Dieppe Raid August 19 1942

No.9 Do you think Giant 2 would have been a success? Twenty German divisions against the 82nd Airborne plus Itallians? I am not beeing disrespectful to the Itallians, but there was no real grip of the situation. Everything was thrown together at the last moment. Not all Itallian units would have responded.

Monty had little faith in the Itallians turning on the germans. His observations was to hope that they could carry out labour duties.

The Giant 2 was a gamble out of proportion. The only way to make it work was to have ensured 100% cooperation of every Itallian unit, and clear communication within the army. However there was a great prejudice against the war weary itallian soldiers. Granted, most did observe that they fought fiercer in Tunisia and Sicily than in the desert. But overall the army had been beaten since the beginning of hostillities in Africa.

Itallians fighting against the 'superior' German units was not an obvious result for Monty.

 

20 German Divisions in Italy does not mean 20 Divisions around Rome or 20 Divisions ready to take the field at a moments notice. Also, among those men were non German units, only there because pressed to be so by the Germans, and, as was seen later on, could surrender when presented with the option, or go over wholesale to the Partisans. Timing and positive decision were the keys to the situation, but not possible without accurate evaluation.

In July when Mussolini was expelled, there were only 7 German Divisions in Italy. The Allies had about 2 weeks to seize the initiative, in conjunction with the Italians, and get a quick result. Instead the politicians laboured on and on about terms, while all the time intransigently insisting on unconditional surrender. For Italy the optimum was a cessation of hostilities and a return to neutrality. However, that would require agreement from the Axis as well as the Allies, i.e. negotiation of a separate peace. No one could see this remotely happening so the next line was Italy joining the Allies. To prevent mass protracted engagements, (as became the case), the Allies had to get in quick and bold with the resources they had. Later was bad because if the Germans decided to contest Italy, which they did, it would allow them time to build-up in the peninsula and prepare defences – again which they did. The Americans had already decided for the Allies the Second Front would be in France, so unless they reversed this decision – i.e. agreed to follow Churchill’s original ‘soft underbelly’ agenda – there was not going to be a build-up of Allied forces for Italy, quite the reverse.

In pursuit of minimising the destruction of Italy, the Italians would act WITH the Allies to neutralise nazis-fascist elements which resisted. As negotiations wore on and Germany, quite understandably after the removal of Mussolini, built-up forces in Italy to the point where a quick knock-out became unreasonable, the Italians expressed a concern to protect Rome. As they spoke more German Divisions were moving into the area including 3 Divisions specifically to hold Rome’s airfields and ports. In ignorance of this, the plan hatched (in respect of Rome) was for the Italian Divisions around Rome to seize the airfields in advance of a drop by the 82nd, (it transpired planes could only be made available for a regiment strength drop), while their would be a general uprising of citizens and Resistance forces in Rome. The object was to hold Rome until Allied forces arrived which had been landed nearby.

Meanwhile, the British were pressing for a main landing near Taranto with secondary landings near Reggio and (by that time) Salerno, which Mark Clark succeeded in getting quashed. Clark by then had been advised the invasion of Sardinia was off, (Sardinia a contingency if Sicily failed), and had investigated and much liked the coast around Mondragone, well above Naples. However, when he discussed this with the respective force’s chiefs, the American Navy and the British Air Forced dissed it in favour of Salerno. It was then Clark set the 82nd to drop on the Volturno river (GIANT) and stop the Germans moving to reinforce their men at Salerno – in itself a sound military move.

When the Italians found out the landing supposed to race to Rome was going to be made at Salerno, and, the Germans had reinforced the airfields, they asked to delay the public armistice announcement and Salerno landing while they altered their arrangements. Ike effectively vetoed this as Salerno preparations were too far gone. Taylor and Gardiner of the 82nd were smuggled into Rome from Gaeta by ambulance, and advised of the Rome situation. Consequently they advised the Allies not to drop the 82nd. Hence the 82nd were never used on the Volturno or at Rome, and Clark was not advised they were available to him again till part way through Salerno.

With no landing near Rome and no postponement of the armistice or Salerno, the King and Badoglio saw no further room for manoeuvre and decided to clear off, leaving instructions for others to pass the word – many of who were clearing off themselves. The Italian Divisions stood ready but only two around Rome received orders and then to have them deploy in protection of the King’s exit route. There is no evidence to suggest there was any form of comprehensive communication to all the principals involved in military, civil or Resistance action. There followed many heroic but pointless engagements as these were not part of the greater plan expected. For example, over 700 civilian and Resistance fighters died in Rome. 38 Italian police (civil and military) died in a firefight with paratroops to deny them a fuel depot. As said the German garrison at Bari was defeated, Cadorna’s Division had the beating of the German 3rd Armour, and on Sardinia the Italian garrison engaged the Germans and fascists there as soon as they got news of the armistice. The Germans evacuated the island and the Italian commander later stated he would have gone on the offensive earlier if only he had been told what was going on in the mainland. The vast majority of Army units were left in ignorance waiting for orders. The Navy sailed to the Allies, (as they wanted to do in 1940, but that’s another story), and most of the Airforce joined them.

My opinion, GIANT 2 only stood a chance IF the full plan had been implemented as intended, and without postponement. Just to have gone ahead and drop one regiment of the 82nd with the landing at Salerno would have been disastrous. On the day of Salerno the Germans moved another Mechanised Division to Rome and 14’000 paratroops from France. The Resistance in Rome was not yet developed to the extent it needed to be to mount such an offensive, and the Partisans were only a tiny percentage of the force they were to become.

