What if Germany would never have invaded Russia?

What if Germany would never have attacked Russia and instead kept on working with them after the campaign in Poland? What happen with the Japanese? Would the Untied States be succesfully invaded? Or would the Germans turn on the Russians later on in the war?

How (in your opinians) would the war shape up?

 

When Stalin felt strong enough to resist the Germans then the flow of raw materials would have dried up and the blokade would have eventually had effect... the war in Africa would have been entirely different however...

 

It could have resulted in a cold war -type mindset or conflict with Germany and Russia similar to the US Cold War.

 

On November 1940 Stalin proposed a long term coexistence based more or less on these his conditions:
- recognition of existing Soviet borders by Germany, Italy and Japan,
- ten-year nonaggression pact between the USSR, Germany, Italy, Japan (four powers),
- mutual economic assistance between the four powers,
- removal of any German troops from Finland,
- Soviet bases in Bulgaria,
- mutual defense pact with Bulgaria,
- Iran and Iran in the Soviet sphere of interests,
- Japanese renunciation of Sakhalin oil and coal concessions,
- free transit through Bosporus and Baltics,
- full compensation for the Germans in the Baltic States (annexed by the Soviets).
Although reasonable (according to some German diplomats) they were eventually refused by Hitler.

 

November 1940? During the Molotow visit in Berlin?
Barbarossa was a decision made after his visit.
http://weltkrieg.cc/articles/read-zweiter-weltkrieg-die-wende-beginnt-im-november-1940_136.html
The Soviets demanded Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, Yugoslawia, even Greece - inacceptable. And Romania, which was the only significant source of oil for Nazi-Germany. No one could accept such an offer.

Later, when Barbarossa was about to start, Stalin regrets deeply his proposals and begged for negotiations.

 

Sorry, but the "Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece" part is not supported by the surviving memorandums of those talks and proposed drafts.


A draft of the agreement as proposed by the Germans:
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE THREE POWER PACT, GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN, ON THE ONE SIDE, AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER SIDE
ARTICLE I
In the Three Power Pact of Berlin, of September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan agreed to oppose the extension of the war into a world conflict with all possible means and to collaborate toward an early restoration of world peace. They expressed their willingness to extend their collaboration to nations in other parts of the world which are inclined to direct their efforts along the same course as theirs. The Soviet Union declares that it concurs in these aims of the Three Power Pact and is on its part determined to cooperate politically in this course with the Three Powers.
ARTICLE II
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to respect each other's natural spheres of influence. Insofar as these spheres of interest come into contact with each other, they will constantly consult each other in an amicable way with regard to the problems arising therefrom.
Germany, Italy, and Japan declare on their part that they recognize the present extent of the possessions of the Soviet Union and will respect it.
ARTICLE III
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union undertake to join no combination of powers and to support no combination of powers which is directed against one of the Four Powers.
The Four Powers will assist each other in economic matters in every way and will supplement and extend the agreements existing among themselves.
ARTICLE IV
This agreement shall take effect upon signature and shall continue for a period of ten years. The Governments of the Four Powers shall consult each other in due time, before the expiration of that period, regarding the extension of the agreement.

SECRET PROTOCOL No. 1
Upon the signing today of the Agreement concluded among them, the Representatives of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union declare as follows:
1) Germany declares that, apart from the territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories of Central Africa.
2) Italy declares that, apart from the territorial revisions in Europe to be carried out at the conclusion of peace, her territorial aspirations center in the territories of Northern and Northeastern Africa.
3) Japan declares that her territorial aspirations center in the area of Eastern Asia to the south of the Island Empire of Japan.
4) The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.
The Four Powers declare that, reserving the settlement of specific questions, they will mutually respect these territorial aspirations and will not oppose their achievement.

SECRET PROTOCOL No. 2
On the occasion of the signing today of the Agreement among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the Representatives of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union declare as follows:
1) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree in the view that it is in their common interest to detach Turkey from her existing international commitments and progressively to win her over to political collaboration with themselves. They declare that they will pursue this aim in close consultation, in accordance with a common line of action which is still to be determined.
2) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union declare their agreement to conclude, at a given time, a joint agreement with Turkey, wherein the Three Powers would recognize the extent of Turkey's possessions.
3) Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union will work in common toward the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention now in force by another convention. By this convention the Soviet Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of its navy through the Straits at any time, whereas all other Powers except the other Black Sea countries, but including Germany and Italy, would in principle renounce the right of passage through the Straits for their naval vessels. The passage of commercial vessels through the Straits would, of course, have to remain free in principle.

 

The Soviet response:
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The Soviet Government has studied the contents of the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister in the concluding conversation on November 13 and takes the following stand:
The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversation of November 13, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support subject to the following conditions:
1) Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland. which, under the compact of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. At the same time the Soviet Union undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland and to protect German economic interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).
2) Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.
3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.
4) Provided that Japan renounces her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.


