How Germany could've won?

Even if the USSR had surrendered, they had destroyed or removed all the factories, burned all the fields and wheat reserves, and cemented all the oil wells shut. Cannot see Germany make much out of that country for five years other than Lebensraum to be honest!

 

Actually, and without even considering the benefits to the larger German economy flowing from captured Soviet resources such as; Estonian oil shale; Ukrainian raw materials (- including 90% of German manganese (according to Hans-Joachim Braun in his work "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century"); the enslavement of millions of Eastern Europeans to work in German factories; and the like - and even with Soviet scorched earth policies (which you are correct did hinder German usage of captured lands - for instance the Germans only harnessed 10-20% of pre-war coal production from the fields east of the Dnieper - and did so to such an extant that the occupied territories of Western Europe proved more important to the German war economy than did recently captured Soviet resources) the occupation of the western Soviet Union was beneficial to the German war effort in all sorts of ways. For just one example, and according to Dr. Earl F. Ziemke, "even in the north, in one of the least productive agricultural areas of the Soviet Union, Army Group North managed to live entirely off the land in 1943." What's more the Germans derived these benefits all while waging their war in Eastern Europe in perhaps the most inefficient manner possible if one's goals were to use Soviet resources to improve the German economy. One can only imagine what horrors the Third Reich would have engineered had Barbarossa been crafted with economic goals foremost and not Halder's misguided focus on attempting to defeat the Red Army in the field and taking Moscow.

 

IMO, Germany's best chance for a victory and perhaps a realist one came after the fall of France. Once Barbarossa began, it was the beginning of the end.

 

IMO, Germany's best chance for a victory and perhaps a realist one came after the fall of France. Once Barbarossa began, it was the beginning of the end.

It depends how we define victory. In hindsight we could call any outcome that allows the Nazi state to survive a victory, but true victory for the aggressor* means achievement of the objectives they went to war for. Perhaps Hitler could have achieved a lasting domination of western Europe, but if it meant forgoing his quest for lebensraum in the east, it would mean abandoning victory as he defined it.

* the other parties' victory conditions may be no more than denying the aggressor his objectives, i.e. return to the status quo ante bellum.

 

For reasonable men this sounds quite reasonable. All economic objectives could have been, more or less, achieved in peaceful manner.

 

Do you really think that,what the Germans got from the SU,was nullifying the costs of Barbarossa ? The costs of the thousands of tanks,artillery,aircraft,the ammunition,fuel,et...
IMHO,what the Germans were stealing from the SU was not very imported,compared to their needs .And,without Barbarossa,their needs would be much less .
The economic needs from Barbarossa is one of the countless WWII myths .

 

Ah yes, but by 1941, Germany’s only reliable short-term potential solutions to domestic economic problems came from either near absolute economic dependence on Stalin’s largesse, or the direct acquisition of the southern Soviet Union’s abundant raw materials - particularly petroleum products. Given the former would have consigned Hitler to a subservient position in regard to his alliance with Stalin (and thus put Stalin in the proverbial driver's seat), the latter, and a turn away from peace was in all actuality a far more logical position for a German state facing a 1941 era United Kingdom with both no intention of giving up the fight and enjoying the backing of the U.S. This is especially important when one considers not only Hitler's larger goals of lebensraum followed by a challenge to the U.S. for global hegemony but also the military means available to Germany to secure the Soviet Union's raw economic resources via war, and therefore taking Hitler beyond the goal of not only securing economic resources also casting off any chance of having to shackle German foreign policy to a potential Soviet "veto".

 

There is no question that the German failure to secure the western Soviet Union's economic resources in 1941-42 was the death knell to Hitler's genocidal and criminal plans - as the consequences were to bleed the Wehrmacht white. The point is that during 1941-42 the Soviet Union repeatedly came dangerously close to allowing Germany to seize and secure economic resources that would have provided Hitler with the means to create a continental colossus every bit the military and industrial equal of the United States of America.

Moreover, stepping back a few years, and with the British decision to fight on following the fall of France, in 1941, only one nation stood as a counterweight to complete German hegemony across all of Europe, the Soviet Union. During 1940–1941, Hitler entertained no other strategic option more likely to grant the Third Reich the freedom to act globally than did Barbarossa. The Soviet Union contained virtually all the economic resources that Germany needed to wage an effective war against an alliance of nations led by the United States (especially given the fact that these resources would be added to the Third Reich's balance sheet - considering that Generalplan Ost sought to eliminate Germany's need to share any of these resources with the former people of the western Soviet Union - who were to be murdered en masse).

Purported alternative options to invading the Soviet Union in 1941, as argued today, were, for 1940–1941-era Germany, illusory. If Hitler had declined to invade the Soviet Union and another year passed as the Axis alliance retooled for and waged mainly a maritime war against the Anglo-American alliance, then the opportunity that Hitler held in 1940–1941 to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weaknesses could have slipped by as the Red Army completed reorganizing and rearming. Moreover, there is no question that war against the Soviet Union was enormously expensive, but Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, as apocalyptic and ideological as he intended it to be, nevertheless, in a military sense, possessed quite a bit of logic. It meant that the German military could use its greatest strengths in an offensive war of maneuver on the European continent, supported by the world’s best tactical air force, against an opponent in the midst of wrenching structural changes to its own military. Germany’s alternative options to invading the Soviet Union in 1941 constituted an unappealing litany of playing to German weaknesses. In particular, a failure to seize Soviet resources in 1941–1942 would have meant the Soviet Union would occupy the driver’s seat in an Axis alliance where the Red Army and Soviet economy commanded ever greater shares of the fruits of Soviet economic output and resource extraction. As early as 1940, the effects of the Allied blockade had already impacted the German economy, with aid from the Soviet Union one of the primary elements keeping the German economy afloat. Thus, Hitler, at a minimum aware of Germany’s own economic problems and seeking to control a resource rich region of his own, made the decision that had not only always been true to his ideological worldview, but also would have granted him the freedom to secure German hegemony over all of Europe.