Monty’s opinion of the Italian Army was no more than can be expected of a British Imperial General. You give him a force to command and an enemy to fight, and he’ll do his best, which in Monty’s cases was exemplary. Monty had little if any interest in Italy or Italians outside the war. When fighting ‘the enemy’, be they Arabs, Italians, Germans or whoever, if they gave him a challenging time they were respected opponents, if they didn’t, they weren’t. Nowhere in any of Monty’s books have I ever read he made any study of a nation’s socio-political history or an appraisal of what made them tick. He inherited a war in Africa with some 100’000 Italian prisoners, in the main very happy to be out of Hitler’s war, and thousands more still in the line who wished they were. If the Davies-Churchill plan for the Garibaldi Legion (Italians recruited into Allied service) had been implemented in 1941, Monty may have held a different opinion? Whatever, when properly equipped, led and motivated, the Italian soldier was as good as any and probably better than some, as was seen.

No.9

 

Good post No.9.

I agree with just about everything you have stated. The Allies were to slow to grasp opportunities, both due to political friction and national diverging views.

As an officer myself I can understand apprehension for a gambit with as many unknowns as Giant two had. Worst in my opinion is the lack of communication and grip in Italy.

A quick victory in Italy does however seem to have been difficult. Even with the advantage of hindsight there are a lot of what if's.

BTW I am impressed about your knowledge of the 'forgotten' campaign in Italy.

 

Thank you for the complement Jaeger . I have always had an interest in the Italian and Aegean campaigns as most of my family ended up fighting there and one of them died there. Years ago when I began studying these in earnest, the popular thumbnails - usually wrong – didn’t begin to explain events, and far too much just didn’t make sense. I’ve spent a total of about 3½ years in Italy and gotten a fair insight into their war, which in turn raised more questions. I continue to visit and continue to learn.

Re the seizure of Italy, before it would be given to the military to plan, I don’t think for a moment the project would have got past the anti-Italian politicians among the Allies. Just supposing it did, it would really need to come about before the invasion of Sicily so that could have been used as a feint with the main landings on the peninsula.

I think you’re very right about command structure, and quality, particularly on two accounts. Firstly there was variety in how men became officers. Commissions could still effectively be bought and/or relied on family status/connections, and, because of the advent of the fascist regime in 1922, there were also political commissions. Secondly, there was no one in a position to take National control after Mussolini. The King, by all accounts, had no understanding or liking of anything military. In character and courage he was about as far removed as possible from his breastplate warrior ancestor who united Italy in the 1860’s and was the last European monarch, (I think), to personally lead their men into battle. After the war of course, Italy expelled their monarchy and only the other year was his son allowed to set foot in the country. Badoglio was appointed because he was generally acceptable, not because he was either a great military leader or a decisive statesman. When they left Rome, they deserted their Army, their Army never deserted them.

No.9

 

Did the allies learn anything from the pacific island hopping technices for thier approch to Deippe?

 

From Robin Neillands " The Dieppe Raid":

One of the great mysteries of the entire Dieppe raid is that the bulk of information reaching the Force Commanders implied that all was going reasonably well when the exact opposition was usually the case...

( Well, most of the radio equipment was lost/broke during the initial phase for the landing troops so the info sent was not very plenty though )

 

Omaha beach was the Americans fault. They had no armour support because they released their armour too far out at sea. I think it was something like 1/2/3 out of 27 got to Omaha. Also think about Utah - that would have been bad for the Americans, except they landed in the wrong area =D.

 

Back to Dieppe.
It still irks me that the chicken or the egg arguement goes on.

Did Mountbatten start his whole "dress rehearsal" spiel right after Dieppe or was it part of the whole concept?
Were any of the "lessons" of Dieppe worth the 3000 to 5000 casualties and the decimation of the Canadian Second Division?
More importantly, were these "lessons" not simple military common sense?

capturing a port by the flanks... check
pre-invasion bombardment by land and air... check
solid intelligence of your objectives... check
flexible timetable and allowance for error and confusion... check
proper landing craft... check
proper communications... check
redundancies and contingencies... check


It seems obvious that when things went horribly wrong and German propaganda crowed a victory, Allied propaganda had to reciprocate to minimize the damage to civilian morale. This is when Mountbatten and others, who had a firm grasp of PR, came up with the "big lie" of operation "dress rehearsal".

Several very carefully researched books have concluded that the Dieppe raid was the product of political need pushing the military into an ill advised operation. At several points the raid should have been squashed for very good and sound military reasons. It kept being pushed ahead or resurected for political reasons and gained so much momentum (or critical mass?) that the conclusion was inevitable.

I am convinced that not a single person involved in its planning wished anything but its success, but I am equally convinced that many of the key players didn't have their heart in it. For operation jubilee to succeed it would have needed the full support of every one of the top planners.
Given the result of the raid, it would have been stupid for future planners of Overlord and other amphibious landings not to benefit and learn from it's hard lessons. This does not mean that Jubilee was conceived as a class study in what not to do, or that it was even necessary for them not to make these lessons.

Mountbatten has been quoted as saying that each casualty at Dieppe saved ten lives on D-Day. That is utter BS. There isn't a thing that happened at Dieppe that could not have been anticipated and avoid under other circumstances. But a domino effect had taken hold in the planning and execution of the raid that led to disaster.