What if: Germany's goal in 1941 was Oil?

What if 1941 Germany had as its goal the knocking out of as much Allied oil supply's as possible and gaining as much oil as it could get as possible.

1. Send approximately One of the Three Barbarossa Army Group's into Turkey around April-May 1941. Hold the other Two Barbarossa Army Group's on the Russian/German Border.

a) Turkey, in its tenuous position, would probably allow Germany to move though its territory at the least. With Hitler's diplomatic skills and Germany being old WW1 Allies, Turkey would probably join the axis as a way to economically and politically survive if given a real invasion ultimatum. Make a pact for Turkey's safety from aggressors to make it tenable to the public.

There is little chance if Turkey did resist they would last longer than a month if German's goal was not total occupation but a) the securing of the Coast down to Palestine and b) north along the Black Sea to the Border with Russia. They could allow a puppet government to continue in the South-East like in Vichy France and give Turkey an easy out to sue for peace.

2. Move 2/3rds of the invading army group to within 50-100 miles of the Russian/Turkey border telling Russia its for Turkey's safety under the new pact. Secretly invite Russia to take the 50-100 miles if needed to appease Stalin at the time. Hitler did these pacts time and again with all the country's and regions he occupied without fighting. It would help gain Turkish support to join against Russia.

Using 1/3rd of the invading Army Group and possibly some Turkish troops, secure the Suez canal, knocking out the easy British Oil and transport. North Africa would need less reinforcements and be less important to hold, if not much easier to hold with the canal out. After securing the canal, knock out through strategic bombing as much of the Allied oil fields of Iran and/or Iraq and Saudi Arabia as possible. This would now knock out the oil Britain now has to take around Africa to get, as well as the oil needed to help supply it's colony's and navel bases in and around India.

3. Commence operation Barbarossa later in 1941. The limited goal being only 500 miles of North/Central Western Russia and holding, concentrating the real offensive attack through the Ukraine and down around the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, with a massive pincer on the Baku oil fields from the 2/3rd's of the invading Turkish third Army group left coming up through the Southern Russian/Turkey border.


I don't think Britain would have been able to have countered with an effective force in 1941 in the Middle East to have stopped even a third of one of German's powerful army groups. Rommel was able to hold his own with a few panzer and army divisions let alone what he could do with whole army's and panzer groups and air-corps.

It's doubtful Russia would have attacked Germany though Poland in mid 1941, but that's why they leave 2 of the army groups there. Russia could have attacked into Turkey, but the German's could have then just used their whole Turkey Invading Army group and maybe Turkey's supporting forces to roll them back up to Baku if needed instead of gaining the canal first.

The U.S. was in no position to help out for a long time as they hadn't even entered the war and would not be able to do much about a Turkey or Middle East invasion with only Navel forces to help out.

Three main questions in bold:

1) I am curious just how much of Britons oil and other supply's was going through the canal. Furthermore, with Iran, Iraq and Saudi oil supply being disrupted, what percentage of Britain's oil would/could be cut? Would Britain have been able to effectively run its Navy and Air force without much, much, more oil from the U.S with avoiding U-Boats?

2) If Germany was able to keep the Southern Ukraine, Baku and surrounding oil fields away from Russia, how many less gas-less Tanks and Planes would Russia be able to throw into its defense? What % of Russian oil came from those area's?

3) Germany and the Axis powers always seemed to be low on oil. I have read Some estimates where Germany and the Axis controlled only 5% of the worlds oil supply's when the Allies controlled 85+%. (Neutral country's the rest). History see's Germany as a fully mechanized Blitzkrieg army when in reality many if not most of its army divisions relied much more on horses and they still fielded formidable army's.

After securing Baku they then invade Iran/Iraq/Saudi Arabia.
If they were able to double or triple their oil production by securing parts of the middle east and Baku oil fields in 1941 what could they have done to Russia afterwords. Even if Germany was not able to hold any of it, but destroyed Baku, The Suez canal and most Middle eastern facility's how soon before it would be useful to the Allies again?

4) Would Japan have decided to attack Russia instead of the U.S. if a large chunk of Russian oil was taken out of production and Germany had ways to supply Japan with excess oil?


A all out German concentration on getting more oil and taking the oil supplies away from the Allies seems to me to have been the best way for Germany to have won the War from 1941. Hitler, using previous successful Diplomatic methods, could have made it work.

