Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I will continue to entertain comments and suggestions concerning our plan for organizing and equipping the RoC forces and for our plans for upgrading our armored forces. In the meantime I will continue the breifing.

First the Army of North China operational area. It extends from the outskirts of Peking south and south south west to the Yellow River. The western boundary is Communist Chinese controlled areas. We only intend to expand further into those areas far enough to secure the main rail line from Peiping through Chengting, SW to Anyang, then to Chengchow and on to Sinyang in the AoCC area. We will establish a sizeable operating base at Taiyuan to control infiltration routes through the mountains west of Chengting. There are at least 5 Chinese Corps and three HQ's to the west and north of our positions there. At present there is minor fighting around Anyang for control of that location. When we are ready we need to mount major operations to seize Chengchow and then Loyang. Once that is accomplished we will control the entire western boundary of the area and control the main MSR between the AoNC and AoCC. We intend to immediately begin constructing a series of small operating bases along the rail line to secure it and we will station a battalion sized element at each to aggressively patrol a buffer zone to the west, One of the Chinese forces favorite tactics is to retreat before our advance. Infiltrate around our flanks with lighter units, cut the supply line to our forward formations and then force them to fall back. By securing the route as we go, aggressive patrolling by these rear area forces and the lighter more mobile nature of our forces under the new TOE, will allow us to respond quicker and advance more rapidly than the Chinese are used to. The outposts will also interdict infiltration, the small units stationed there can defeat minor enemy forces and if the enemy attempts to consolidate to attack these small bases we can attack the enemy consolidation of forces identified by aerial reconaissance with artillery, airpower or area QRF's. This area China contains the greatest amount of cultivated land and will serve as a breadbasket for China and Japan if we can secure and pacify it. Initially we will base our operations out of Tientsin Tientsin is a city of about 1.5 million people has decent port facilities. It is located 36 miles from the coast on the Hai River. Unfortunately, the channel is relatively shallow and vessels with a draft greater than 14' must anchor off the coast. The United States has a portion of the 4th Marine Regiment stationed there. We should use their presence to our advantage. Adopt a totally non-aggressive posture towards them. Allow them and westerners free travel so they can observe and report our efforts at building a new, democratic China. Tientsin connects with Peiping by a short rail line and will allow us to keep the seat of government supplied with little chance of the enemy interdicting our LOS. We recommend that Admiral Noka locate his Naval Logistics Command supporting the AoNC here until the interior rail lines are secured and the Port at Tsingtao improved sufficiently for him to move his operations there. We will immediately begin clearing and security operations in the surrounding countryside. Tsintao is a city of approximately 600,000. people with a magnificent natural harbor. We will immediately dispatch engineering forces to begin improving it so it can serve as the main port in the area. The city was occupied by the Germans for many years and has a distinct German flavor. It would be a good location to locate and house German liason, technical personnel and scientists. We will construct a research and development facility here as well as training facilities for the education and technical training of Japanese and Chinese personnel. We will immediately begin clearing operations here to liberate the surrounding countryside. The area produces much cotton and tobacco which will be useful to our economy and war effort. Our objective will be to clear the agricultural countryside and have the forces ling up at Tsinan. Tsinan is an important rail junction and allows for an interior LOS between Tsingtao, Tientsin and Peiping. We will construct a string of small operating bases along the rail line to prevent re-infiltration of the area, and secure the railway from interdiction. Small sized, inexperienced infantry units will garrison them and patrol the surrounding countryside to gain operational skill and experience. These outposts will be some of the first turned over to RoC troops once they become ready. Tsinan is a city of 820,000 and a key rail junction. A third leg will push out of Haichow towards Suchow, clear the countryside between the Haichow/Suchow railway and the Yellow River and between the rail line and the southern flank of the IJA forces clearing from Tsingtao to Tsinan. Once they reach the Suchow/Tsinan railway, they too will construct a series of small operational outposts to secure the railway and police the surrounding countryside. Small platoon and company sized guerilla units are all our forces should encounter in these areas except for where the 51st and 69th Chinese Corps have the rail line cut north of Suchow. Each unit has around 1200 troops of all types for a total of 2400. About 2/3rds of the total are infantry types the remainder support personnel. The Chinese 98th Corps with about 3000 total troops is threatening Anyang.

