Questions Regarding Supplies from Marseilles and Toulon

Once the Allies secured these ports in August 1944, were they only used to supply the drive up the Rhone Valley or were supplies from these ports transported to units advancing from the Normandy landings as well?

Once the 6th and 12th Army Groups linked up (Sept. 11, 1944?), did U.S. troops "backfill" into the areas between the Normandy and Southern France landings?

Were any sizeable German units trapped behind Allied lines once the link up was complete?

If so, did these forces (or German stragglers) create problems for transportation units moving supplies from the southern ports to the Allied forces in northwestern France?

Thanks in advance!

 

Hi superbee,

i did a little research but i didn´t found a good source. Only thing i found was a US Army Brochure. Not very helpful but good to read.

Southern France

 

According to author Robin Neillands in his book "The Battle For The Rhine"; Patches 7th Army was wholly supplied by the the ports in the Med, with little going to the 3rd Army (which was on his flank). You can find examples where this was not true, but for the most part, this holds up.

Part of the logistics nightmare Ike had to tend with, was the split needed between these armies so as to not completely overwhelm the ports in the north. Hodges had his objectives and kept anything allocated to him which came up from the south.

Of other note, while Ike had total control of the combat units, he had no control over the logistics organizations supplying his troops. This led to bit of friction at times and its lucky the preponderance of US supplies smoothed over inefficiencies, stupidity and ego's.

 

The ports of Southern France supplied between 25-40% of US supply needs in North Western Europe. The ports were capable of supplying over 500,000 long tons a month (peak of 547,602 in November 1944; Antwerp reached it's peak of 628,227 tons in April 1945). The supply route was used primarily for Dever's US 6th Army Group (usually Patch's US 7th Army and de Lattre's 1st French Army), but was also used to supply Bradley's US 12th Army Group (usually Hodge's US 1st Army, Patton's US 3rd Army and Simpson's US 9th Army). Patton's 3rd Army was actually closest and probably received more than US 1st Army.

 

Ruppenthal should have chapter and verse on this. Also, "Riviera to the Rhine" (another Green Book) should have a fair amount of information on this.

At one point Patton's army had to transfer some divisions to Devers because Devers was able to supply his forces from Marseilles/Toulon; I don't think 3rd Army got too much in the way of supplies from Marseilles/Toulon, but I suppose it must have received something, since Antwerp was not moving supplies until mid-November.

 

Antwerp was opened on 26 November, and by mid December daily discharges were reaching 20,000 tons a day. In December 428,000 long tons were discharged at Antwerp (27% of total US supplies), and 501,000 tons through Southern France (32% of total supplies). Antwerp and the Southern French ports were about equal throughout the rest of the war, each at about 25-30%. The Southern French ports likely provided supply to 12th AG throughout the war.

 

Dragoon didn't trap any sizable German forces, they had their own mini "Falaise Gap" at Montelimar. The Germans were able to keep the escape path for the 19th Army at least partially open. German stragglers did not create much of a problem for the Allies.

 

There was some supply overlap, but it was pretty much just the Seventh Army being supplied by the southern French ports. From my research the 12th Army Group was supplied wholly through Antwerp, Ghent, etc. And before the Belgian ports were opened the 12th received it's supplies from northern French ports and Normandy beaches. I recently posted a Port to Front map which I scanned from the 13th Port unit history.

 

Great site Andrew! I have to think though that the southern French ports probably provided supply to a lot more than US Seventh Army before Antwerp opened. Seventh Army at it's maximum had about 15 divisions, and probably more like ten or less during September through November 1944. During that time the Southern French ports were supplying 30% - 40% of the total supplies landed at the time, the same or more than the percentage that Antwerp eventually provided. As soon as Marseilles etc came on line, supplies from elsewhere dropped, despite having more troops to support, US 7th Army and French 1st Army. Antwerp didn't really start delivering supplies until December 1944, Ghent in Feb-Mar 1945. So where were the supplies for US 12th Army Group coming from in September, October and November 1944?
In September 1944 supplies from all sources other than the Southern French ports dropped by 55,000 tons. It dropped by another 100,000 tons in October. Supplies landed in November were 70,000 tons higher than in October, but still 84,000 tons less than August. Yet if you factor in the So. French ports total supplies delivered each month actually grew by 97,000 tons in September, 99,000 tons in October and 93,000 tons in November. Supplies landed through So France accounted for almost 40% of the total in Ocotber adn November, yet the troops only accounted for about 30% of the total. It seems likely that some of that discrepancy went to US 12th Army Group.

 

Just to be clear, there is no question that Antwerp was the major supply source for US 12th Army Group from December 1944 on. It was only in the period from September through November that significant amounts of supply would have been delivered to US 12th Army Group (3rd Army) from Southern France. During those two months the Southern French ports would have been able to support 5 - 10 divisions beyond the needs of US 7th Army and French 1st Army. Supplies from Normandy and other Northern French ports actually decreased in the three months before Antwerp opened.
The problem was getting the supplies to US 3rd Army. The Southern France ports suffered from the same problem as Cherbourg, they were too far away. Lorraine (Metz-Nancy) is about equidistant from Cherbourg and Marseille. As soon as supply was available from Antwerp, it is unlikely that much was delivered to US 3rd Army from Southern France.

 

A question :how were the supplies transported from the ports to the units?
By truck? By railway ? By water ? By a combination of these ?

 

It was mostly trucks until the end of September, when rail traffic started to get up to speed. Rolling stock was a limitation up to mid October.

"The supply statistics for September tell the story: during the month trucks moved some 220,000 tons of general cargo northward from the beaches and ports, while the railroads hauled slightly more than 63,000 tons." [of 326,813 tons landed at the Southern French ports]

HyperWar: Riviera to the Rhine