Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I can see the advantages to this procedure, coupling our expansion of formations with the limitations of our production. It does seem however that to some degree we exchange our current situation with Divisions of various size and a legion of Independent Mixed Brigades (of various sizes) for Divisions and Regimental Combat units.

As yet I see no provision for the funneling of replacement troops to existing combat formations. Keeping the formations we have at a combat peak surely must take precedence over expansion.

 

I beleive I need to clarify sir. We will be using only one standard infantry divisional TOE, and upgrades to reflect the integration of new weapons and structures. (For the game database I have to input data on all possible configurations. There are additional TOE's for when new weapons systems become available and that the unit would upgrade to. For instance when Germany introduces the Panzerfaust in 1943, I have created a TOE structure adding that weapon. If we can negotiate purchases or production rights we can produce the weapon and upgrade units to the TOE equipped with them.)

A triangular structured division has three regiments, each with three battalions. As an example we can again use the 42d Division, it is one of the current TOE's and not the new standardized one.

42d Infantry Division TOE

Infantry squads x 324
Combat Engineer Squads x 48
HMG squads x 56
37mm Type 94 ATG x 22
70mm Type 92 Howitzer x 18
75mm Infantry Gun x 12
75mm Type 90 Field Gun x 36
Motorized Infantry Squads x 12
Horse Cavalry Squad x 16
Type 97 Tankette x 7
7,7mm Type 99 AAMG x 16
Construction Engineer squads x 5
various motor transport and logistical support squads x 460

Now using this TOE and a triangular structure, each of the divisions three regiments would have:

Infantry squads x 108
Combat Engineer Squads x 16
HMG squads x 18
37mm Type 94 ATG x 6
70mm Type 92 Howitzer x 6
75mm Infantry Gun x 4
75mm Type 90 Field Gun x 12
Support squads x 142

These units are divisional assets located in various specialty units i.e. Recon, engineer units, etc.
HMG squads x 2
37mm Type 94 ATG x 4
Motorized Infantry Squads x 12
Horse Cavalry Squad x 16
Type 97 Tankette x 7
7,7mm Type 99 AAMG x 16
Construction Engineer squads x 5
various motor transport and logistical support squads x 34

An independant regiment would have the exact same assets as the divisional regiment. As we have already discussed, the extra divisional assets would be grouped into specialty units for attachment as needed. Since all divisions will not always have a need for them, and they would be idle, if we strip them, we can have fewer, more robust and capable specialty units. They can then be employed where they are needed. If we had a need for a divisional sized unit and none were available we could utilize three independant regiments and have exactly the same collective assets as a division. Likewise, in many instances only a battalion or a regiment might be required to perform the mission. You could split the smaller unit (battalion or regiment) off of the division, but the more efficient method would be to use the smaller independant unit, and keep the division whole and employed in areas where a division is needed.
In combat where a divisional sized unit is needed, the division, all other factors being equal will be marginally more effective because the regiments are accustomed to coordinating with one another. Divisions normally fight their unit by regiments so tactically there is no benefit other than that conferred by their familiarity with one another.
I can provide more detailed examples once I have had the opportunity to discuss the weapons choices and actual new TOE's, but we have reduced variations by at least 90%. We have also reduced the number of different weapons systems within the unit, opting where possible for dual or multipurpose weapons. We have gone with lighter more mobile systems, where possible, to give more mobility,

As for your question on replacements and existing formations. We will forecast a need for new recruits each month, they will be inducted, basically trained, and receive advanced individual training and be placed in replacement battalions for further training and holding until needed. A severely damaged unit may be replenished with individual trained men from these replacement battalions and new equipment from depots, it may be disbanded and its assets redistributed or returned to the replacement pool, or we can opt to rebuild it over time. A dissolved unit can be reformed at a later date with new personnel and equipment. When we were going through our breakdown and redistribution of existing formations, some severely understrength units were dissolved and their assets used to bring our most experienced units to full TOE strength. Some units were downsized to the next lower level and their excess personnel and equipment returned to the replacement pool. When the situation presents itself in the future we will decide how to handle the unit on a case by case basis and submit it for approval. In the present we felt, Nishio, myself and the IJA Chief of Staff, General Kokuou, that by breaking up all units down to their component battalions, and then mixing and matching them to form new units with new designations and officers, we could virtually eliminate chances for a military coup. The recent assasination attempt on Nishio should provide evidence that we were not being overly cautious.