In accordance with the foregoing, the draft of the protocol concerning the delimitation of the spheres of influence as outlined by the Reich Foreign Minister would have to be amended so as to stipulate the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.
Likewise, the draft of the protocol or agreement between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey should be amended so as to guarantee a base for light naval and land forces of the U.S.S.R. On the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease, including-in case Turkey declares herself willing to join the Four Power Pact-a guarantee of the independence and of the territory of Turkey by the three countries named.
This protocol should provide that in case Turkey refuses to join the Four Powers, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures, and a separate agreement to this effect should be concluded.

Furthermore there should be agreement upon:
a) a third secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union concerning Finland (see Point 1 above).
b) a fourth secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union concerning the renunciation by Japan of the oil and coal concession in Northern Sakhalin (in return for an adequate compensation).
c) a fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy, recognizing that Bulgaria is geographically located inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union and that it is therefore a political necessity that a mutual assistance pact be concluded between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which in no way shall affect the internal regime of Bulgaria, her sovereignty or independence.
In conclusion Molotov stated that the Soviet proposal provided five protocols instead of the two envisaged by the Reich Foreign Minister. He would appreciate a statement of the German view.

 

I can't decide who told the truth.

 

With Hitler in power, I don't see how or why the Soviet Union would sign such a treaty for that long....

Hitler's intentions for Russia were spelled out in Mein Kampf.

 

Ehm, ten years non-aggression pact was proposed by Stalin.
Clearly he wanted to avoid a confrontation in 1941 or 1942, hoping for an exhausted german and a modernized Red Army. And then, he just had to cut the oil supply and an easy victory waited.

 

Indeed, Hitler proposed a hundred years or something equally ridiculous, but Uncle Joe wasn't that naive.

 

I've been thinking of this possibility, but:

What the Britons did was the best move possible : through the naval blocade Germany has lost access to Atlantic and vital raw materials, troops were send to just to protect Mediterranean and North Africa. The USSR would have sooner or later stopped supplying Germany with raw materials from the east. Hermetically closed German Reich would have imploded, this way or another. The only chance was a quick victory at the east to get access to Russian resources to sustain British blockade. Germany had neither choice nor a chance to win, (with hindsight).

 

Sigh : this is not correct : on 22 june 1941 the Soviet oil supply was cut and no easy victory waited .

 

Sigh - this is not correct. The romanian oil was still available for Nazi Germany.
Stalin demanded (control over) Romania in November 1940. Something Hitler could never allow when he was still at war with Britain. Stalin must have known this but calculated that Hitler can't attack while still at war with Britain.

He only was saved by the impossibility to invade the entire Soviet Union. And by the sad truth that his terror was immensly successful by really eliminating every opposition whatsoever which could replace him.

 

Proof that Stalin demanded control over Romania ?

Stalin could have occupied Romania, but he didn't .

And in 1940 the oil imports from Romania were only 20 % of the total oil that was available for Germany : 1.3 million ton on a total of 7 million ton .

In 1939 it was 1.6 million ton on a total of 8.1 million ton . Thus there is no corelation between the amount of oil from Romania and German successes . There is even no relartion between the total amount of oil that was available to Germany and the successes/defeats of the Wehrmacht :more oil does not mean more successes,less oil does not mean defeats .

 

1) This is proving not having a basic knowledge of the German planning of Barbarossa : the Germans did not plan to invade the entire SU, because it was not needed .


2 ) This is giving the terror an importance it never had : the millions of Soviet soldiers who fought in WWII did not fight because of the terror : the terror was specificially directed against the communist party and the state administration, not against the Soviet population who was only slightly hurt .

 

I think that it would eventually set something like this into motion sooner or later.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin%27s_Missed_Chance

 

It wasn't Stalin's habit to gamble (unlike Hitler), there is no example for a soviet aggressive war among Stalin against a really dangerous enemy. Prior to Barbarossa, he begged teary for negotiations. He knew that the Red Army was still in poor condition.

A pre-emptive strike of the Red Army in 1941 would have been the best they could do for Nazi-Germany, the Wehrmacht then didn't needed to fight in the difficult conditions of the East. Victory would have been a matter of weeks. World War 1 showed what happened after a failed russian attack.

 

This is NOT proved by what happened in WWI : the failed Russian offensive of august 1914 was followed by several other offensives,even after the abdication of the Tsar, there was still a big Russian offensive in 1917 (Broesilow offensive ) .

 

But actually they weren't. He wrote there that Russia had been a great power - mainly thanks to her Germanic nucleus - people of German origin ruling Russia. But then that the Jews and the Bolsheviks would destroy her (or rather her economy, the Germanic nucleus they had destroyed already by them), and Russia would eventually self-disintegrate.
He didn't' want to conquer Russia - obviously Germany was too small for this, he wanted to to pick up the pieces of a self-imploded USSR.
The country that really needed to be destroyed, according to Mein Kampf, was France.

Similarly Stalin didn't want to attack anyone in sight. He wanted to pick up the pieces of Capitalism, which was self-disintegrating (at least according to Marxism and Stalinism), because of its inherent internal contradictions and was ready for (internal) revolutions.
He was ready to help it to disintegrate (by sowing discord among capitalist states) but outright (and risky) aggression was out of the question. Actually he personally purged all adherents of the theory that the revolution needed to be spread by violent means all around the world by the USSR.