Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Yes sir, we should have sufficient airlift to hit at least two targets with paradrops simultaneously. Depending on the size of the drops and how many additional transport aircraft types we can pump out pre-X day possibly more. The submarine question I am less sure of, it depends upon how many of our boats are adaptable to reconfigure. We have sufficient amphibious forces to hit multiple targets (remember we won't be making the historical Wake Island, Guam and Philipines landings). The two veteran regiments General Nishio has signed off on letting us run through airborne school should give us sufficient additional airborne troops, but if yourself and Nishio feel we need a greater "cushion" we could run a third regiment through. It really is not a problem to have additional trained airborne troops utilized in a strictly ground combat role (ala the 101st Airborne at Bastogne).

It was my understanding that we would be delivering our declaration of war, on Friday evening, at close of business, London time to both the British and Dutch government in exile, also located in London. London is 8 hours behind Singapore so if we deliver our declaration at 4:30 pm London time, it would be 30 minutes past midnight Singapore time, so technically the next day. This allows for only about 4 hours for the enemy to respond. Nautical dawn in Singapore will be around 0430, at which time we can begin debarkation and pre-invasion bombardment for landing operations and airstrikes can launch. Sunrise will be around 0645 so H-hour should be aound this time. I do not think this allows for sufficient time for the enemy to effect major changes to their defensive posture. The 4 carriers of division 1 & 2 assigned to attack Singapore can probably catch a good number of ships in port and the strike package should be configured accordingly. We could possibly attach our CVL's, Ryujo and Zuiho to carrier division three and have them support the landings on southern Borneo and then Palembang, while Shokaku and Zuikaku break off and hit enemy harbor facilities. I will assign additional intelligence assets to the DEI in order to determine the most likely location of enemy naval forces in case we should decide to go this route and deal with them preemptively. Shoho is scheduled to commission in November, I do not think it possible to have her ready for the operations but will investigate further.

Steverodgers wrote:

Very good point sir. This is also one of the reasons I have requested that the Prime Minister allow us to immediately put some of our Minekaze/Kamikaze/Mutsuki destroyers into repair shipyards to begin upgrading the ASW capability of our Type D-destroyers, in order to deal with enemy subsurface units. I believe this is their greatest threat to our operations. The mining of enemy harbors is a good idea, if we have sufficient boats to perform the mining. I fear this is one of those areas where our assets are fairly thin. The minelaying boats are the type we will need to use to land troops if we decide to follow that route. We will need to decide which is the better use for them. I do think it wise to station submarines off the enemy's ports to attack traffic trying to leave. We need to keep additional units off Pearl Harbor and off American naval installations in the Philipines, to perform the reconaissance role and to provide warning if their fleets sortie. Additional submarines should be stationed in the northern end of the Straits of Malacca to interdict possible reinforcing British Naval units.

The discussion also raises a subject I have failed to address. A certain number of our DD/DE/E units will need to be completed to fill the DMS/DML role. We will always have a need for minesweepers and minelayers.

 

Failure to capture oil production facilities intact will harm us worse than if the Dutch have 200 submarines available on x-day + one. If Dutch naval bases remain after our initial landing operations, then perhaps we can forward deploy Submarine Tenders close enough to allow our large Submarines to quickly load Mines after they complete landing operations, then mine the Dutch submarine bases

 

we do have several DMS ships avalable, the only harbor mined is Singapore. Batavia and Soerbaja have good harbor defence, but we can land elsewhere.

 

You are correct Steve we currently have DMS and DML types available. I was referring back to the DD/DE/Escort proposal and letting our Prime Minister know that we need to incorporate some of these types into our production plans. We must also remember that while at present only Singapore is mined (and we don't intend to assault it directly, too strong), once hostilities commence, our opponents may mine harbors or choke points before we hit our secondary and tertiary targets. Much of this depends upon how rapidly we can secure the initial objectives and move on. For follow on operations it must be assumed that our enemies will deploy mines as a component of a coordinated defense. We need to have sufficient assets to counter this. DMS and DML types do retain much of their DD/DE/E type capabilities, and can still be used in escort work when not performing in their intended role.

Mr. Prime Minister, is the declaration of war in relation to start of hostilities timeline, as I laid it out, acceptable?