 

I would anticipate friction to our actions in the existing force structure, and particularly the Kwantung Army. Do we have plans against the eventuality?

 

We started by issuing orders to units in the Kwantung Army, we stripped specific regiments and battalions with orders to prepare and move to particular locations to engage in combat operations against the enemy. We have been ordering replacements for these units to move to Manchukuo from the Home Islands. Generally, green units requiring intensive training. We have left the units commanded by Commanders in whose loyalty we are certain of, in charge of their units and have ordered them moved to key strategic points within Manchukuo. If we can prevent any overt subversive actions by those units and leaders whose loyalty is in question until combat operations begin, we feel they will align with the new government because of our apparent success. We also feel that given the current position of the Soviet Union, hard pressed by the German invasion, our best opportunity to breakup the Kwangtung Army, with its highly proficient combat units is now.

 

I will go back and address specific questions or complaints about the information put before you thus far, but in the meantime if there are no objections I'd like to contonue on to outlining the general situation we face in China. Mr. Prime Minister, your call.

 

I do have some questions, but they might be addressed in your further briefing, so I suggest you continue and let us see where that leads us.

 

Roger that sir,

O.K., here we go. China is a huge country; there is not a strong national allegiance to any particular group. Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists, Mao Tse-Tung's Communists, our puppet Wang Jingwei's Reorganized Nationalist Government of China (RGC), and a polyglot of local and regional warlords command allegiance in different areas. For the sake of this discussion we will deal with Manchuria/Manchukuo separately. We would prefer, at the present time, to retain our puppet government there. It is fairly stable, it has a huge percentage of our needed resources and we have a pliable puppet in Puyi, the Kangde Emperor, last of the Qing Dynasty, installed by us in 1934.
Responsibility for all of the rest of China will rest with General Nishio in command of Japanese Expeditionary Forces, China (JEF-C). This command will be based in Peiping. We intend to dissolve the present national government and re-institute it with a promise of eventual independence and a constitution. Wang Jingwei, who at one time was Sun Yat-Sen's chief lieutenant, will be reappointed as the head of the national government. Sun Yat-Sen's government was the Republic of China (RoC), we will appropriate the name. We will use propoganda in an attempt to paint Wang Jingwei's new government as the realization of Sun's dream. We have history on our side. Here is a photograph of the original Revive China Party:


From left to right are Tse Tsan-Tai (Treasurer), Yeung Kui-wan (President), and Sun Yat-Sen (Secretary). They were the original leaders attempting to depose the Qing Dynasty. Yeung was assasinated by Qing agents in 1901, Tse and Sun carried on the fight. There is a photo of Sun with the Revive China Society, with Yeung seated in the front row and Sun in the back with a number of Japanese mentors and supporters, Chiang has offered a million dollars for this photo and negative, because he wants to re-write the history of the revolution. We have a copy:


continued....

 

I would think it might present some difficulty supporting the Xuantong Empero on one side and Wang Jingwei on the other could present some problems. If we intend to maintain Manchuko and China as separate states this might help to resolve some of that tension, but will Wang support this? I do not trust that he is completely our creature, nor would I expect such a condition to be useful to us politically in the eyes of the West. Might we retain the two as separate states for present, but with promises of reunification at a later date?

 

Like so many issues left by our predecessors to tidy up, this is one of those partially thought out programs that were improvised without consideration of the wider strategic situation. Had we been content with Manchukuo, installing the playboy Puyi would have been sufficient to our needs. The expansion into central and south China, without considering Puyi's place, forced us to look to other intermediaries as our agent on the scene. Certainly both have aspirations to become the "Head Man" of a united China, but it can not be both. Puyi, as our initial creation and his ancestry, would seem to have the claim of prior position and his general lack of ability and personal power is a plus for us long term, but we can not force this issue so long as we are at war with the West.

