Hitler finds out about Khalkhin Gol

In mid-September, 1940, Japan is negotiating to enter the Axis pact with Germany and Italy. Hitler is willing to have Japan as an ally, since it would give him someone to distract the Soviet Union on her eastern flank when Hitler intends to invade, as he's planning to do in the summer of '41. This is thrown into turmoil when Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr presents the Fuehrer with a stunning revelation. A spy in Moscow has found records in the Red Army HQ of a battle that took place on 20 August, 1939 in Mongolia. A Soviet army under General Georgi Zhukov decisively smashed an invading Japanese force, driving the Japanese back into China, inflicting heavy casualties on them, and causing Japan to curb her enthuiasm about tangling with the "Bear."


This could well have be the deal breaker. If Japan is not welcomed into the Axis, then Japan would have to fight America and Britain alone, and, more importantly, Britain would likely not have America to help them, since Hitler only declared war on the U.S. hoping for a Japanese quid pro quo declaration of war on the U.S.S.R.

 

Were Hitler and the German leadership unaware of Khalkhin Gol? Granted it wasn't splashed all over the newspapers, but were military and diplomatic professionals ignorant of the events? Germany and the USSR were allies or partners under the non-aggression pact; would they need a spy to inform them? Did the Russians keep their victory a secret? No doubt they concealed the early Japanese successes, but wouldn't their propaganda criticize the Japanese aggression and extol the eventual triumph under the leadership of Comrade Stalin?

Although this was on a far smaller scale than Barbarossa, Stalin as supreme commander seems to have managed it properly, putting a competent general in charge, letting him do his job, providing him the resources he needed, and giving him time to prepare an effective counterstroke. Unfortunately the lesson seems to have been lost.

 

I'd have to take issue with that analysis.
The US entry into the war in 1941 did not provide any (net) "help" to Britain, as the US entry into WWII was in fact a big negative though 1942 and into 1943.

Note: The US did in fact provide a massive "help" to Britain & the Soviets through Lend-Lease, however this was not in any way affected or dependant on the US becoming an active participant.

 

The Brits would get American support no matter what. Actually they already got it well before the German DoW on Germany. At FDR's order the USN had already begun a shooting war that had cost the US a destroyer or two. Give it a little bit more time, some more losses and the US declares war on Germany.

 

Technically as long as the U.S were not at war with the Axis there were ways to help Germany too. This included money and Oil , not offically, but via businessmen. I remember talking to a German veteran mentionning he could get Kodak technicolor films up to the end of 1941 and much later via the black market.

 

Declaring war and just hoping for a Japanese quid pro quo would be remarkably poor thinking even by Hitler's standard. Earlier in 1941 he had assured the Japanese that Germany would step in if they became involved in war with the US. Germany was already at war with the USSR; if they wanted or expected a quid pro quo, that would have been the time to ask for it.

Declaring war didn't do anything for Hitler beyond allowing U-boats to operate freely in the western Atlantic. Although he failed to appreciate America's ultimate potential, he was sensible enough to recognize that helping Donitz a bit was not worth making us a full participant in the European war. Apparently he thought the commitment in the Pacific - largely naval - tipped the balance.

 

Don't underestimate the effects of Drumbeat, it was a major blow to the Allied war effort.

Hitler didn't think that the US would be able to contribute anything more to the Allied war effort for the first year or so, and in this he was actually correct.

The US contribution in the first 12 - 18 months was outweighed by the drain on Britain's war effort by Drumbeat & the Pacific war.
Hitler thought (as I understand it) that US contribution would be negligible until mid-1943, by which time Germany has to win the war on the Eastern Front - or else it won't matter.
The US is already making a major contribution by supply armaments to the Brits & Soviets, and Hitler likely considered them de facto participants anyways

I think he was correct in this - Germany has to win by early 1943 or else they will be defeated.


The Allied war effort may have actually been better if the US had not been in the European war in the first half of 1942, instead had concentrated on building up their air, ground & naval capabilities, and then jumping in to the war in the second half of 1942 with better prepared forces.

Opana Pointer seems to be saying that the US could have gotten a DoW against Germany by mid-42, and I would imagine that it would be easier if the US were already at war. (with Japan)

 

Come on!

I readily admit that US history magnifies our early role and to some extent you may be correct, but just the moral boost to GB by no longer being “alone”, and the German’s now having to deal with another enemy, had to have been of tremendous value.

It was only 10 months after Pearl Harbor that US contributed heavily to the invasion of N. Africa.

There is also the additional protection of convoys to GB provided by the US Navy and the increase of US Merchant Marine Activity.

Other intangibles were the active planning and cooperation between the countries, and the US increasing its war production and planning.

