Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Freebird,

I hate to follow on the heels of Takao's OUTSTANDING post. In fact one of the best posts in my recent memory :bow:. Your question is a fair question. We do want it to be accurate and not based upon hindsight, we have attempted to make sure that anything we've discussed is plausible.

Agreed. We will try to base all actions upon what Japan could have known at the time. I think we are doing that.

In addition to what Takao posted, we're starting in October 1941. Japan did have an extensive intelligence network and traded intell with Germany. The Battle of the Atlantic had been going on for two years. The campaign had still not reached its peak, it had placed an immense strain on Britain and it was not clear at this time that the allies would win it. Japanese officers were aware of this and since they were a maritime nation knew it was a possible threat. A serious threat.

"The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." – W.S.Churchill

Japan had military observers in Germany, plus information provided by their diplomatic corps, and had seen first hand the effectiveness of mechanized warfare. France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands had been overrun in May and June of 1940. Japan had also fought a series of wars with the Soviet Union and were well aware of their territorial ambitions in the region. The first in 1904-1905 resulted in a Japanese victory and led to Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate. In 1918 as a result of the Russian Revolution, the United States asked Japan to contribute troops to the Siberian Intervention, they eventually had more than 70,000. troops committed. Then in 1938 and 1939 the Japanese and Soviets fought again in two battles. While the Soviets suffered 26% more casualties, their superior use of armor led to a Japanese withdrawl. Japan realized that they needed more powerful anti-tank weapons and armor assets, not to counter the US and Britain but to face the Russians. The Type 1 47mm gun was developed as a direct response to the lack of effectiveness of their 37mm AT gun and Type97 tank's 57mm gun when facing Soviet armor during the Nomonhan Incident. The Type 1 was an interim type and further development was expected to take place. Japan was also a fiercely anti-communist country, Japan and Russia would fight again and that was clear even in late-1941.

Japan had a very effective intelligence network. They knew from half a century of dealing with Britain and the US, that being involved in a war with Germany, that Britain really couldn't do much in the Pacific. They also knew that due to public resistance to becoming directly involved in the war and a strong isolationist sentiment, the US was unlikely to intervene unless dircetly attacked. Australia knew this also and had petitioned Britain on a number of occasions, over several decades, to enhance their presence in the region. Britain was unable to defend the region in WWI because its stength was required in Europe and the Med. Britain even requested Japanese assistance in dealing with German commerce raiders in August 1914, and Japan declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914. Because of the war neither the US or Britain had the necessary Naval assets to intervene in the Pacific. During the war she protected the pacific region and the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean from Germany, and sent ships to the mediterranean to assist the British, she fought Germany at the battle of Tsingtao and was raising a 100,000 man force to be sent to France. As mentioned earlier, the US had to go to Japan and request that they supply troops for the Siberian Expedition in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Britain was so financially exhausted after WWI that she came to rely more and more on the US for the strength to protect her interests in asia. The US because of a strong pacifist sentiment in the aftermath of WWI and then the financial collapse in 1929, never had the strength to adequately protect its interests either. Though Japan had a fairly good idea as to allied strength in the region, I do think they were surprised in how rapidly the allied nations collapsed.

Takao wrote:

Speaking of seaplanes here's an interesting tidbit: In September 1914 Japan launched the world's first successful naval-launched air raid against German targets (the ship that launched this attack also launched the world's first night air raid). They were seaplanes.

 

So this means I have to cancel the hit on freebird?

My error on Yamato arraingement, I saw what you generally propose. I would submit that we convert one Yamato at a time to the new AA-defence suite so as not to overtax our shipyards and delay the introduction of new CV's.