Looking long term, A unified and determined China is a threat to our Imperial ambitions on the Asian mainland. Ideally a China of several medium sized countries, grouped into a loose Confederation or Commonwealth with Puyi as a figurehead Emperor with much pomp and circumstance, but little real power, would be the ideal configuration for Imperial Japan in my opinion.

The need to placate the United States and to strip Chaing and Mao of support forces us to promote the idea of a "United Chinese Republic" even though it has the potential to see us denied the Coal and other ores vital to our Empire. We could be at war with the US as early as mid 1942, certainly early 1943, and our efforts to crush Chaing and Mao may be far enough along to allow us to dispense with the fiction of trying bring China into a state of equality among nations in favor of one as an honored vassal of His Most Imperial Majesty.

Colonel please forgive my interruption and continue with your enlightening briefing.

 

Dear Prime Minister,

i understand your concerns but in our plannings we have never intented to give away the control over China. We are seeing us more like a puppetplayer that pull the strings behind the scenes. The people we will set in charge are only meant to have a limited space to move and this will only happen under our control. So we need to build up a Chinese State that looks like it from the outside...not the inside. A lot of very skillfully operating men at our side will be neccessary and i know you will have some of those under your control.... And to be honest, i heard once a man saying: "There is no problem that cant be solved by a car or a aircraft accident." You will know what i mean.

Colonel Bobimoto has my full support in this matter.

Respectfully yours,

Gen. Nishio

 

I wonder if Chiang will accept a treaty with us if we agree to support his effort against Mao and give him basic independence.

 

I discussed this way back when...

No, a thousand times no. Chiang is getting way to much from the United States in money and material. As soon as he accepts any "peace" with Japan, this flow is sure to dry up. He has already turned down several, increasingly beneficial to him, Japanese propositions, and shows every sign of turning down whatever other Japanese propositions come his way. There is nothing that we can give to him, that the Americans can not give 10 times or 50 times more. Already his agents are scheming for Nationalist China to acquire American B-17 bombers and have begun expanding at least one, and possibly more, airfield to handle these large bombers. While at the same time, we have no bomber that approaches the B-17 in size or capability.

Chiang knows he has us "over a barrel" and he also knows he has the full support of the Americans, so he is playing his advantageous position to the hilt.

 

Respectfully General Nishio,

I cannot agree with your interpretation as such.

We have already "made much hay" about using Chinese troops as part of our defensive forces in China, and providing them with decent weaponry to achieve such a task. Now, if this idea has been tossed in the waste bucket, then I feel your beliefs would be correct. However, if it is still our intention to create and use an "allied" Chinese miltary, then the "Chinese State" that we build must "look like it" from the "outside" AND "inside." For I do not see that it is feasible to create a "Chinese Army" that will fight for Japan, but it might be possible to create a Chinese Army to fight for "China." But if this "China" does not look like their "China," then I believe that it is impossible to engage the loyalty required to make them "trustworthy" troops to the Japanese cause in China. Furthermore, without their loyalty and trustworthiness, providing them with "Japanese advanced weaponry" should be out of the question.

The downside of your "problem solution" is that it, while solving one problem, it can create another that is 10 times worse. Better that they be "kept under our thumb", jailed, or exiled, rather than turning them into another martyr for our opponents' cause.

 

Gentlemen, very good points all. I initially intended to reply point by point to your reservations, but think it best to continue to relay General Nishio's plan because most of your points are addressed therein. (OOC: I have twice sat down and written long explainations, but when I have gone to post them they have hung up and I have lost them. Just as well since it is probably more intelligible when I am not replying point by point). When I have finished, any points you have raised that you do not feel have been sufficiently addressed, please bring to my attention. Furthermore, if you wish greater detail on a particular area, please interrupt so that I might address it.

General Terauchi,
You stated:
"I wonder if Chiang will accept a treaty with us if we agree to support his effort against Mao and give him basic independence."

