Ardennes 1944

What if the US had left the 2nd Infantry in place in the Loshiem gap instead of replacing it with the 106th and sent the 106th ID into the line between the 2nd and 28th ID. The 28th got to shorten its lines by say half and thicken up their defenses.
What impact would this have had on the German offensive in December 1944?

My speculation is that it would have resulted in a disasterous German defeat and the "Battle of the Bulge" would have more likely been called "Germany's Desperate Failure."

For example, with the 2nd in place in the Loshiem gap the 19th VG would have been crushed and the gap never opened. The German advance in that area would have done well just to take St. Vith. Without the collaspe of the 106th there is no quick avenue forward for 6th Panzer Army.
Eisenborn Ridge would have still been the uncrackable nut with units like KG Pieper being surrounded and destroyed without accomplishing much of anything.
Further south the 5th Panzer Army now faces a much thicker line in the 28th's sector. Originally it took the Germans nearly 72 hours to really achieve a breakthrough in this region. With another 24 to 36 hours delay the US could have reinforced their front here and the breakthrough would never come.
The 106th's sector was never the main thrust but having this division in place twarts 5th Pz Army from flanking the 28th through a very thinly held sector of company sized strong points.
With no clear breakthrough the Germans would have not gotten much beyond their starting points with the result that their offensive would have been regarded in history as another hopeless attempt to win the unwinnable.

 

A few more points.

The Corps HQ did not keep the HQ of the 106th adaquately informed of events to either flank. It was not until a regiment of the 28th Divsion made direct contact with the 106th and reported that it was out of contact with the rest of the 28th, that the overall situation became clearer. Neither did the 106th have a adaquate grasp of when promised reinforcements would arrive, or their quantity. It was known the 9th Armored Div was in 1st Army reserve, and the fact of its release from reserve was made known to the 106th. But, the actual size of the reinforcements sent (one combat command) and time of arrival were not well defined.

When a second armored combat commad of the 7th Armored Divsion arrived the commander of the 106th was not yet cognizant of the true situation. He planned and started execution of a relief of the two surrounded regiments with the two armored CCs. This failed and left the surrounded group in a worse position. They had been ordered to attack west out of the Schnee Eifel to link with the relief force. This left them concentrated on several hillsides exposed to the German columns on a main road. Fo lack of trucks they had to abandon most of their personal equipment, stoves & fuel, remaining rations, ammo that could not be carried, the regimental cannon companys, a antiaircraft battery, AT guns, and most imporotant they abandoned the shelters and bunkers the 2d Divsion had built. Had they remained in the original defensive positions air supply may have been possible (a air supply effort was ordered by 1st Army, but never executed). Their original defensive positions were not in the path of the German mechanized columns or threatening the German supply routes, so efforts to reduce the pocket would have been weakend by higher priorities elswhere.

I am guessing the more experinced commander and staff of the 2d Divsion would have grasped the situation better, probablly realizing the difficulty in trying to relieve the stranded regiments. While I cant say if they would have held out through the entire battle like the 101st they would have had a better chance tucked away in bunkers in the forrested hills.

The 2d probablly would have executed a better artillery fire support during the critical opening hours of the battle. The inexperince 10th divsion cmd & artillery cmd staffs did not catch on fast enough what the battalion comanders needed in the first few hours.

One other difference might have been the attached battalions. The 2d Div usually had a independant tank battalion and a Tank Destroyer battalion attached. I'm not sure that was the case when the 2d was relieved by the 106th. But, tanks & tank destroyers are not mentioned in accounts of the 106ths battle. They were present with the 2d when it fought further north along the Elseborn Ridge area.

The commander of the 106th died of heart failure shortly after the relief effort failed to advance. The 1st Army commander had already endorsed the corps commanders request to replace him.

The remainder of the 106th fought through the rest of the Bulge battle, ending in january just a few miles from its original starting point. After taking replacements in Febuary it was assigned in March to expand and guard POW camps for the wave of surrendering German soldiers that were headed west into France.

 

Ok so the 106th may not have had any tanks, or TD. That leaves the question of if the 2d had any while in the Schnee Eifle. Since it was attacking up to a few day before its relief I'm guessing it did. A battalion of 50+ tanks and another of 36TD and the accompanying squadron of armored cars changes the equation for the Germans attempting to get in behind the forward US infantry regiments.

A second question is what US unit was in the Loshiem area before the 14th Cav Group took over? Or had that unit been there for several weeks?

 

Historically, the 106th failed on a number of different accounts along with the 14th Cavalry group. This compound failure resulted in the breakthrough in the Losheim Gap area and allowed 6th SS Panzer the hole it was looking for.