A seperate operation will need to be mounted to clear the main northern rail line and relieve the forces at Anyang. We will use armored and mechanized forces we currently have moving down from southern Manchukuo. These actions will comprise Phase I of our operational plan for this AO.

Phase two will be the clearing of areas between the interior MSR and the MSR that forms the border running NE to SW. One force will push down the rail line from Anyang a second force up from through Kaifeng. The forces will join at the rail junction and push west to attack Chengchow, a smaller blocking force will peel off to counter any Chinese Communist movements from Loyang. It is probable that the Chinese will make significant shifts to their force locations when Phase 1 begins so we will continually update Chinese unit locations and strengths while Ohase 1 operations are ongoing. At present I would plan on three divisions of IJA troops total for the Phase 2 attacks. This estimate could increase, but more likely we will be able to seriously attrit the Chinese formations with airpower when they move and consolidate to respond to our initial operations.

The planning map can be forund here so you can see what I've attempted to describe:
http://www.urban-netz.com/AE/PlanningMapA_PortAFBasename_Scen1.png

 

Since we are proposing to establish educational and technical training facilities in Tsingtao. We would also like to propose setting up a foundary, a factory for producing bulldozers and one for building trucks in Tientsin. Access to huge coal deposits, iron ore, coke and a large workforce, plus water and rail connections would make this a very good location. Wages paid would be spent in the city with merchants catering to the workforce and would further aid in the economic development of this area. The other primary economic outputs of the AoNC operational area would be agricultural and transportation.

 

Hi!

Sorry to step into the middle of this gargantuan exercise (and I admit to not having read the entire thread yet); but I find a couple of things I'd like to comment on;

1) the original supposition was "Everything as it was in November 1941"

2) then the entire western world (including those Far Eastern outposts Ozland and Kiwiland) is already very suspicious of Japan, so CAC's provision of drawing Australia in is, very unlikely at best.

3) For an example of how Japan is commonly perceived in Western eyes in this period, one only needs to look as far as "Tintin and the Blue Lotus" (first published 1934).

4) The ABCD encirclement occured already in 1940, as a result of Japanese continued agression in China.

 

Green Slime, there are layers and layers here.

We strive to stay in character as much as possible as to who we are in the simulation. As the Prime Minister it is my job to help the Council reach consensus as much as possible, but also to present a "civilian's" eye view to our proceedings. In doing this I question much of what our "military" members take as gospel.

At this time, as in all times, leaders have a certain myopia in their view of the world. America could not envision an attack on Pearl Harbor, Churchill could not believe Singapore could fall. Japanese leaders would, or at least could, believe they could place wedges within the Allied camp and act accordingly.

Recently we had a dust up in the "How could Germany Win" thread and in a way this is a reflection of that. Japan's war is a interesting mix of occasionally brilliant tactic's melded with unbelievable strategic blunders. The purpose of this exercise, besides allowing grown men to act like boys, is to examine how Japan could have faired had they embraced a long term strategic plan for survival.

Britain, the US and the Soviet Union did this, the Axis did not. Isn't about time we considered a possibility where they, or at least Japan, did?

 

Forgive my ignorance as I am not professional military officer, but if I correctly understand the objectives of Phase One in the AoNC Operational area it could be somewhat crudely compared to the strategy employed by the Roman, Hadrian and his famous wall. Operations in the Anyang-Chengchow-Sinyang area designed to give us a secure and supplied outer line or "wall" that we can move troops along to counter any 'barbarian' incursions.

Clearing operations along various routes radiating from the coast being equivalent to Hadrian's military roads leading from the heart of the Empire to the outer marches and the various outposts acting like the periodic forts constructed within a days march of one another to provide security for the peaceful populace.

Successful completion of Phase One and Two objectives would give us secure control of the Breadbasket of China vital to both the Empire and our Chinese subjects while providing us a secure perimeter against Communist and Nationalist forces facing AoNC area and part of AoCC area.

