Senate vote, Pearl Harbor, FDR, Kimmel, Short & Marshall

Thank you Slipdigit.

Is it possible that the beginning of hostilities could have been revealed in the heavenly bodies?

Every Japanese landing, save the one at Davao, between 8 DEC 41 and 23 JAN 42 occurred during the week of a 1st Quarter or a 3rd Quarter moon. These generally are the periods when the tides are least vigorous.

Location Date Moon Quarter
Malaya-Thailand 8 DEC 41 3rd (-3 day)
Wake-Guam 10 DEC 41 3rd (-1 day)
Legaspi 12 DEC 41 3rd (+1)
Davao 20 DEC 41 New Moon (+2)
Lingayen 22 DEC 4 1st (-3)
Tarakan/Menado 11 JAN 42 3rd (+1)
Balikpapan 23 JAN 42 1st (-1)
Kendari 24 JAN 42 1st (0)

There are the two War Warning messages being cited here. They were issued on 16 OCT 41 and 27 NOV 41, respectively.

If Zulu Time is used then the dates between 24 OCT to 30 OCT and 22 NOV to 28 NOV 41 fall inside a 1st Quarter moon cycle. Kido Butai does depart on 25 NOV 41 (Z) or 26 NOV 41 local. Similarly, 3rd Quarter moon cycles fall between 9 NOV 41 to 15 NOV 41 and 8 DEC 41 to 14 DEC 41. The Pearl Harbor/Malaya attacks begin on 7/8 DEC 41, depending where one is located.

There was general agreement that something was going to happen in the Far East, to start the war between Japan and the Allies. Where the first blow was going to land and who was going to be on the receiving end can be argued in perpetuity if wished.
Still, a heightened alert appears warranted for all commands, during the periods most likely for a Japanese landing. That did seem to occur historically in weeks of the 1st and 3rd lunar quarters. The weeks where a New or Full moon occurs are likely to be a period of reduced concern for landings.
If this extrapolation is correct, then there could have been regular periods for heightened vigilance and regular periods for stand down. It would be unnecessary to flog men and machine into heightened states of continual alert and readiness, awaiting the (presumably) unknown start date(s). Nor would it necessary to rely upon intel gleaned and distributed from higher sources to determine upon a course of action based on who, what, where and when to expect conflict.
Actually, 7 DEC 41 was such a date for heightened alert. And if this supposition isn't totally out of whack, it only requires a H.O. Pub 9 and a cursory reading of USN FTP-167 to understand why that date deserved a heightened alert.

 

You stated that Halsey was engaging in “hindsight", but the fact is that Halsey at the time took strong measures to ensure the security of his command.

 

Glenn,
Thank you for your note. Admiral Halsey wrote:
"Even then, I think everyone present knew that the disaster would be formally investigated, but I'll take my oath that not one of us would have guessed that the blame would fall on Kimmel, because not one of us thought he deserved it--any part of it. I want to emphasize my next statement. In all my experience, I have never known a Commander in Chief of any United States Fleet who worked harder, and under more adverse circumstances, to increase its efficiency and to prepare it for war; further, I know of no officer who might have been in command at that time who could have done more than Kimmel did. I also want to repeat and reemphasize the answer I made when the Roberts Commission asked me how I happened to be ready for the Japanese attack. I told them, 'Because of one man: Admiral Kimmel.'"
Admiral Willam F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story, McGraw Hill, Inc., New York, 1947, p.82.
Regards,
tk

 

Originally Posted by Glenn239
Halsey maintained his TF at a high level of alert during his voyage to and from Johnston just before the war. It would be intellectually dishonest to suggest he engaged in ‘hindsight’ when his behaviour at the time with the forces under his command suggests the opposite.

Can we please get the Misson straight?!? Wake is located at 19 Deg 18 min N, 166 Deg 38 min E. Johnston is located at 16 Deg 45 min N, 169 Deg 31 min W. It's "Navigationally Dishonest" to imagine that even a plebe could shoot a sextant that far off . I hope.
BTW OP. Are you actually concurring with Adm. Halsey's commentary from the foreword of Adm. Theobald's book?!?

Quote:
He was afraid he'd run into some Japanese forces at sea. That's why he left the BBs at Pearl.
You stated that Halsey was engaging in “hindsight", but the fact is that Halsey at the time took strong measures to ensure the security of his command.

OP makes two references to hindsight. The first concerns Adm Halsey's commentary in the foreword to Adm Theobald's book. The second was in reference to the Bomb Grid/Plot message. I'm trying to grasp which one is being referred to here.
Yes, both seem to be referenced in the Theobald book. However, if Bomb Plot/Grid comms are not being forwarded to the IJN, then the message becomes superfluous. It can also be argued that since there was a Naval Base in Pearl Harbor, such information logically concludes an attack occurs.