I think most counter what-if's of Turkey fighting it out, Briton effectively defending the middle-east or Russian/U.S. timely intervention in Turkey would not have realistically happened. Even if the counter what-ifs did happen, Germany could have been left in a better position to attack in 1942 or Japan might have made other decisions to German's benefit.


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See on this forum:yes or no,Germans take Gibraltar

 

I am sorry as to addressing each of your positions in turn, haven't figured out how to use the "multiple quotes" option (don't laugh guys!). So I'll post my reply in a narrative made up of other files I have put together over the years.

The original Baku fields on the west shore of the Capsian were sabotaged by the Soviets themselves as they left the area in anticipation of the Nazis actually getting to the fields as they did at Maikop and Grozny. At Baku, there were ten defense zones built around the city to prevent possible German invasion. Taking into consideration the growing demand for oil, the Baku workers reached the record level of oil extraction in 1941 – 23.482 million tons. Just in case Hitler’s troops were not stopped before they reached Baku, Stalin entrusted one man with making sure that the Nazis could not avail of the city’s legendary oil. Nikolai Baibakov. By the autumn of 1942 764 wells were stopped up with cement and prepared for destruction and 81 sets of drilling equipment together with the personnel were sent to East Baku (Baku II), on the opposite shore of the Caspian Sea.

None of the captured fields ever sent a single barrel of oil to the Nazis, in fact the pipe they had brought to Maikop/Grozny were captured by the Soviets when they returned. Those German pipes were then used to ship the petroleum to the Soviets! After the wells in Baku I were capped off with deep injections of cement, the Soviets transferred their petroleum production to the known but non-developed Baku II fields on the east shore of the Caspian (Turkmenia). The Baku I area didn't get back into production until post war, when the Soviets themselves repaired the damage they had done when they withdrew.

Oil fields and refineries are far to easy to put out of production, and far too difficult to get back into production during time of war. Witness the NEI (Dutch Shell, East Indies), fields the Japanese captured. The Dutch and their supporters did such an admirable job of sabotage that the Japanese didn’t get them back to 100% production until late 1944! And by then they had no way to use what they produced, since they couldn’t transport it back to the home islands, nor use it in situ.

For the UK, British Isles oil imports in 1939 were as follows:

46.2% - Caribbean - mainly Venezuela, but includes Trinidad and Mexico
30.8% - Middle East - Persia (Iran), & Iraq
19.2% - US
(the rest came from Rumania)

Then with Italy entering into the war in mid-1940, and the Central Med. a war zone, middle east oil became more expensive since it had to be shipped around the Cape. In consequence by 1942, no middle east oil was sent to the home islands, both Persian and Iraqi oil production/refining was scaled back short term (civil unrest didn't help), and that which was produced was used "in house", i.e. the MTO, plus some sent to India, especially after the loss of the Far East oil producers; NEI, Burma, Borneo and Malaya to the Japanese. So this is the picture for UK petroleum by 1942:

60.0% - US,
40.0% - Trinidad, Venezuela and Mexico (Rumanian oil purchases stopped in 1940, but they had accounted for only 4.2% of British imports that year)

By 1944, 79% of Britain's oil imports would be from the US; 21% from the Caribbean, as those sources could be shipped cheaper. The Suez Canal have been of no import to the UK for supplying the home islands (they had been shipping over 90% of all goods around the Cape since the opening days of the war), since Italy was holding Ethiopia and "air-patrolling" the southern entrance to Suez only warships and supply ships for the troops in Egypt used the canal, the UK didn't receive any substantial percentage of their oil from their holdings in the mid-east after 1940.

The British Isles themselves got most of their oil and petro-products for most of the war from the US, still the world's leading oil exporter at the moment. The US supplied (from our own fields) nearly 75% of all the oil and its products used by ALL the western allies for the entire war. Note how very different the petro-world was then!

The Persian Gulf was not nearly as significant an oil producer in WWII as it is now. In 1939, the US accounted for 60.4% of GLOPAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, and Latin America another 15.3%, so more than three quarters of the world's petroleum production was in the New World (Western Hemisphere).

