"The Blitzkreig Myth" by John Mosier

http://www.curledup.com/blitzkr.htm
The Myth of Blitzkrieg
Hi;
Just through with this fascinating read and some observations;
1. The author cites the precipitous retreat of the BEF as being the essential cause of the Fall of France-in essence a political failure of will on the part of the British as opposed to a military defeat of the allies.
2. The author also cites COMMUNIST AGENTS WORKING IN THE WEST as contributing to the Western defeat-this assumes that Stalin was sharing intell with Hitler, with whom he was allied at the time of the Battle of France.
3. The author is focused on WWII in the West-and generally ignores the war in the East where mobile warfare was a much more effective strategy. SO while he spends a great deal of time on failures like The Bulge, Market Garden, North Africa (compared to a back and forth road race between Axis and Allies) and etc he takes zero account of Kiev, Bagration and the like.
4. The author cites the Versailles treaty as contributory to the deadly effectiveness of the Wehrmacht-the logic being that as it turned out THE LESS EFFECTIVE officers were downsized after WWI-while something like the opposite occurred in Britain. The author seems to be of the opinion that it was LEADERSHIP that was the critical factor in German military effectiveness-that and doctrines and training first developed in the WWI era.
5. The author cites the works of the post WWI military theorists Fuller (the overwhelming massed armour assault) and Douhet (the overwhelming massed aerial bomber assault) as having a cult like hold on the military planners of WWII-especially on one Adolf Hitler. Hitler was so enamoured of massed armored gambling that he launched the Avranches and Bulge offensives in the West in 1944, even after the failed Kursk offensive of 1943 in the East. It is interesting that Mosier accounts Avranches-and the resulting Axis collapse and route to Falaise Gap- as a greater disaster for German arms than Stalingrad.
6. The author counts the strategic bombing of Germany by the Allies and the Axis bombing of England as massive failures.
7. The author validates Eisenhower's "broad front strategy" on the Rhine as the militarily correct one. Glorious armored incurions, such as advocated by Patton and Montgomery would have been risky affairs that could have ended in bloody "Anzios on the Rhine" (not to mention inviting possible WMD attack). The timeless wisdom is to overwhelm the enemies' defenses on a broad front with superior strength-Nothing new in general princlple that Scipio Afrincanus would not recognize.
An interesting and stimulating read worth mulling over-even if you disagree on some points (like: "what could have the power of German industry and transport accomplished WITHOUT strategic bombing?" Or "Blitzkreig a total myth? Perhaps 'overrated' or 'not always a successfull strategy' might be closer to the mark?")
Jeff in MN USA

 

Slip;
According to Mosier Blitzkreig was a myth the Allied officer corps used to cover up for their own poor performances in comparison with their opposite numbers in the Wehrmacht in 1940. Fortunately for the Allied cause Blitzkreig was also a myth Adolf Hitler believed in totally, and time and time again he squandered his precious reserves in long shot armored attacks.
JeffinMNUSA

 

Mosier's book is of great interest to me for several reasons. What amazes me the most however, is that he is dimissed by many for going against over 65+ years of recieved knowledge in WW 2 history, particularly that of the early part of the war.

To keep this short, and also generalized, I will say first that I disagree with many of his conclusions on Blitzkreig warfare and why it was either overlooked or over-emphasized. Secondly, I was VERY pleased to discover that Mosier uses a very wide selection of references, and on more than one occassion, Mosier himself advocates the necessity of comparative research, a method which I find to be extremely lacking in the works of other historians. Most importantly, he blames the lack of inter-Allied coordination between the French and the British at the highest levels, and correctly points out that their choice of General Billotte was nothing more than a target for their scapegoating for the impending disaster. Mosier's disdain for General Gort's leadership is also quite apparent, and I for one do not think it is misplaced for Gort has until now escaped much of the criticism he deserves.

I found Mosier's arguements, analysis and research methods to a breath of fresh air compared to the repeated and well worn garbage spewed forth by the "traditionalist" WW 2 historians.

 

I agree that Mosier is a refreshing read. The problem I have is that I know very little about WWII and thought I could learn something by reading books on the subject. I was wrong. When I read Mosier's book I suddenly realized that much of what I had already read was useless or worse. Patton's race across France is a laugh. He did so because there was NO ONE THERE! I have also read 3 or 4 books about the fall of France- each with a different reason for the disaster-the French were poorly led; the Germans had superior intelligence and leadership etc, etc.
Mr Mosier totally suprised me because english professors are not supposed to be military historians. This book was a wake up call. Too bad he only wrote one other book about WWI.

 

If you need basic knowledge of the war, read John Keegan before you start with argumentative books. You would do well to read Jeff's post point by point and compare that to Keegan's account of the war in '40 and '45. If Jeff's summary is accurate--and I have no doubt that it is--than I must disagree with assertions 1, 2, and 3.

His conclusion that motorized vehicles did not aid US infantry division in combat power is dubious, IMHO.

 

Trip;
And Mosier fails to take into account the Allied blitzkreig in France following the Normandy breakout and the Soviet blitzkreig in Belarus that destroyed Armee Group Centre. Still an interesting read-if from the very fringes. You are correct that Keegan has a much more centrist view and should be read first.
JeffinMNUSA

 

How such a comparison can be made is puzzling to me. How did the author explain his view?

 

Slon;
I forget the rationale but I believe he is clearly wrong by any standard of measurement. I think it possible the man mixed bourbon with the typewriter... acceptable with entertainers but unforgivable with serious historians. And I see Mosier as way more entertainer than historian.
JeffinMNUSA

 

I haven't read the book,but if one may judge from the points above,he is writing a lot of rubbish
1) nonsens :the British retreat had only political consequences
2) nonsens :there were a few isolated cases of sabotage,without any effect on the weapon production
4) nonsens :the treaty of Versailles had the opposite effect :the German army was very weakened quantitatively :in 1940 a lot of company commanders were older than 40 (ww I veterans ),qualitatively the Germans were not better:those who stayed were not the best,but officers of the general staf,without combat experience
5) about Fuller :he had only little influence in Germany,and BTW after 1942 the reign of king Panzer was over.
about Douhet:before ww II he had a lot of influence ,but already in 1940 his theory (the bomber will win the war on its own,and cheaply )was flawed.
7) the broad front strategy was not military correct,it was the only possible (logistics)

 

I will not be getting this book.