I trust Phase One will take place during 1942, when would Phase Two take place?

 

Thanks for the excellent information Col. Bobimoto! I hope that the members of the Council will see the necessity of our tank development. The "upgrading" of the Chinese and Korean Forces is a very important psychology sign towards them to show them, that we trust them and see them as full aliies. We do have a a risk to equip them with tanks, but it seems to be the best solution that i can imagine. The development of amphibious tanks isn´t worth the efforts as been stated.
The phase one will work and give us a good platform to start with our different other tasks. The time table for phase 2 is indeed interesting and we should work hard to make it coming as early as possible. But we should not work hasty on it one little error can be disastrous for our future plannings. So hurry but do it good!

Col. Bobimot, can you provide me some informations on our special forces, training and level and so on?

Kind Regards,

Gen. Nishio

 

A very astute analogy sir. You are correct. That line will function somewhat as an outer wall. It will be a secure line of communication with small operating bases located along it. Patrols will be mounted out of them into enemy territory to maintain a buffer zone. Aerial reconaissance and these foot patrols will seek to locate and interdict enemy infiltration and concentrations. We hope to use a combined arms concept to totally disrupt their ability to mount operations against us. Formations small enough to evade our air and artillery will be eliminated by patrols from our ground element. Concentrations large enough to pose a threat to our small units will be pounded by air and artillery, while a heavy QRF (Quick Reaction Force) either armored/mechanized/motorized or infantry moved by the secure rail line can be quickly moved into position to bolster the local defenses or counter attack and eliminate the enemy concentration. The Chinese favorite counter would be to infiltrate, isolate and cut off the targeted unit before attacking it. One of the purposes of the inner line is to provide alternate routes to maintain supply and communication. They are also positioned to be able to identify and attack enemy concentrations in the rear areas of the outer line.
One area I have not mentioned about the TOE changes is the question of horse cavalry. Most IJA divisions have a cavalry element for reconaissance. They too will be stripped from the organizational tables and consolidated into units of like type. We will make heavy use of these formations on the inner perimeter/wall/line. The advantages of cavalry are rapidity of movement, and lack of the heavy support requirements found with motorized/mechanized forces. The disadvantages are their lack of firepower when compared to an infantry formation and being a large, vulnerable target. We already have these units, how best to use them?
Our answer is to use them to patrol the large rural/agricultural areas where a minimal possibility of encountering main force enemy units exists, but where their mobility makes them a superior option to employing an infantry formation. The reason this condition will exist along the inner line is because the outer perimeter will reduce the enemys ability to infiltrate large concentrations into the inner areas. Therefore, if they wish to operate against our rear areas they will have to infiltrate small groups and small amounts of supply at any one time. Concentrations will take longer to effect. Cavalry being very mobile and able to cover large areas should be able to identify and attack these infiltrations before they can consolidate. They should also prove advantageous in countering guerrillas. They can also patrol wide areas, building relations and providing security to the villages strewn across the AO (Area of Operations).

Your interpretation is correct, except we will not just be clearing along the road and rail lines. The initial operation will involve a large number of infantry formations, most operating in platoon and squad sized elements. We want to clear the roads and countryside during phase one. Every village in the operational area should be entered, news of the new Chinese Government, land reforms and the institutional changes to a democratic government be announced and then move on. Guerrilla bands, bandits and small enemy units tracked down and destroyed. We have no intelligence that would indicate we will encounter opposition forces of any size during the inital phase in the inner regions. Nothing that the size units we will be deploying cannot counter. Total forces we see needing for the operation would be nine battalions or a divisional sized element. We have a good many unexperienced divisions sitting idle in Japan, we would like to use one of them under a seperate army command, assigned to Nishio's JEF-C to conduct the operation. Nishio's forces permanently assigned to the AoNC would concentrate in the large urban areas, provide security there and act as backup forces. While in these cities they would basically stand down and reorganize to the new TOE. The green units in the seperate army (more on this seperate army later) would gain operational experience and receive a minor blooding. At the end of the operation they would return to the coast by rail and be withdrawn to rest, rebuild and retrain. Nishio's, reorganized, AoNC units would relieve the new units in place and take back over, being responsible for ongoing operations.

