Was the Morgenthau plan implemented at the end of the war or did the agreement change, and if so at who's insistence? Did the plan call for 2 permanent German states and again, if so, what names were they to have? Did the agreements at Potsdam put an end to this plan or did the allies (principally) the US consider it still workable?
That was proposed in 1944 by US Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, and was designed to render Germany incapable of fighting another war. It was initially semi-endorsed by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Quebec Conference, but the British government rejected it at home and even Roosevelt had reservations about the viability of such an idea and pulled back from it. Then when its idea was leaked to th American public, in an election year, it was completely disavowed by FDR. It was estimated by many in both governments that 40% of Germany's population would die of starvation if the plan were implemented. Not only did Roosevelt eventually doubt its worth, with Roosevelt's death, it was shelved completely and Henry Morgenthau ceased being a Secretary under Truman. It should be remembered though that a few of its principles were carried into later plans. But none as draconian as Morgenthau had proposed. The modified policy which was agreed on at the Potsdam Conference in 1946, proposed that about 50% of German heavy industry was to be destroyed. The folly of this quickly became apparent in that economically this was bad for Europe, as Germany had been the industrial leader of Europe, and a poor Germany was dragging down the economic recovery of Europe as a whole. This, combined with the growing threat (perceived or otherwise) of the Soviet Union, led to the inclusion of West Germany in the Marshall Plan and it's re-arming as well as its inclusion in NATO in 1949 as a full partner. This was in direct response to the Berlin blockade, and it in turn led to the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The Morgenthau Plan was proposed by one individual and only briefly even considered. It was never considered as a seriously good idea by more than a very few people in the US or Britain. It was not something that was accepted by the US as a whole, nor was it ever implemented. It was not discussed at Yalta, by anyone as it had been shelved by FDR before the meeting, and Truman accepted Morgenthau's resignation after FDR's demise. The Soviets may have welcomed such an idea on their side, and did their very best to strip eastern Germany of all industrial ability. However, it was NOT suggested as a viable concept, and not implemented by the western allies even though in a fit of pique or maybe even vengeance Churchill thought the Morgenthau Plan was a good idea when it was first proposed. Both FDR and Truman (later) realized it was an extension of the failed concept of turning Germany into an agrarian society after WW1, and that attempt may have influenced both Germany’s run-away hyperinflation in the twenties and the occurrence of the Great Depression in the thirties.
Thabks for your answer that has more than met my expectations but I have a nagging doubt that perhaps it was still covert during the occupation of Germany.If its plans were not implemented then why did General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone, approve the distribution of one thousand free copies of "Germany is Our Problem" the book outlining the full Morgenthau Plan,written by Morgenthau to American military officials in Germany. Was this a unwritten implentation ie Was it used to guide the commanders as to their mind set in relation to their dealings with German industry and the rebuilding program? Perhaps the soviet reaction and threat made the Allies change their mind?
Goebbels used the Morgenthau plan as a propaganda win late in the war. It was really a stupid idea to begin with.
I don't fully disagree with your post, the book Germany is our Problem, and its essentials were actually authored by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr.'s aide, Harry Dexter White. White was later identified as a Soviet agent and may have advocated the plan at Soviet behest. The main part of the book Eisenhower worked on was refuting the portion which proposed internationalizing all of Germany’s industrial centers, or giving them to neighboring nations. He (Eisenhower) favored placing Germany's main industrial areas under international governance temporarily, and getting the German people working on trying to feed themselves by focusing on agricultural production. Remember that by 1945 there was an extreme food shortage in Europe, and Germany especially as the most agrarian area ended up in the Soviet occupation zone. Eisenhower also disliked the idea of permanently dividing Germany back into its numberous smaller duchy/states, i.e. pre-Unification as proposed in Morgenthau's (White's) plan. While I’m not defending his distribution of the book itself, it was far easier to read and understand than JCS 1067 which was his guide for governing occupied Germany in his zone. See: http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf Much of that guide (JCS 1067) was not easily understood by those who weren’t in on its construction, while the book was much easier to assimilate, and a very toned down version of the original Morgenthau Plan. And since it had been written in response to other "flawed" handbooks for occupation, as well as the Morgenthau Plan, it was really the guide Eisenhower used. Or at least that is the way I see it, I could be wrong.
Actually the M plan WAS implemented for a period of time, maybe 2 years. There seems to be some confusion here as to what document the name "Morgenthau plan" should be attached to, with some authors, possibly apologists, preferring to attach it only to the first rough draft from 1944, when in reality it applied to, and was used for, almost all the follow-on plans that adhered to it's general philosophy. In early 1947 former U.S. president Herbert Hoover, who had become an expert on food supply issues, was dispatched by president Truman to lead a team of agricultural and economic experts to review the food situation in occupied Germany. Hoover was so alarmed by what he saw that he expanded the scope of the reports. In one of them he reported.5. In addition to the above courses of action, there have been general policies of destruction or limitation of possible peaceful productivity under the headings of "Pastoral state" and war potential". The original of these policies apparently expressed on Sept 15, 1944, at Quebec, aimed at "converting Germany into a country principally agricultural and pastoral,". He also noted. There are several illusions in all this "was potential" attitude. A. there is the illusion that the new Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "Pastoral State." It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population in France. Allan Lightner, a high ranking member of the U.S. occupation administration made the following observations: ...those [Morgenthau plan] ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary [James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in [September] 1946. They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067. Well, to us those months between V-E Day and mid-'46 seemed a long time. That's when much of the dismantling was taking place. ....it gradually became clear to our people who had favored the Morgenthau plan that in our own interest, in terms of our ability to accomplish our political goals in Germany, you had to give them hope for the future. How could we make them a democratic country by treating them as the Romans treated the Carthaginians. I guess the turning point was Secretary Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart in September 1946. By that time after the experience of running occupied Germany for a year, the more Draconian policies of JCS-1067 were being interpreted differently. The British Government of late 1946 seems to agree with Lightner, as does president Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State James Byrnes, unless the British government is lying in its private meeting minutes.: b) U.S. policy was pastoralising (Morgenthan) until Stuttgart speech. They supported R. & Fr. case - to point of reducing steel prodn to 5.8 m. Before this was completed I had seen Byrnes (before Stuttgart speech) & asked wtr. this meant he wd. overthrow Morgenthau policy. He said yes - with Truman's authy. The Morgenthau policy to pastoralize Germany was obviously not just briefly considered and then just by a few. In various shapes it guided official U.S. occupation policy for at the very least one and a half year until political and humanitarian realities forced even the most stubborn adherents in power to abandon it. Let's hope it didn't cause too many excess deaths...
