Thoughts on North Africa?

Morning, gentlemen. This topic actualyl came up on another forum I was on. The North Africa campaign- thoughts on significance to the overall war?
My take on North Africa is that the theater was not very significant to the overall war. Germany only sent in troops because of Italian failings; Hitler never committed enough forces to really have any chance of accomplishing much; and the outcome of North Africa really only served as a delaying action for other theaters. For the Germans, North Africa seems to have just tied up some reasonably significant resources (mainly rommel and Afrika corps) which could have been better used elsewhere. For the Allies, the axis forces in North Africa only served to delay the allied landings in Italy.

It also crosses my mind that if the germans had ignored the problems of their Italian allies in the desert, the resources used there could have maybe turned the tide in a more important theater.

Thoughts?

 

Well, crazy.

Africa was indeed a secondary theatre. It did not have importance to the Führer, except that fighting along the Italians would show the cohesion of the Axis nations.

In the other hand, it had really importance for the British, who could only fight the Germans on the ground on this theatre. Therefore, Africa had some importance because it meant the posiblity of teaching the British who were they fighting and give them a big defeat as big as Dunkirk. That would have put an end on British power in the Mediterranean. We had by 1941 the Eastern Mediterranean. If Keßelring's idea would have been listened instead of Rommel's, Malta would have fallen in 1942 and the British would have been expelled from the Central Mediterranean and would have stopped bothering Rommel's supply lines. With these lines secured, Rommel could have advanced until Egypt and the Middle East, taking away from the British two thirds of the Mediterranean, a vital communication line like Suez and the vital petrol of the Middle East.
But unfortunately if this would have happened in 1942 the outcome would have been the same, but in 1947 or so, because the war was lost when 2. and 3. Armoured Armies where diverted from Army Group Centre, late on August 1941 in Russia...

 

Well, crazy.

Africa was indeed a secondary theatre. It did not have importance to the Führer, except that fighting along the Italians would show the cohesion of the Axis nations.

In the other hand, it had really importance for the British, who could only fight the Germans on the ground on this theatre. Therefore, Africa had some importance because it meant the posiblity of teaching the British who were they fighting and give them a big defeat as big as Dunkirk. That would have put an end on British power in the Mediterranean. We had by 1941 the Eastern Mediterranean. If Keßelring's idea would have been listened instead of Rommel's, Malta would have fallen in 1942 and the British would have been expelled from the Central Mediterranean and would have stopped bothering Rommel's supply lines. With these lines secured, Rommel could have advanced until Egypt and the Middle East, taking away from the British two thirds of the Mediterranean, a vital communication line like Suez and the vital petrol of the Middle East.
But unfortunately if this would have happened in 1942 the outcome would have been the same, but in 1947 or so, because the war was lost when 2. and 3. Armoured Armies where diverted from Army Group Centre, late on August 1941 in Russia...

 

Good point- sort of. Friedrich, you say Africa "meant the possibility of" giving the English a big defeat... So wouldn't that also mean the Africa was significant in that it gave the British an opportunity to fight and defeat a german force? The brits were able to test their mettle on the ground against arguably one of the greatest generals of the time, and they came away with a big confidence boost.
In the military sense, though, the theater did remain secondary. And I would have to disagree with you on a apoint I have seen you and other mention... I don't think the germans had the potential to conquer Egypt and the Middle East. Simple logisitcs- the distances were too far and the conditions too difficult to maintain communication and supply. The desert conditions wreaked havoc on german and allied tanks and equipment. The further the germans extended, the more exponontial their supply and communication problems become.

 

Good topic.
These are my thoughts - they are for sure open to disagreement !

North Africa was certainly important to Italian ambitions and prestige, and, as Friedrich says, it was important to the British as just about the only theatre at that time where they could 'have a go'.
O'Connor did rather better than the Italians expected, so Hitler very reluctantly sent the DAK to save Mussolini's , er, face
Of course, the DAK then did rather better than the British ( or, probably, Hitler ) expected. . . .

But reading any biography of Rommel, it seems obvious that, to the German High Command, North Africa was absolutely a 'sideshow'.

But it then became an important morale point with ' This is ,perhaps, the end of the beginning...' etc.

 

North Africa was indeed a sideshow for Hitler. For the Allies, it was truly the only theatre they could fight in on the ground. The UK and later the USA, concerntrated whole heartedly in Africa, as it would then give them a staging area to attack the underbelly of Europe.

The germans were outnumbered 4 to 1 (i think...in tanks) and Rommel managed to cut that number down to 2:1 pretty impressive if you ask me. The Italian holdings in Africa lacked infrastructure...no railroads or anything. The british holdings, on the other hand, did. This meant the Italians/DAK had trouble transporting supplies, while it was relatively easy for the British.

