Was FDR to blame for Pearl Harbor?

No you did not. You quite clearly claimed for the questioned portion.

I still doubt the Pearl Harbor Reports quote a book by Stinnett that hadn't been writen yet.

 

Hardly. We had not broken all their codes at the time of PH indeed they had changed one of them just before the PH op and it wasn't until around Midway that we started getting a reasonable amount of it translated.

It's hardly "picking at strings". The Japanese officers stated that the keys were removed and their is no evidence to the contrary so the ball is in your court.

Did you read what this says? It's a transmission from HQ to the fleet. Not fleet units transmiting

This is highly suspicious to me. What comercial firms had the equipement time and inclination to triangulate on Pacific transmissions.

Didn't part of the Japanese plan for PH include deceptive radio transmissions? I think I've read that they even transfered the operators due to their unique "signature".

 

that is true. i could tell who i was talking to on other end of a morse conversation while serving in 70,s. we all had our habits that were being monitored by others and vice versa. int 101

 

yep used the old five baudot code that teleprinters used.

 

As the story goes, Kido Butai hit very rough weather around December 4th and the unit became widely scattered. The allegation is that radio transmissions were necessary to reestablish formation. I’ve no idea whether it’s true or false, other than Japanese logs do confirm horrible weather at that time. From everything I’ve read so far, there is no basis to suppose the conspiracy theorists are correct. But if the signet logs of the U.S. Navy’s listening posts in the North Pacific are still classified for days such as December 3rd, 4th, or 5th 1941, then it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to realize that the matter cannot be buried until they are opened to the public and it is confirmed from the original worksheets that no radio interception of Kido Butai was made.

 

Hanyok, Robert J., CATCHING THE FOX UNAWARE - Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Naval War College Review, October 1, 2008
https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval War College Review/2008/Hanyok NWCR Au08 web.pdf
Just keep hitting “Yes” and “Ok” until the article comes up

And what is this sinister connection between Dudley Knox and E J King? Looks to me like more of Stinnett's blowing smoke.

 

Well, it has certainly been demonstrated that the FDR Administration implemented the McCollum memo. You haven't even come close to refuting that (or even tried) It's in the archives. Period.

What about the 4000 kilocycle intercepts at Station KING, Dutch Harbor. Are you simply ignoring those or saying they don't exist? Which is it? You can't simply ignore these items as if they aren't in the record. Either they're there, or they aren't. If they are, and no one has proven they aren't, then they have to be addressed.

Also, if there are still classified documents concerning radio transmission intercepts about the PH attack, then they have to be released so it can be put to rest. To simply state "there were no transmissions” is quite narrow-minded, (and arrogant) until all evidence has been sifted through. It's almost as if some folks want everyone to forget about those documents. Like they are scared something will be uncovered. Obviously.

And Mike, I quoted the lewrockwell review because it was well written and said exactly what I was going to type any way. It had nothing to do with the McCollum memo below the statement I made about the PHPT archives. I tried to make it in sequential order. Forgive me for not crediting the lewrockwell author for the quote.

 

Date(s) and bearing(s), if you please

And did you happen to look at that article in the Naval War College Review?

 

Could not find server.

To ensure formation cohesion Nagumo reluctantly broke radio silence before Midway in rough visibility, so there is precedent.

With respect to your question, I’ve already indicated my opinion. Relying on Japanese testimony instead of the U.S. signet records is bad methodology. If the US Navy’s signet archives are open and there are no intercepts logged in the working sheets, then this whole discussion is pointless. The US Navy could not suppress information it did not possess. Period. End of story.

If some of the logs between November 26th and December 7th are still classified, then it is impossible to state with certainty that no intercepts were made until those logs are declassified.

Note that even if intercepts were made, it doesn’t mean there was some silly conspiracy to get the US in the war at the price of American lives. Rather, that someone somewhere screwed the pooch on the threat estimate and then passed the buck.

