Axis Joint Strike on the USSR

And then there's the fact that if the US decided to aid the Soviets it would put them in a position where a confrontation would be very difficult to avoid. What happens if the US supplies food and clothing by way of either plane or escorted convoys to the Soviets. Without the PH attack the IJN is at best on par with the USN in the Pacific and that's before the US starts shifting ships and planes.

 

That is a fact, as soon as the Nazis attacked the USSR, they were put on the Lend-Lease list, and while the first shipments didn't leave American ports for the Soviets until Nov. of 1941, they were on the way. Japan also had already sent a large portion of its troops and goods south into Vichy-French Indo China (Vietnam) in 1940, well before the Nazis attacked in June (without telling the Japanese by the way).

For the Japanese, helping the Nazis in the USSR was a non-starter. They couldn't gain anything by helping, and didn't have either the troops, the petroleum, the rubber, the military machinery, nor the food-stuffs to "go north" into the barren wastes of Siberia against a still very strong Far East Red Army and Air force.

They (Japan) had removed a great deal of their experienced manpower from the Mongolian/Manchurian area for their work in both their garrisons on their island strongholds, and in southeast Asia (Indo-China) where they occupied those former French territories. And BTW, there were more Soviet troops left in the far east than one might think. Soviet troops in the far east on 22 June 1941:

17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies.

Soviet troops in the far east on 1 January 1942:

19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies.

Apparently, even when units were sent west after the start of Operation Barbarossa, they were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front, nor the 80,000 Mongolian troops carrying Soviet weapons.

 

This is utter nonsense. The Japs had a lot to gain from the Russian Far East... in the Russian Revolution they desperately tried to hold onto it until the last minute when it ended up consuming close to half of its GDP on the expedition.

All I'm saying is what if the Japanese hadn't invaded China in 36 and built up its ground army because it saw the Soviets as a threat. When Barbarossa happens, the Japs see the opportunity and go for it again. Except this time the Japanese are at full force... 60 divisions could've realistically been put together from 36-41... supplies, armor and technology all would've been in far better shape because of the lack of the embargo placed on it when it invaded China. You cited 20 Russian divisions which pretty much was equivalent to the force the Japs had on the northern border historically... the Russians obviously would've shifted far more troops to the east if they had witnessed the buildup of 60 divisions. The Japs could've done some heavy damage if they had focused against the Soviets, drawing away 30+ divisions away from the western front than had historically been there.

 

Oh yes?
I could say that it is utter nonsense to say that Japan had a lot to gain from the Russian Far East .
And,unless you have any proof,it is IMHO,utter nonsense to claim that the Japanese intervention in the Russan civil war cost them half of their GDP.

 

The Japs absolutely hated Communism like the rest of the allies that intervened in the Russian Civil War... that and their desire to turn Siberia into a buffer state that would always protect them from the reach of the Russians.

"After the international coalition withdrew its forces, the Japanese Army stayed on. However, political opposition prevented the Army from annexing the resource-rich region. Japan continued to support White Movement leader Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak until his defeat and capture in 1920, and also supported the regime of Ataman Semenov, whose unstable government collapsed by 1922. In March and April 1922, the Japanese Army repulsed large Bolshevik offensives against Vladivostok. Public opinion in Japan mounted against the cost of the Siberian Intervention, which had absorbed over half the national budget for two years. On June 24, 1922 Japan announced that it would unilaterally withdraw from all of Russian territory with the exception of northern Sakhalin island ( held until 1925 ) , which had been seized in retaliation for the Nikolaevsk Incident of 1920 by October"

Spending over half your national budget for two years on something where the Japanese did not have a "lot to gain" doesn't make a lot of sense does it? No, I think the Japanese very much wanted Russia out of the picture... they just needed help. They very well knew they couldn't take on the USSR by themselves.