 

General strategic plan.
1.) Begin process to bring our economy to a full wartime footing. (Japan did not do this historically until 1943.
2.) Immediately cease production of DB-601/HA 40 engine type and swap production over to Nakajima Sakae HA-35 engine.
3.) Adapt the Ki-61 airframe that we are producing the DB-601 for over to a radial engine. (Actually done when the HA-40 engine plant was destroyed resulting in the Ki-100, the Ki-61 is nearing pre-production test flights, Dec. 41. The historical re-engineering took place between 19 Jan 45 and 1 Feb 45 so we're only talking a 12 day delay in introducing the aircraft).
4.) Adopt stingent communications opsec standards. Begin electronic disinformation campaign.
5.) Build up naval base at Truk. Construct repair shipyard at same. Re-base Kido Butai to Truk.
6.) Begin propoganda campaign within US to strengthen isolationist factions. Our initial action should be a letter to isolationist Senators that we request to be read into the congressional record and simultaneous publication in the Sunday newspapers that have an isolationist bias. This letter should contain an explaination of our recent political difficulties and reassurances that we desire peace and an Asia ruled by democratic governments. Begin dismantling Manchukuo Army, replacing those units with less experienced units, Japanese and Chinese, allowing our most experienced units to be re-deployed and removing the political threat posed by the Kwantung Army faction.
7.) Pressure Germany for complete sharing of technological research/developments. Pressure Germany to have Vichy Government lodge protest with the US over British and Free French seizures of Vichy French territory. (Vichy France and not Free France is the government recognized by the US as legitimate.)
8.) Establish Republic of China government, with down the road promise of independance along the lines of the US/Philipines, Tydings/McDuffie act. Present this action to the American public as such. Form CDF and CNDF units, (Chinese Defense Forces and Chinese Naval Defense Forces). Hopefully, these organizations will free up Japanese land Forces for redeployment and be able to take over ASW functions in the Yellow Sea from Japanese Naval Forces. Stress to the Chinese people that once these organizations are up and running we will begin withdrawl of Japanese Occupation forces.
9.) Begin establishment of industrial and shipbuilding facilities in major Chinese cities, Shanghai, Haichow, Tsingtao and Tientsin to start (once the shipyards are functioning concentrate on merchant and escort hulls). We insure that the Chinese constitution that we have them write, guarantees the rights of foreign property ownership. This protects our investment, ties their economic well being to ours, we portray it to the western powers as protecting their economic investments, we gain additional, valuable war production and pacify the Chinese people with jobs.
10.) Begin propoganda operations within China to convince the Chinese people that we are setting them on the path to an independant, self-governing country. Push the idea that the new government is the rightfull descendent of the Sun Yat-sen movement.
11.) JEF-China begins combat operations to clear and hold coastal regions of JEF-North and JEF-Center. Propaganda to western press that this is to allow for security in these areas, free from communist and warlord (Chaing) interference. Upon securing these areas begin setting up local governments, turn policing over to Chinese forces, hold local and District elections. Above all else avoid attrocities.
12.) This item we have not reached agreement on. Seizure of Noumea, New Caledonia and Kwangchowan (on the China coast near Hainan) from Free French Forces in conjunction with Vichy French Territorial troops. I still think we can focus attention on the south Pacific and isolate or force a diplomatic agreement with Australia. At the very least it could force a withdrawl of Australian forces serving with the British in the Far East for redeployment to protect Australia from a perceived threat. This will also focus US attention away from mainland Asia and towards the South Pacific. We will portray the action in the US press as aiding our French allies in regaining territory illegally seized, remove all combat troops immediately and return Kido Butai to Truk, to act as a counter to US intervention (unlikely). When time to execute the SRA plan comes, we pull Carrier divisions 1 & 2 and move them secretly to Formosa and carrier division 3 to the Palaus. The US will hopefully not detect their movement and will still think them deployed to Truk.
13.) Establish Republic of Korea, use a Tydings/McDuffie act, type of agreement. Establish a KDF and KNDF military organization. Tout this progress towards democracy in the US.
14.) Establish OEAS Organization of East Asian States. Have Japan, China and Korea as founding members. Invite the Philipines and Australia to join. Offer to let the US join in a non voting advisory capacity for the Philipines.
Continued......