The USSR accounted for the largest single chunk of the remaining production, 10.6% (at that time) which came from both Baku and the Maikop and Grozny fields. The other known and producing petroleum fields worldwide were these:

Iraq & Persia (Iran) accounted for 5.4%.
the NEI (Dutch East Indies) 2.7%.
Romania 2.4%.
the British Empire (Malaysia, Burma, and British Borneo) 2.0%.

The Arabian and North African oil fields had not yet been found nor developed. UK imports of petroleum early in the war were running around 11-12 million metric tons (2,200 lbs). About half of this could be satisfied from Empire sources alone (Persia, Iraq, Malaysia, Burma, and British Borneo, as far as I know.) After June, 1940, they surely could get as much as they wanted of the NEI production (with the Dutch nation occupied), which could have covered the rest of the Commonwealth states and Dominions in the Pacific. But the US is a lot closer to the home islands, and they could get high quality refined product from there as well, so they probably got as much as they could afford from the US.

The British had been sending between 85 and 90% of their commercial shipping around the "Horn of Africa" since the outbreak of war, both to and from their dominions and commonwealth partners in the Pacific area. That Suez canal connection was most generally used for military shipments to the troops in Egypt and the RN in the Med., but the Levant area and eastern Mediterranean islands could be as easily supplied through the protectorates of Syria, Persia (Iran), and Iraq.

Finally. As to taking Turkey, the Nazis were notoriously bad at crossing water in amphibious landings, and the entire country is really on a plateau which limits the number of places an amphibious attack can be made on. Then when/if they conquer the Turks, they still cannot get the Baku oil back to Germany for use. There was no pipeline between the Caspian and the Black Seas, they had no oil tankers, and little chance of building either during war-time.

 

Wow,brndrt, nice essay. And maybe I just didn't read the question carefully enough, but weren't the Germans already going for oil (the Caucasus) in 1941 elsewhere? Or was that '42...?

 

That was 1942 but was a rather pitiful attempt.

 

What he means is that instead of assualting Eurussia proper and then coming to the Causcaus mountains and saying "Hey!, lets go get some oil" thus weakening the Stalingrad offensive; Germany would devote an entire army group (Which might not be neccesary, perhaps using 10 Gebrigs divisions might work) towards immediatly cutting off Baku to be used by Hitler (Perhaps in 5 years) as well as making a new Southern front.

This could perhaps lead to a quick capture of Stalingrad as most of the Red army was in Eurussia and the Transcauscaus MD wasnt very large at the time.

 

Another point :concerning the oil of the Caucasus . The USSr was not that dependent on oil . In 1940 USSR oil production was 32'168 million ton .In 1945 19,436 (and I don't think the difference was made up by USA deliveries ). Thus a decrease of 40 % .In 1940 the oil of the Caucasus was 27 million ton =84 % .In 1945 13,2 =68 % . Source:the economic geography of Soviet oil and Coal and their means of transport in WW II . Maybe someone working in the oil industry should be able to solve this question .

 

I'm not "in the industry", but the decline in the Baku I field was due to the Soviets themselves pumping cement into the wells and closing them down as the Nazis approached and threatened the fields. Stalin told the fellow (Nikolai Baibakov) that he put in charge of the sabotage that "if the Germans get one drop of oil out of Baku, you wil be shot." He then added; "if we cannot recover the oil later, you will be shot again!" By late 1942 764 wells had been "capped" off, and weren't re-opened until late 1946 (I think) when Baku came back online. And the US did supply a great deal of the missing POLs to the USSR through Lend-Lease, mostly in high-grade avgas and refined lubricants. The Soviets production was then largely diverted toward diesel, distillite, and low grade gasoline production. They excelled in producing low octane fuel for the GAZ trucks (as low as 50 octane rating), and upon which many engines could function.

The Maikop and Grozny fields were captured by the Nazis, and those too must be figured into the "caucuses" production, not just Baku. They never got back into production until they were retaken by the Red Army, and that at a low level. Baku I was out of the mix after 1942, and the other two not back up to snuff until post war either.

 

Brndirt 1 :thank you very much ! Of course,you had the source,stupid me ,but for those who haven't,from the same source:"The big question is why did the production of Baku decrease by nearly 50 % by 1945 since it never was bombed by the Germans? .Is this a result of failure to repair or replace essential equipment as well as a failure to drill new wells when existing ones ran dry . Or perhaps something as labor shortage ? " But Brndirt 1 has already given the answer .

