The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942

You always hear about the German,American and British paratroopers during the war. But hardly anything about airborne troops used in the Pacific and Asia.


The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942

by Graham Donaldson

The Japanese Navy and Army developed, trained and experimented with their own raised airborne troops knowing quite clearly on how utilise them in military operations. The Imperial Navy opted for the creating of an aerial landed diversion inland from the beaches where the main amphibious assault by sea would be. The Japanese Navy had the concept of intending to disable the airfields preventing interference by enemy warplanes on an amphibious landing by co-ordinating the timing of their sea-borne assault and parachute drop to create maximum surprise at the point of contact. German airborne troops were employed as the spearhead of the remarkable and daring invasion of Denmark and Norway. The Scandanavian experience had France & Britain plus the neutral nations see themselves as next in line. The Dutch in Holland had deployed to meet such an airborne assault to bridge the water-obstacle defences, fought with skill and determination, yet a lucky chance at Waalhaven was exploited by the Germans air-landing reinforcements, although it had been a near run thing until German ground troops linked with the paratroopers. The lightly armed Japanese paratroopers of 1942 would have the tactical task of attacking the air base defenses, once successful then the Japanese would quickly use the airfield for their own warplanes to support the invasion. Small groups were sent out to secure crossroads and block-off reinforcements or actually secure other objectives of importance to direct the defense away from the beachheads. Japanese coordinated combined island amphibious invasions were swift and devastating, orchastrating and intergrating elements of superior firepower which resulted in overwhelming force. The surprise element in the military sense does not necessarily mean open-mouth astonishment, it does explain that doing the unexpected which is not planned for by the enemy. The surprise element was available to the Japanese for they had the incentive, initiative and mobility to strike anywhere with their main forces, having control of the sea and air superiority. Where airborne formations would land to create havoc could only be guessed at by ABDA Command. An opportunity for the Japanese military to exploit manuouvre warfare and achive victories by the skill of their mission commanders creating the advantage by applying strength against the enemy weakspots while attempting to use surprise to avoid attrition.

Full article:
The Japanese paratroopers in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942

 

Well you learn something new everyday mate, thankyou

 

nice article you see very little on japenese paratroops the only book i have is an osprey publication by g rottman & a takizawa isbn 1 84176903 7 as usual with osprey books smallat 64 pages but recommended.

 

The airborne operations in the Far East along with other things are not as popular or well known in the West as are the Western European and Med theaters.

