Night Bombing

I watch on TV the planes of NATO bombing Kadafi's forces during the night. Same tactic was used in Iraq, Serbia etc.
The idea is that you cannot take down something you cannot see. Or something radar cannot see.
I was thinking that this tactic was used experimentally in the begining, in the Pacific. Especially when the first kamikazis started to target the Navy's vessels. Experimentally because many officers believed that it was not correct tacticly.
Aircrafts from the big 'E' had been bombed all night long the Japanese airfields within their range so to have some relief the next day. And the night raids were so successful that some days no attack from Japanese planes happened.
Of course the development of the radar played vital role.
I cannot recall the name of the superior officer who introduce this tactic. The results showed that he won the bet.
(Same tactic was used in Western Front also for bombing Germany and make Goering embarassed).

 

The Germans used Zeppelin night bombing raids on London during WW1 (1915), although these were not very successful they probually are the 'first' night bombing attacks by aircraft.

 

Correct.
Anyone can find out the name of the man who suggest this tactic? I 'm trying to remember it one week now but in vain. I think he was a lt. colonel or colonel.
His idea had some enemies in the begining who believed that the night bombing only casualties can bring.

 

No...I mean the name and rank of the man who suggested the night bombing at Pacific as a mesure against the increasing number of kamikazi attackes. I believe he served in the the lucky 'E'.

 

The concept of maintaining night coverage over Japanese airfield as a proactive defense against the late war Kamikaze attacks was a joint development of the operations officers for TF-38 (Capt John S Thach) and TF-58 (Capt James H Flatley, Jr). These two closely collaborated in their respective operational methods and both were pretty much give a free hand by their bosses (VAdm John S McCain and VAdm Marc A Mitscher, respectively) in the conduct of their operations. The night operations over enemy airfield, when in striking range, was termed "The Big Blue Blanket" and was largely the brain-child of Jimmie Thach.

The actual night operations were termed "Zippers," an attack on specific targets at a particular field, and "Hecklers," more general and random attacks on facilities designed to disrupt operations. None of these were mass raids. Generally a Zipper type attack was carried out by a couple of divisions at most, say, four fighters, F6F-5N and four TBM-3E working in combination. A Heckler attack was usually but a single division, either on a single type or a mix 2 and 2.

Enterprise was the TF-58 flagship for but a few days. After Bunker Hill was struck on 11 May 45, Mitscher transferred his flag to Enterprise until that ship was struck on the 14th. After that TF-58 was run from Randolph until McCain relieved Mitscher on the 28th. TF-38 flag, in the last months of the war was aboard Shangri-La.

Truth be known, Mitscher was not real thrilled with night carrier operations and Flatley had to push Thach's concept a bit. The move to Enterprise after Bunker Hill was hit was an expedient made with the knowledge that he, Mitscher, would soon be handing the reins over to McCain. For longer periods, Mitscher never would have used Enterprise or any other night carrier for his flag.

My I suggest two works, both by the late Steve Ewing: Reaper Leader - The Life of Jiimmy Flatley and Thach Weave - The Life and Times of Jimmie Thach.

Rich

 

Thank you all for your time.

At that time Japanese had developed a type of Radar and this caused problems in night attacks because they can 'see' the planes coming.
A brilliant solution was:the two units they made the night bombing, flew in same vertical line but in different altimeter so only one trace was appeared in radar monitor. The anticraft weapons focus to the one team and the other one could drop the bombes with no problem.