Battle of the Bulge: What took them so long?

Gentleman,

Today is the anniversary of teh Battle of the Bulge. Appropriately I have a question about the last phase of the battle, the American counterattack: What in your opinion are factors contributed to the slowness of the allied offensive phase of the battle?

S. Patton's relieve of Bastogne is considered a classic in mobile warfare. The erradication of the German salient however took the First and Third Army three more weeks to complete, and the battle was not declared won until 13 Janauary. The battle is by all accounts a sluggish bloodbath of extreme intensity, and according some, a disappointment for the Allies. In the words of Carlos D'Este, instead of a rapid, decisive counterstroke Eisenhower hoped for, the American counteroffensive had " assumed all the characteristics of a steamroller". Max Hastings argued that this episode demonstrated the inferior offensive power of the US Army vis-a-vis the Wehrmacht, rejecting the influence of the rough terrain and the cold as mere excuses since the counteroffensive was fought on exactly the same sector the 5th Panzer Army ruptured the US line when the terrain did not prove decsive and that the cold equally effected the Germans.

 

Well, there's the terrain. Do you remember Hurtgenwald? Metz? Same problem, awful terrain to fight in an offensive battle.

 

There is also experience involved here. The Wehrmacht had plenty of experience fighting in the cold/snowy weather whereas the Allied armies, specifically the Americans, did not. I can't remember where I read it, but this was a significant factor.

 

I think that Pzjgr has a point ; motivation and experience are a factor.

Many of the German forces ( not all ,though ) were among the most seasoned in the Wehrmacht ( and probably, at that time, the World ). The Waffen-SS elements in particular were very well-equipped and months of planning had gone into the attack. And the word 'fanatical' is often (over-)used, but many of the Germans displayed a high level of motivation and aggression.

The Allies had to extemporize their response and develop a counter-stroke in extremely adverse conditions. And many of the Allied troops fought hard just to secure somewhere warm to sleep for the night - and I don't blame them !

 

WX was also a factor in preventing air to ground support for the US, resupplying by air drop, and medivac too. (Not to mention turning whole Armies under combat conditions to meet a threat takes TIME)

 

Za,

I know the influence of the terrain but the 5 Pz. Army made its breakthrough at the very sector. In your opinion, what factors in the dispositions of the German units caused them to have more success in delaying the allied advance? Was "force to space" a factor in this battle?

PzGr,

Right on. The Americans were also logistically hard pressed in late '44 and protective winter clothing lost priority to gasoline and ammunition. The quality of American winter boots is said to be of abysmal quality and trench foot reached endemic proportions during the winter of '44 as we well know.

Martin Bull,

What good German units were engaged in this period of fighting? The Germans had began to evacuate the Ardennes salient by the end of December (I think) but information at the final phase of the Ardennes campaign is scarce. Official history says 60% of German panzer forces were still in the encirclment but where did they fight?

 

And don´t forget that actually the German operation was in two phases to "guarantee success".

Operation Nordwind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

I should explain about my first posting that I was comparing the two offensive actions, the German before Christmas and the Allied after.

The Germans hadn't started to evacuate the Ardennes by late December but the initiative of the assault had been decisively lost to them. The German strategy ( implemented on 27th December ) was to fall back from the Meuse to a new defensive line, prior to a new assault. So, for instance, Fuhrer Begleit started to move back from Hotton to Bastogne. Likewise, the badly mauled Leibstandarte fell back on St Vith. With the exception of the now-legendary KG Peiper which had virtually ceased to exist, most of the German units involved in the initial thrust were still in fighting condition and still in the Ardennes.

Even in damaged state, these were highly dangerous German forces in a fluid situation and one can perhaps understand a degree of caution among the Allies as to how best to tackle them in difficult terrain which, as the Americans had already shown, favours the defender over the attacker.

 

Thanks getlemen, excellent and informative posts. I have more people to salute to than I can do so. I am comparing the maps now and seeing that on 16 December the Germans attacked American towns and crossroads held by companies with whole kampfgruppes but during 22-26 December the Germans defended comparable positions with regiments.

 

I think Texson hit on a very important point here. The Americans went into battle, way under supplied! Ammo, winter gear, food, medical supplies. I'm sure the list goes on. The weather, one of the coldest and nastiest on record for that area, prevented re-supply, as Texson said. You can't go on a strong offensive, if you don't have equipment or supplies to support such an action.

 

Slipdigit has recommended some good further reading ; to answer some of the more strategic/tactical issues raised here, I'd also point to Trevor N. Dupuy's book 'Hitler's Last Gamble : The Battle Of The Bulge December 1944 - January 1945' ( HarperCollins 1994 ).

This is a less-popular work on the offensive ( it has no photos or personal accounts ) but concentrates much more on unit dispositions and dates - very useful !

 

I also read a year ago on the Allied bombing mission numbers and amounts creating havoc to German supply lines behind the front lines and also the major cities where the trains were waiting to go forward. Truly remarkable job,too. I wonder how much the Germans could have done with those supplies and reinforcements...

 

could morale be a factor,no wintter boots etc.?.

 

Monty took charge in the north. You know Monty.

 

I can see there being a few different factors:

1) Terrain was most certainly a factor here. When you look at the area where the "bulge" was made, the terrain there is not suited for quick counter attacks, especially in winter time. The German forces were able to do this, however, because of the element of surprise. The Americans did not have this on their side. In many of the heavily forested areas in that region, American air power was simply of no use. Remember that the USAF pretty well controlled the skies and had a great deal of ground attack aircraft that simply could not attack enemy forces in heavily forested areas.

2) Morale was not at the highest point it had ever been. Winter and cold weather gear was sparse and this certainly must have had an effect on the morale of the troops moving to take back their ground. Many of them were tired, they had been told earlier they would be home by Christmas and now here they were slugging it out for ground that they controlled only a week or two before.

3) Even though many historians have actually debated the effectiveness of the confusion wrought by German infiltration, I still believe this played a role (remember, even a small role in a war can have huge consequences). Many of the infiltrators took positions at key road junctions, causing traffic nightmares for the armored divisions of the US Army. It took some time, in my opinion, to sort this out and figure out if the guy at the checkpoint could be trusted with the directions he gave or not.

I'm sure I could go on with more and more, but being at work I should probably go do something they pay me for!

 

A friend that was captured at the Bulge as a private had a few thoughts from a grunt's perspective. I think the German retreat was so fast that the supply lines were unable to keep up. The general thought was that it would be very soon that it would all be over soon. With the weather, and being spread so thin, the high command decided to stay put to get better organized. Also, a lot of seasoned troops were pulled back for a breather and replaced with inexperienced replacement units. After the initial shock of the unexpected thrust, the Allies were stumped as they did not have accurate intel as to the forces they were dealing with. Countering plans had to be quick and limited in scope due to that. It was a lot more complex in the details, but I think that sums up a perspective about what happened.

 

Bull,

Dupuy is definately someone I'd like to check out when I have money in my pockets. Thanks.

Kai-Petri,

I thought the German railroad net had enough excess capacity to absord air air raids?

In any event the bridge busting attacks and the strafing runs on the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Army trains were highly effective.

Another issue that I have overlooked was the extend of the destruction the American Combat Engineers made out of the bridges in this sector--the demolition was very throughough, in most cases, which impeded the counterattacking American forces.