 

Wow, a lot of good information. A detailed response at the bottom of this thread.

 

Thank you Clint for all that good information.

I can see now that Germany trying to take out middle eastern oil would not have been worth the effort at that time. Which means the Germans could have more troops for the occupation of a smaller area in Northern Turkey.

I still think occupying Northern Turkey with the Goal of knocking out Baku oil at the start of Barbarossa could have crippled Russia, saved many German troops and equipment lost in winter weather and lost Russia the war.

Here are some highlights of a secret British and French plan to knock out Baku in 1940:

A French army of 150,000, equipped with 100 aircraft, was concentrated in Syria intended for the invasion of Soviet TransCaucasus and the strike on the oil regions of Baku. Secret documents seized in the taking of Paris show that while preparing for a war against the USSR in 1939-40, Britain and France had plans of occupation of Baku and its districts. In recent years, documents have been made public which say that both Great Britain and France worked out plans to bomb Baku. Reports that Stalin was providing the fascist aggressor with oil were bound to put the French on alert. In October 1939 the US ambassador to France, William Bullitt, wired to Washington that Paris was considering the possibility of "bombing and destroying Baku". This was supposed to be done by the French Air Forces deployed in Syria.

Here is the whole article, worthy of a huge what if all by itself:
Untitled

That article blew my mind.

The German's could have also knocked out Baku from Northern Turkey or even Syria if it gained more of a presence there.


In May 1941, Vichy France signed an agreement granting the Germans access to military facilities in Syria. In accordance with these orders, aircraft of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) were allowed to refuel in Syria


As for the sticky question of invading Turkey, I think it is most likely that Turkey joins the axis if pressed either before of after an invasion by Germany.

Here is what happened to Romania:

During the Second World War, Romania tried to remain neutral, but on June 28, 1940, it received a Soviet ultimatum with an implied threat of invasion in the event of non-compliance. This, in combination with other factors, prompted the government to join the Axis. The Romanian government ally, Nazi Germany, guaranteed future Romanian territorial integrity. Of all regional allies, with which Romania had treaties with military clauses, only Turkey replied that it would live up to its treaty obligations by providing support in case of a Soviet military aggression.

I think Turkey goes the way of Romania and joins Germany. A strong German ultimatum with the real threat of invasion with a Big Army group at its northern doorstep leaves Turkey with few good options. Russia is a historical enemy and Turkey has shown strong anti-Soviet leanings, Germany is a historical Allie and Turkey has made pacts of friendship with it. France no longer can help protect it and has many Vicky Forces in Syria allied with Germany at this time. Britain is not strong enough to support Turkey by itself in time to save it from economic and military destruction.

The Germans had enough of a presence in Iraq and Syria (Vicky French)to keep the British from really helping Turkey:



Iraq was briefly a co-belligerent of the Axis, fighting the United Kingdom in the Anglo-Iraqi War of May, 1941.Anti-British sentiments were widespread in Iraq prior to 1941. Seizing power on April 1, 1941, the nationalist government of Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali repudiated the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and demanded that the British abandon their military bases and withdraw from the country. Ali sought support from Germany and Italy in expelling British forces from Iraq.



Turkey Overview: In foreign policy it adopted an anti-Soviet stance. After the eruption of World War II, it announced a declaration of neutrality, and on 19/10/1939 it signed a mutual assistance pact with Great Britain and France. Influenced by the early war triumphs of Nazi Germany, Turkey decided to initiate cooperation with the Axis; on 18/06/1941 it signed a pact of friendship with Third Reich. Subsequently, it provided considerable quantities of strategic raw materials to support the German war effort, including 30% of all chrome needed by Germany. Western powers fruitlessly attempted to persuade Turkey to abandon this Axis-friendly neutrality and to join the Allied cause.

Armed Forces: In 1940 the Turkish armed forces were poorly equipped; weapons shipments from Germany, Great Britain, and U.S. did little to improve that condition. After Germany delivered one submarine in 1939, the Turkish navy contained 19 naval vessels and they included one armoured ship, one line cruiser, two light cruisers, two torpedo-boats, four destroyers, five submarines, and four other lesser ships (most vessels were obsolete). The real combat value of the navy was insignificant. By 1940 the Turkish air force was composed of four air regiments (each regiment contained six air companies), and had in possession a total of 370 aircraft (it had 8 500 personnel). Shipments of military equipment from Germany replaced the shipments from Allied countries in the same year.



