How Germany could've won?

Be careful of that quote. It's a gold mine for people to take Churchills oratory rants and turn them into conspiracy theorists, claiming that the US and England baited the Germans to attacking Poland. Those were in a 1936 broadcast that many take out of context. It was vintage Winston. Funny exercise, place that quote into a Google search, the top 3-5 sites are denier related. It's amazing.

Churchill was an intelligent man and foresaw much of what National Socialism entailed. He didn't like the looks of it.

Late edit: was curious, because in regards to the quote, which I have heard many times by revisionists, what broadcast or hearsay is it taken from? Can't seem to find the source, real or fictitious?

 

Belasar,


My 'Quote' is not working, but must comment on your point #6 of 17th Dec.

Britain had a fully equipped Canadian Division, and a 2 Brigade Australian Division, plus the 300,000 (15+ Divisions?) British from Dunkirk, , all of whom were in hospital being patched up, or on leave to regain their strength. Not much heavy gear, but plenty of rifles and LMGs etc. Not sure of the rest of the British Army still in Britain at that time, but I would be surprised if it was not at least a few Divisions.

Germany had nowhere near enough Ju52s in mid 1940 to lodge and resupply sufficient paras on Britain, even without the RAF to shoot them down. And with the barges a certain disaster, the German paras were doomed to become POWs.

JMO



john

 

Personally I believe that it was good that Churchill was so determined...

 

Quote is a bit twitchy today, took me two tries

With respect Ozjohn you are missing my greater point.

When I was much younger I spent countless hours playing counter top 'paper' wargames from companies like Avalon Hill and SPI. They were both fun and educational in respect to showing why certain battles and campaign's played out as they did. They do have one great flaw however as they do not adequately reflect the fog of war. Units have consistent values and react predictably in every situation. Their values are known to both sides and they never go off script.

This quirk often bedevil's historian's who look back at events where all the mystery has been stripped. 70 years on we know what Britain had, what Germany had, what they could reasonably do with what they had, what the weather was like, what things they counted upon would fail and what things would work beyond expectations.

Hitler and the OKW saw at best little more than half this, so two Churchill and his War Cabinet, though a different half. I agree with you that had Seelowe been attempted it would have been a disaster greater than El Alemien and nearly as bad as Stalingrad. That however is not the point.

To British leaders in June 1940 a invasion was both expected and feared. To this point Germany had done what all their (Britain and France) best military planners thought impossible, and a supported German landing was a very real prospect to them. They had not the luxury of reading the final chapter to see how it all turned out in the summer of 1940.

Had Germany landed 8 to 10 supplied Divisions, supported by the Luftwaffe, they would have swept Britain's forces before them. They had already done this in France to a much better Anglo-French force when the odds were far more even.

This is why that moment in time is so critical, and why it is the perfect time to take a road not taken. Britain does not, can not know how things will be in a year when she unexpectedly gains a powerful ally or 5 months after that when she gains an ally who can assure her of a way back onto the continent.

Had Germany offered a different narrative the nature of the conflict might have gone a completely different direction, turning a global world war into what it began as, a regional European war. We can not simply read the accumulated daily reports of both sides from the comfort of our easy chair, cold drink at our side, to honestly place ourselves in their shoes. In some respects we must unlearn what we know to truly understand both their reality and just how our reality could be different from the one we know.

 

I share that sentiment.

 

Germany never had the air power and naval capacity as well as resources to win a long term war AND hold onto gains. Sweeping in would have been hard enough. Hanging on, nearly impossible. Hitler was nuts and Mussolini quite immature.

 

1040
Belasar

"Had Germany landed 8 to 10 supplied Divisions, supported by the Luftwaffe,"


That is 100 to 200,000 men!

They had less that 500x Ju52s, (50 paras per plane load?) and about 3000 barges, some of which were for supplies only. It is my contention that NONE of those 3000 barges would have made it to a English beach! And if they HAD made it to that beach the UNpowered ones had to be pushed through the surf by the powered barges to the waters edge.

THEN they had to go back and start re-supplying!

Also most likely makeshift landing fields had old buses etc parked on them, and cows and sheep and steel poles! Anything to stop a Ju52 from landing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_order_of_battle

Britain had PLENTY of men, (close to THIRTY Divisions), to handle the best result that Germany could ever hope for.

Looks like we will have to agree to disagree.

