Washington Naval Treaty

In the 20s, I believe, eight countries convened in Washington, D.C. for a treaty that, they hoped, would prevent a costly and unproductive naval arms race in the expensive post-Great War world.

The Big Five were Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.
They established, between the five, a capital ship ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75.

Now, Japan agreed to a 5:5:3 ratio with the British and the Americans. Their condition, however, was that both nations stop any further fortifications of Pacific Islands.

It just seemed to me like one big tip-off of Japan's future belligerence. In hindsight, of course, it seems to me that that was more than just a little foreshadowing. However, did the leaders of the nations at the time have any reason to read more into Japan's demand?

 

As long as nations exist belligerence is part of the game, it's the politician's job to defuse situations before it gets out of control and the post WW1 naval build ups were a very dangerous arms race. If you keep stockpiling weapons sooner or later you are going to think the solution to a problem is using them. Also limiting arms buildup means that if war breaks out it will be less destructive thoug this is a double edged sword in MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) times.
So the we have the Washington and London treaties, SALT (forget how many of those there were), and the rest of the more recent alphabet soup.
The general idea behind all the treaties is to discourage war by making both sides vulnerable so that neither is tempted to resort to force, fixed fortifications are a defensive force multiplier and free forces for offensive action so they may offset the balance and it made sense to include them, after all the US had few (and non vital) interests in reach of Japan and if those were heavily fortified ....

 

The Washington Naval Conference, included nine countries, convened in November, 1921, and concluded with the signing of three treaties (the Five Power Treaty, the Four Power Treaty, and the Nine Power Treaty) in February, 1922.

The aim of the conference was two-fold; to prevent a burgeoning naval arms race between Britain, the US, and Japan, and to lessen growing tensions in the Western Pacific and Asia caused by Japan's growing militarism and the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance. The first goal was achieved by an agreement between Britain, The US, Japan, Italy, and France to limit naval construction according to a tonnage ratio and other restrictions on certain types of ships. This was accomplished in the Five Power Treaty, also known as the Washington Naval Treaty.

This treaty also contained an article (XIX) that prohibited Britain, Japan, and the US from further fortifying it's Pacific island possessions except for Hawaii, the Aleutians, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, The Kuriles and Sakhalin. This was not a Japanese "demand", but was introduced to encourage Japan to accept a lesser amount of naval tonnage in the treaty. This was to Japan's advantage because before the US (or Britain) could pursue an offensive war against Japan it would need fortified naval bases in the western Pacific. Japan was also constrained because it could not pursue militaristic goals in the Pacific without fortified naval bases, which it did not, at that time, possess.

The naval tonnage ratio was also finely calculated to provide just enough naval power to allow for legitimate naval defense, but not enough to allow any country to become overwhelmingly powerful in relation to any other country. In fact, the treaty provided for Japan's security without unduely restricting the US or British navies from pursuing legitimate interests in trade protection and defense of their overseas territories. But it did nothing to actually limit or discourage Japanese territorial aggression, most of which, in the 1920's and early 1930's, was driven by the Japanese Army which was not affected by the treaty. It did dampen the incipient naval arms race for almost two decades and in that regard was considered partially successful.

 

The Washington Naval Conference, included nine countries, convened in November, 1921, and concluded with the signing of three treaties (the Five Power Treaty, the Four Power Treaty, and the Nine Power Treaty) in February, 1922.

The aim of the conference was two-fold; to prevent a burgeoning naval arms race between Britain, the US, and Japan, and to lessen growing tensions in the Western Pacific and Asia caused by Japan's growing militarism and the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance. The first goal was achieved by an agreement between Britain, The US, Japan, Italy, and France to limit naval construction according to a tonnage ratio and other restrictions on certain types of ships. This was accomplished in the Five Power Treaty, also known as the Washington Naval Treaty.