 

If you don't know,there is a difference between GDP and national budget .
And,again,the situation in 1922 was very different from the one of 1936 or 1941:in 1922 Japan had not to consider a possible US attack or ultimatum.And,in 1922,Japan was not that involved in China.
In 1936 (or later) Japan could not be involved in China (already in 1931),have a big fleet and attack in Siberia .
Btw :maybe you should consider the following :as no one in 1936 knew that on 22 june 1941 Hitler would attack the SU,why should Japan reorientate its foreign and defense policy in 1936,with the hope of attacking together with Hitler ?the SU in 1941.

 

Ideas and plans from the "Hokushin-Ron" Northern Strategy faction withing the Japanese hierarchy.

"Detailed planning of Japanese operations against the USSR"


"In 1934 Japanese Kantogun forces had four complete armored divisions, 18 air squadrons and 164,100 in infantry divisions. At a secret military conference they fixed July 2 as X-day for the fight against the Soviets. They concluded the following points: (a) initially not to intervene in a Russo-German War; (b) to proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations, while consolidating secret preparations against USSR; (c) if a Russo-German War turns out favorably for Japan, to settle the Northern problem by force and maintain stability in recent northern conquests. Accordingly, from the outbreak of a Russo-German War the Chungking operation (Chinese war) should be suspended. Army High Command was traditionally watchful towards the Soviet Union. They considered the settlement of the 'China incident' incomplete, because Japan was tied down by the USSR. At the root of the High Command attitude towards the USSR lay the following consideration: conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness towards the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia.
The main objective of the Imperial Army would be to build up to the strength necessary to occupy all the Maritime Province and Sakhalin Island, while at same time securing Manchuria and occupying exterior Mongolia and the Lake Baikal. Other probable objectives added to the basic war plan were a possible invasion of Irkutsk-Krasnoyarsk (East-Central Siberia), and/or an incursion to occupy Central Asia mainland.
After this secret conference, Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun" or "Kantokuen" for short. The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops."

Hokushin-ron

 

I agree with the assertion that Siberia was indeed resource rich and very valuable to both the Soviet Union and Japan. I don't support the idea that Japan needed to restructure its strategic military composition in order to succeed against the Red Army in 1941 though. The battle of Lake Khasan more or less showed the IJA could defeat the Red Army on equal terms and Khalkhin Gol demonstrated that the Japanese could be defeated by the Red Army if out-numbered and out gunned. As a footnote of Khalkhin Gol I will point out that the Japanese committed their forces piecemeal, without preperation, lacked recon/intel and still managed to cause the Red Army as many casualties as they (IJA) lost. In summer of 1941 I would therefore believe that a properly supplied and numerically superior IJA moving offensively could handle the Red Army in the Far East/Siberia. The IJA would need to suspend anything but defensive operations in China or maybe seek a favorable (but temporary) peace there and shift major forces north to Manchukuo in the months prior to invasion.
As for the political effects, if Japan is defensive in China for ALL of 1941 leading up to the attack on the Soviet Union then perhaps the US oil embargo has a chance of not happening? I understand it was more or less a response to the Japanese occupation of French Indochina, but possibly influenced by the ongoing war in China. Either way, without Pearl Harbor just how much public outcry would there be in the US to start a war with Japan if they were no longer fighting the Chinese but instead attacking "the Reds"? The same "Reds" as had made a pact with Nazis, swallowed up the Baltics, occupied Eastern Poland and attacked poor little Finland (from the American public's perspective).

 

I disagree here. Khalkin Gol showed that the Japanese were doomed if they decided on a full scale war with Russia.

First, the Japanese deployed a single infantry division there. It was all they could manage to support at the end of a 300+ mile supply line from the nearest rail head. The division was commited intact as a whole and, for the Japanese, well equipped and trained.