 

Because glittering generalities are being used to draw conclusions. Vague bits of information are being asserted as irrefutable facts. These facts morph in absolute proofs. An example might be, "Since I know of a Bomb Plot/Grid, and everyone knows it too, therefore I know the intention of the Japanese was to bomb Pearl Harbor."

I believe that you are trying to point out the differences and the steps between data collection, data translation, data interpretation, data distribution, data assimilation and data application. The jumping to conclusions, based upon how it supports one's theory, does not absolve one from the need for taking all the steps between collection and application. You may get lucky and get it right. Or worse, you may miss the whole point.

 

If you are seeing stars in the middle of the day, you might need to get that checked out!

 

Isn't there a petroglyph where FDR is depicted as an Apostate of Hell? I'm certainly no fan of his. However, as a human being, I would place him at a higher level than most of his peers.
Have you ever come across the book, Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America ? It should be prescribed reading for anyone considering an avocation as at CT. If for no other reason to serve as a cautionary warning not to suspend one's reasoning or allow undue manipulation.
Then again, I did get along with the CTs, whether they were I,M,O,R or T's.

 

OP,
Good point. Here's some more of the story:
Joint Memo for FDR from Marshall & Stark
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions….
“(b)-War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks….
“Specifically they recommend:
“That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.”
Memo dated, November 5, 1941.
CC to Kimmel 11/14/41—Received 11/20/41
16PHA2220-21

CNO Admiral Stark
“[On 11/27/41] I do not recall…having seen the [11/26/41 American Note/Ultimatum] or having heard anything about it….
“I haven’t the slightest recollection of that note.”
32PHA91—Testimony to the Naval Court

Chief of Naval War Plans Admiral Turner
“We didn’t know [about Hull’s delivery of the 11/26/41 note/ultimatum] at the Navy Department until we got it through MAGIC on the 28th.”
4PHA2039
NB: Kimmel was never told that FDR ignored Marshall and Stark's advice and sent the American Note/Ultimatum on 11/26/41 anyway. Of course, if Kimmel had had access to MAGIC, like Marshall and Stark testified that they thought he had, then Kimmel also would have known that the die was cast. Indeed, if Kimmel had had access to MAGIC then Marshall would not have needed to send his belated Alert, because there was nothing in it that was not readily available from MAGIC.

And, apparently, no one realized at the time that the American Note was written in the first iterations by Soviet spy, Harry Dexter White, also, apparently at the urging of the NKVD, aka., the KGB.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board styled the American Note as:
" the document that touched the button that started the war.”
39PHA137, 29PHA2152

Regards,
tk

 

Why does POTUS or STATE have to run diplomatic dispatches by a Fleet Commander or Department Head, much less the CNO or CoS? It's nice if FDR or Hull think of how their actions will affect the folks who are about to enforce their policies. Not necessary, but nice.
I've read somewhere that it was the IJN policy to run all their Strategies by their cooks first. I guess that it's not entirely unfeasible that it should be run down the Chain until everyone is onboard. It seems cumbersome though.

Now just where was Adm Kimmel going to get his MAGIC traffic? In his testimony, ADM Stark attests to the fact that he never saw the note...which Capt. Turner did...by reading it in MAGIC. So now even Adm Stark is out of the loop.

Just how did this dispatch, "touch the button that started the war"? Kido Butai departed Etorofu on the 26/27th of November 1941. They left Etorofu after transferring up from Kure, et al, so that they could depart in cognito. And it would have been the 29th Tokyo time/28th Washington time, before it was being run by the IJN cooks.

I wanna see what the SVR/FSB/KGB/NKVD/GRU have deep in THEIR vaults!

 

Mr. Kimmel,

What about Stark's message to Admirals Kimmel and Hart from Nov. 24th,

And also, did not Knox, Stark, Stimson, and Gerow, meet on the November 27th. at which time Stimson phoned Hull for a situation report, that is what Prange says in At Dawn We Slept on pg 398.

Further What about the famous War Waring message sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 27th, the lead sentence is

Kimmel didn't need MAGIC, he had OPNAV!

 

Also, was not Admiral Turner the one whom came up with the phrase "war warning" as reported by Prange on pg.406 of ADWS. So, it seems that the Navy Department and Admiral Turner were well aware of the break in diplomatic relations by November 27th and not because of a MAGIC intercept on the November 28th.