This treaty also contained an article (XIX) that prohibited Britain, Japan, and the US from further fortifying it's Pacific island possessions except for Hawaii, the Aleutians, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, The Kuriles and Sakhalin. This was not a Japanese "demand", but was introduced to encourage Japan to accept a lesser amount of naval tonnage in the treaty. This was to Japan's advantage because before the US (or Britain) could pursue an offensive war against Japan it would need fortified naval bases in the western Pacific. Japan was also constrained because it could not pursue militaristic goals in the Pacific without fortified naval bases, which it did not, at that time, possess.

The naval tonnage ratio was also finely calculated to provide just enough naval power to allow for legitimate naval defense, but not enough to allow any country to become overwhelmingly powerful in relation to any other country. In fact, the treaty provided for Japan's security without unduely restricting the US or British navies from pursuing legitimate interests in trade protection and defense of their overseas territories. But it did nothing to actually limit or discourage Japanese territorial aggression, most of which, in the 1920's and early 1930's, was driven by the Japanese Army which was not affected by the treaty. It did dampen the incipient naval arms race for almost two decades and in that regard was considered partially successful.

 

I believe the treaty was a failure, the breaking of the long standing Anglo-Japanese alliance as required by the 4 power treaty was one of the main causes of Japanese resentment and of the rise of the "militaristic" army at the expense of the generally more moderate and westernized navy, so instead of preventing war it actually planted the seeds for it.

Also the ratio was different for each ship class for example 525.000 / 315.000 / 175.000 (15-9-5 for 35.000t battleships) but 135.000 / 81.000 / 60.000 (5-3-2 for 27.000 carriers).

I also believe the motivations behind the treaty are a lot less "pacific centric" than you describe, altough the French were in Indochina and the Italians had a few concessions in China their main interests were elsewhere.

 

Well, that largely depends on how you define "success" and "failure". The WNT did not "break" the Anglo-Japanese treaty of Alliance so much as replace it. Japanese militarism doomed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty far more than the Washington Naval Conference, because Britain wanted no part of a treaty which might easily involve it in a war between Japan and the US, and on the wrong side to boot. Japanese aggression was on the rise before 1920 and caused the British great concern because they were obligated to go to war to defend Japan; if Japan got in a war with the US, Britain would be screwed. The Four Power Treaty was far more a symptom of Japan's militarism than a cause.

As for Japanese 'resentment", hindsight clearly shows that no matter what the US and Britain did, Japan was going to zealously look for, and find, reasons to resent Western power. Most of Japan's so-called "grievances" were nothing more than arrogance on the part of the Japanese, who felt that anybody who didn't kowtow to Japanese intentions was disrespectful.

Nobody held a gun to Japan's head and forced it to sign any of the agreements. But clearly, doing so was far better than entering a naval arms race, it couldn't possibly win, and bankrupting the nation in the process.

The ratios generally quoted are roughly those for capital ships and were close to the actual overall treaty ratios. The treaty specified a number of differences for each country because each country had a different situation relating to capital ships already built, under construction, and planned. The intent, and actual result, of the treaty was to produce navies that were roughly on the ratio of Britain> 500,000 tons, US > 500,000 tons, Japan > 300,000 tons, Italy 175,000 tons, France> 175,000 tons. This didn't happen immediately, but the intention was that navies would maintain the ratios laid down in the treaty as time passed. The US, for example, didn't actually begin to build up to it's allowed treaty limits until the mid-1930's.

Well, the motives for individual countries to attend the conference were, of course, varied. But for the US, which called the conference, the motivation was as described; to discourage a naval arms race between Britain, The US, and Japan, and to ease tensions in Asia and the Western Pacific. Britain, no doubt, had concerns in other areas, as did France and Italy, but these concerns were not the reason for the Conference, and were not resolved there. All of the resulting treaties dealt either with naval arms limitations, or with issues in the Pacific and in Asia. So whether you feel the Washington Naval Conference was "Pacific centric" or not, it must be admitted that two of the three major participants felt that way.

 

The four power treaty specifically required the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, you can't get more specific than that in international diplomacy and according to most of my readings a lot of Japanese perceived that as a betrayal and a loss of face for the pro-British navy. Japanese "militarism" in the early 20 is nowhere as strong as it was 20 years later, the militaristic leaders of the late 30s would never have accepted the Washington treaty excactly as they didn't accept the London one.