 

We need to divide our planning into 3 parts. First how to quickly over run Malaya, Burma, the DEI and critical islands in the S Pacific like Rabaul. Be prepared for US entry, how to best end the China incident and how far into India do we wish to go. Third, plan for eventual war with the US if they do not come in early. As far as equipment we need to decide what is immediate and practical and what will require further R&D or factory upgrades. One ship I would like to work on is a long ranged landing ship, since our best one is short ranged. I believe a key factor is our R&D and ship construction is does the US enter the war immediatly or will we have time.

 

Belasar wrote:

I concur.

Great discussions and output today, All. The Philippines keeps worrying me, strategic as they are. Our airfields in Formosa will be kept busy watching and later suppressing them. WE must not push our perimeter out too far and extend our limited troops; or waste our early Naval superiority too quickly.

We must learn from our difficulties on the Chinese mainland, gained over nine long years and with the Russians.

 

I concur with Admiral Rikinaga and the Prime Minister. Since Musashi is not yet completely fitted out, we should convert her first. Yamato can remain in service as she is until yard space is available.

 

What causus beli do we anticipate with Britain? Dutch participation in the U.S. led oil and steel embargoes may be enough, and with the chaos in Europe we might almost be able to invade Borneo and the Dutch East Indies with relatively little media attention or interference. I don't believe the United States will intervene over this any more than our occupation of Indochina. If Britain cooperates in their defense that might provide sufficient cause.

Perhaps we could even pursue some kind of truce with England afterwords in exchange for an agreement not to interfere with their East Asian possessions so long as they agree not to fortify them in such a way as to threaten our own security. We could even consider the magnanimous return of the Dutch possessions, while retaining binding leases on the oil production for our military use, as a gesture of goodwill.

I am assuming that our primary goal in this adventure is gaining a degree of industrial self sufficiency to insure our security in the face of Chinese and Soviet threats, and thus we might profitably negotiate with almost any power that would further that aim. Please correct me if I am wrong. Our goals in the conflict should be quite clear, since it is a terrible and dangerous adventure and we risk much, possibly everything.

A question for my esteemed fellows on the council: Why has our government been so anti-communist? Much of the monied gentry in the United States is staunchly anti-communist out of a perceived threat from native socialist, anarchist, and labor movements to their personal wealth and position, and they have successfully used the Russian Revolution to tie communism to a more general fear of immigration thus turning a formerly amicable relationship with Russia into a rather hostile one.

Even before the revolution, our relationship with Russia was deeply competitive and quite belligerent, so it seems to me possible that much of the local anti-communist fervor I have heard about is essentially a transformed anti-Russian sentiment. (Quite understandable, given our relative positions.) Forgive my political ignorance, but is there a native socialist, anarchist, or labor movement of sufficient magnitude to threaten the local aristocracy or our own industrial magnates? Did the previous administration and its backers use native anti-Russian sentiment to create the anti-communist fervor, as their counterparts in the United States did? If it is relatively recent and shallow, might it be in our interest in separating communism from Russia once again in the popular imagination, so that we might profitably cooperate with communist organizations with whom we share a mutual foe in Chiang, Churchill, or Roosevelt?

Forgive my ignorance of politics. I have been so taken with naval matters that I have neglected the political arena in my own country.

 

Japan saw Britain as a finished power and there are a lot of resources in Britains control as well as an excellent base at Singapore.

 

Dear Noka Shijin,

I know that the swimming flight decks aren´t a 100% solution and that they are seeming to be toys in someones eyes! But this is what we in the Army often enough will get as training material, like cardboard made tank dummies on trucks or similar funny stuff. The idea to make a training carrier out of an old merchant ship isn´t that wrong, and i don´t think it is neccessary to have the crews for days aboard. The idea of having a safety net at the end of the deck to catch a aircraft after a bad landing seems a good thing to me. It is one thing to lose a aircraft but it is another to lose a pilot. The aircraft is "only" money you´ve lost but loosing the pilot means loosing lot of time , money and a good pilot too. To me it would make sense to rebuild a carrier flight deck on land for the first times to train the pilots to get clear with the small landing stripes they will have on the flight decks, remember the US Navy is doing this at Cedar Key Airport

View attachment 15947

Only my cheap opinion to this!