15.) Have Vichy France request, through OEAS, a mutual defence treaty with Japan, Korea, China and the Philipines. State that the reason for the request is fear of further British/Free France offensive or retalitory operations against Vichy territory. Have Korea offer to send engineer units to Indo-China, but refuse to send combat units because their forces are for defense only. Have Japan offer to send engineer and air units to New Caledonia, again refuse to send land combat units because they could be deemed as offensive in nature. Actually send SNLF units posing as engineers to occupy Isle of Pines and Mare' Island. These locations are uninhabited. but have excellent potential as air bases/small ports. We should begin improvements on these bases immediately after the Vichy request for assistance. These units are close enough to Noumea that they can be transferred there quickly, by Daihatsu or Toku Daihatsu type landing craft, in the event of a threat. Have Indo-China request additional Japanese land and air units and cite fear of the large British presence in Singapore, Malaya in general and Borneo. Have Thailand request admittance to OEAS, state fear of British forces on their borders with Malaya and Burma as their reasoning. All this is really for show, we want these actions to leak to the American press, and if the Philipines join the OEAS, they will be reporting these events back to the US. We want the US to remain focused on China and the threat New Caledonia presents to Australia, we want Australia focused on the New Caledonia threat, but keep the New Caledonia threat as a potential threat and not an imminent threat. It will be hard for the US to paint the build up of bases and aircraft in New Caledonia as anything other than precautions against potential British action. We can use non Japanese engineer units (Korean) to improve air and port facilities in Indo-China in preparation for the SRA operations, while making it appear that they are precautionary against potential British threats. Korea's refusal to send ground units if reported to the American press and through them to the American people will give the isolationist in the US ammunition to tie the Roosevelt administrations hands. We will also be beginning to shape the US public's perception, of Britain, as a colonial power in the Far East that many Asian nations fear as an aggressor. New British forces sent to bolster the defenses in the Far East can be protested by OEAS nations as escalation by the British. It's all propoganda on our part, but perception is reality to the American public.
16.) Have Nishio adopt a defensive or limited offensive posture in North and Central China. He should from day one, begin planning, reinforcement, reorganization and building up of supplies in the Amoy, Foochow, Hangchow area of south China. Once the clearing operations are well under way in North and Central China, he can leave the final stages of those operations to his headquarters staff and transfer his HQ to South China. Begin operations against Communist Chinese forces there. The objective of these operations will be to secure the south China coast and establish a defensive line from Hangchow to Chusien, to Pucheng, along the MSR to Canton, capturing Wenchow and coupled with seizure of Kwangchow from the Free French in the Noumea operation (see #12) we will control the south Chinese coast and fully isolate Hong Kong. There are significant Communist Chinese forces in this area, but we can defeat them. We will however allow false reports of the difficulties we are experiencing to filter out to the western press. We will even intimate that it could be a repeat of the Changsha operations where Japan was defeated. This will allow us to move large numbers of troops, supplies and aircraft into Formosa, Hainan, the Pescadores and North Indo China. Appearing to be reinforcing our efforts in South China, they will actually be our buildup for the SRA operation. Hopefully, it will also cause western intelligence sources to underestimate our combat capabilities. The Communists rely on propoganda so it is unlikely they will willingly reveal how well our operations are really progressing.
17.) Forces ostensibly being sent to bolster the south China operation will begin preparing for the SRA operation.
18.) Japan will issue a version of the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, and 1928/1930 Clark Memorandum. Citing fears of the expansion of the current European Wars into the Pacific region, Japan in following the example of the great democratic government of the United States issues the doctrine. Citing the United States and it's current (actions taken under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine to secure the Carribean, Central and South American countries against Germany, France and Italy) and historical actions, aimed at preventing european meddling in countries in the western hemisphere, asserts it's right to engage in similar actions to prevent european powers from meddling in the affairs of Japan's neighbors. Protest British support of insurgent Chinese forces. Request that Britain, the Netherlands, and Vichy France begin talks to follow the United States and Japan's lead (Tydings/McDuffie act in the Philipines and Japan's recent agreements with China and Korea) in retuning control of their Asian territories to the indigenous peoples and aid them in forming democratic, self-governing, countries.

