Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I respectfully suggest that we first need to resolve our basic strategy. Just on this page, we have one suggestion to land in the immediate vicinity of Singapore and another to not land much south of Kota Bharu. If we confine our landings to the Kota Bharu-Singora area, we already have a viable plan to accomplish that and the conquest of Malaya without using the carrier force. Indeed that plan becomes more certain when reinforced by forces made available by not assaulting the Philippines. Discuss it, take a vote, whatever, but we need to make a decision and stick to it as the basis for further planning.

 

Respectfully sir, that is precisely why we need one man to plan for a particular area. We don't want to fight by committee. Once, we've agreed on an overall strategy and objectives, we need to leave it to the area commanders to form a cohesive battleplan for achieving them. I presented my vision of how I'd go about it, Steve another. The correct approach could be either one, or one we did not forsee or mention. I had suggested using our carriers because I wanted to achieve everything more quickly to avoid damage to the oil production facilities, I would not wait until Singapore was reduced. I'd keep it neutralized. I'd also hit keys points and bypass others, cleaning the others up after we achieve our goals.

Historically Japan hit the objectives uver a longer period.

Malayan Campaign 8 Dec 1941 to 31 january 1942.
Tarakan 11-12 January 1942.
Miri/Brunei 16 Dec 1941. (The Dutch Governor ordered the destruction of the oil fields on * December after hearing of the Pearl harbor attacks).
Balikpaupan 23-24 January 1942.
Battle of Singapore 8 to 15 February 1942.
Palembang 13 to 15 February 1942.
Medan Sumatra mid March 1942.

IMHO, we should seize and defend vital points, then move to eleminate all enemy forces. Not eleminate the opposition then seize the vital facilities, giving the enemy the time to damage or destroy them.

 

I was thinking about ASW operations specificly.

 

My understanding was that once a Area Commander was tasked with an objective, it would be up to him and his staff to create multiple options for the successful completion of the objective. The battle plans would then be submitted to the council for approval of what is deemed the lowest risk/highest reward option. Once the plan is approved, and a date assigned for the start of the operation, the necessary units would begin training and preparing for the assault.

 

This would seen to be a very reasonable method sir. I really don't care what method the individual commander chooses to use to come up with their plan. The method as you suggested. To present a plan to the council and have it critiqued and adjusted, or assemble a group of officers who the area commander chooses and brainstorm it. Whichever method the commander feels will result in a plan that he can successfully implement, I don't care how they devise the plan.
Let it be known that I'm speaking for myself and not the Prime Minister, but merely expressing my personal opinion.

 

We need to agree on the basic priorities for asset allocation.1A is Singapore and Palembang. 1B Balikpappen, Tarakan, Kendarri. 2 is open, but other islands around Borneo and Miri and Butuan. 3 is securing Java and Burma. 4 is Rabaul and the south Pacific area. And co equal being ready in case of the US intervening

 

I must respectfully disagree, nothing is more important than the seizure of oil production facilities intact.

 

But with out the seizure of Singapore it remains a serious threat. We need Singapore to be able to hold Palembang and to move south to JAva

 

I don't think so. We need to begin the Malayan campaign, but since we have the use of the carriers, and more importantly, their aircraft, since they will not be attacking the Naval and Air Bases at Pearl Harbor, I think we can pound Singapore hard enough to make the a non-threat, temporarily. During this period they are suppressed we should use the troops and shipping that was historically used to attack the Philipines, Wake, Guam and wherever else and take all oil production and refinery facilities we can. We need to start from the most valuable and work our way down the list. We should have seized enough airfields early on as a side effect of our oil facility seizures and the start of the Malayan campaign to quickly release the carriers and then we can forward base land based air units, to continue the suppression. IMO, most of Singapore's Naval and Air capabilities can be neutralized in the first couple of strikes. Anything that does manage to venture forth will be gratly overmatched by our forces. As long as we gain and hold air and naval superiority over the contested areas, we cut off the enemy from reinforcement, resupply and the ability to consolidate, we can then deal with the military installations at our leisure.

 

I must concur with Col. Bobimoto's observations. Put simply, we can sustain ourselves effectively, for a longer period, if we aquire the !B objectives and not Singapore than we can if the reverse is true.

Of course we want both and shall get both.

I have high confidence, that by eliminating our US objectives, we will have the assets neccasary to accelerate the seizure of Singapore ahead of the original timetable based on previous planning.

 

One reaason we need Singapore is it is the only major naval base in the region. Saigon is not capable of major warship repairs and the only other possibilities is Manila andHong Kong. Which is one reason I propose using the 48th from the Phillipines as an additional landing to force an early surrender of Malaya.