 

Let's take a look at them. According to Stinnet in
Day of deceit: the truth about FDR ... - Google Books
The intercepts occured on 26 Nov. But according to:
Countdown to Pearl Harbor
That's the very day the strike force left Japan. Which means the intercepts may or may not have been from the ships (it could have been the ships or it could have been the Japanese disinformation campaign broadcasts). In any case they would still have been very close to Japan or even still in harbor. Indeed if you look at a map and the relative location of the kuriles, Japan, and Dutch Harbor it's going to be several days before a brodcast from the fleet can be distinguished from one from the Home Islands.

 

Regarding any intercept at Dutch Harbor - some quick calculations gives us some useful information to which we can apply some critical thinking regarding DFs.

The direct rhumb line bearing from Dutch Harbor (at 53-52-48N 166-31-12W) to, oh, say, Kure (at 34-14-01N 134-34-00E) is 245 degrees. If you want to use great circle, the bearing changes over distance, varying from 270 degrees to 225 degrees, which when you think about it and compare those values to the rhumb line bearing makes sense.

The rhumb line can be calculated from Dutch Harbor to Hitokappu-wan (at 44-55-49N 147-37-48E) as well, at it works out to 254 degrees; the bearing changes on the great circle vary from 272 degrees to 236 degrees.

So, Larry is correct, with the equipment of the day it was near impossible to discern if a transmission made on the 26th originated at Hitokappu-wan or, for example, Kure; thus a DF on a 26 November intercept is meaningless. Further, if one tries to triangulate the DF line from Dutch Harbor with those of the DFs made from stations Cast and Hypo, guess what? Yes, that’s right, home waters, somewhere in the vicinity of Kagoshima-wan.

From Hanyok:

“American intelligence reports for 26 and 27 November, each covering the previous twenty-four hours of intercept, reflected the continuing effectiveness of Japanese radio deception. The 16th Naval District transmitted an intelligence summary stating that ‘our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers are still in the Sasebo–Kure area.’75 On 25 November, Hypo, Rochefort’s unit in Hawaii, noted that Kirishima was believed to be in Yokosuka. On 26 November, ‘H” reported that ‘several carriers were near Sasebo, including car[rier] Div[ision] 4’ (Zuikaku and Shokaku, which was call sign NE RU 8). Rochefort also reported that during the evening the carriers were heard using their ‘secret [drill] calls’ on 4963 kilohertz, a tactical frequency, but that no bearings were available.76 The Pacific Fleet COMINT summary for 26 November mentioned no carriers but commented that the Third Fleet, with which the carriers usually were associated, had not yet left the Sasebo area.77
“At about the 1000 (Tokyo) on 27 November, Cavite took bearings of 30 degrees on the drill call signs for Akagi and Hiryu (9 RU SI),which put them in the Kure area. Cavite also heard on the same bearing the call sign 8 ROSA, which it identified as the ‘carrier.’ Koryu; an unidentified merchant ship (6 MI TA); and another, unidentified, call sign, 7 ME NE—placing them all in the Kure area.78 Station H still plotted the carriers at Sasebo with the Third Fleet but noted that
activity at the base was ‘light.’”

Goodness, there’s a frequency noted here, 4963, gasp, a Japanese tactical frequency. Oh, and here’s Hanyok’s footnotes:

“75. PHH, part 37, p. 1060.
76. “Ops Logs—Stations H, M, S, W & J, 24 November - 6 December 1941,” NARA, RG 38,
CNSG Library, box 164, folder 5830/58, “Station ‘H’ Chronology.”
77. PHH, part 35, p. 76.
78. TESTM 281511, NARA, RG 38, box 15, folder 2000/1, “Inactive Stations,” “SI Genser” message files.”

So, with the Kido Butai leaving Hitokappu-wan on 26 November, that means in order for any intercept DF’ed by Dutch Harbor to have possibly have been generated by the Kido Butai at sea, and that would have provided any indication that fleet was anywhere other than Japanese home waters, it would have to have been received after noon on 28 November and indicate a bearing considerable less than 245 degrees. Does Stinnett have such an intercept?

It helps to know a little bit about navigation and have a map handy.