The stage should now be set for our invasion of the SRA. We should have managed to bolster US isolationists and have painted ourselves in the US press as being a country attempting to emulate the United States. We should have thoroughly confused US and British intelligence as to our intentions. The Roosevelt Administration will find it hard to protest our actions without inviting criticism in the American public of their own actions. Gentlemen, I await your critique of this plan so that we can arrive at a workable solution.


Colonel Bobimoto

 

Point 1, Complete agreement. We must maximize our production for a long conflict.

Point 2, Agreed. We cannot afford the time or resources to perfect this design, whatever its possible benefits.

Point 3, Agreed. The delay is acceptable for a effective design.

Point 4, Full agreement. We cannot succeed by force of arms alone.

Point 5, Complete agreement. The center of our Empire will be moving east and south and our primary combat fleet base should move with it.

Point 6, Full agreement. We cannot prevail by force of arms alone.

Point 7, Full agreement. We cannot succeed by force of arms alone.

Point 8, Full agreement. I would offer the suggestion that we include an air component to the CDF/CDNF. This would amplify the impression that there is an alternate Chinese government. It would also make good 'copy' in the west as there is a romantic 'air' to pilots. It could prove a political counterpoint to Chaing's mercenary air force, and provide air defence and maritime search to our communication lines. We are planning upgrades and even completely new airframes for our frontline formation's, the aircraft to be replaced, along with those being discontinued, would make a fine source of planes for this newly formed asset.

Point 9, Full agreement. We must do all possible to expand our production facilities.

Point 10, Full agreement. We cannot prevail by force of arms alone.

Point 11, Full agreement. We must lay the foundation for General Nishio's final assault upon the Chinese bandit factions.

Point 12, This matter has been the most contentious, and as yet, unresolved issue before the Imperial Council. I have a sense from previous discussions that a slim majority favor pursuing this option. I, however, have not been able to give my full endorsement for it as I have three nagging concerns. Briefly, I worry this could upset our timetable for operations, that it could become an overextension of our limited asset's and that it could counter all the effort we are trying to make in lessing tensions in the US and Australia.

I will, however, endorse this on three conditions.

First, it must neither delay or subtract from our forces assets needed to quickly and completely secure the resources from the SRA intact to the ability humanly possible.

Second, it must not be used, as it has in China, as an excuse for further expansion. It is an outpost, nothing more. I do not wish to be told down the line that it is too exposed and that to protect it we must seize some new parcel of land elsewhere. The tail must not wag the dog!

Last, this action is both political as well as military, and must be seen as such. If we can exchange this for some agreement with Australia, the US, or Great Britain, (preferably all three) then we must do so. At best it will remain a draw on our resources, while offering nothing to send back to the homeland. Again, as in China, I do not want the military to take the position that once our banner has been planted, and Imperial blood shed, that no withdrawl can be considered without loseing face.

Point 13, Full agreement. As you have anticipated Col. Bobimoto I would support a KDF air component as well. Let them protect their home while protecting our line of comunications and freeing Imperial squadrons for frontline service.

Point 14, Full agreement. Largely window dressing, but it presents a unified mosaic that supports our overall propaganda efforts. I would also favor the creation of Maylay and Burmese Defence Force, as well as client states for the OEAS when the time comes. Primarily as a ground force to start, but token Naval and Air formations could be added as with China and Korea as resources allow.

Point 15, Agreed, with reservations. See my responce to Point 12.

Point 16, Full agreement, pending General Nishio's confirmation.

Point 17, Full agreement.

Point 18, Full Agreement.

The Prime Minister.

 

Items 1-7,9 and 10 will begin being implemented immediately.

The Honorable Prime Minister wrote:

Good idea sir! Would you like us to do the same with the KDF, Korean Defense Forces? Since we have agreed to increase pilot training, inclusion of acceptable candidates from both countries in our initial classes would reduce the manpower drain upon our own forces and widen our pool of potential candidates allowing us to maintain the highest of standards. Since the pilot training program is twelve months long we should have sufficient 2d line or obselete aircraft handed down from our own squadrons to equip them. When we get them up and actively deployed, stories of selected individuals and their actions, portrayed in their home countries newspapers will go a long way towards building pride in country and in their own armed forces. When we can identify their best, we should group them in elite squadrons, equip them with the best aircraft (by them we will hopefully have engine and airframe factories locted in China) and follow their exploits in the newspapers. A Chinese pilot that shoots down a western devil, after a more than a century of exploitation by western nations, and propagandizing his exploits in the media, will go far towards shifting public opinion towards the new government. This will further lead to a feeling of independance and pride within the civilian populace and probably lead to additional enlistments in their military forces. Any functions they can take over from Japanese forces relieves our assets for deployment elsewhere. I think the first combatant vessel, built, manned and commissioned in the CNDF should be named the RCS Sun Yat-sen. Additional units should be named after dead heroes or significant battles the new mlitary engages in. Maybe DD's and CL's after heroes and DE's/Escorts after battles. We need to build pride and tradition in the people and their military as rapidly as possible. Tradition, pride and hard training build Esprit de Corps and that leads to better/more effective troops. Should we also begin selecting naval officers to send to Eta Jima?