Second, it showed that the Soviets had an overwhelming material superiority as they deployed a whole army against the Japanese (5 divisions). Their mechanzied superiority was stunning for Japan with over 300 AFV being deployed. The Japanese division literally was overwhelmed by the opposition.
So, while the Japanese dished out fairly heavy casualties on the Soviets it didn't matter. The Soviets just kept coming and ground the Japanese into the dirt.
The same holds true in the air. The IJAAF had fewer than 100 aircraft available. They barely had the pilots to fly them. So, while the Japanese pilots were excellent sheer numbers ensured that about half eventually were lost in combat fighting against up to 10 times their numbers in the air.
The Japanese losses were literally unsustainable. The 23rd Division was reinforced by elements of the 7th during this battle but it made no difference. The Japanese took nearly 80% casualties on the ground and saw their meager air assets reduced to nothing.

The two infantry divisions represent nearly a quarter of the forces available to them in Manchuko (Manchuria). The Soviets had and kept nearly 50 divisions in the Far East throughout the war or, about five times what the Japanese had.

Third, the Japanese found they were totally unprepared for large scale mechanized warfare. Their antitank capacity was next to nill and that bravery of individual troops counted for little trying to take on masses of tanks and armored cars even when those vehicles were handled poorly.

Actually, the Japanese handed the Soviets more casualties. Stalin also sacked the aircraft designer Poliparkov for his aircraft's poor performance against the Japanese air forces in this battle (it was more a case of inept pilots but that wasn't going to placate Stalin). Mikoyan and Gurivitch took over the Poliparkov bureau as MiG.... Zhukov won on the ground by brute force but, he won.
Japan also initially committed whole and intact units to the action. But, they couldn't support much so far from a supply depot or rail head. Worse, they had no means available to them to improve that situation.
Had this battle spread to a general war the Japanese would have been hard pressed just to maintain their front lines against the Soviets. I would expect their air forces to collapse within a month or two entirely simply through attrition. The 100 or so AFV they have in China are going to be worthless and helpless against masses of even older Soviet tanks.

Basically, Japan, a sea power, was not going to win a land war in Asia against Russia, a land power.

 

I definitely agree with T.A. that the Japanese would need better preparation to fight against a land power like the Soviets... T.A. I'd like to hear your thoughts on what would have happened if Japan had refrained from a war with China. How would it have progressed from 1936-41 without an embargo? Let's assume those clashes with the Soviets cause Japan to focus more heavily on tanks/aircraft instead of the historical naval path they chose. The Japanese already had a powerful navy by 1936 that could have crushed anything the Soviets could throw against them. You say the Soviets fielded 50 divisions in the Far East, but the Japanese were capable of matching this and even exceeding this number had it not involved itself with China. You keep talking about railheads... 2 years is enough time to build a couple hundred miles of rail if they planned major operations against the Soviets, especially without an embargo from America.

 

On the other hand this is really telagraphing your blow to an opponent who (after the fact) was famous for the quality and quantity of their espionage system. Also if Kalingol doesn't happen how will the Japanese know just how deficent they are?

 

To elaborate a bit on what TA said (I have to he making me look bad ).

The two sides were pretty equally numbered in men with the SU outnumbering them by 20k or so.

In the air, again, the both sides had virtually the same number of aircraft.

Where the SU had a significant numerical advantage was in the Artillely and Tanks; outnumbering the Japanese by more than 3 to 1. Also, Soviet armor and guns were of heavier caliber which did not help the Japanese either.


The battle was won after Zhukov decided to break the stalemate and launched a pincer strike similiar to German Blitzkrieg (yes the Russians too knew the importance of this). After launching the first ever Soviet joint fighters/bombers onto the enemy reinforced by artillery Zhukov sprung his trap. Left and Right wings quickly encircled the Japanese in a classic double envelopment. The Japanese ambitions ended on June 25th 1939 just one day after Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty was signed.

It must also be mentioned that it was not Japan but Russia which fought further from their supply lines. The Red Army was about 750km away from their supply base and Zhukov had to muster over 2500 trucks to supply his men.
Also it was not the Russians but the Japanese which suffered more casualties. KIA for the Red Army was under 8k with Japan suffering close to 9k KIA (not speaking of wounded). Unless something new has opened up in Japan we will probably never know exactly how many casualties the IJ suffered some claim as high as 45k.