 

Hitler´s bold attack strategy was based on the famous " just kick in the door and the whole rotten house collapses" based on the poor Red Army performance in the "Winter War", NOT making long lasting offensives, it would be over in 8 weeks or...what? By spring and summer 1941 Hitler was lowering production figures for ammunition, and if I recall correctly, even quite a big number of men were sent to reserve in civilian life. And Barbarossa was just behind the corner. Hitler was not ready for this war, he was again trusting his instincts, and all the while the "yes" men around him were telling him everything was fine. I believe the famous meeting between Guderian and Hitler in Sept/Oct 1941 is the best possible example to show how bad things were in the end. Guderian needed new tanks, new everything and all Hitler could give was 200 panzer engines...

 

Considering seelow. Did the british not mine the dover straight? Home fleet is based way up north in scapa flow and it rarely left anchor did it not? The Germans recalled all U-boats to be fitted for longer ranged missions but was it not possible to forget that and just have them sit by the dover straight? the luftwaffe had the range and poer to fight and win along the british coast so why is sea lion not possible. the british had to send ships to the meditteranean and by the time home fleet could have passed through the dover straight going through mines and U-boats i think the germans would have had more than enough time to get men across the channel. throw in some fallschrimjagers and some good air support and it seems that germany could have established a beach head. and if they could do that then it most likely would have screwed the british. what do you think?

 

Scapa Flow is on the Orkneys, not on the moon! And then the Poms had that obnoxious little thing they called the RAF......

 

there were no falschirmjäger available in september 1940 :those who were not killed at Rotterdam,were alive in Britain,in POW camps (or on the way to Canada)

 

And,to move men and material from France to Kent,you need transport ships,and,unless I am wrong :there were NONE available .The Germans always could have tried with Rhine barges,but,this would be unwise .

 

I dont see the RAF competing against the luftwaffe over the channel. its well within operational range of german fighters at that point. and im sure transportation can be found. didnt the germans land a good amount of men in norway from sea? why cant that be repeated?

 

1) Germany lacked the shipping to land sufficient troops to take over Britain.
2) If they landed a force they lacked the shipping to keep them supplied. What would they do once they'd expended their initial munitions and eaten their initial rations?
3) They lacked the means to transport large amounts of heavy equipment. How well would they fare if the British counter-attacked and didn't have armor or heavy artillery?
4) If they did manage to get this equipment across the channel, how would they transport their logistical needs? What happens when the fuel, ammo and spare parts are expended?

Germany did not, at any time have the capacity to pull off Sea Lion.

 

As a famous one liner....Swedish Ambassador to German ambassador in Sweden...

Whats stopping you?

And my favourite...Might be a myth though...but plenty of written works state it is not...

Dont dictate to us until your marching up Whitehall and even then we wont listen...

Was never going to happen...The threat though galvanised a nation that didn't need to fight on if it did not want to. The island was safe. No way to win the war. But certainly never going to lose it.

 

No. Both the British and the Germans did have some mine fields in the Channel but it was never completely closd.
[qutoe]Home fleet is based way up north in scapa flow and it rarely left anchor did it not? [/quote]
Actually it left Scapa on a fair number of occasions but the British didn't even plan on using it to defeat SeaLion. They didn't need to.

They planned to do so but the Channel and area around the invasion beaches would have been a rather unhealthy spot for submarines.

To fight yes, to win on occasion yes, to defend the invasion fleet and complete all the other tasks they need to, no.

Highly unlikely.

Almost impossible.
Take a look at what the KM consisted of in the fall of 1940. The largest ships they had available were two heavy cruisers one of which was under refit for part of the period and suffered an engineering failure in it's post refit trials so it hardly counts. Then they had three light cruisers. Niether of those were actually intended to support the invasion fleet for that they relied on a few destroyers and lighter vessels. I'll leave the British forces as an exercise for you.

Sure they landed a fair number of men at Norway. No where near the number needed for the invasion of Britain though. They also landed them in a surprise attack on a neutral country and lost to either damage or sinking a significant portion of the KM as well as the LW transport capability. As it was they were planning on using river barges to move most of the troops.

 

The barges that would carry the troops were designed for calm rivers. The average wave height in the channel is greater then what the barges could handle,so they could only move in the best of weather.

 

That's simple: Burger King!

 

Another issue with the resources Germany captured is the lack of ability to exploit. Germany actually recieved less food after the attack then before. Germany did not have the manpower to properly exploit the resources. A catch 22 for Germany was it could not produce enough food and so could not properly feed its conquered inhabitants, yet it could not produce the food with out the manpower. Tooze talks about how the Germans still were backwards in food production. Like the Soviets, most farms still used manual labor, in fact it is a myth that Germany could have used women in factories along the scale of the US because so many women were needed for agriculture. The German rail system could not adaquately supply the troops, how were they supposed to transport the material back to Germany even if the men could be found to work the mines?