p.s-an after thought just occured to me. Should we build movie theaters in urban areas of China and Korea, produce movies geared towards entertainment, throw in some propoganda films and newreels aimed towards propogandizing the exploits of their armed forces? Should we subsidize the production, distribution and sales of radios to the Japanese, Chinese and Korean populations and produce entertainment and news programing, to be broadcast to them? Seems like a potentially effective means of reaching the masses. Provide musical, dramatic and/or comedic performances that the Chinese/Koreans will listen to for entertainment and intersperce the broadcasts with commercials bent towards propoganda purposes and regular news broadcasts heavily laden with the truth, but tweaked with propoganda to shape perceptions towards our ends. We could really develop a comprehensive program.

 

Jobs, adequate food and entertainment will go a long ways towards keeping a populace docile and ripe for manipulation.

 

Colonel Bobimoto,

first great work out of our plannings, Congrats! And then we need a 4 eye discussion on point 16 of your plan. Please contact me at me save line for further plannings.

Sincerely,

Nishio, Field Marshal

 

To be honest I had not given much thought to providing vessels much larger than our standard size convoy escorts other than perhaps one Type E as a 'flagship'. mostly the transfer of existing Type H and older Type G once our new production Type G's start launching. If we can spare them, then do so.

Information is a war asset, so by all means use media to promote our cause within our client states.

We could offer the prospect of them creating service schools of their own, after the successfull conclusion of the current conflict, but to train at ours in the interm.

 

I concur that the Ukuru class (Type E) should constitute our primary convoy escort ship class. Yes sir. I believe we can achieve respectable numbers of these and unless I am mistaken, this is the type ship Admiral Karonada suggested we use as our workhorse escort type.

Of course I'll suport whatever the group decides, but my suggestion has always been to use the smallest feasible escort ship, the historical Type C/D which we are calling here Type F. There could be a proportion of larger, faster ships - older destroyers or Ukurus - to serve as leaders or where a few knots' speed is really essential.

Did we ever determine whether in game terms we need distinct leaders for escort groups or destroyer squadrons? The latter is relevant to our planned AA conversion of the older light cruisers and their employment. Is there a discernable need for the cruisers' reconnaissance aircraft in the destroyer squadron?

Turning to operations, we cannot assume that a carrier force can turn up off Singapore on X-Day undetected. Not in real life anyway; perhaps WITP allows units to start at a point without considering how they got there. Transiting the South China Sea is not like slipping across the empty North Pacific. Historically the Allies were aware of convoy movements towards Malaya, that may even have contributed to the surprise at Pearl Harbor, but I don't see a comparable surprise being achievable at Singapore.

I'm also concerned about the proposed tour of the East Indies by Carrier Division 3. It's tempting to assume that our enemies are so feeble that two Japanese carriers can do anything they want, but it leaves little margin for error or misfortune. Concentration of force is not only good offensive strategy, it's the best defense. Dispersion can give an overall weaker opponent a chance to strike an effective blow. While I concur generally with using the carriers to support our SRA operations, their primary mission remains engaging the US fleet if/when necessary. We cannot afford to have carriers lostor disabled because we spread them too widely across the theater of operations.

 

As far as the strike, having the ships in Saigon will allow a strike, especially if we launch early and then sail in to recover. We could use the Kido to hit targets in South china as a diversion and excuse. I agree on having div 3 alone. i would suggest having Zuiho and Ryuho combined. The Dutch are weak, but never discount a lucky shot.