The Italians and French never did build to the treaty limits, also most of their ships were "first generation" and not on a par with those of the major navies, the British and US had to scrap a number of old ships to get below the limit but remained very close to it, the difference was small and due to most pre Washington BBs being below 35.000 tonns so there was some "slack" too small for an additional hull.
The Japanese were also very close to the limit as most of their ships were pretty big, they didn't really scrap any old dreadnoughts as they had none (Settsu was not a true Dreadnought) but Hiei was officialy de-militarized as she was in excess of the allowed tonnage.

 

Yes, it is true that the Four Power Treaty dissolved the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, but both Britain and the US wanted that to happen specifically because Japan was acting very aggressively and had been for a number of years. The Japanese militarists were behind this aggressive attitude. The British were concerned that Japan's aggressive attitude would eventually lead to a military conflict with the US, exactly as it eventually did. The British wisely did not want to become embroiled in a war with the US because of Japanese aggression.

The Japanese therefore, had only themselves to blame for the demise of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. If they felt any "loss of face" due to being dumped as allies of the British, that was the price they paid for their arrogance and aggression in Asia. True, Japanese militarism was much more rampant in the 1930's, but it was evident enough in the late 'teens and early twenties to cause Britain to have very serious second thoughts about being allied to them, and justifiably so.

What, exactly, is your point?

The US did scrap a number of ships, either already completed or under construction, and by the mid-1930's had not built a large number of vessels, especially carriers, that otherwise would have been allowed under the WNT. That is why the US was able to build the Yorktown class and the Hornet and Wasp, in the late 1930's. The Treaty obviously did dampen any enthusiasm in the signatory countries for a naval arms race that might otherwise have occurred in the 1920's. Britain, for example, never built the N3 battleships and G3 battle cruisers, and Japan never completed the 8-8 program, while the US canceled the Lexington class except for the two ships converted to carriers.

 

My point was that economic realities did a lot more to end the arms race than the treaty, France and Italy didn't build up to allowed battleship strength until long after the treaty had expired the other three powers did build to the limit in battleships but waited until early experiments showed what a fleet carrier should look like before stating to build them.
BTW Most sources consider Hornet part of the Yorktown class though she was built later than Yorktown and Enterprise.

 

The non-fortification requirement is no more indicative of Japanese beligerence than the 5:3 superiority is indicative of American belligerence. Everyone understood that the American insistence on the 5:3 meant that the Americans could execute a successful offensive against the Japanese.
Why would America fortify the Philippines? For a war against Japan. Why would Japan fortify the Mandates? For a war against America. All these matters had to do with fighting a war, so they are naturally military in nature, but that in itself does not equal belligerence. There were plenty of folks on both sides of the Pacific who foresaw a war between the US and Japan, but the treaty helped establish a peace that lasted almost two decades.

 

No, that is merely an artifact of hindsight.

It's true that few, if any, countries would have been willing to pursue a naval arms race after 1930 due entirely to the economic crises the world went through during that period. But in 1920, the economies of the world appeared far more robust and the three major naval powers, Britain, the US, and Japan, had plans for ambitious naval construction programs that clearly would have fed off each other. No one was able to foresee the economic difficulties of just a decade hence. It was the WNT that nipped the next naval arms race in the bud years before economic problems would have accomplished the same thing.

As for Fleet carriers, I would point out that both Japan and the US began building (converting them from capital ships) two fleet carriers each in the 1920's (Lexington/Saratoga, and Akagi/Kaga). As it happened, the US got it right and the Saratoga soldiered on throughout WW II pretty much as designed (minus her 8" guns, of course). Japan was much less fortunate with the Akagi/Kaga, having to put both through major rebuilds in the early 1930's.