I would like to see us begin the operation within two weeks. The operation should be concluded within 16-21 days depending upon the amount of enemy forces we encounter. AoNC forces should take over and continue improving the operating bases along the Tientsin/Tsinan/Suchow/Pengpu line. They can continue learning to operate under the new TOE, finish taking in new/reissued equipment, while patrolling the surrounding area, rebuilding their tactical proficiency.

Phase two will commence just as soon as our overall stategic situation allows, as soon as the pemanently assigned AoNC units are deemed ready operationally, and to a large extent will depend upon the Chinese Communist response to phase one. It could follow almost immediately on the low end and no later than years end at the outside.

Another thing I am not sure I made clear. We need to immediately send a relief column down the outer line to Anyang to counter Chicom moves in that area. The forces in place can probably hold, but I'd like to send an armored/motorized column from the Peiping area to clear the outer MSR/rail line/perimeter as far as Anyang and then bolstering the defenses at the latter location. This will serve multiple purposes, we will insure our retention of that key rail location and will also draw Chicom attention and units to that area. they will fear the move to Anyang is a precursor for further advances against Loyang or Chengchow and they will move to reinforce these areas. It will also allow us to reinforce the right flank of our forces already holding Kaifeng. This operation is seperate but will compliment our phase one operation, and will utilize forces already in place.

 

One thing on the Assam, once Mandalay is reached it is, there is a rail link to the north to Mitch, but otherwise, any advance towards India will require extensive road building. There is a decent river and the are no roads between Burma and India that are suitable for large operations.

 

Thank you General, I hope that I clearly communicated the intent of our planning and deliberations.

Yes sir, at present General Headquarters has not ordered any additional Special Operations Forces stood up, past the transfer and redesignation of several experienced infantry formations intended to support the Malaya Operation. Since you have been named as commander of that operation we need to begin planning there as soon as we finish the China briefing, We will need to coordinate closely with General Terauchi Hisaichi and his Indo-China forces. He has some important preliminary operations that need to be carried out to shape the battlefield and provide a better base for our offensive operations.

General Headquarters orderd the 42d and 47th Infantry Regiments to move to Nyutabaru, there to meet up with the trained parachutists that we were going to use to form the 1st Raiding Regiment (historical note: The 1st Raiding Training Group had been formed in December 1940 at Hamamatsu Airfield in Japan and developed tactics, training and equipment. The Japanese Army began training paratroopers to form operational units in mid-February 1941. In May 1941 they transferred the school to Baichengzu Manchuria. In August the school returned back to Japan at Nyutabaru. The first operational unit (1st Raiding Regiment) actually formed 1 December, 1941 from three of the first 5 training classes.) At Nyutabaru these two regiments will be split up, reorganized as Airborne units with a new TOE and trained in Airborne operations by these trained parachutists. 1st Bn 42d Regiment will be redesignated the 1st Airborne Battalion, 2Bn 42d will redesignate 2d Abn Bn, 3dBn 42d will redesignate 3d Abn Bn. Ist Bn 47th will become 4th Abn Bn, 2dBn 47th will become 5th Abn Bn, and 3d Bn 47th the 6th Abn Bn. The 42d and 47th are very experienced, high morale units, I'd rate them at 90+ on a scale of 1 to 100. Once they have their first 5 jumps under their belts they will absorb any additional personnel needed to bring them to full strength from the existing paratroop training cadre. They will then be shipped to Cam Rahn Bay in Indo-China to begin unit planning and training for the initial SRA Operations. The remaining paratrooper training cadre not needed to round out the deploying battalions will remain at Nyutabaru to train additional paratroopers for new units and for use as replacements. The Airborne units, after the first six, will be volunteer organizations. We will take applications from throughout the Imperial Army. Officers and men meeting our requirements and with acceptable service records will be allowed to apply. New soldiers after basic training and before graduation from infantry training school will also be allowed to apply. We will begin recruiting immediately so there are new applicants waiting to begin training immediately after the 42d/47th are graduated.These veteran and new troops, once trained in airborne ops, will move to a new base we are establishing to be named Camp Fuji. There they will be divided up and form cadres to stand up the 7th through 15th Abn Battalions. Advanced unit training will take place there.
After our Airborne forces are released from the SRA Operations, the better soldiers will have the opportunity to volunteer for the Special Operations Forces, we will call them Giretsu Kuteitai. Once we start standing these units up with a cadre of our better paratroopers as a base, we can take volunteers army wide, send them through Airborne School, and then to the operational Giretsu Kuteitai units.
The Imperial Navy is also raising Airborne units. The 1st Yokosuka SNLF paratrooper unit stood up barely two weeks ago on September 20th, 1941. Plans to stand up the 2d on 15 October and the 3d on 20 November are in the works. They have seperate training facilities from our IJA paratroopers. I propose we combine the two training schools to attain a common standard of training, techniques and doctrine. We could roll the SNLF instructors in with those at the IJA school. I do think it important that the SNLF retain the capability of airborne insertion. I would like to shift their focus to train heavily in submarine, and riverine insertion, intelligence gathering, and raiding. The navy should retain and operate the training schools for these skills and we can send the Giretsu Kuteitai through the Navy schools. We also need to look towards setting up jungle, amphibious and mountain warfare schools at some later date.