John
1099

 

If you read my post closely you would note in the 3rd major paragraph that I explicitly note that any invasion attempt would fail. We know it will fail because we at 70 years past know who had what in their hands. No one in Britain during the summer 1940 could possibly know exactly what Germany did have to throw at Britain. Certainly they could guess, but that would be a guess, not the absolute knowledge we now have. They would have to consider the worst case scenario, otherwise they would be fools.

Again you seem to miss the point. Britain, like the United States, were democratic nations who had elected leaders subject to the will and whims of their electorate. They could guide the public opinion, but not command it. We like to give Churchill and FDR near saint like attributes and call the ordinary people they led 'the Greatest Generation'. They were however as human as you and I. Hitler's worst crimes were unknown to us/them and the worst of them were yet to happen.

The Anglo-French went to war on September 3rd, 1939, not with flags flying and songs of glory on their tongues but with a fair degree of trepidation. America would not go to war until nearly a year and a half after the debacle in France, and then only after attacked directly. Given a viable alternative the US would have stayed out of a European war and it is not unreasonable to contemplate Britain might eventually accept a negotiated end if it got much of western Europe free of German control, if Britain could not secure at least one powerful ally.

Historically Germany 'doubled down' when she should/could have stood pat. Germany however, gift wrapped one ally by turning on Russia and turned American public opinion from a desire to avoid a war in Europe to one who was willing to become our 'Greatest Generation'

I can not prove it could transpire as I projected, then again you can not disprove it could not, so yes we will have to agree to disagree.

 

Never really thought the Germans could make the Seelöwe succeed, but if I had to make a plan, I´d go for the invasion offensive as soon as the war in the West was in the phase of Dunkirk and operation Dynamo. Then again if Hitler had pushed all power to getting the BEF trapped this would have been a massive morale blow. The first option seems to me the Germans did not have men or ammo to do this, and at the same time go for the southern sector fighting and securing positions.Trapping BEF would perhaps work, but then again who knows...

 

Belasar raises valid points, but ignores the inherent antogonism and distrust between the two dictatorships, and the building irritation along their declared "spheres of interest". The invasion of Finland and the Baltic states, the grab for parts of Romania, all of which were, by the terms of the treaty, actually to be discussed before hand with the other part, none of which actually were.

This was par for German behaviour, with all of her "allies". So little crucial information on diplomacy was shared with Italy and Japan. The Soviets also played this game, counting on it easier to get forgiveness than seek permission, and of course, exploiting German pre-occupation with other tasks.

There was the understanding, that the trade agreement with the Soviet Union was semi-dependant on the continued war with the Western nations. It's not at all certain, that the Soviets would've been at all as co-operative had peace been achieved. They were hardly that co-operative while the war was focused on the Western nations.

On the whole though, I agree that Germany's greatest chance was in 1940, to give up the nations defeated in the West, in exchange for concessions for establishing right-of-passage, military bases, preferential trade agreements, and payments.

Of course, that means you still have the issue of the growing Soviet colossus in the East to deal with, knowing you'll be entirely eclipsed within 5-8 years.

And the ceasing of direct hostilities, without a Soviet conflict, would mean continued impetus to the Plan X naval build-up as a prestige project, something not conducive to fighting any future war with the Soviets...

 

Not going to read 28 pages, but the idea falls at the first hurdle.

'Sea Lion' would have been a disastrous failure with few if any Germans being anything but drowned or a POW at the end of the first 24 to 48 hours.

The reason, the Royal Navy Home Fleet! (4x BB and BC, 14x CA, 60x DD, and a couple of CVs, even about 20 or so SS.) Add to that all the ships that would have been taken from other fleets and duties to defend the homeland. Deserting the convoys if needed.

An overwhelming force based at ports from Scapa Flow to Portsmouth and Liverpool. A minuscule German defending force available in the months of July, August, and September that had NIL hope of succeeding.

The RAF was NEVER, EVER going to be removed from the equation as they would have been withdrawn to Scotland etc to await the invasion.

I often say that the bow waves of the RN would have swamped the barges without firing a shot!

JMNHO

John

5058

 

Small detail : only half of the BEF was at Dunkirk .

 

Good to see you back kicking about GS!

I do not believe I am overly discounting the animus between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union for two reasons.

I respectfully remind all that for 40 years the US-USSR co-existed in a world where the existence of nuclear weapons could end civilization as we know it in under a hour. I have seen much Soviet and American propaganda of that period, indeed I lived though it. Our rhetoric was not much less than much of that between Germany and the SU.

Why did we survive this without going to war?