The Battle of Palembang was a battle of the Pacific theatre of World War II. It occurred near Palembang, on Sumatra, on February 13-February 15, 1942.
The Royal Dutch Shell oil refineries at nearby Pladju (or Pladjoe) were the major objectives for the Empire of Japan in the Pacific War, because of an oil embargo imposed on Japan by the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. With the area’s abundant fuel supply and airfield, Palembang offered significant potential as a military base to both the Allies and the Japanese.
Defences in the Palembang Area
In January, the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command {ABDACOM) decided to concentrate Allied air forces in Sumatra at two airfields near Palembang: Pangkalan Benteng, also known as “P1″ and a secret air base at Prabumulih (Praboemoelih), or “P2″.
The British Royal Air Force created No. 225 (Bomber) Group at Palembang. It included two Royal Australian Air Force squadrons and a large number of Australians serving with British squadrons.
The group could only muster 40 Bristol Blenheim bombers and 35 Lockheed Hudson light bombers. The Blenheims had flown from the Middle East and Egypt, where they were considered too old to cope with newer German and Italian fighters. (A handful of United States Far East Air Force B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers also operated out of Palembang briefly in January, but these were withdrawn to Java and Australia before the battle commenced.)
No. 226 (Fighter) Group RAF also arrived at Palembang in early February: two squadrons of Hawker Hurricanes transported to Sumatra by the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. They were joined by the remnants of British, Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Force Hurricane and Brewster Buffalo squadrons, which had both inflicted and suffered heavy losses in intense air battles over the Malayan and Singapore campaigns.
The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) South Sumatra Island Territorial Command, its command in the Palembang area, consisted of about 2,000 troops under Lieutenant Colonel L. N. W. Vogelesang: the South Sumatra Garrison Battalion and a Stadswacht/Landstorm (”home guard/reserve”) infantry company in Palembang, a Stadswacht/Landstorm infantry company in Jambi (Djambi), as well as various artillery and machine gun units. (KNIL units in other parts of Sumatra lacked mobility and played no part in the fighting.) The Royal Netherlands Navy was represented by the minelayer Pro Patria and the patrol boats P-38 and P-40 on the Musi river.
The Battle
Airborne attack
While the Allied planes attacked the Japanese ships on February 13, Kawasaki Ki-56 transport planes of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Chutai, Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF), dropped Teishin Shudan (Raiding Group) paratroopers over Pangkalan Benteng airfield. At the same time Mitsubishi Ki-21 bombers from the 98th Sentai dropped supplies for paratroopers. The formation was escorted by a large force of Nakajima Ki-43 fighters from the 59th and 64th Sentai.
As many as 180 men from the Japanese 2nd Parachute Regiment, under Colonel Seiichi Kume, dropped between Palembang and Pangkalan Benteng, and more 90 men came down west of the refineries at Pladjoe. Although the Japanese paratroopers failed to capture the Pangkalan Benteng airfield, at the Pladjoe oil refinery they managed to gain possession of the entire complex, which was undamaged. A makeshift counter-attack by Landstorm troops and anti-aircraft gunners from Praboemoelih managed to retake the complex but took heavy losses. The planned demolition failed to do any serious damage to the refinery, but the oil stores were set ablaze. Two hours after first drop, another 60 Japanese paratroopers were dropped near Pangkalan Benteng airfield.
On February 14, the surviving Japanese paratroopers advanced to the Musi, Salang and Telang rivers, near Palembang.
Amphibious Assault
The main Japanese invasion force, an amphibious assault fleet under Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), was on its way from Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina. It was made up of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 229th Infantry Regiment and one battalion from the 230th Infantry Regiment. A small advance party set out eight transports escorted by the cruiser Sendai and four destroyers. The main force followed in 14 transports, escorted by the heavy cruiser Chokai and four destroyers. The covering force included the aircraft carrier Ryujo, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and three destroyers. Additional air cover was provided by land-based IJN planes and the IJAAF 3rd Air Division.
On the morning of February 13, a river boat commandeered by the British Royal Navy, HMS Li Wo — under Lieutenant Thomas Wilkinson — ferrying personnel and equipment between Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, ran into the Japanese fleet. Although Li Wo was armed only with a 4-inch (100 mm) gun and two machineguns, its crew fired at the Japanese troop transport ships, setting one on fire and damaging several others, while under fire from the Japanese cruisers. This action continued for 90 minutes until the Li Wo ran out of ammunition. Wilkinson then ordered the ramming of the nearest transport, before his ship was destroyed by Japanese fire. Wilkinson received a posthumous Victoria Cross (VC), the highest award for gallantry in the British Commonwealth, and the only VC awarded in the Dutch East Indies campaign.
On February 15, an ABDA naval force comprised of five cruisers: HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java and HNLMS Tromp, HMS Exeter, HMAS Hobart and 10 destroyers, under Admiral Karel Doorman, made an abortive attempt to intercept the Japanese force. Planes from Ryujo and land-based aircraft made a series of attacks on the Allied ships, forcing them to withdraw to the south of Sumatra.
As the Japanese landing force approached Sumatra. The remaining Allied aircraft attacked it, and the Japanese transport ship Otawa Maru was sunk. Hurricanes flew up the rivers, machine-gunning Japanese landing craft.
However, on the afternoon of February 15, it was ordered that all Allied aircraft were ordered to Java, where a major Japanese attack was anticipated, and the Allied air units had withdrawn from southern Sumatra by the evening of February 16, 1942. Other personnel were evacuated via Oosthaven (now Bandar Lampung) by ships to Java or India.

The Battle of Palembang: Sumatra | Indonesia Logue

 

1944

Some 350 Japanese paratroopers dropped at dusk on 6 December, most of them near the San Pablo airstrip. Although the Japanese attacks were poorly coordinated, the enemy was able to seize some abandoned weapons and use them against the Americans over the next four days. Hastily mustered groups of support and service troops held off the Japanese until the 11th Airborne Division, reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 149th Infantry, 38th Infantry Division, concentrated enough strength to contain and defeat the enemy paratroops by nightfall of 11 December. Although the Japanese destroyed a few American supply dumps and aircraft on the ground and delayed construction projects, their attacks on the airfields failed to have any effect on the overall Leyte Campaign.