We considered this option in our initial planning and rejected it, for several reasons. The foremost is that Chiang commands very little popular support among the people. He attained his position as one of China's leaders by military force. Our ultimate goal is to be able to withdraw most of our troops from China and have a stable, self-governing entity left behind which we will bind closely and inextricably to Japan with economic ties. To have the cost to our treasury in gold and to our military in lives, of a perpetual occupation of China should never even be considered. A Japan that controls China is a regional power. A Japan that controls the bulk of the nations in the Pacific and Asian mainland is a world power. We can only achieve the latter by extricating ourselves militarily from the former.
Admiral Takao, provided another good reason. Chiang profits most from being allied to the western powers.

"No, a thousand times no. Chiang is getting way to much from the United States in money and material."

I will continue now with the breifing.....

 

MANCHUKUO

Gentlemen,
First, we will address Manchukuo and then China. We would like to use Manchukuo as a counter or check and balance to China proper. Manchukuo, which is basically Manchuria and Inner-Mongolia, is fairly stable at present. Our puppet the Emperor Puyi was installed by us in 1934. He cooperates with us publically, but is often difficult in private. We have planned ahead, just in case it becomes necessary for the Emperor to have a tragic accident or Chinese anarchists or revolutionaries (our agents) happen to assasinate him. His younger brother Pujie is set to take his place. We arranged for Pujie to marry Lady Hiro Saga, a distant cousin of our own illustrious Emperor. We have had Puyi name him as his heir apparent, just in case it becomes necessary for Puyi to have one of the tragic events mentioned earlier, befall him.
Now for General Nishio's general plan for Manchukuo. We will slowly begin to loosen our hold on Puyi. At present we control everything and have embarked on an intensive Japanization effort regarding Puyi and his people. We wish him to begin to feel he has some control of his destiny and that of his people. We will start by pulling back on the forced Japanization of Manchukuo. We will allow them to start wearing customeary dress again. We will begin to allow religious reforms, Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam will again be recognized. We will cease to force Shinto upon the Emperor and his people. It will be remain an option, but just one of several. Our opponents Chiang, Mao and a number of warlords have made use of skilled Muslim generals and religious pronunciations by Muslim Imams to support their efforts. Can we not make use of them also? We have even gone so far as build a Shinto Temple to the goddess Amaterasu on Puyi's palace grounds, instead of the traditional Chinese Temple of Heaven. Our own Emperor Showa has expressed surprise and concern as to why this was done. Once we have allowed them some degree of cultural identity we will begin reforming the government into some form of Constitutional Monarchy. We will feed Puyi additional power and liberties in small doses. Just enough for him to feel he is regaining control. We will surround him with advisors that generally advocate the paths we wish him to take. We will be prepared at any time to again tighten the reins on him, but if we approach the situation wisely this should seldom be necessary. We will rebuild Manchukuo's military as a purely defensive, paramilitary force. A force suited for maintaining order within the country but inadequate for engaging in large scale military offensive operations against China and lacking the strength to oppose potential Soviet aggression. The Kangde Emperor, will retain hopes of one day restoring the Qing Dynasty. We will privately promote and encourage these dreams. We will also insure that the Republic of China and Soviet Russia so overmatch his indigenous forces that he must retain a large Japanese garrison in order to retain what country he does have. We will eventually set Manchukuo up as an independant government. We will insure that they lack the weapons manufacturing ability to build a credible force. We will arrange to sign a long term mutual defense treaty with Manchukuo, at "their request".
If we have push back from Wang Jingwei, we will inform him that we have adopted a policy similar to that which we have adopted towards himself and the Republic of China. We will aid in establishing a stable government, but will not "run" the country or dictate what the nation must do. This will not be the actual case, we will control the direction of these nations, but our control will be hidden and subtle. That is what the good General Nishio meant when he stated: "need to build up a Chinese State that looks like it from the outside...not the inside.."
We will behind the scenes control their direction but, Wang Jingwei and the Chinese people must think every step along the way is aimed at their eventual independance.

On to China...

 

Colonel Bobimoto,

i need to thank you for finding the words to explain it in a much better way i ever could do!

Dear Admiral,

i can understand your concerns, but your questions should be answered after reading this brilliant made statement of our very estimated Colonel Bobimoto. Yes, this "Solution" can create a ten times worse situation and it was meant in this way: we can lift up any important chinese politician if he is valuable. When he is starting to be a pain, we have the tools to remove him in one or the other way. This means we have to choose the right way for every problem. Sometimes it is good enough to retire him and give him a nice house at the south chinese coast. I know that it isnt very clever to do this like the Soviets do it. To many that died due to an heart attack are always a sign for something different...