 

Everybody was experimenting a bit, look at the Brits with Eagle and the Glorious class, Lexington came close to getting it right but beside the 8 inch turrets many sources quote that the huge island/smokestack structure created bad airflows over the flight deck and her large turning radius was a handicap, Ranger, that was the first US carrier buil as such, was not considered a success. But my point was that until the results of early experiments were thoroughly examined nobody built large carriers classes despite the treaty allowing a lot more builds, the most visible result of the treaties as far as carriers are concerned is that the USN built Wasp instead of the fourth Yorktown they would most likely have built otherwise.

 

I think it's very difficult to separate the diplomacy and the economics into discrete factors. Without the framework of the treaties, nations may not have felt the liberty to give their fatigued finances the breather that they did historically.

 

That may be true. I'm just pointing out that the USN did, in the 1920's, build two large carriers that were relatively successful in WW II. Exhaust stacks were a major problem on virtually ALL fast carriers until the advent of nuclear propulsion. Just read Freidman's volume and US carrier design for information on that issue. I think no navy built large carrier classes more because of cost than design issues. The Essex class was the only really large class of carriers ever built and they were initially ordered as part of the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940, which was, essentially, a war program.

The Ranger was a failure only in comparison to other US carriers. In any other navy she would have been at least competitive. She was my father's first ship when he qualified as carrier pilot in 1940; there were things he didn't like about her, but he said he didn't realize most of the negatives until he reported aboard the Enterprise in 1941. Even then, he claimed she had better accommodations than the Essex class carriers he served on later in the war.

 

Might that be because of wartime inflation of crew complements?

 

I think WW2 carriers were tonn per tonn, less expensive than contemporary battleships that had to have absolutely "the best of everything" but I may be wrong, does anybody have comparable costs?
It's usual for a navy to build one or more experimental vessels to test new ideas and "revolutionary" designs before going to large classes, for carriers the experimentation period lasted some 20 years from Furious and Argus to Yorktown, Hiryu and Ark Royal. I can't really say how much that was due to funding and how much to the time needed to try out different things to see what worked.
The RN did eventually get to order a large carrier class with the Colossus/Majestic but selected a smaller design than the previous Illustrious class to cut on construction time.
One strange thing about the treaty is that while for battleships the upper 35.000t limit was higher than existing BBs, with the exception of Hood, for carriers it alowed building conversions that were much larger than the 23.000 tonn limit for new carriers, I have no evidence of this but I suspect this was because they knew the conversions would "get something wrong" and so would not be more capable than the later smaller but more advanced ships.

 

Well, a good sized conversion "victim," such as the Lexington class battlecruisers, would be around the ball park of at least 25,000 or 27,000 tons to begin with, before their conversions. I am not sure about the tonnage for the Langley, but it would probably be a lot smaller seeing as how it was converted from a collier, not a battlewagon.

Perhaps a better reason for the extra conversion tonnage is that each nation had already envisaged a fleet of large carriers converted from battlewagons, and each therefore had no problems with the extra tonnage provided for conversion cases.

THe gist of it is that they probably foresaw advances in technology, and, translating those advances into bigger sizes, decided that the tonnage limits for everything would be higher.

 

Well, a good sized conversion "victim," such as the Lexington class battlecruisers, would be around the ball park of at least 25,000 or 27,000 tons to begin with, before their conversions. I am not sure about the tonnage for the Langley, but it would probably be a lot smaller seeing as how it was converted from a collier, not a battlewagon.

Perhaps a better reason for the extra conversion tonnage is that each nation had already envisaged a fleet of large carriers converted from battlewagons, and each therefore had no problems with the extra tonnage provided for conversion cases.

The gist of it is that they probably foresaw advances in technology, and, translating those advances into bigger sizes, decided that the tonnage limits for everything would be higher.

 

Could very well be. My father was a pilot and claimed the pilots' accommodations on the Essex class carriers were more cramped and uncomfortable. The ventilation of the officers' quarters on the Essex class was very inadequate and it was difficult to even get restful sleep as a result. I think that was more of a design deficiency than a matter of over crowding.

 

I wonder if the designers had decided that Ranger was unnecessarily "luxurious" and standards could be scaled back. Or was your father's Ranger service in a more temperate setting perhaps?