 

Crazy, if you have read some other points of mine I think that we could have reached the Middle East only in certain situations and the most important of that are supplies' line. Rommel needed the Central Mediterranean Brit-free to get his supplies complete and on time, so they could be taken to Bengasi and Tobrouk. After there, the only important port was Alexandria. Will full supplies Rommel could have taken the city and advance until Suez. Think about the secure supply lines by sea and the short supply lines on ground. Then, there were ports in Palestine and the advance could be continued. But reaching Iran by example, with 2.000 kilommetres supply lines by ground. It was totally impossible.

And yes, North Africa did not care for Hitler and he told Rommel that when he asked him to come to Berlin on February 6th 1941. He said that he was sending him to Africa just to help the Itlians, just becdause of that.

 

And thanks to ULTRA. Britain had those supply routes taped ....

 

Good point, Martin. Now that you mention it, I'm suprised that the allied use of ULTRA dosen't come up more. That was a HUGE advantage for the allies. The kind of thing which has influence on nearly all the topics we are discussing!
Especially if we are considering the African theater, where supplies were so vital, the allied mastery of ULTRA really negated anything the Germans could have managed. Even if they could have secured specific objectives like Malta, the allies still could have easily disrupted supplies. The distances supply ships needed to travel and the amount of supplies needed would have provided the allies with easy interdiction targets...

 

I read somewhere that Rommel went to his grave convinced that spies in Italy were betraying convoy details to the British.....

 

Yes, you are right, gentlemen.

But here the point could be that the "impressive" and "huge" Italian Navy could have done something to protect the convoys, but noooooo... they didn't. If you add this that the enemy knew exactly which convoys were, what did they carry, where did they go and when...

 

True, Friedrich- let's just say the Italian navy did not garner any lasting fame in ww2!!
And Martin, I've read things much on the same lines, from rommeland others. Adn wasn't it only long after the war that the allies revealed to the germans that they had broken their codes

Now that I'm thinking about it, the allied mastery of german codes could be argued as the most significant victory/advantage for the allies...

 

Yeah... you did not defeat us in Normandy or the Rhein... You defeated us in Bretshley Park (spelling?) and the Ultra stuff . First, during the battle of Britain, then at the Atlantic and Mediterranean, etc.

 

Well said!
To follow that- (Friedrich, you'll love this one)- What if the allies had not been able to break the german/japanese codes?

hmmmm... that looks like a new What If thread...

 

Howdy Fella's,
This is a tid bit of the summary page of a 1st Armored Div. phamphlet from Oran to the Appennines
that I recently found in my Fathers war memories box.

" A great many innovations in tactics and equiptment were tested on the battle fields of Algeria, Tunisia and Italy by the men of the First Armored Div..
Some of the innovations came from the states but the majority were invented in Combat to fill a need and to adjust.
The innovations that turned out to be improvements were kept, tested again and sent back to the US for use in future operations by other Armored Units.
Too, the 1st Armored made mistakes-and every one was studied and reported to keep other divisions in future battles from suffering similar errors.
Wherever American tanks and halftracks rolled on French or German soil, there to went the battle lessons that the 1st Armored men had died to learn"

Now this is just an Armored perspective but I'm sure it's the same for the Infantry, Artillery, Airborne etc..
As a point of fact my Father recieved a Silver Star for inventing a 'Dike Cutter' that helped lead to the successful breakout at Anzio and onto Rome, this invention was used on the beaches of Normandy by the US, British and Canadian forces.

North Africa and Italy were the proving grounds upon which a successful Normandy invasion was based.
Even the Vets from N. Africa and Italy were highly sought after for Normandy, they had the savvy .

Without N. Africa and Italy I think the going in Normandy could have had an entirely different outcome.

KRs,
Will

 

Ox, you are very right. Experience is one of the most important things in life and of course, at war. That is History made for.

 

On the topic of Ultra, the infomation was rated top secret, however the source of the infomation, i.e where it came from, I believe carried the code 'Bigot'. Very few people in the Allied Command structure knew of the actual soure of Ultra transcripts. Early on in the war this did prove to be a problem as commanders would not trust info from unknown sources. Indeed had the British at Crete paid more attention to the Ultra they may well have had victory instead of turning victory into defeat. But Ultra was probally the Allies most significant advantage over the Germans. As for use of intelligence, who does everyone think made the best use of it? Allies, I suppose, but look at the Arnhem operation and you see what not using your intelligence does for you... You end up dropping onto nice shiny German panzers!!!

 

That is absolutely correct, Oxbowcowboy - and sometimes overlooked.
'Torch', Kasserine, Sicily and Salerno were tough lessons learned at a bitter cost but those lessons were vitally important to the whole Allied effort for D-Day.

 

Dont forget Dieppe. The Canadians paid a heavy price to teach us the fundamentals of invasion tactics. Without Dieppe and its lessons, other landings would have been very different.

 

Ox and RedBaron, great points! Africa may not have had too much significance in the OVERALL war, but combat is combat... And the African campaign gave both the Americans and British a chance to not only tangle with German forces, but forces under Rommel no less.
I would generally take practice/battlefield experience as the most valuable quality in soldiers.