 

This is really a bit premature General Terauchi, India and any proposed move into that area will largely be determined by the strategic/political situation many, many months down the road. You are correct that once Mandalay is secured there are no good road networks into India. We would need to continue to advance the approximately 300 miles up the railway to the northeast to secure Myitkvina and fully cut off any land routes where supplies could be moved to Paoshan China and therefore on to Chiang's forces. If it does become necessary to invade India, I would use a dual land advance, amphibious assault to seize a base for continued advances. A land force pushing up the coastal road from Prome, cross the river south of Akyab. Seize that position and continue up the coastal road to threaten the port of Chittagong from the south. Chittagong is a good port with access to the road and rail networks leading into India's interior. As a precursor I would secure the Andaman Islands as a screen and a position to base reconaissance aircraft and long range bombers. They could screen much of our naval activity in the Andaman Sea along the coast of Thailand all the way to Rangoon.

 

Thank you very much Col. Bobimoto for the update. Yes, your correct about the plannings regarding the Malya Operations. General Terauchi is a experienced man and it will be a pleasure to do the plannings with him. Let me know the right time for a meetinmg with you and the General.

Thanks!

Kind Regards,

Gen. Nishio

 

We can start that as soon as we have finished presenting the China plan sir. We have done some preliminary planning, but nothing major or very involved.

 

When you mentioned Assam I wasn't sure how far west you were talking about.
There was an airborne assault on Palembang by the Japanese that failed, that is the only major air attack I know of.

 

A few final points and then we can move on to the Army of Central China, AO.
The left flank boundary of AoNC is the Yellow River. It provides a natural barrier to infiltration across it from the AoCC area. It also provides a potential infiltration and smuggling route down it from enemy controlled areas. We will need to patrol it. Our suggestion would be to establish a riverine force using Daihatsu landing barges. We would suggest using them in three configurations. Type one would mount a single barrel 40mm bofors auto cannon and a 7.7 Mg, the Type two would mount 2 x 20mm single oerlikons and carry a squad of troops, and the type three would have an 81mm mortar mounted in the cargo area and two by 12.7mm Type 1 machine guns on pintle mounts. Our thoughts are that if employed at the minimum in threes, one of each type, we could handle basically any potential situation. The 81mm mortar could provide side artillery type fire support if the troops needed to be landed ashore and the Type 1 machine guns would prove capable against personnel, light fortifications and soft skinned vehicles at extended ranges. The 20mm guns would prove capable against vessels and medium fortifications, the 40mm could rapidly destroy any vessel the little task force might encounter and shore targets. The infantry squad could land to destroy enemy camps or supply dumps, be used to board and search vessels,etc.

Some additional information on why we chose to recommend construction of the industry we did at Tientsin.

