britain and Germany for the last years. I find it to be interesting. I put down my vote for ETO. I should of course have voted for the Eastern front, but for me ETO introduced more changes than the Eastern front. (please don't kill me Za...)

Za Rodinu · Sep 22, 2007

:lol:

GRW · Sep 22, 2007

I voted "other", since I'm primarily interested in the British home front. The ETO comes a close second though.

Peppy · Sep 22, 2007

North Africa, it had Rommal AND mp40's. Actually, it had a touch of the chivalry that didn't seem to be in other areas.

Richard · Sep 22, 2007

Give me a good reason to vote?

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What are you most interested in?

What are you most interested in?

ETO

PTO

Eastern front

North Africa, Italy ect.

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