 

Steve we're not denying that we need to take Singapore, we do. We also need to start the campaign to reduce it on day one. What we are saying is that the speed with which Singapore is captured is not as critical as the speed with which we seize the oil production/refineries. If they manage to destroy or damage a significant portion of them we have lost the war no matter what happens with Singapore. If we can capture most or all of them intact, we can increase our economy, have fuel for aircraft and ships and have a fighting chance.
Our economy is the whole reason we're going to war. At present our industry requires 13900t of fuel per day to operate. Our domestic oil refineries can produce 9315 tons per day, so we have a daily shortfall of 4585t of fuel per day. This comes from stockpiles we created before the United States, Britain and the Dutch placed an oil/fuel embargo on us. We cannot expand industry because it increases the rate we deplete our stockpiles. When the stockpiles are exhausted our economy shuts down. Our domestic oil refineries require 10350t of crude oil per day to run at full capacity (even so they still produce 4585t less than our industry requires). Our crude oil production in Japan and our controlled territories is only 2240t per day, or a shortfall of 8110t of crude oil per day. When the stockpiles are depleted our refineries shut down and the economy crashes even faster. Now our industry requires raw materials. We only produce a small fraction on the home islands. Most of our daily raw material needs must be shipped in. Ships use fuel and that is an additional strain on our already defecit fuel situation. Our naval ships require fuel to operate, another drain on our supply. Palembang alone can give us the oil to keep our refineries supplied, but we still have the daily fuel shortfall. The oil and refineries at Balikpaupan and Medan, combined, will provide the fuel to make that up. Even so we're operating our merchant and naval fleets off the stockpiled fuel. Djambi is located near Palembang and it produces oil to supply about 25% of the refinery capacity at Palembang. 2500 or so additional tons of fuel per day for our shipping needs. Soerabaja, Miri, Samarinda, Tarakan, Bengkalis, Tjepoe, Boela, Brunei and Babo combine for an additional 6600 tons of potential oil sources and 3960t of refining capacity. I'd like to get these nine latter locations but the first ones I listed are critical to our survival.

 

I need to provide some additional information to clarify the above post. Brunei and Miri are co-located on the north coast of Borneo, have minimal defenses, are lightly held and are probably the two easiest targets to seize. Total assets between the two, 1600t of oil per day and refining capacity to process all but 100t. Fuel produced 1350t per day.
Samarinda is co-located with Balikpaupan, a location I feel is critical to seize early, as it's production is 2nd only to Palembang. It's location on the SE coast of Borneo, and distance from friendly bases makes assaulting it by surprise, on D-Day problematic. This is an additional reason to undertake the New Caledonia operation. I would like to lure the allies into a sense of complacency concerning shipping traffic moving north and south through the Celebes Sea, within detection range of US reconaissance aircraft out of the Philipines. If they become used to seeing non-hostile traffic moving from the French territories in New Caledonia and Indo-China, and back, our slow moving transport/cargo ships won't draw undue attention, and will probably be interpreted as routine.
If we can get Vichy France to sign off on the operation and the signing of a mutual defense treaty. Post operation, we can plausibly claim that the sending of engineering units to Indo-China to improve airfields and port facilities is a precaution against British/Free French retribution. No combat troops will be shifted at this time. If we then have Nishio shift his operations to south China and begin an offensive against Communist Chinese forces there, the presence of warships, increased supply convoys, the build up of troops in Formosa, Hainan, the Pescadores and Northern Indo-China will appear to be associated with that operation and not as preparatory steps for an invasion of Malaya and Borneo. We need to then engage in a disinformation campaign to overstate the difficulties we are experiencing in south China. We need the allies to think we are bogged down and their under-estimation of our capabilities will seem to have been verified. We need to step up negotiation efforts with the British to have them stop supplying the Chi-Com forces, even seem desperate. They will report their impressions to Washington. We should also step up our negotiation efforts with the aim of ending the oil/fuel embargo, make minor concessions and hint at a willingness to make major ones. All in an effort to make the Allied powers believe that their efforts are bearing fruit and that there is a good chance for a negotiated settlement and that a military solution will not be required.
Our tentative date for delivering our Declaration of War to Britain and the Netherlands should be at close of business, Friday, November 28th, with combat operations begining the following morning.
If weather conditions or the progress of our preparations require a delay, the first alternate date should be 05 December.
A final alternate date of 12 December should also be planned for. I would not recommend a delay past this date, if we are going to initiate hostilities.
I would further recommend that General Officer couriers be immediately dispatched to London, Washington and Berlin. They will carry our plans, and a special set of ciphers to these locations and reveal only that information required to our Ambassadors at the appropriate time. I have stated this before and feel I must continually reinterate, confidential information should not be transmitted through our diplomatic channels, even if encrypted, due to the information Germany has provided to us. We must assume the allies are reading our mail. Improved cryptological ciphers will immediately be dispatched and used by forces that will be involved in these operations. The old ciphers will continue to be used by all other forces in an attempt to mislead allied intelligence as to our intentions.
The code to inform our embassy staffs that combat operations are about to begin and to deliver the Declaration of War will be transmitted in the clear, and transmitted to the General officer couriers so that they can provide the appropriate information to our diplomatic personnel. The code to alert that combat operations are imminent is that "Ambassador Horii will depart for your location (XXdate)". If the operation is to be delayed, we will transmitt, "Ambassador Horii's departure had been delayed" and a reason will be given. If the operation is a go, we will transmitt, "Ambassodor Horii has departed our location and will be arriving, your location on (XXdate)". The departure and arrival dates will correspond to an actual flight or ship arrival/departure as not to draw attention to the message.
I await critique or suggestions for modification to this plan of action.