 

I apologize if I misquoted your intention sir. It was not intentional.
-As to the Ukuru/Type C/D escort and Type G (Ch-13,28 and 60 class subchasers) Would the C/D Escorts really benefit us at this time? They are only slightly less displacement, have only 2/3rd's the DP gun armament, 1 vs 2 depth charge chutes and 2/3rd's of the depth charge throwers of the Ukuru's. The speed difference is 3 knts 19.5 vs 16.5. At the present time is the lesser capability (the decreased ASW capability concerns me most) worth the slightly shorter build time? As for large numbers of smaller escorts, will not the Type G's fill that role? They have a 16 knt speed and are 60% the displacement of a C/D, very quick to build and are a substantial vs minimal resource savings? I'd really like to hear your thoughts on this. I regard your opinion highly and have great respect for your knowledge. Make whatever changes you think will serve us best and I will fully support that revised plan. I have the utmost confidence in your decisions.

Yes.

Would not a large destroyer, so configured, not serve just as well? Reconnaissance aircraft are a valuable asset, their utility is somewhat limited by weather and small numbers. As for the CL classes we are discussing the Imperial Navy had plans to convert the Tenryu class into dedicated AA ASW platforms similar to what we are discussing from 1935 on, the Kuma's didn't appear to be very successful or necessary in thier destroyer leader role. We also have the Nagara and Sendai classes. Would we not be wise to convert two-four of them? Then evaluate their utility in the CLAA role, use the rest for other purposes and determine which way to go with them. I don't remember who, but it was you, TOS or Takao that recommended only doing a few until we saw if the conversion worked well.

No the game mimics real life. You can make a move undetected if you avoid enemy search zones or ships. The game gives the opponent electronic intercept and search/sighting reports. I do think by making high speed dashes at night from port to port, and travelling in areas secure fron enemy search planes you can manage to minimize the chances of detection.

I look forward to having the plan outline critiqued and modifications or whole new plans proposed. IMHO, that's the only way we will be able to determine the plan of action that gives the best chance of success. Feel free to modify or propose an all new plan. We owe it to the Emperor and the nation to consider all possibilities.

 

Certainly we know that in many areas we must economize to the greatest extent possible. Deciding which of these is the tough point.

Since, as I understand it new merchant construction would be of ships with a higher speed than the Type C/D's, perhaps a faster escort would be wise unless or untill sheer numbers is our only defence. But like Adm. Karornada in this I will bow to the majority decision.

 

Good point Mr. Prime Minister. Our most efficient merchant cargo ship type is the Yusen S Cargo. It is most efficient in tons of cargo moved per ton of fuel consumed and among the top 5 in tons of cargo shipped per ton of displacement. This is the ship type I would like to see us standardize on. The fuel efficiency could make a huge difference in our fuel consuption when the distances and amount of material we need to move is considered. Every ton of fuel saved here allows for more fuel for naval combatant use. We currently have 942 vessels for 3,343,640 tons of merchant shipping in service. I'd like to start another 19 Yusen S Cargo of the AK configuration, 10 of the APA configuration, 15 in an AKA configuration and 10 AKE's. This would be an additional 54 ships and 369,360 tons of displacement. These ships have an 18 knot max speed and 14 knot cruise speed so the Prime Minister is correct that a 16.5 knot escort may not be optimal. If I remember correctly one of our ASW countermeasures was high speed convoys through exposed areas.
As for merchant tankers the Tonan Whaler is our most fuel efficient type and carries the greatest amount of fuel/oil as cargo. We need to move massive amounts so this is a big plus. More cargo with fewer ships. They only have a 15 knot top speed and 13 knot cruise speed so the C/D type escorts would be suitable for this type, but I'm not sure I want to use this type tanker for the high exposure leg of the journey from point of production to the home islands. Perhaps from point of production to a hub base and then load the cargo on a Type-N tanker with a 19 knot top speed for a high speed convoy from the hub to the home islands. I guess this just depends upon how important we feel high speed is to avoiding submarine attacks. It is something we need to discuss further.
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For a tanker that could keep pace with the Yusen S class how much do we lose in cargo capacity? Fuel economy?

 

1. I agree with this. How quickly can we re-tool to begin increasing production? If I understand correctly we only have a handful just beginning production now. Will we have the time to allow our pilots to train with the new planes?