HyperWar: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Leyte

 

Now, this attack against San Pablo airfield I didn´t know about...

Why did the [Racist Term Removed] Japanese quit using paras? I mean, they were rather succesful in Java and Sumatra, and didn´t go through an equivalent of Crete, high casualty rate included, that would have disuaded High Command from employing them again. For example, drops over Port Moresby, either from Buna or Milne Bay, would have broken the back of the gallant defenders of the Kokoda Trail.

 

The SNLF Paratroopers


Of the above, probably the most unique were the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF's, which comprised the Japanese Navy's own parachute infantry force. Apparently not all the men in each of these three outfits were provided with jump training, as a force of 750 in each SNLF were organized as combat paratroopers, the remainder as an administrative and logistic base force. The Navy paratroopers were only organized on the very eve of the war, beginning in September 1941. Their first training drop occurred only on November 16th. Note, too, how all of the SNLF's bore the name of a major Japanese naval base for administrative purposes, although in practice they were attached to the various fleet headquarters, and administered directly from there. This is perhaps another reason that the Japanese SNLF's have not been considered in the same class with the US Marine Corps, because there was no higher organization controlling all the SNLF's. The Japanese did on occasion create what they called a Combined Special Naval Landing Force, which was usually two of the conventional SNLF's lumped together under the command of a Rear-Admiral. Some of the above SNLF's remained in the China theatre or in various base areas for much or all of the war (for instance, the Shanghai SNLF, which operated from that port-- the 4th Yokosuka and 8th Sasebo SNLF's were attached to 3rd China Contingent Fleet and based on the island of Hainan, off China's southern coast, a piece of real estate intially seized by Japanese naval infantry during the war with China). However, the Special Naval Landing Forces played an important part in the initial Japanese offensive operations, particularly in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, their role was usually to spearhead amphibious landings, and secure the beaches so that the larger Army contingents to follow could be put ashore without mishap.
Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces

 

Good question Ill have to see what I can find on why.

 

Roger that, JC. Opinions, anyone?

 

I imagine that further operations depended on type of terrain? I wouldn't want to be a paratrooper told to land -safely- in a dense jungle, nor on a mountainside. My thought is perhaps because of that, that they stopped attacks or targets were not seen as important enough (and with American air superiority later on, it was putting planes/fuel/men at risk when not needed).

 

The attack on Port Moresby which I used as an example was a part of the initial Jap offensive, when they still had superiority in almost every aspect. The place had lots of open space that would have made for excellent LZ, and was easily within reach of both Buna and Milne Bay, had the Nip ever captured it.

Doesn´t sound to me like the kind of brew that would deter the Japanese, taking into consideration his predilection for maneuver warfare, specially of the outflanking kind.

 

That is interesting and so true. I did not know that Japan had paratroopers. Thanks JC.

 

Most welcome. It looks like the number of Japanese paratroops ,both Army and Navy ,were not that many. That could be another reason why they were used more. and of course the long distances between battlefields is another consideration.

 

This is from,
Enemy Air-Borne Forces, Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 7, December 2, 1942
[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from a WWII U.S. War Department Special Series publication. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]




55. HISTORICAL NOTE

About the time that Germany was making world headlines with her conquest, partly air-borne, of the Low Countries, the Japanese, who are notorious imitators, were starting their parachute training in earnest. Since the end of 1940, Japanese parachutists have received training from German instructors. In accordance with their recommendations, most of the training since 1941 has been conducted at Hainan Island at Sama-A (Navy) and at Kiungshon (Army). By the autumn of that year, a hundred German instructors were reported to be in Japan, Occupied China, and Formosa, mainly at Tatsuka, Nakamita, Shirahama, Shibata, Tachikawa, Kasumigaura, Kogo, and Hainan Island. Some training has been reported in Manchuria at Hsinking and Harbin, and also in North China near Shanghai, Wuchang, Nanking, and Hsiang Fan.



The Japanese parachute battalion consists of a headquarters staff, a supply unit (which carries 15 reserve aero engines), 3 parachute companies, and flying personnel. The total strength of a battalion is about 670 officers and men. The Japanese parachute company comprises a command group, a supply group, and 3 sections. The section is formed of 2 rifle groups, and 1 heavy weapons group. A rifle group is made up of a squad of riflemen, an antitank team, and an airplane crew. A heavy weapons group has 1 machine-gun section, 1 gun crew, and 1 airplane crew. The organization of the Japanese parachute company as reported several months ago is shown in figure 8.