Sincerely

General Nishio

 

most honourable sirs, i must agree with general Nishio. our factories can build aircraft every day but it takes 17-21 years to build a pilot. your most humble servant. Kano Matsudaira.

 

From my point of view the solution for most of our problems is to find at China. China as long as it isn´t under control binds the majority of our armed forces at the moment. My planning goes that way, that we need to have control of the coastline and the most important industry places in the south. Next is to get control of the Indias Assam region or the most part of it between Burma and Buthan to cut of the British and Communist Chinese support lines. It makes sense to bomb out the Allied airbases as they are within the range of our bombers. A eventually peace with the Chinese Nationalists under some circumstances would be helpful. Next is and we shouldn´t forget it is that overexpanded frontlines will make us weak against attacks from outside. We shouldn´t take more that we can chew. Lot of occupied countries are good for resources but it means that you always have to increase the numbers of troops to secure those countries and prevent successful attacks from outside and inside. The main Problem i can see at the Pcific islands are the Phillipines with the US forces on it. We should have good plannings and the possibilities to occupy it very quick if we are forced to do so. The bigger part on this is for the Navy to have the bases and the transport ships for our Army.
Please let me know your opinions to it.

Sincerely

General Nishio

 

[Historical note, this document, written in 1921, actually formed the basis for US operations in the Pacific when WWII broke out. Any changes were primarily in areas where technological innovations had occurred.]

Gentlemen,
I present to the council an operational planning document we have obtained from the United States. It was written by a Lt. Col. E.H. Ellis, United States Marine Corps. It is titled Operation Plan 712-Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. Though produced in 1921 our intelligence personnel feel, based upon developments and practices by our potential opponents, that it will form the basis for United States Operations against us in the event of war. I present it here as a means for our officers to understand the probable strategies and tactics that will most likely be used against us, should we expand into the South Pacific region.

Biographical information on the papers author:
Earl Hancock Ellis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Plan 712-Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia:
HyperWar: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia

respectfully submitted,

Col. Bobimoto

 

Gentlemen,

To this point our informal discussions, while not definitive, has given us the oppertunity to understand each others perspective and paramount concerns. No absolute decisions have yet been made, but many innovative and imaginative concepts have been presented and peliminary debate has begun. It is incumbant upon us however, to justify the Emperor's faith in us by selection to this Imperial Council by presenting His Imperial Majesty a coherent and well reasoned course of action for the Future of the Empire.

So far our discussion has been far ranging moving from topic to topic, allowing a free flow of thought that has benefited us greatly. To allow us to reach final reccomendations for presentation I propose we narrow our debate to individual points that can be resolved for implimentation.

I believe the first matter we need to resolve is the China Issue. This matter we inheirited from the previous councils and it consumes much of our militay's resources.

I shall ask our diligent Intelligence Chief Col. Bobimoto to present to the Council a detailed Intelligence summary of the China problem. It will include, but not be limited to, disposition of our forces, those of various Chinese factions, resource and Industry locations (under our control and not), terrain, roads, rail and river communications, as well as any other details he feels we need to know in order to make a wise choice of action.

Once we have all had a chance to examine the available data, I will then ask General Nishio to offer an assesment of three potential courses of action for us to consider. As General Nishio will be primarily concerned with operations in China I feel his opinion should be heard first prior to general debate. The three course I propose are as follows,

Containment and Consolidation

Essentially we hold in place, consolidate our present gains, effect what modest reductions of force possible while preparing our forces to be able to repel any possible Soviet incursions into our sphere of influence.

Retrenchment

Identify those areas absolutely essential to the Empire, withdraw to a shorter and more defensable perimiter to allow the creation of a large strategic reserve that can provide assets for other operations and a deterrent to a Soviet incursion.