2. I really don't want correct you as nothing is yet set in stone, but I was under the impression that Shokaku-Zuikaku made up CarDiv5? At least according to the fleet organization table include in the Imperial Council's War Room. Overall I agree with the plan, but would recommend switching CarDiv5 with CarDiv3 and CarDiv4 of the 2nd Fleet (Zuiho, Hosho, and Taiyo). This will allow the better trained crews of the fleet carriers to concentrate on other high value targets like Sumatra or aiding in neutralizing Singapore.

3. Palembang concerns me a bit. From the closest shore it is surrounded by swamp. Not an ideal landing site. Paratroopers are probably the best bet to initially secure the oil field and refineries. If there is not enough time to get troops trained for airborne ops, we should use the three SNLF units already trained. Also, we could follow up a drop by sending a patrol boat or two upriver with reinforcments. An additional 400-600 troop on two or three patrol boats would be helpful. I’m not sure about enemy troop strengths, but if we can get enough men and supplies into Palembang, then maybe we can land the main troop concentrations to the south or west, where conditions for rapid movement are a bit more ideal.

3-2. it would be nice, but as you say problematic. I agree the idea warrants further discussion as to how to best achieve this goal.

4. Fully agree with this objective.

5. While an important target and resource, I feel it’s too dependent upon the completion of other objectives and spread to far away to take simultaneously with other objectives. I think in this case we should be prepared to take action if the opportunity presents itself, but I would assume for now that it is out of our initial reach. I don't want to see us too far spread out so quickly.

6. I fully agree.

 

I agree that adequate speed and seakeeping are crucial characteristics for escort ships, more so than details of armament. ASW is largely a matter or detection and deterrence, which depend primarily on numbers. Ships from subchasers to fleet destroyers have basically the same detection capability, including the Type 1 eyeball. A submarine trying to slip through the screen of one of our convoys won't be so worried about how many 4.7s or depth charges each ship carries as about how many escorts there are; detection by any escort will throw the sub onto the defensive. When we do spot one of them, we'll likely have two or more escorts prosecute the engagement.

One way to look at it: the Ch13 subchaser has the requisite weapons and sensors for ASW; anything larger than that is mainly for range, speed, or flagship capability.

I haven't done a detailed study of our merchant fleet, but I have to wonder what proportion of them really cannot be escorted by 16-knot ships comparable to the corvettes and minesweepers the British are using in the Atlantic. Our intelligence tells us that even the 'fast' HX convoys are escorted largely by corvettes, with a few destroyers in each group including the flagship. The American and British war emergency cargo ships are mainly in the 11-12 knot range, although there are a proportion of faster units, especially tankers.

Anyway we need to wrap up this topic.

Is there a discernable need for the cruisers' reconnaissance aircraft in the destroyer squadron?
Would not a large destroyer, so configured, not serve just as well?

Here I must defer to those more familiar with WITP or, speaking in character, destroyer squadron operations. Bobimoto-san indicates that we do need flagships, so I would use the ones we have rather than develop a new type. This is doubly so if the flagship needs to operate aircraft. I would still proceed with the AA rearmament of the light cruisers; this will serve to protect themselves, the destroyers, and whatever they are escorting. As discussed earlier, we should do 2-4 ships at a time so as not to disrupt operations or overload our shipyard facilities.

 

1.)We need to eliminate/neutralize Singapore. Air strikes from carrier division 1 (Akagi-Kaga) and carrier division 2 (Soryu-Hiryu) should hit Singapore at dawn, additional land based air from Indo-China will follow up and continue the supression.

How long is it proposed to use Kido Butai to support the Singapore operation? As I understand it, the plan also involves amphibious landings in the vicinity, so are we asking the carriers to cover the invasion force and the landing? Until air bases are established in Malaya, air cover and support for the troops will either be land-based air from Indo-China, 600 miles away, or will require the carriers to linger offshore. Do we have a proposed timeline for this operation?

 

We have bases at Patani and Singora. Perhaps we can station a few squadrons in these locations. I would prefer mostly fighters, as the locations of these air bases are pretty close to a number of British air bases. From here we can escort our bombers on the final leg of their bombing missions from Indo-China and provide CAP for our invasion forces. Hopefully this will allow us to release our carriers from the op a bit sooner than otherwise would be the case.

I would also propose a submarine picket in the Java Sea to intercept possible attempts to combine the fleet at Singapore with the Dutch cruiser squadrons out of Java.