One could say the threat of utter destruction played its part and I do not deny this, but this comes with caveat that the technology in itself turned response time from a matter of days to one of minutes, almost eliminating the ability to work diplomatically to diffuse the situation. The greater motivator in my opinion is that both sides acted rationally from the beginning rather than based upon ideology.

My premiss holds to the idea Germany acts rationally, not only here, but in its further acts with all the players of the period.

My second reason involves historical precedent. Germany and the SU had already done the seemingly impossible in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. They did so despite the full weight of their collective ideology because they both saw the advantage in doing so. We can not say it was impossible for a rational German leadership from not starting a war with Russia when Hitler could at least agree to a agreement with Stalin himself when he expected the war with the west was going to be both longer and more costly than it was (at least in the case of defeating the Anglo-French alliance)

 

The fighting in France in 1940 was very fierce indeed. When the BEF had to leave France they had to leave most of their equipment behind.


Casualty rates for BEF soldiers in this campaign were about 16.6%. In the First World War they were about 17%. This gives some idea of how serious the fighting was.

[SIZE=14.3999996185303px]Nearly 300 000 British and over 100 000 French troops were evacuated.[/SIZE]

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/worldwar2/theatres-of-war/western-europe/investigation/invasion/sources/docs/1/




Sounds like a bood beating to the one ones who wereevacuated and what was the other half about to do and kick the Germans out of France?

 

At Dunkirk (operation Dynamo) some 190000 British soldiers and 140000 Allied ones (MOSTLY French) were evacuated .

During operation Ariel,more than 100000 British soldiers were evacuated from the western French harbours .

Thus,it is not so that the whole BEF was evacuated at Dunkirk,and this means that the importance of Dunkirk was not the one the British propaganda was giving during the war .

The strength of the BEF was almost 400000 men .

 

Thanks

As to your second reason; that would be unplugged if the Germans managed to negotiate a peace with the West under the proposed premises. Stalin tried to renew and strengthen the agreement during the first half of ´41, implicitly understanding that as long as Germany was seriously tied up against the UK, that it would take several years to deravel the Commonwealth, and the Soviets were ever unwilling to deliver all what the Germans needed to actually win.

This was Hitler's bind; unless the peace with the UK was sufficiently rewarding in freeing up resources facing the UK (and indirectly over the long term, the US) then it was inevitable that a clash between the Soviets and the Nazis; both were seeking to expand their domain. Whether on a 5 year time table, or a ten year time table, it was understood to be inevitable.Given the Soviet systems amazing improvements in military industry, and the recent purges, from the German viewpoint, there was never going to be a better time to strike than '41.

The threat of nuclear war combined with the horrific loss of life in European Warfare to deter both sides from direct conflict during the Cold War. In the 1930's and early 40's that kind of restrain was not evident.

 

I don't think anyone can doubt/dispute the courage and skill displayed by the armed forces of Great Britain during the this dark period. GB greatest ally IMO is that lake in between England and Europe. This, however; also leaves serious vulnerabilities which GB by herself cannot overcome...

 

LJAd,

Not sure of the exact figures, but i think most of the French men were returned to France, only to become POWs soon after.

...and of the Brits, the wounded went to hospital to be patched up, and the others went on leave for R & R. By September, most would have been ready for action again.


John
14450

 

Eward Smalley gives in "The BEF 1939-1940 " (P 19 )a manpower strength of the BEF of 394165.

The BEF lost some 68000 men (most POW),some 190000 were evacuated at Dunkirk,the remaining in operation Ariel .(144171)

Most of the French returned to France ,what happened to them is unclear :I guess that they were not committed during Fall Blau: they had no weapons, and there were not enough weapons for them in France .

Following the National Archives the BEF losses were :
KIA : 4006

WIA : 16815


MIA : 47959

Most of the MIA were POW, but there were also several thousands of killed (exemple : at the Lancastria disaster )

 

Maybe Germany would have been able to secure their place on Europe if they had thrown most of their resources from the navy and using them to motorize and mechanize the German Army, this might have improved their logistics and mobility for Operation Barbarossa to have succeeded. What was the point of a U-Boat campaign?

The action against the British is what motivated the US to join. If they had just ignored Britain then the US would not care what happened to the USSR. They of course would do Lend-Lease Not too sure how their economy would survive holding on to the areas though. Hitler did not seem to care what might happen even though his economic advisers warned him. I feel as if Hitler should have made the Kriegsmarine to act as a tactical force to defend against shipping of metals from Norway and Sweden.