[(AR) = armed with automatic rifle (P) = armed with pistol]
(a) Total company: 107 pistols, 95 automatic rifles, 18 AT rifles, 12 MG's, 3 40-mm Arisaka cannon (model 19), 19 portable radios, 1 command plane, 10 transport planes, 20 pursuit planes.
(b) Personal and armament of company headquarters: 1 captain (CO) (P); 1 Lt (2d-in-comd) (P); 1 Lt (technical O) (P); 1 1st Sgt (P); 1 Transport Sgt (P); 4 EM (clerk, first-aid man, liaison agent, mechanic) (P).
(c) Supply section: 1 NCO (sec chief) (P); 4 NCO’s (pilots) (P); 1 NCO (observer) (P); 2 EM (mechanics) (P); 2 EM (basic) (P); 1 radio set; 5 planes--1 command, 1 transport, 2 pursuit.
(d) Combat section headquarters: 1 Lt (sec CO) (P); 1 NCO (mechanic) (P).
(e) Initial ammunition for the rifle group: 32-34 hand grenades; 360-450 rds, pistol; 3,000-3,375 rds, automatic rifle; 1,500 rds, AT rifle.
(f) Rifle squad: 1 NCO (Ldr) (P); 3 EM (sharpshooters) (AT rifles); 3 EM (loaders) (AR).
(g) AT team: 1 NCO (Ldr) (P); 3 EM (sharpshooters) (AT rifles); 3 EM (loaders) (AR).
(h) Plane crew of the rifle group: 3 NCO's (pilots) (P); 1 NCO (observer) (P); 1 EM (mechanic) (P); 3 planes—1 transport, 2 pursuit.
(i) Initial ammunition for the weapons group: 450 rds, pistol; 1,525 rds AT; 5,000 rds, MG; 100 rds, cannon.
(j) MG squad: 1 NCO (Ldr) (P); 4 EM (gunners) (P); 4 EM (loaders) (AR); 2(7) 12.7 mm MG's. (k) Gun crew: 1 NCO (Ldr) (P); 1 EM (gun pointer) (P); 1 EM (loader) (AR); 1 EM (range-finder operator) (AR); 1 EM (sharpshooter) (AR); 1 40-mm Arisaka cannon (model 19). (l) Plane crew of the weapons group: 1 NCO (observer) (P); 3 NCO's (pilots) (P); 1 EM (mechanic) (P); 3 planes—1 transport, 2 pursuit.

Figure 8. Organization of the Japanese parachute company (July 1941)



57. SELECTION OF PERSONNEL

Trainees are selected between the ages of 20 to 25 after a strict medical examination, part of which is conducted in a room subject to controlled air pressure. Intelligence and psychological tests are also given. Many applicants are eliminated in the preliminary examinations, only the superior candidates being chosen. At the Shibata training center, it is reported that two steel globular cages about 5 feet in diameter, with a seat inside and an opening at eye-level in front of the seat, are used in training parachutists to overcome giddiness and in rejecting those who prove unsatisfactory. A trainee is strapped in the seat, and the cage then rolled about. Immediately upon stopping, the candidate must read satisfactorily certain letters and figures which are held opposite the eye-level opening in the cage.

58. OFFICER STANDARDS

All members of Japanese parachute troops receive high pay as compared to that of ordinary Japanese soldiers. They take special courses in foreign languages and map reading, and must be familiar with airplanes and engine details. All parachute troop officers are drawn from the Japanese Air Corps. They cannot be over 28 years old, with the exception of the battalion commanders, usually colonels, for whom the top allowable age is 35. In addition to meeting the same rigid requirements as the younger men, officers must have completed special courses at the Staff College

