How Germany could've won?

Indeed!

But if you ignore the "undesired" limitations of reality, like Uncle Adi and his generals did, everything seems to be possible, until Uncle Joe's soldiers appear at your doorstep to wake you up.

 

Hitler was already urging Japan to attack the USA earlier in 1941 and promising his support if they did so.
To Hitler, with lend-lease and the USN escorting merchant shipping in the Atlantic, the USA was already in a state of undeclared war against Germany. He hoped that with the Japanese attack, and the U-boat campaign it would cause enough disruption to give him time to defeat the Soviet Union before the USA could intervene in any meaningful way.
It was a massive gamble, but that was how Hitler had achieved his successes before.

 

A lot of people are forgetting something that (IMHO) is as important as the Ribbentrop-Molotow pact,the non aggression pact between the SU and Japan (april 1941),which clearly was indicating that Japan was going on a confrontation course with the US,and thus would not join Germany in a war against the SU .

 

If the Germans had figured out about DDay somehow, they could have prepared for the allies and might have been able to stop them from invading France VE Day would have never come

 

The Enigma myth again
When the Allies landed in Normandy,the Germans committed all what was available(even the 2 SSPzD from Toulouse and 2 SSPzDs from Russia) and it was NOT enough .
IMHO,the critical period for the Germans was the first week,all that was sent afterwards,was irrelevant .The only units that could make the difference,were the PzDs,and only a few were ready on 6 june .
From memory : Panzer Lehr,12 SS,2,116,21 (and I even doubt that the last two were operational on 6 june)
The units prsent in Normandy could nor repel the allies,the units sent to Normandy after 6 june,also failed .

 

21st Panzer was active and was the only panzer division to significantly engage the Allies on June 6; one of its battle groups even briefly reached the shoreline between the British and Canadian beaches.

I say "significantly" because elements of 12th SS Panzer made contact with the Canadians around Carpiquet airfield late in the day. 12th SS only received movement orders in mid-afternoon, and most of its forces were not in position to engage until June 7. This is probably the biggest element in the "what if the panzers reacted promptly" speculation.

Panzer Lehr suffered heavy losses to air attack on its march to the invasion area, mainly light and logistic vehicles rather than tanks. It too might have benefitted from getting underway early on June 6, while cloudy weather provided some protection.

 

Even if D-day were defeated which was unlikely in and of itself it is very unlikely that VE day would not have occured. It probably would have been later but I'd guess it would still happen before the A-bomb is used on Germany.

 

The main reason why German lost is the painful lack of powerful allies. What Axis needed to be is a continental industrial and military powerblock, but no Axis member of that time was anywhere near Germany's military and industrial capacity. Such alliance would also have to be a true alliance of equal members together joined against the common enemy and not Germany exploiting its satellites.

 

One can't possibly have many allies when waging a war on such an ideology...

 

I believe that half the reason the RAF defeated the Luftwaffe was because when the RAF was on it's last legs. The German air force desided to switch over to night time raids and focused more on flattening London rather then eliminating the RAF therefore giving the RAF more time. Had Hitler and Goering decided to leave the air force as top priority rather then using simple terrorism, they may have defeated the RAF and leaving the United Kingdom open for invasion. What the Nazis also did not know was that the British secret service has cracked they're enigma messages with the ULTRA program. That way the allies could practically read the German's minds. Had the Germans knew that their code was cracked they could have perhaps switched to an alternative. And above all, Hitler and his blood-thirsty war machine in all of their might could not break the spirit of the British people. Moral was always high on British shores and the 'never give up' attitude that the Allies had shared eventualy led us to A fine victory and ultimatly A (some what) happy ending.

 

The Germans had air superiority at one point and they should have used their air force to soften landing areas and secure space over the waters. Sea Lion would of then been possible and judging by how effective aviation proved to be against naval ships the luftwaffe could have drawn the british fleet out and devastated it. The Luftwaffe's lack of cooperation with the kriegsmarine was a huge problem for the german fight against the british isles. the 2 should of worked together and victory might have been possible. I still dont understand hitler and Goering's idea that the Stuka (a tactical precision bomber) the HE-111 JU-88 (commercial air liner designs converted to strategic bombers) would be good enough to defeat Britain. They could of at least designed an actual strategic bomber to bomb the place if thats what they wanted.

 

Given that it provides a pretty good template of what Hitler did, I don't see taking it at its face value as being naive at all. Many who read Mein Kampf prior to WWII did so and they were ultimately proven correct. I can give some leeway to those who prior to the war just saw it as political spouting, but I think it should have become apparent rather quickly to most that Hitler was serious about it.

If you don't accept that Hitler's purpose for engaging in war was to further lebensraum by conquering the "vast spaces" to the east and subjugating/enslaving the Slavic peoples, then what do you propose Hitler was up to?

 

With the RAF gone, I don't see any reason for a naval invasion. The now open sky means that Germany can parashoot thousand of its soldiers on British soil, occupy the harbors, get the armor, and overrun England.

 

Wishful thinking.

 

The only way to put a meaningful number of boots and materiel on the ground and "overrun England" would be an amphibious invasion. Period. Loss of the RAF would have provided some challenges but nobody has yet come up with the scenario that knocks out the RN, hence GB lives to fight another day.

 

The RAF was never really on it's "last legs" though. Indeed the LW may have been closer to that state than the RAF. Furthermore the RAF had a plan that would prevent it from being pushed over the edge that the LW couldn't defeat.

They had air superiority at a number of points. The problem for them was that they couldn't hold it for any length of time. During the period when Sea Lion was being considred the LW was not particualy effective vs warships especially those at speed and with a decent load out of AA ammo. It is highly unlikely that the LW could have destroyed the RN and would likely have suffered prohibitive casualties trying to do so.

 

There were no thousands of paratroopers available in the summer of 1940:most of them had been elilinated in Norway and Holland .
The same for the transportaircraft .

 

Perhaps. But by 1944 VE day was inevitable. With the unstoppable advance by the red army from the east it was only a matter of time before they made it into Germany. Although with the failed opening of the second front in the west the Soviet advance may have taken more time. But almost nothing could stop them, unless Japan would have joined in by attacking through China and into the Soviet Union. But they were tied up in their own war in the pacific.

 

If the Overlord had failed it would have probably taken until 1945 for another attempt in the west, so the Germans could have probably transferred troops and armor to the East. Then again considering Hitler´s tactics they would have been destroyed in no time at all and would not have delayed the Red Army advance for too long.

 

Very interesting thread - I have enjoyed reading through the ideas/theories expressed. If there is one thing that is certain it is that historians, and history enthusiasts, will be debating events such as those surrounding WWII's outcome for years to come. Incidentally, my contribution to this debate comes through my new book entitled Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe. I figured I would mention it here given the topics debated in this thread. Anyway, what my work does is to challenge what is largely a conventional wisdom explaining German defeat during World War II as almost inevitable, primarily for reasons of economic or military brute force created when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and entered into a two-front war.

My work highlights how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine, and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. It is thus a qualitative based thesis for explaining the war's outcome - rather than a quantitative.

As such, my book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes what is really a unique perspective for explaining the course and outcome of the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book’s last section explores the War's final year, and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.

I am happy to say that so far my work has been well received (including some substantial endorsements from experts in the field), but of course I am looking forward to seeing how my work fits into this very spirited, and enjoyable, debate. Of course my ultimate hope is that I have added a perspective of value toward understanding the outcome of the Second World War - a part of history that I have been virtually obsessed with for the better part of thirty years.

Cheers