It is one thing to lose simply being outnumbered and another when your entire army is encirlced and utterly destroyed. After this engagement Japan realized that she was facing a nation which not only had plenty of heavy toys but was also very familiar with the art of modern warfare.

 

Another factor to consider is the Chinese. Even if Japan doesn't get involved in a war with them in 37 they are likely to play a role. The Soviets and the Chinese for instance had pretty good relations and if it looked like the Japanese were bogged down at all China might try to retake Manchuria. Certainly the Soviets would encourage it.

 

I am not so sure about the Chinese. With the country split between Nationalist and Communist, and both more intent on destroying each other, one would have to defeat the other then attempt to expell the Japanese with the resources of a war ravaged nation. It seems a strech, but then this whole thread is one big strech.

 

Well the Communist would be inclined to help the Soviets and both didn't care much for the Japanese. I beleive the Soveits were also supplying arms to the Chinese. If the Soviets really wanted the Chinese to come in I think they had enough carrots to dangle in front of the Chinese that they could have gotten it to work. In any case the Japanese could hardly ignore the threat this represented and would need to keep significant elements of their army and airforce in postiont to defend against the Chinese.

 

Hi TA, I appreciate the comments. However we do diverge on a few points:

True the IJA deployed only the 23rd Infantry Div there, but that was not all they could manage and the nearest railhead was definately not 300 miles away (more like 50 miles, or -"sixtyfive kilometer road running from the railhead at Handagai to Chiangchunmiao"). According to CARL:
(Combined Arms Research Library)
In May- "23d Infantry Division was responsible for border security in the region where the skirmishes had occurred. The commander of the 23d Division ordered its 64th Infantry Regiment (minus two companies) and its reconnaissance element to drive the Mongolians from the Japanese claimed border area."

These units were subsequently annihilated, followed by a further Japanese response:

"The Kwantung Army decided that a division size attack was needed to oust the Soviets and their allies. This operation began on 1 July..."

Now this small bit of information sums up the Japanese perception of the situation and subsequent committment of limited forces whose mission it was to restore border integrity and not much else. The scale and scope of Japanese committement was therefore very limited.
Now contrast this with the Soviet committement which was on a whole different level. The Soviets were more or less motivated to use the events to display a strategic show of force and spared nothing in that regard for political reasons, thus the almost lavish level of personnel and support that was thrown into the operations. The scale and scope of Soviet comittment compared to the Japanese is apples and oranges. The bottom line here is that the Soviets put everything that they could into the operation and the Japanese sent a limited force with a limited objective.

The Soviets used 500 tanks and 300+ armored cars (of limited value), but these were supported at the very edge of sustainability and it took weeks to build up enough support for limited mobile operations in spite of amajor effort. This wasn't in any way sustainable beyond Nomohan or without a maximum effort.

"Soviet logistics efforts must take a great deal of the credit for the Soviet success in achieving tactical surprise. Japanese staff officers refused to believe that the Soviets could mass the forces that they did because the great length of the Soviet logistics "tail" precluded such a commitment. Trucks enabled the Red Army to supply its troops around Nomonhan. The 1st Front Army (organized during the Nomonhan fighting) had over 2,600 trucks on hand, including 1,000 fuel trucks, The 750kilometer logistics route from Borzya to Nomonhan, however, required almost 5,000 trucks to supply adequately the Soviet field forces. In mid-August, General Zhukov received another 1,625 trucks from European Russia and these additions enabled him to transport barely enough material for his 20 August offensive. These numbers of trucks were beyond the comprehension of Japanese planners. "

Prior to the main Soviet attack:
"Poor weather and low visibility hampered Japanese aerial reconnaissance for about two weeks before the Soviet offensive. From 12 August on, there had been but one day of clear weather."

Due to what I highlighted above and some other information from the linked source I still believe that the Japanese could have deployed significant forces for a successful strategic attack on the Soviet Far East. If the Japanese could supply major ground operations in the Philipines in 1942 by ship and then over land it would seem plausible that those same formations could be deployed and supplied by rail in Manchukuo also.