The foundary is of course to provide steel to both bulldozer and truck factories. We felt that these two types of factories could also quickly adapted to produce spare parts for the Chinese armored forces once they stand up. We also need to increase engineer vehicle production as was discussed earlier in our deliberations.

 

Given that we are switching the Imperial Japanese Navy over to USN weapons would it not be wise to use the soon to be discarded weaponry to outfit these riverine craft, rather than taking over new production weaponry that would be better put to good use aboard IJN warships? Can't say that I see the need to divert new Oerlikons and Bofors to this menial task, given that the 25 will work almost as well at the given task. Further, conversion of the Chi-Ha & Shinhoto Chi-Ha will further free up about 1,000 57mm & 47mm guns which, I would think would be better suited to these types of craft, and this would also leave Bofors production be put to areas where it can be better used. After all the danger to these riverine watercraft from enemy aircraft infinitesimal, and does not require the use of a 40mm Bofors, it is also unlikely that these riverine craft will be able to put the Bofors range to good use either, given that thier LOS will likely be very limited.

 

Very good points all Admiral. Thank you. Please elaborate on your proposal. I would like more detailed information on how you would arm them and employ them.

 

I apologize for the confusion General. I did not realize that I had mentioned Assam, if I did I assume it was that I mis-spoke (mis-typed actually). If you could provide me with the quote I will be glad to clarify what I intended.

 

I second Takao-san's comments, was about to write the same thing myself. We are procuring weapons like the 40mm for defense of our front-line warships, an urgent need, and I expect we will have requirements for cargo ships, bases in forward areas, etc. more needful of state-of-the-art weapons. River craft can make do with surplus weapons like the 25mm; incidentally most 25mm mounts are manually operated. We also have several hundred older Type 91 40mm guns, Vickers 2pdr pom-poms, replaced on front-line ships due to their low velocity and range, which would not be such significant problems for river craft.

While it's good to plan ahead, river craft ought to be able to be improvised fairly quickly as needed. We might investigate whether suitable craft are already available on Chinese rivers.

 

I admit the logic of the good Admirals, Takao and Karonada is irrefutable. Admiral Karonada, we do have a number of gunboats of various types and small draft craft. Most of these we are planning on using on the Yangtzee. What we are looking for is a cheap, very shallow draft vessel that can reach most of the areas along the Yellow river and into its tributaries. We feel that craft based upon our Daihatsu will be most useful. The fact that they are made of wood and can be plated with light armor we view as a plus from a strategic materials standpoint. We would like to be able to land troops to investigate suspicious activity or personnel along the shore lines. To attack enemy camps or supply depots. To search and clear riverside villages. We need to be able to use them to interdict shipping in order to search for personnel and supplies being smuggled, disguised as civilian traffic, on civilian vessels. There needs to be sufficient firepower carried to support the infantry in their missions. large caliber machine guns and/or light machine cannon will be sufficient on most vessels. Your suggestion as to the 25mm guns is an excellent fit and choice for the autocannon.
For heavier artillery type support of troops ashore, a mortar is a lightweight, heavy projectile type of weapon easily mounted, and I still think we need a variant thus armed. As for a vessel capable of engaging light armor or fortifications, or to quickly sink or disable an enemy ship when required. Which of the mentioned weapons would you suggest? The 57mm gun freed up from upgraded tanks is a possibility. We will be retaining the 47mm for the forseeable future and have additional requirements for it as an infantry anti tank gun. We still have units using the Type 94 37mm gun or longer barrelled Type 01 37mm variant, that will need to upgrade to the Type 01 47mm, so I do not think this would be a good option. As naval experts what do you feel would be the most capable multipurpose gun for our intended missions?

 

I would not expect to encounter Chinese river craft which could not be engaged with the weapons we've been discussing, 25mm, 40mm pompom, or 57mm/18 gun. Those can also provide effective fire support against most shore targets. The 25mm is also considered an anti-tank weapon, against lighter tanks anyway - how likely are we to encounter on the rivers armor too heavy for it or the other guns to cope with?

I agree mortars can be very useful, particularly since the landing craft could beach themselves to provide a fixed firing position. It might also be possible to carry mortars in a dismountable configuration if they need to deploy ashore.