If Turkey does have the stones to fight Germany rather than join the axis right off, which I doubt, they probably surrender within a few weeks to a month, with Hitler promising territorial Independence, extra lands in the Caucus after the war, and a Vichy Turkey arrangement where Hitler only occupies the Black Sea region and has accesses to air bases. That vrs complete destruction if it does not surrender or join the axis would seem to be the best option forTurkey.



Here is what could happen to Russia in 1941:


By taking the oil region of Russia (i.e. Baku) in five or 10 days, the motorized units of the Red Army would be without fuel.'" Baku provided 75% of the total oil in the USSR, deprived of which, "the Soviet Union would find itself in a crisis". "The fundamental weakness of the Russian economy is its dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus. Russian armed forces and agriculture depend on them heavily."
and far-reaching famine would follow their destruction."

In May 1941 Russia had not developed Baku II and had not begun sabotaging Baku. If the German's do take Baku though moving forces into Turkey, Perhaps 10% of the Baku production could have been salvaged (2-3 million tons) and used to help support a further invasion into Russia from Turkey and the Ukraine, (not risking near the troops and equipment in freezing cold weather) and win a short fought war. I think Germany was living off of 6-9 million tons of oil at the time. Even if they can not get anything out of Baku they still are set up to win a longer war with most Russian oil taken out of her grasp. With most German forces intact from lack of cold-weather fighting they would now being able to get close enough to Baku II from Baku to knock that out if needed. There is also the good chance the British may have destroyed Baku for Germany once Germany enters Turkey making Barbarossa easier.

Even if Turkey does put up a fight, Germany can do enough to knock out Baku. Unless the Russians have a large emergency supply of oil they may be facing famine, motorized units unable to get gas and the might of the German's Army's starting an invasion from the non-cold weather south.

 

While that is all true, by 1941 there were three rings of defense around the Baku fields, and by 1942 they had been cement plugged and the production moved to the easten shore at Baku II.

The three Caucus area oil fieilds were put out of production by the Soviets themselves, Maikop, Grozny, and Baku I. Not a drop of oil would have made it into the Nazi storage tanks or refineries. The Baku I field was a non-producing entity for the Soviets from 1942 until 1946, at their own hand. Stalin told Nikolai Baibakov that he would be shot if a single drop of oil fell into Nazi hands, and he then pumped cement into the wells and transferred the oil drilling machinery and personnel to the eastern field which had been discovered but never fully exploited. Stalin also told Baibakov that if they (the Soviets) couldn't recover the wells post-war he would be shot again!

The British had the "plan" but not the need to execute it. The plan was not to remove the oil from the German control directly, but to do so to remove it from Soviet control as at the time the Soviets were shipping oil to the Nazis. After June of 1941, the picture changed. The plan for the sabotage was in place, not implemented until 1942 as the need/threat was too remote. Even with the "fictional" taking of Turkey, they could have been turned off post-haste if need be.

And let's not forget that shortly after the launching of Barbarossa (on August 25th), the Red Army entered Persia (Iran) from the NW and the British/Commonwealth Army entered the southern section from Iraq, and thus co-occupied the entire area of Persia (Iran). The Soviets withdrew in 1946 as they had agreed to do at Yalta.

And as the Germans had gotten the Turks into the position of loosing their empire after WW1, they weren’t too thrilled with them in this new war. If the Turks had asked, the western allies would have been happy to come to their aid in combating the Nazis in any invasion plan. That was why the Red Army moved into the northern part of Iran on the southern shore of the Caspian sea in Aug. of 1941, to keep the Nazis from having a staging area to strike them from the south.

Even though the fall of France in 1940 nominally placed Syria under the control of the Vichy Government, it wasn’t long before the UK and the Free French wrested control from the Vichy backed government and occupied the area from July of 1941 on, one month after the launch of Barbarossa. They remained there until post-war, in fact the French didn’t leave until April of 1946.

The Turks probably wouldn’t have accepted the Soviets (read Russians) on their territory, but they might have quite easily accepted Free French and Commonwealth troops and air corps help.

