How Hitler could have won

More about the german jews that Hitler was determined to exterminate, and the many causes of his defeat.

Richard Lewinsky

 

Fortunately for us Europeans, Hitler and the Third Reich only could have won, or at least survived WW2, if they had been able to make peace with some of their enemies. But this was impossible because what nazism meant was struggle for total domination and exploitation, unacceptable by any other power like SU, USA or UK.
Some other options :
- if Americans had really been incapable of building anything but fridges...
- if Britons could accept total german hegemony over Europe...
- if Soviets had been democrats and parcimonious with their blood...

 

Which is why I say the Germans could perhaps have won, but the Nazis never could. The Nazis blew all their political credibility in 1933-1939, and then proceeded to waste their military credibility on an unwinnable war, making really bad economical and immoral decisions on the way to their ignoble but inevitable doom.

 

2 points :
1) the making of immoral decisions were not causing Germany's defeat
2)about the bad economic decisions :could you give some exemples of bad economic decisions,that,in your opinion,were causing Germany's defeat ?

 

"LJAd" I'm not the poster known as "green slime", but I'll take a shot at these if you don't mind. I believe the waste of time, effort and material in attempting to make "Greater Germany" Judenfrei, was detrimental to the total war they themselves promoted. I mean during the final spasms of the Nazi regime trains carrying much needed material and supplies for the Eastern Front were diverted to allow the KZ trains through to the extermination/labor camps. That couldn't be helpful to the war effort, and clearly connected with an "immoral" position of Nazi racial beliefs.

As far as #2, how about not going on a full war production footing and utilizing their "women folk" until the war was clearly on the decline?

The German economy of the 1930’s continued to satisfy both civilian and military requirements, even after September of 1939 when production should have shifted to military needs. Hitler believed that he could have it both ways, "Kanonen und Butter" - that is, satisfying the civilian population at home by not placing restrictions on their consumer product consumption, while at the same time satisfying the production needs of Germany's military forces. In fact, Germany was not geared for total war production until 1944. This indicates that German economic and military resource management efforts were not optimally configured for a nation at war previous to that time, and in 1944, the tide had already long since turned.

…In terms of human resources, Germany should have increased the hours of a workday to way beyond a regular "9-5" day early in the war. Women were not considered as a serious alternative work force until late in the war either. In 1939, German industries utilized 2.62 million women. In July of 1944, German industries still only utilized 2.67 million women. This average was maintained from 1939 to 1944.


Goto:

A Germany-Soviet Military-Economic Comparison

 

a) Reread my statement: I didn't say immoral decisions were the cause of their defeat... But indirectly they were a cause of the "unconditional" surrender demand made by the allies, and therefore definitely meant they were heading towards a more complete & utter defeat.

1) Political credibility: Not one of the Western powers was willing to give any notice of Germany's peace overtures from 6th October 1939 onward.
2) Immoral Decisions: mistreatment of a not insignificant portion of the population of Europe, not only undermined their own efforts, alienated sections of said population, it also aided the allied cause, speeding their defeat: In a nation beset by enemies on all sides, short on rolling stock and coal, they still spent time and energy transporting millions of Europeans to Concentration camps.
3) Economic decisions: Not mobilising the economy for war until Speer became Minister of Armaments; Slave labour (never going to produce quality goods, and sabotage problems); Women never mobilised; wasting of resources (mismanaging weapons procurement programs, competing organisations on almost every level, etc); Consumer goods still at nearly pre-war levels during 1941 (Compare to the war economy that not only England was on, but the entire British Empire).

All of these decisions are such, that the Nazis could not have made any other decision, because of their ideology, and world view. There is no way, they could have won. The Jewish question had to be resolved, German women would never work in a factory, Hitler's and Nazis world view required multiple organisations to compete for resources, rather than co-ordinate their efforts. Whether it comes to Foreign Intelligence, or competing Military branches, or the large variety of different tracked vehicles causing logistical nightmares... the list just goes on and on...

All told: The Nazis were doomed.

A more reasonable Germany, may have been able to achieve more lasting results, retain certain territories, and not be invaded: but a more reasonable Germany wouldn't be at war... Nevertheless, a "win".

 

Yes, Brndrt1, you stated what I meant, even before I completed my post! And bringing up my very points! Well stated!

 

Thanks for the salute, and I figured I had a pretty good idea of what you were getting at. I apologize for "hijacking" your post/reply. I had the time and had a good idea where I could find that old link. Have a good one!

 

Tooze in Wages of Destruction makes a pretty good case for economic decisions in the early 30's having significant impact on German economic problems and production capacity in the late 30s and 40s. If Germany concentrates on building up their economy and winning friends in the early 30's the pressure for war is considerably decrease and if Germany does go to war in the 40's theres a better chance that they can keep it more limited in scope.