59. THE JAPANESE TRAINING PROGRAM


Originally 6 months in duration, the Japanese parachutist training course has been intensified and shortened under German supervision. The basic training of the parachute troops in the Canton area, in March 1941, consisted of five stages. The first stage began with somersaults and the second stage with jumps from a table, the height gradually increasing to 12 feet. In the third stage, troops jumped from platforms from 12 to 25 feet high onto sand pits. The fourth stage progressed to controlled parachute jumps from a 350-foot tower, the parachute being attached to the tower by a rope.1 Parachutists were given about 3 months of preliminary training before jumps from aircraft were made. During these 3 months they attended classes in geography, topography, foreign languages, and communications, and, in addition, gained experience as passengers in different types of aircraft. The fifth stage of training consisted of "first" jumps from slow-flying aircraft at 4,000 feet. Later jumps were made at lower altitudes, and from faster aircraft. Jumpers were trained to delay opening of the parachute until 250 to 350 feet from the ground. They were told that such timing reduced the time of exposure to cold, and eliminated to some degree drift and danger of ground fire. The standard aimed at is said to be 12 men jumping in 10 seconds, as a transport covers a distance of approximately 730 yards during that time. Equipment carried by troops was increased as training advanced.

1 According to one report, airplanes are used for this stage.

60. EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE PARACHUTISTS


Japanese parachute troops are not only capably trained but intelligently equipped for combat employment.
a. Clothing
All ranks are provided with special clothing: fur-lined jacket and trousers, and a hood with goggles. Buff-colored crash helmets, with ear flaps and chin straps, and light canvas-webbing equipment (inside the helmet) were worn in the Netherlands East Indies operations. Japanese parachutists landed at Koepang in green uniforms.
b. Officer Accessories
Each Japanese officer carries a flashlight, a wallet containing maps, and writing material. At Palembang officers wore after landing a green khaki cap, similar to a baseball cap, with an orange star at the front, and green khaki shirts and shorts. Each of them carried a 32-caliber automatic pistol (with cleaning rod), a Leicatype camera, field glasses (calibrated on the right lens only), and a haversack containing such articles as leather gloves, cigarettes, several small liquid-filled vials, and packages of concentrated food.
c. Haversack
The noncommissioned officers and men are equipped with a haversack containing a complete change of underclothing, an extra pair of shoes, and ordinary and emergency rations.
d. Food
The 3-day ration carried in the haversack consists of 2 1/4 pounds of rice, 2 tins of canned fish, 2 tins of canned meat, and 1 ounce of tea. The iron ration for parachutists is made in wafer form of ground rice and wheat, with some sesame seed. In addition, they use an extract of mussel flesh, prunes, preserved ginger, crushed bean meal, and norwi (dried seaweed containing alkali, soda, and iodine). Such rations have been tried out successfully in the climates of Malaya, the East Indies, the Philippines, China, Manchuria, and Siberia.
e. Weapons
Japanese parachute troops carry pistols and daggers or knives, used to cut the parachute shrouds upon landing. The individual sometimes wears a small radio receiving set on his belt. Other radios, machine guns, light mortars, entrenching tools, and so on, are frequently dropped separately from the men. Troops are usually equipped with submachine guns and light folding bicycles. The majority of the Japanese dropped at Koepang were armed with either submachine guns or automatic rifles.
f. Parachutes With the Japanese export market for silk largely cut off since Pearl Harbor, it will be logical to expect the Japanese to produce an almost indefinite number of high-quality parachutes with their abundant silk. At the start of the offensive against Sumatra in early 1942, each man carried a spare parachute for use in emergency. Normally the Japanese parachute opens after 3 seconds and then checks the falling rate to 16.5 feet per second. Since the average Japanese soldier is lighter than the American, he can theoretically carry down relatively more equipment. In Japanese maneuvers, the parachute of a section leader, who jumps first, is often dyed a special color to enable other members of the section to watch for signals from him during the descent and after landing.

61. JAPANESE AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN AIR-BORNE TRANSPORT

A standardized national type for the transport of airborne units, such as the Ju-52 in Germany, has not yet been revealed in enemy operations in the Orient. In some raids, the Japanese have used type TB-92 four-motored bombers. In the Palembang attack, among the craft they used were several captured Hudsons with British identifications; at Koepang, aircraft resembling Douglas types were used. Japanese parachutists are known to have been transported in command planes, such as the Kawa amphibian biplane, Model 115; in transport planes, such as the triple-engined Mitsubishi, Model 112, bomber and transport; and in various pursuit planes. It was reported a year ago that the Fukudakei factory was producing troop-carrying gliders with 25-horsepower engines to extend the range.