Please wait and read all the information Colonel Bobimoto will provide to you.

Thank you, honorable Admiral.

Kind regards,

Gen. Nishio

 

CHINA

We currently support a puppet government, The Reorganized Government of China, with Wang Jingwei, as its leader. Our government has little popular support and is seen for exactly what it is, a front for Japanese intervention. At first Wang would seem to be the appropriate choice as he was a close associate of and chief lieutenant to Sun Yat-Sen. Sun Yat-Sen was and still is viewed as the father of the Nationalist Chinese independence movement and overthrow of the Qing Dynasty. Sun died in 1925 of liver cancer. In the power vacuum after his death both Wang, the heir apparent, and Chiang Kai-Shek, a KMT general, vied for control of the government. Chiang by virtue of his control of the military forces won out. Chiang has attempted to portray himself as the legitimate heir to Sun, by virtue of being his brother-in-law. The two were married to sisters, though Chiang's marriage to Soong May-Ling took place after Sun's death. Unfortunately, for Chiang's, narrative, Sun's own widow, elected to the KMT's Central Executive Committee soon after Sun's death, fled to Moscow when the Chiang controlled KMT expelled the Communists in 1927. She accused him of betraying her husbands legacy. Chiang and the KMT fought a civil war against the CPC (Communist Party of China) from 1927 until 1937, when our invasion convinced them to sign a truce. Chiang ordered many purges of the Communists and tens of thousands have been murdered and the KMT has destroyed most of the CPC's conventional military power. Chiang maintains his control via his military forces and by alliances with a number of warlords. He is not popular with the people and is vulnerable there. The CPC on the other hand is popular with the common people, primarily due to their promotion of land reform. They lack the military power to do much more than conduct guerilla operations, and what military strength they do have they are hoarding for a renewal of their civil war with the KMT once we have been defeated or decide to leave of our own accord. Wang was originally fairly far left in his political leanings until he worked in close quarters with CPC elements of the KMT prior to Sun's death. His political leanings became more centerist. After Sun's death, the fracture of the Chinese government into numerous factions grappling for power, moved him further right, and he became convinced of the necessity of governing from a position of strength. This was especially true when Chiang used his forces to remove Wang's government from power at Wuhan and he was forced to accept Chiang's leadership of the KMT.

Now one thing became apparent to the general and I when we were reviewing China's recent history. The Chinese can come together against a common enemy, but once that enemy is gone they splinter into numerous factions. Sun, Chiang and the Mao have both noted this trait and have lamented it. Chiang has used terror and massacres to enforce his will upon the populace, a tactic we unfortunately have seen fit to utilize also. So the question is how to manage it? We need to rehabilitate Wang's image as the heir to Sun's vision. We need to disband the RGC and reform it as the RoC (Republic of China), with great fanfare. Wang needs to speak and stress that he is intent upon seeing Sun's vision of China realized. We, the Japanese, need to sign a ten year independance plan/treaty with Wang's government. We need to institute land reform and begin building a democratic government from the ground up. If we make enough progress we could approach Sun's widow and propose she join the government. We need to apologize for previous attrocities against the populace and blame it upon the radical element that attempted to overthrow our own government. We need to stress the role Japan played during the early days of China's revolution when it was we that provided sanctuary to Sun. Provided funds and mentoring. We can do it, we just need to be better at telling our story than our opponents are at telling theirs.

First we have determined that it would be advantageous to break the country into three AOR's (Area of Responsibility). Each area represents unique problems and we want individual commanders that can focus on these unique problems. The three AOR's are Army of North China (AoNC), Army of Central China (AoCC) and Army of South China (AoSC), all under the overall command of General Nishio and Japanese Expeditionary Forces-China (JEF-C), co-located with the new national government in Peiping. I will get into the exact details of each area later, but a general summary to start with would be as follows:
AoNC-Area from Manchukuo border to the Yellow River. Main enemy forces CPC. Largely, rural. Land reform would be most beneficial in this region, and could lead to less governmental opposition and higher food yields.
AoCC-Area between Yellow River and Yangtzee Rivers. Highly urbanized. Primary opposition KMT. Industrialization, education and job creation efforts will have the greatest effect here. If we can increase the standard of living in these urban areas and manage their opinions with propoganda in the media, we sould do quite well here.
AoSC-Primarily coastal cities with large expanses of forests/jungles. Inland cities controlled by KMT. Large KMT presence. This is where we need to begin destroying Chiang's armies.