 

Mr. Prime Minister,

Actual combat data from Germany regarding aerial combat would suggest that the 7.7mm machine guns currently carried by many of our combat aircraft is insufficient for dealing with many new and improved allied types. I would like to have our aviation engineers adapt the A6M2 and KI-43 for the mounting of the HO-103 12.7mm aircraft machine gun. I would also like to change the A6M2's Type 99 20mm to the HO-5 20mm belt fed type to improve efficiency. Since I have received your approval to begin design studies to convert the KI-61 over to a radial engine, if it proves successful we will probably adopt it as our standard IJA fighter type. I would also like to begin design studies to produce a carrier capable version with strengthened landing gear and reinforced frame, as a potential follow-on type for the A6M series if we encounter developmental difficulties with it's planned follow on type. Since, we will have to continue producing the KI-43 until the KI-61 (modified) can be produced or we can produce sufficient quantities of the A6M for both Army and Navy needs. I would suggest that we immediately begin engineering the following improvements into the KI-43 series. 1.) Replacement of the 7.7mm cowl mounted machine guns with the HO-103 (actually done), 2.) we should also look at strengthening the wing structure as some failures have been reported during violent combat maneuvers (actually done), 3.) taking advantage of the strengthened wing by mounting two 20mm HO-5's (possible but not done, however late in the war 30mm's were mounted on surviving aircraft) 4.) Fitting pilot armor and self-sealing fuel tanks since range is not as critical as in naval fighters (actually done). If we order the design studies now we should be able to begin producing them in early November. This should give us an even more formidable fighter until improved KI-61 production can be facilitated.

 

We still have a number of KI-27 Nates in service, but they are being replaced by the KI-43 as rapidly as possible. I do not recommend that any additional units be manufactured and as rapidly as possible all be replaced in frontline squadrons and all remaining aircraft be assigned to rear area training squadrons. I do recommend that the two Type 89 7.7mm machine guns be replaced with the HO-103 12.7mm so that trainees are training with the gun they'll be using once sent to an operational squadron. This can be easily effected by a field modification program and would be rather straight forward and simple.

 

Our current frontline Army bomber is the KI-21 IIa bomber. It has served us well, but is probably reaching the end of it's usefull service life. It is a reliable aircraft and has served us well. We have a need for a heavy ground attack aircraft, additional ASW aircraft, and I think it prudent to plan for a heavy, land based, anti-shipping aircraft. I propose we modify this airframe and keep it in production. Replace the glazed nose with a solid nose, fit additional armor and self-sealing tanks to produce a ground attack version. Change all defensive 7.7mg's to the 12.7mm HO-103. Fit eight HO-103's and two HO-5's in the reinforced solid nose, plus the bombload and we have a formidable ground attack aircraft. The same aircraft without the armor to increase the range, and provisions made for mounting the MAD system, currently under development and depending upon the bomb loadout we have a good land based ASW/anti-shipping aircraft.

 

What about using gliders for the Palembang assault. I dont know if we would have time to build them, but I dont think we wouold need many and we can ask Germany for assistance.

 

Agreed. As these are intended for IJA service, perhaps General Nishio should be consulted?

Prime Minister

 

This seems agreeable. Perhaps some of these retired from frontline service could find their way to CDF/KDF air formations?

On a different, yet related matter. What is to come of the 7.7mm machine guns? Can they be adapted for ground use and provided to CDF/KDF formations to give them more 'punch'?

Prime Minister

 

I'll look into that sir. I am fairly sure that they can be adapted for use as vehicle mounted anti-personnel weapons though. I like the idea of providing excess KI-27 Nates to allied airforces.