62. TACTICS IN THE USE OF JAPANESE PARACHUTE TROOPS


The usual first operation of Japanese invasion forces is to seize key airdromes and their environs. Bombardment of nearby air bases is a common tactic in connection with the capture of a selected airdrome; such bombing is designed to minimize air interference with landing operations. For obvious reasons, the Japanese try not to damage the runways of the airdromes which they hope eventually to use for their own invading planes and air-landing troops. The details of the Japanese attack on Koepang are worth repeating. Transports resembling Douglas types, supported by bombers and fighters, each carried from 15 to 30 green-uniformed men, who were dropped in groups of from 6 to 8. All ground defenses were strafed. The jumpers, who appeared to make their jumps from the belly of the aircraft, were apparently carried by the slipstream along a static rail to the tail assembly, where a catch pulled the ripcord and released the jumper. The jumps were made from 300 to 500 feet, there being no aerial opposition. In addition to white parachutes, red and blue ones were used. During the descent submachine guns were fired, and the Japanese made a great deal of noise, calling out, "You are my prisoner, Australian!" and similar taunts. Upon landing, the Japanese quickly took up ambush and sniping positions.

63. THE JAPANESE MANEUVERS OF JUNE 1941 NEAR AKITA

In the Japanese maneuvers carried out in June 1941 near Akita to test basic training and to formulate tactical doctrine, four problems were investigated: (1) the dropping of a unit of approximately two infantry platoons to carry out a demolition mission in enemy rear areas; (2) the dropping of a similar-sized unit to cover the landing of an infantry battalion transported by plane; (3) a problem like the preceding, except that the parachutists were protected by low-flying airplanes using machine guns; (4) the dropping of an infantry company to seize important terrain features in the rear of an enemy position prior to an attack by ground troops. If the reported views as to the success of the maneuvers are correct, the Japanese concluded: first, that the employment of parachute troops for demolition movements was advantageous neither from the point of view of certainty in accomplishing a mission, nor from the point of view of economy in men and equipment; second, that the use of parachute troops in the absence of support from air-landing troops or from ground troops was a doubtful procedure; third, that no necessity existed for the formation of highly trained parachute units, for the reason that with very little basic training the men and equipment of infantry units could be utilized. The final point, though a little puzzling, may reflect the alleged Japanese Army dislike for highly specialized units and preference for all-around units.

. JAPANESE AIR-LANDING TROOPS

A corollary to the Japanese opinion just cited would surely be that ordinary troops could be used as air-landing troops with very little preliminary instruction or practice in air movement. Japan has already considerably outstripped Italy in air-borne capabilities. With her already large number of parachutists, with her aggressive air force, with her still formidable navy, and, above all, with her veteran, agile troops, Japan may be expected to try other and possibly greater air-borne operations before she is brought to her knees.

Enemy Air-Borne Forces, Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 7, December 1942 (LoneSentry.com)

 

Google Books has this.You can read part of the book there.
"Japanese Parachute Troops WWII"

Japanese Paratroop Forces of World ... - Google Book Search

 

Excerpt from Japanese Paratroopers

“The Japanese considered that the ideal landing area was a locality where paratroops could assemble easily after
the jump. They determined that the attack objective should be within three miles or less of the landing site. However,
in actual operations the Japanese have landed as far as 12 miles from their objective. If the landing point was too
far from the objective the Japanese felt that the element of surprise would be lost, and the enemy would have
additional time to make defensive preparations.
Japanese paratroopers were briefed in detail upon completion of the reconnaissance. Frequently, annotated aerial
photographs of the installations to be seized were issued, and often rehearsals were held. Assembly areas to be
used before and after the assault were selected.
In actual practice, orders for the operation were specific, covering phases, objectives, and tactics in minute detail.
Communications and signal systems were established, with air-ground communication generally effected by panels.
Between units on the ground, radio may be used, or improvised methods, such as the sounding of musical
instruments and distinctive noises, were adopted. The latter measures, however, were probably for identification
among the supporting units rather than for communication.”

Japanese Paratroopers, Japanese Parachute Troops in World War II

 

JC, I recall posting that a Dutch commander had stakes planted all around an airstrip to deter Japanese paratroopers from attacking. Do you have anymore info about this?

 

No I don't Ill have to look into this .

 

Japanese Parachute Troops ( Special Series No. 32 ). I can't get it to direct link. But you can access it here. Even though it says "session expired" just click on the "OK" and it will take you to the site.

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I'll try the link. Thanks again.