Which brings us to another point. The General and I noticed several factors common with all our defeats or pyrric victories against Chinese forces. Invariably, the Chinese engage us, defend for a time then begin a withdrawl and draw us in. Light highly mobile forces infiltrate and operate against our supply lines and flanks forcing us to stall the offensive. Supply is cut off and our forces are forced to fight their way out. If they are not successful in their execution the enemy simply falls back, regroups and prepares to fight another day. NO MORE!!! Two of the reasons behind our re-organization of forces was to make our forces more mobile and reduce their logistical footprint. We managed to do this while increasing intrinsic firepower. Heavy assets that are less mobile, road bound, or with large logistical footprints are grouped into seperate units for attachment when required. We have a tactical answer to answer the Chinese and we will get into that, in depth later.
Gentlemen.....

 

Politial Structure

Peiping will be designated the Capital of China. It will be a national city and self-governing and not part of any other political entity.
The country will be divided into three, eventually four, major political areas. These areas can be called states, provinces, regions, whatever, I will refer to them as provinces here for clarity. We are not concerned with the exact name, but will be they governed by a Chinese official that we appoint and advise, with the promise that in two years they can be replaced by a governor selected through an election where citizens of the province will vote. The province will be subdivided into a number of smaller districts, I would prefer that they be divided upon historical, cultural, ethnic or clan lines. These Districts will be controlled by a Commissioner, who we shall appoint and who will report to the district governor. Within these districts will be individual cities, towns, villages and non alligned rural areas. The Mayor, leader, chief or Elder for each village or town will be selected by the residents at a town or village meeting. The Mayor of major towns and cities will be by election. We will also begin planning for the election of representatives from these districts to a Provincial Assembly that will be formed to approve actions by the Governor and pass laws and regulations. Hopefully, this election can be held in eight months.
Each Governor will have control of their Provincial Guard Forces. These have been fairly balanced between Provinces to insure no single governor has enough power to threaten their neighbors or the national government. The National Government in turn will not have control of sufficient troops to sieze power or intimidate the provinces. Each province will have sufficient strength to protect it's land and peoples, and in concert with the other governors challenge larger international threats.

Admiral Takao stated:

This is a very good point Admiral and one we have put a great deal of thought into.
-RGC Chinese Forces that are presently serving are poor formations at best. It is a lack of training, a lack of motivation, a lack of leadership and inspiration.
-I think you are correct when you state that they require loyalty to make them competant and trustworthy troops. -Chiang uses money, intimidation and the natural animosity one feels towards a foreign invader to hold together his forces. Even so they are poorly trained, poorly motivated and tend to attrit on their own.
How can we do better?
Here is our plan. One all existing RGC forces will moved to three central locations, one in each Army AOR, just as soon as we can replace them with a Japanese unit. Once at these locations they will be disbanded but not discharged. Troops will be organized into groups based upon where their home at the time they entered service or a location they wish to make their home. They will be returned to the central location in one of the three areas of responsibility that includes their native area. There they will be formed into units based upon a number of population centers and the one assigned will be the one nearest to the soldiers hometown. These units will recruit actively in the city/town they are representing and the surrounding area. We will attempt to form at least cadres in each area. We hope to stand most groups up as battalions to be expanded to regiments over time when sufficient personnel become available.
-These units will be organized, armed and equipped in a manner comparable to one of our current TOE's. This will be one of the TOE's we are discarding and not one of the new more capable TOE's.
-The unit will be raised and train in it's own native geographical area, the people and land they will be protecting will be that of their friends and families. It will not be some intangible "National Government" they are fighting for. In larger operations where they are required to fight alongside units from other districts, a natural competetive spirit should make itself known. Local pride will insure that a unit does it's duty and performs well.
more to follow....