As for "Immoral decisions" impacting the war it's worth remembering that they were welcomed in many areas of Eastern Europe as liborators before they turned the populace against them. Whether or not haveing the populations of these areas continue to support them would be enough to turn the war around is an open question but it would seem to me that it would have resulted in a net gain at a time when Germany couldn't afford net losses.

 

hm,about the women :
your POV is to narrow(only counting women working in the industries):let's look on "the wages of destruction"P 358:
the fact that more women were not mobilised for war work,is sometimes taken as one more symptom of the inability of the Nazi regime to demand sacrifices from the German population .In this respect it has often been contrasted to Britain where an increase of female participation to the workforce was the key to sustaining the wareffort .Such comparisons are COMPLETELY MISLEADING,because the labour market participation of women in 1939 was higher then that reached by Britain and the US even at the end of the war .
In 1939 more than a third of the German workforce were women.
For Britain,it was only a quarter.
At the end of the war,it was 51 % for Germany and 41 % for Britain .
The explanation of this difference :the structural differences of both economies.
In 1939 :Germany:14 million women workers,2.7 million(as you stated) in the industry and,6 MILLION in the agriculture.
:Britain :6 million women workers,of which less than 100000 in the agriculture .
Thus
1)because there were already more % German women working,the % could only partially be increased
2) since most German women were working in the agriculture,they could not be shifted to the industry,otherwise the food production would fall ignominiously .
Other point :that Germany was not going on a full war production (your point 2) :well,that's an old muth,spreaded by ... yes , Speer,who,after he was liberated was telling the credulous journalists the following
1) before me :chaos
2) I was the saviour of the German economy
3) If the stupid Hitler had followed my advice,we could have won .
You get the picture ?
But,three times wrong :
1) there was no chaos before the arival of the "messiah" Speer :his predecessor (Todt) was doing a good job
2)Speer was not the saviour of the German economy :he was embroiding on the foundations laid by Todt ,and,a lot of his figures publicised in his memoirs(big increase of war production) have been debunked as falsifications.
3)I doubt very much Speer's claims that,without Hitler's interventions,the situation would be better .
One should look at the question who was the instigator of the V1 and V2 projects (which can be assumed as wast of money and ressources ).

 

1) your point 1 :doubtful :the appeasers did not disappear on 3 september 1939
2) the immoral decisions :the economic consequences ,waste,of the Holocaust were neglectable in proportion to the German war effort
3) the economic decisions :already been answered;don't believe what Speer was claiming (much better is Tooze),that the German women were not working in the factories,maybe,but,they were working at the farms :those producing butter,milk,bread,..also were working for the war economy .

 

on the Speer myth,I should counsel very strongly chapter 17 of "Wages of destruction":Speer,the miracle man .

 

1) Actually, in the Empire, of course there were diehard appeasers, but they no longer reflected the popular opinion. There was no way it was going to be accepted anymore.

2)I disagree. Because the indirect consequences and costs are larger than just the immediate costs.

3) Farming in Europe was often inefficient and small scale (it still is in Poland and France). The women living in cities were most definitely not involved in farming. I'll look further at Tooze, but I'm sceptical.

 

the bad economic decisions ...I got one of these: the nazis didn´t secure the spanish tungsten supply during the SCW, so the allies dramaticaly rise up its price during the war.

Adolph and Italy...

 

Won the WWII as you know defeating Russia, Britain and US? Nothing short of the Sun Gun could.

 

First thing he could have done was taken a chance early on, Even before there Air battle was won, he should have launched the invasion.. Forget about the RN and RAF, They would have caused casualties but very possibly not enought to prevent the Germans gaining a bridgehead and securing there supply lines. Win or lose the casualties wouldn't have been enought to cripple germany and there military operations. Then depending on situation launch an offensive in NA, Secure Egypt and pssibly area's of Mid East, Sudan and Horn of Africa and and take Malta and Gibralter. While this would be around time they wanted to invade Russia it would be better sevuring there other fronts before taking on there biggest task. In any case the invasion of Russia was behind schedule and poorly equipped in way of supplies and spare's, an extra year would make a big difference.

 

an extra year also would make a big difference for the SU :a production of thousands of T 34

 

The likelyhood of secuing a bridgehead for even a few hours would have been vanishinglly small. Securing supply lines would have been essentially out of the question.

The KM would essentially cease to exist except for a few cripples and the LW would have suffered even more severe losses than they did historially during the BOB.

Simply not in the cards.

 

First thing he could have done was taken a chance early on, Even before there Air battle was won, he should have launched the invasion

There is some merit to Von Noobles words...It may well have failed at the time also, but if there was to be an invasion the optimum time would have been to foolow the BEF on their heels. The only time there was chance if there ever was one.

 

Bring it on.............