 

Are you saying that Germany would not have realistically been able to take out Baku in 1941 if that was their intention from the start? Even by bombing? And that even if the German's did knock out Baku that the Russians would have been able to survive the next year without the Baku oil and Baku II undeveloped at the time? And you think the most likely thing for Turkey to do is to fight it out and hope Britain or Russia helps them in time to save their country from ruin because of what happened in WW1 with Germany?

I think that the German's don't need to take Baku, hold Baku, take or hold all of Turkey or hold off Russian or British troops from Persia from retaking it later. All they need to do is get about 250+ miles into Turkey close enough to bomb and destroy Baku at the start of Barbarossa mid 1941 to initiate a Russian economic collapse and make the invasion from the South West Ukraine much easier.The British and French thought Russia would collapse with Baku out as well.
Of the Luftwaffe air-contingent, 929 planes at the start of Barbarossa were medium bombers. The Messerschmidt Bf 110, Heinkel He 111, and Junkers Ju 88 all had a range of about 1500 miles. Istanbul is about 1000 miles from Baku, so 250 miles into Turkey west of Istanbul would get them to the 1500 mile round trip range.

Now, If Germany really wanted to make sure sure the job was done, they could sacrifice 50-100 planes and try and destroy Baku as a suicide mission from territory they currently held. I'm not claiming this would ever happen, or happen in 1941, but they could have done it if they had the will and the losses could have been well worth the many more planes and lives lost later.


What happens in Turkey after that is not as important as just taking out the oil at the start of the war. It would be gravy if they could take Baku, gain some oil, or if Turkey did join the axis, but none would matter if destroying Baku to Russia in summer 1941 caused industrial collapse and widespread famine as the British and French suspected it would.

And again its just my opinion, but I think the most likely scenario is Turkey joins the axis before invasion or folds and becomes a Vicky Turkey soon after invasion. Of course many other things could happen like quick Russian/British intervention with a solid Turkey holding out and welcoming the Russians in to stop Germany from getting within bombing range of Baku, I just think with what we know of their ties and German Diplomacy, it is most likely Turkey comes into the axis one way or the other, and that Germany gains the 250+ miles at the start of the war either way, making it a moot point.

I guess it really comes down to three questions at this point:

1) Could Germany have taken out Baku in 1941 by bomber if it had the will to do so? 250+ miles seems very attainable with Hitler's forces no matter who tried to stop them.

2) Russia does not need Baku oil later in the war but would Russia have been able to survive the loss of Baku oil in the summer of 1941?

3) Wouldn't a warmer southern Ukraine invasion strategy, including knocking out Baku oil, have been much more beneficial to Germany than the colder northern invasion that cost them so much and failed to collapse the Russian economy?

Salute- Scott

 

Let me address this last part first. The French and British didn't think the Soviet Union would collapse without Baku, they hoped that by reducing Baku's production, Hitler would get less petroleum from Stalin. Not to starve the USSR, but to reduce the amount Hitler received from Stalin before June, 1941. That amount was many millions of barrels of oil going to the Nazi war machine, and being used against the western atllies.

The medium bombers might have "slowed up" the Baku production of the Soviets after the Barbarossa invasion, but bombing an oil field and its refineries is a always a more difficult task than people think.

Remember that from June of 1942, until August of 1944 the allies bombed Ploesti almost without let up. And even though production was slowed for short periods each time, it always was "back online" in far too short a time for allied planners. I believe there were something like seventeen different bombing raids, ranging in size from over 600 heavy bombers down to the original raid of only 16 B-26s. These weren't the wimply little loads from the Luftwaffe mediums either, these were from B-17s and B-26s with tons not pounds of bombs.

I believe the most they every accomplished was a 75% production reduction, and that was only for less than a month. Most of the oil men of the Baku fields were leaders in the field, they could keep Baku producing while Baku II came online to full production. And the Soviets didn’t simply refine it and use it, the product was stored in various places around the SU not just at Baku.

I just figure that Baku was an unreasonable target, and much more difficult to "knock out" of the war than people think. Today folks remember the massive fires at the Kuwait fields, and think it is an easy deed setting those wells alight. That is not true, those fires were started on the ground, not by air-dropped bombs.