 

I can agree with structuring China into 3 or 4 strong provinces and a weak central government as it could allow continued influence by us, but the restructuring of their armed forces seem rather more comprehensive than I first understood it to be.

It does sound like that for a considerable period of time the ROC forces will be of little or no use to us even in the limited role of internal security. The period during which they are dis-banded, transferred to their region of birth or preference, then reformed, equipped and trained to a new standard would seem to encompass months of reorganization, during which our forces (who are undergoing some reorganization themselves) will have to provide both internal security and front line deployment.

Did we not hope to affect limited operations in South China in 1942 to lay the preparation for more vigorous operations in 1943? Can we still do both operations in 1942 and such a radical restructuring of ROC forces?

 

Mr. Prime Minister,

As soon as we receive permission for the implementation of the plan, and the sooner the better as far as we are concerned, you may use the following as a tenative timeline.
1.-One week for RGC formations to move to one of three Provincial centers for documentation of personnel and equipment and disbandment. (Recruiting teams made up of local officials and IJA military personnel begin recruiting at final locations.) (elapsed time 1 week)
2.-Former RGC Personnel will be organized into locationally based provisional companies, personnel verified, assigned an IJN escort squad and shipped to final location. ten days to two weeks. (Personnel recruited in section 1 will be given initial medical assessment, and formed into training companies) (elapsed time 2.5 to 3 weeks)
3.-Former RGC personnel arrive at final destination, personnel verified. Swearing into RoC Armed Forces, will be assigned to one of three Provincial Armies. Personnel will be assigned to units, and refresher training in basic military subjects, political education, ethical education and military obligations will commence. Four weeks. (1st levy of new recruits undergo 6 weeks basic training). (elapsed time 6.5 to 7 weeks)
4.-Newly formed units begin assuming localized security operations from IJA forces.
5.-At this point we will enter into a continual training, expansion/rebuilding, training, employment cycle for the RoC units.
a.) Unit will enter stand down phase.
b.) Unfit personnel discharged, personnel for advanced schooling or transfer to different units transferred, casualties replaced, new personnel augmented and assigned, units re-organized.
c.) small unit training (during this phase security operations within the home location would rotate between the three elements in training)
d.) major unit training
e.) deployment
a.) cycle begins again.
With each iteration of the cycle the unit will become more capable, experienced and better prepared for more demanding missions. This cycle also assumes that the primary unit is retained in and around its home location. If deployed outside its home area, the entire unit would enter the rebuild, train, deploy cycle and deploy for an indeterminate time to another area for combat operations.

This cycle is applicable for all unit sizes from a company to a division. For example, if we are dealling with a battalion the major unit would be the company and the minor the squads and platoons. The battalion would rotate it's three companies throught the train up, deploy, re-build process. For a regiment, it would be battalions as major units and companies as minor units the regiment would attempt to continually have one battalion in each phase. We haven't gone into the Chinese Formation TOE's in depth, but for regimental and larger, we will adopt a square structure. Three of the elements will be organized just as a Japanese unit of the same type would be today. The fourth element will be a military police element. Older personnel, personnel recovering from wounds would be assigned to this unit along with specially trained military police personnel. This fourth unit would maintain security and safety in the home location when the remainder of the unit is deployed on combat operations and if the home unit is in garrison, outside the home location, the combat element provides backup for the Military Police element. If employed in other areas, for instance if we assigned four regiments of RoC troops to the Changsha Operation, we would have 12 infantry battalions engaged in combat with four military police battalions to police the line of supply, protect the same, guard prisoners and undertake safety and security operations within the captured city once it falls. The infantry battalions would move on and pursue the enemy, set up defensive positions against counter-attack, etc. Combat operations.

As a final answer to your question. If we receive approval quickly enough, I predict they can be capable of taking over internal security in cities by 01 December. We should have some units that have been through several training evolutions that are quite competant in engaging in major combat operations by June 1942, and at the rate we hope to expand, we should be able to begin drawing down IJA forces for deployment to other areas by June 1943. Until that time we will be using the RoC forces to augment and build upon our combat power to destroy our opposition.