Hitler's Armada

Anyone who hasn't read this book it is an alternative look upon the time around the 'Battle of Britain' and the author makes some good points regarding the Royal Navy being the main reason the German's didn't invade and not the success of the RAF,I'm not having a go at the RAF they did a brilliant job but this book is worth a read.

 

Well, I haven't read that book, but clearly the RAF was barely hanging on for most of the Battle of Britain. They were given a break when the Germans accidentally (by some accounts) starting bombing cities instead of RAF bases and radar sites.

Germany really would have been out of its element trying to invade the UK by sea against the UK's superior navy. Most of the German navy was bottled up by the RN already in the Baltic Sea. The Royal Navy I believe would have been able to meet and defeat any such German flotilla coming from France. The RAF could have served with the Royal Navy as well in providing air cover.

Logistically, the Germans really had a problem in assembling an invasion force from the proper troop transports, invasion boats, and supporting cruisers. Lots of equipment was in the field and probably not fully operational. The available troops were probably in need of R&R; plus their was the need to patrol and police the newly conquered areas on the Continent.They probably might have had better chances with an initial and limited airborne invasion with paratroopers to secure possible ports of entry for the invasion fleet (if assembled in time).

Al in all, Operation Sea Lion was a pipe dream.

 

I think the German vessels were nothing like the Allies' boats on D-Day more Canal barges than Landing craft and like the book said the Royal Navy would of had a field day against this type of plan

 

Sounds like an interesting book - Sea Lion does not get a lot of coverage.

 

They may have been 'barely hanging on' but the RAF did somehow manage to destroy 1,100 Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of Britain period.

 

in fact they "barely" won the battle..which seems to have caused some consternation to this day. Figuures whys..rather thabmn me reading the book..how many fighters and bombers did the RNshoot down in the southern battle area between say july and october 1940?

 

"A win is a win ...one point or forty." - some American Football coach

 

Max Hastings makes a good point in his new book about Churchill - the Navy fared very badly indeed against air attack in both the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres and wouldn't have done much better in the Channel or North Sea. As for the RAF providing 'cover', they would have encountered the same problems with range that the Luftwaffe faced. Which anyway begs the question - if the RAF was just 'hanging on', how much cover could they have provided.....?

 

Another alternative I think would be to think if the RAF fighter planes had had bigger and more ffective guns just how many more German bombers would have not made it home....

 

A 'few slow-moving Stukas' sure gave the Navy a major problem in the Mediterranean in 1941/2 ; and don't forget that those 1,000 ships were spread quite thinly. By the time of the Battle of Britain, the Navy had already lost one battleship, two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, twenty-two submarines and thirty-seven destroyers. Something must have been sinking them.....

 

I am new to this forum, but have previously visited several others, and am always fascinated to observe how quickly a reference to any book on Operation 'Sealion' degenerates into a squabble, usually ill-informed, about the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the Luftwaffe against warships. I have always been interested in the events of 1940, and I read 'Hitler's Armada' about six months ago. It was the reference to it that drew my attention to this forum.

Quite simply, the book is superb! It is packed with facts and figures, examines the role and effectiveness of the RN in the Norwegian campaign and Operation 'Dynamo' and describes the German invasion plan in considerable detail. It also lays out, possibly for the first time in print, the dispositions of all significant RN warships at the time of greatest threat (September, 1940).

It is virtually impossible to gainsay the conclusion presented by the author, that the strength of the RN in Home Waters (and in fact mainly at Sheerness, Harwich, and Plymouth, rather than at Scapa Flow as the pro-RAF lobby have always erroneously claimed) that made a German invasion attempt impossible.

I would urge anyone with a serious interest in the subject to get hold of a copy of this book if they really wish to know the true facts, although I fear that those who cling to the idea of the crucial importance of the Battle of Britain may well not like what they read!!

 

its not a case of liking what one reads mate...more a case of the battle happened how it happened and not how it could have happened if...unless the raf didnt actually win an air battle in 1940?

 

It's a fairly sterile subject, really ( like so many 'what-ifs' ) - one could equally say that if a stiff breeze had got up on whichever day the Germans attempted to invade using converted Rhine barges, the invasion would have failed.....

The fact is, surely, that invasion was not at the forefront of German thinking. A devasting, aerial assault followed by rapid Political and moral collapse (such as had been acheived elsewhere by Blitzkrieg ) was the intention.

It failed.

I must say that I am always fascinated to observe how would-be revisionists will devote endless discussion and printers ink to deny that the German armed forces failed to achieve their objective thanks to the efforts of the RAF.

They may not like to read it - but it happened.

 

Could someone, anyone, tell me how many amphibious operations were successful when the defenders held air superiority? While at it, someone could ask the Japanese how hard it is to conduct naval operations when you are both shooting at enemy ships and defending against air attack.

 

I believe Hitler never really had a true vision of making an invasion- he had too much to lose politically. A failed invasion would ruin his political image just after the partying of the fall of France. Too much to lose in the game. Also the Rhine barges were too slow to be used, and the RAF Bomber Command could destroy several of them at night as they did, and the RN might join this work. Interesting subject anyway but sending the men with shipping them to battle in Rhine river barges- I dont´think so!

My book reference:Feel free to comment.

From Derek Robinson "Invasion 1940"

For Germans:

"This was the enormous gamble of Sealion. Its planners assumed that all would go well, or at least fairly well.They could tolerate losses of 10 or 20 per cent in the crossing, but they must have enough shipping to get back to France, re-load, return, and hustle reinforcements to the men on the beaches who, after 48 hours, of fighting, must be running out of strength and hope and ammunition. The RN existed to shatter that plan. Even if it sank only half the enemy ships each night, that was enough to kill off Sealion.

---------

What evidence is there that the RN was competent to find and to smash Sealion at night? Here is what it did in September 1940.

On 11 SEptember , every port from Holland to Cherbourg got entered and shelled. Next night, British destroyers, MTB`s and fast gunboats from the Nore, Portsmouth and Plymouth carried out what was almost a tour of inspection, entering the mouth of the Maas, Flushing and the Scheldt, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulougne, Le Touquet and even heavily fortified Cherbourg surveying them for signs of invasion preparations and shelling...any vessels..they encountered. All the attackers got back to England unharmed.And so it continued. The biggest operation was in the early hours of 11 October. The Battleship Revenge, with an escort of seven destroyers, bombarded Cherbourg harbour and left it in flames. A week later Calais got similar treatment. A total of 45 salvoes hit the harbour. No British ships were lost.

If the RN, night after night, in fair weather or foul, could penetrate the invasion ports and sink enemy ships, there can surely be no doubt that the same British warships could find the Sealion fleets in mid-Channel, and reduce them to wreckage and corpses. The German Army and Navy expected to land 60,000 men on S-day. Few would have lived to see the dawn. "

 

Hello barrow,

Sorry, but I fail to follow on that conclusion!

Don't you think that the German invasion never took place, since the Luftwaffe failed in its objectives. Due to this decisive RAF victory, the planed German invasion force would have been at the mercy of the RN.

Hence the RAF victory provided the basis for the actual threat potential of the RN towards an Operation Sealion.

Regards
Kruska

 

Given that the RAF postion with respect to the ratio of fighters available compared to the LW got better soon after it started and never appreciably deteriated I'm not at all sure that's clear.