This difficulty is why NAPALM was invented BTW, a bomb material which would "stick around" and burn hot and slowly enough to set heavy oils and refined product alight. Normal incendiary devices were not too efficient at this task. The only time the Japanese ever "knocked out" an oil holding farm was when a pilot used kamikazi methods and dived his plane and its bomb into a tank farm in the far east. They were frustrated by their inability to set the stuff alight with normal bomb runs.

I just don't think taking out Baku would "hinder" the Soviet all as much as you suppose. They weren't that "mechanized" an army at the beginning and they quickly got the Lend-Lease program focused toward POL.

In the first four months, from June 23 to late October 1941, there were 130,340 long tons of petroleum products (one long ton equals 1,016,047 kg) received by the USSR from the US. By June 21, 1942, the Allies had supplied 298,349 tons of petroleum products over the first year of the war.

Over the period of June 22, 1941 to September 20, 1945, when Lend-Lease began closing down, the USSR received a total of 2,113,409 long tons of petroleum products, about half of this total (1,305,518 long tons) was in avgas of over 99 octane.

Excerpts from:

http://www.oilru.com/or/22/360/

Read that entire article as it is written from the Soviet/Russian point of view, not the western allies. It was written before the final Lend-Lease debt had been paid by the former USSR, and I am unsure if that has been completely paid as of 2009, but I would assume it has been.

(FYI) As a rule of thumb, a gallon of light "sweet" crude oil weights about 7 pounds; do the math yourself. A "long" or metric ton is about 2,200 pounds, where a "short" ton is the normal measuring size in the petro-world at 2,000 pounds.

 

re: distance- it was 1000 miles from Istanbul to Baku. If the Germans got 250m past Istanbul-or 250m East of Istanbul not West, they would be around 750 miles away, or a 1500 mile round-trip.

I realize that The British/French goal was not to collapse Russia with a strike on Baku, but they did think it could:

Baku provided 75% of the total oil in the USSR, deprived of which, "the Soviet Union would find itself in a crisis". "The fundamental weakness of the Russian economy is its dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus. Russian armed forces and agriculture depend on them heavily."
and far-reaching famine would follow their destruction."

It would be up the the German's to take advantage of of knocking out Baku initially with further bombing raids and other victory's along the Southern Ukraine Invasion route before the Allies could resupply them.

Indecently, what do you think the German's best strategy would have been in mid 1941 to Win the war against the Russian's? (besides not attacking them at all). And no, I don't want Germany to have won the war, I'm just curious on the What if Strategies.

Here is a short movie I helped make on a Russian sniper behind enemy line's taking out a German 88 crew.

YouTube - Vernichter - HD Version - 48 hour film project, SJ, 2009

 

The Rusian Armed forces disposed in june 1941 of 500OOO horses and 280000 cars and trucks . About the Soviet economy:I do not think that in 1941 any economy (excepted the USA ) was dependent on oil :not for transport,not for heating,not for the industry :exemple :in 1939 there were in Belgium 100000 cars and trucks,which were seldom used :now 4000000 .In the USA :how much houses were heated by oil ?

 

So let's see ,
each truck has an average power of ~100 horsepowers *280 000 = 28 000 000 horsepower
each horse has approximately ~ 1 horsepower * 500000 = 500 000 horsepower

Still think they weren't dependent on oil?

 

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe the largest oil producer in the 1940s was the USA. And their military organization obviously reflected that. The sheer number and type of their equipment, as well as their extensive logistical networks, and an almost over the top navy reflected the American's extravagance with oil.

If the Axis captured the oilfields within its reach, all America had to do to keep up the fight was tone down the WAY overpowered navy a little, adjust the highly mechanized military organization, and voila! Enough oil for everyone, as early as 1943.

 

America had enough oil for everyone battling the Axis, without toning down our Navy in the slightest.

In 1939, the US accounted for 60.4% of GLOPAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, and Latin America another 15.3%, so more than three quarters of the world's petroleum production was in the New World (Western Hemisphere).

In the final years of WW2, according to PAW (Petroleum Administration for War) figures of 1943, 95% of all the United Nations' aviation gas comes from the U.S. and 65% of the USA's total overseas tonnage for war is devoted to carrying oil.

Another amazing statistic: in the continental U.S. one oil well has been drilled for every three sq. mi. v. one in every 526 sq. mi. for the rest of the world before the fifties. America remained an oil exporter through the fifties, slid to only oil self-sufficeint in the sixties, and only became an oil importer in the seventies.