Starting with the 14th Cavalry Group its commander Col. Devine failed to integrate the attached self-propelled artillery battalion (sorry, this is off the cuff so for now I'll leave unit designations out of it where I'm not sure on them) and towed tank destroyer battalion into his defense plan. Instead, he sited the tank destroyers on their own to hold the northern flank of his assigned frontage.
The tank destroyer battalion set up strong points in company strength to defend three critical town road junctions. But, they were not tied into the 14th's communications system nor were they supported by other units.
The 14th itself only had one cavalry squadron on the front at the time of the German attack. The second was in reserve and doing heavy maintenance with over half their vehicles down for repair at Vieslaim. The forward squadron held their positions in company strenght and were tied only to the sp artillery battalion and to 14th Cavalry Group.
Devine from what I have read was more concerned with maintenance and the proper appearance and military courtesy of his men than with tactical matters. His XO went "missing" shortly after the battle began. Devine left his command post without leaving clear instructions as to his intentions and failed to return (he was either killed or captured can't recall which). This left the 14th Cavalry in disarray. It also left the 106th ID with no idea what was happening on one flank.
The 19th VG managed to overcome the forward cavalrymen and the tank destroyers losing the equivalent of about two battalions of men doing so. But, they were now in a position to engulf the northern flank of the 106th.
The 106th itself had only been in Europe for a short time. It had no battle experiance and had had a high turnover of cadre in the US that had badly disrupted its training there. (Cadres are formed by stripping a unit in training of key personnel and trained troops to form the nucleus of another division or unit that was being formed. The cadremen were intended to give the new unit a core of trained troops that could teach the new recruits to the unit their jobs. Problem was this left the unit culled with a shortage of well trained men itself). So, the 106th had a high number of short service men in it when it arrived in Europe. Note, its supporting units are towed ones, not self propelled.
It also had been in position in the Losheim Gap position only seven days. While it did inherit the 2nd Infantry Division's positions it did not proceed to ensure good communications between the various units within the division. There were few field phones in place and most were lost through wire cuts from artillery early on in the battle. Radios often failed and the troops didn't have enough batteries on hand to keep them working.
Unlike the 2nd which had tied into the 14th Cavalry's communications the 106th hadn't and the 14th had made no attempt on their part to change that. On the other flank the 28th ID had only megear units covering the other flank of the 106th. But, terrain was in their favor there with few roads and a great deal of rough terrain.
What followed was the 19th VG began to flank the 106th while the 14th Cavalry disintegrated into a rout. What was left of the tank destroyers fell back into the 99th Division lines, not that they had much choice.
With two other VG divisions making heavy, if unsuccessful, attacks on the front of the 106th and the 19th threatening their rear the command of the 106th hesitated. They were torn between retiring and holding their positions as earlier ordered by corps. With communications failing artillery support was becoming spotty. When many of the artillery battalions had to shift positions due to the German advance support pretty much ended altogether. Between the shifting of positions and poor radio situation communications to the artillery all but ceased.
Soon thereafter the two regiments of the 106th discovered they were cutoff. While there was initially some discussion of fighting out of the pocket this ended because of the confused situation and lack of communications to higher command. Instead they surrendered.
The Gap was no open.

Had the 2nd still been there they would have had communications. This was a veteran unit. They had far more field telephones and other equipment on hand than they were supposed to. They had run multiple lines to most positions and had good radio practices. With almost a dozen corps artillery batteries in range along with the 14th Cavalry's sp guns and their own they would have had no shortage of supporting fire.
Just the fact that the 2nd would not have suffered the mass breakdown of command and communications the 106th suffered would have ensured they continued to fight.

I suspect this would have greatly changed the complexion of the Ardennes Offensive.

 

That very well elaborates my thoughts. The 14th was a relatively 'green' unit?

From Dupuys book about the 106th I gathered that the two regiments in the pocket did leave their defense positions to make the attack. The leading companys ran up against the German motorized/armored columns along the road leading into their rear, and the riiflemen were quickly pinned down.

 

Surprisingly, no, the 14th Cavalry Group landed on D+14 and had been in the advance across France. But, it had seen relatively little fighting and nothing heavy during that period. This is why up to this point its command weaknesses had not shown up.

 

i seen a book written by an american,he called it ,the great bug out,did they run away.yours,4th wilts.

 

Lee, I see you've decided to go septic-baiting over here beings you're on a week's ban from somewhere else.
It'll end in tears mate.
No need for it.

 

Here's a decent account. I have a more detailed one published in Military Review but can't find it at the moment....likely in one of several file cabinets full of "stuff."

Untitled Document

 

The Military Review article is far more detailed on the 14th's operations and included maps etc. It was also far more harsh than the "official" version in its views on that unit's performance.

 

Jeff :
Battle of the Bulge, Then and Now, from After the Battle ` do you own a copy ... ?

if not it is required reading ........

E ~

 

i,m just glad monty was in command in the north,tidying up the front,christ only knows what may have happened otherwise.yours,4th wilts.

 

It seems to me that it was Patton that saved the day, not Montebank. However, I had a friend that was captured at the Bulge. While he was just a ground pounder, he said the lack of information was the big problem. Their battle was very local, They had almost no information of whether they had any reserves or supplies coming. They did know that a large and powerful German force was attacking them with more than they had to defend with.

I also know that veteran units would figure out what was vital and what was junk. Gas mask bags were good for socks and cigs. You recovered commo wire that normally would be left in place. Two bad field phones could make one good one. Scroungers were a commodity that were exploited in force. More experienced troops would be a valuable asset on both sides. The problem is that all levels were getting cocky and were planning a few days of R&R for Christmas.