Resolution

Seek a military defeat of Chinese forces directly that will provide both greater resources to the Empire and security to our Imperial holdings on the mainland of China.

I do not present these in any specific order of personal preference, each in my opinion has merits and hazards.

This debate will take place in the Imperial Council room (Alt-Hist sub-forum) and will be on the record. At its concusion a binding vote will be taken by all members of the council, with the majority will prevailing. After we have concluded this debate we will move onto the Southern Resorce Area matter and then our industial and production considerations.

We will continue to debate informally all issues here in the Imperial lounge, that are not in formal debate in the council room.

Col. Bobimoto will need time to prepare the required information and will advise us when it is ready.

Respectfully,

The Prime Minister.

 

Concur - Rikanaga.

Fully agreed with Honorable Nishio san's strategy. Defend the areas and consolidate our forces along the lines he requests, with full Naval support, of course (coastal and riverine). Improve training and equipment of garrison and indigenous troops to allow strengthening of a rapid reaction reserve by Regular IJA Divisions and SNLF) to respond effectively to problems in Rangoon, P.I., Bhutan, to interdict enemy supplies coming from Burma and to harass Allied forces on the Indian border (exploiting opportunities there, if available).

In the event our glorious offensive succeeds well. I would strongly favor organizing our defenses and exploiting the resources and wealth gained as we envisioned in the original plan that we intend to execute so masterfully in the coming months. Please counteract the temptation to secure additional lands too quickly after our devastatingly effective attacks overwhelm the running lackey dogs of the Allied Colonialists.

I look forward to your thoughts and criticisms of this humble request,
Rikanaga

 

Thank you much Rikanaga-san!

I knew that i could count on you! As soon as we have the intelligence report from Colonel Bobimoto, i can give you more details on my planning and details on neede transport capacity and the use of Battleships and cruisers.

Have a quiet and nice evening!

Sincerely

General Nishio

 

I hope I'm doing this right well here I go:First and formost you have to secure the resources to do any( this was one of the main reasons of japanese expanson) no one is willing to trade with me because of the war in China. Americas oil and scrap metal embargo is killing me and considering the time frame the pearl harbor attack is under way. I would cancel thoses plans because I don't want to risk taking on the americans just yet, I don't tink with drawing from china is much of a option, there for I would attack dutch indonesia and secure the oil fields there. Considering the political climate in america I don't have a lot of time before they declear war on me so I would also attack french indo china for more resources. Withdrawing from china is also another option the majority of my army is fighting there and with the sheer size of china its pointles, thoses troopscan be used else where.

 

My sources show 35 divisions in China, I dont think this includes the Kwangtung army as welll as sub divisional sized units. The main issue in China is that we dont have enough to defeat the forces that Chiang and Mao have and also occupy the seized territory.

 

My one shows up with 35 Divisions and 39 independant Brigades which gives 80% of the whole IJA. And we do have around 690.000 Chinese collaborationist that gives in numbers 3.209649 men of IJA vs. 5.320000 for China. Not a good ratio to deal with. But you can see that "only" 3.700000 men are real soldiers. That is a reason to try to get a arangement with the Nationalists. The other point is that if we decide to withdrawal from China, we never will get a equivalent amount of resources and we do have the next enemies base at a distance of around 800 kilometers which is nothing more than 1.5 hours for bombers. Is that real good?

 

That is why I want to give Chiang his opportunity to go after the communists. A civil war will ensure that the Chinese are not able to focus on us.

 

Yes but that must be well made and it must look like their own decision. We are giving them their own "Gouvernment" and Police but all under our control. And if this will work we know about the leaders and other important persons and if they want play bad tricks on us....... You´ll know what i mean?!

To say it much easier, We have to make a good offer to get them at our side, that is one of the most important things to do. Otherwise it will start a hard time and we have to search for other resources and have to build up a quick and effective homeland defense strategy.

 

I think we can reach agreement that we can exploit the resources for a fee paid to Chiang.