 

All right. I guess without a formal war declaration it would've been difficult to get many Americans, such as people or German or Irish descent, to back the U.S. getting into the European war without Pearl Harbor, and Germany's declaration of war, as a catalyst, and that FDR wanted so badly to involve the U.S. to get the unemployed in uniform.

But, the Soviets, and Russia today, are notoriously tight-lipped. So, I tend to think that it would have taken a spy to get this info for Hitler, even from an ally such as the U.S.S.R. I also think that if Hitler knew Japan would be gun-shy about fighting the Reds again after getting their butts handed to them, that he might have at least had second thoughts about signing Japan up for the alliance. I hope that explains my thinking.

 

Don't underestimate the effects of Drumbeat, it was a major blow to the Allied war effort.

Yes, but let's not overestimate it either; for a few months the U-boats racked up more tonnage than usual, in return for getting the US in for the duration. They achieved this largely by foregoing attacks on the vital North Atlantic convoy route.

Tonnage in general was always a constraint, but beyond that, what impact was there on the Allied war effort? The forces and resources that America would eventually contribute to the European war were still being created. Was any major buildup or operation delayed because of Drumbeat? Those American troops which were ready to deploy, and which Britain was ready to accommodate, did go, without loss or interruption; the heavy escorts provided for troop convoys were one reason for the U-boats' "Happy Time" along the East Coast.

The British and Canadians gave us 18 Flower class corvettes, which were used to fight U-boats where the U-boats were operating, exactly as they would anyway. 24 A/S trawlers were assigned to American waters for a few months.

Side note - I vacation in Virginia Beach. At one time there was a plaque on the boardwalk memorializing HMT Kingston Ceylonite, lost to a mine offshore. A nice touch to remind tourists and locals of a bit of history. Unfortunately it disappeared after a boardwalk improvement project.

Getting back to topic, there would have been little harm to Hitler's cause even if the US did enter the war sometime after Dec 11. It's not as if the Germans were poised to exploit the opportunity; it took over a month to get a mere five U-boats enroute to American waters.

 

Khalkhin Gol was a Soviet victory, but the Soviet forces didn't proved to have an absurd advantage like the historians popularly say they had. The Japanese fought outnumbred against a much more numerous enemy, and in an unfavourable terrain (to their tactics). They lacked proper air cover and lacked information of the enemy offensive. Even so, they managed to inflict almost the same casualities as they suffered. Coronel Tsuji said in several interviews in the post war he could have won if IGHQ had supported him. The Japanese (more precisely the Kwantung Army) defeat there was mainly a defeat from their own mistakes, nothing that would make the Germans change their policy towards the Soviets.

 

Well, Jenisch, I meant would Hitler have changed his mind about having Japan as an ally. I'm sure any Soviet report that fell into his lap would have said what you just did, and would have made Hitler change his mind.

 

Remember that Japan and Germany had for a number of years been developing closer political ties:
The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by both Germany and Japan in 1936 (Italy joined in 1937). The Pact of Steel (1939, Italy + Germany) preceeded the Tripartite Pact (1940) only because the two European powers were concerned about France / Britain, while Japan wanted the focus to be on the Soviet Union.

Hitler would not have changed his mind about Japan. Any possible doubts a report to that effect would have raised would have subsequently been negated by the Soviet debacle in Finland. As I'm sure they were. For Germany, the issue at hand was not the reliability of Japan, but the threat of the USSR, vs the threat of French and British. Imperial Russia had collapsed 1917 (Whereas the West had been shaken but remained firm (+1 million lads from Uncle Sam will do that)), there were almost regular purgings amoung the Red Army Officer corps, and their economy was still suffering. Russia was not seen as a threat (yet). It was understood to be an awakening Giant, but was seen to be several years away from actaully being able to threaten the European heartland.

If anything, the Non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (not discussed with either Japan nor Italy) together with the Japanese defeat in Nomonhan encouraged the Japanese to look South to solve their problems. Interestingly, Molotov-Ribbentrop only happened because neither the British nor the Poles would seriously negotiate with the Soviets.

Therefore, Germany only had themselves to blame re lack of Japanese reciprocal DoW in 1941. Having committed on their Southern gamble, the Japanese weren't about to get involved vs the USSR, at least not until after the western allies sued for peace. But no peace overture came.

The Fascists had neither the resources, nor the manpower, to achieve their goals longterm, without the collapse of political will in at least one of the Allied troika USSR, Great Britain, and USA.

 

Of course, Hitler already had a weak Axis sister in Italy, and Japan was far more powerful than Mussolini's outfit.
Hitler also likely believed that his attack on Russia would seriously weaken her commitment to the far East, which was not
critically important for Russia's survival, thus encouraging the Japanese to give it another go, especially if encouraged by a German
success in the West. Nor would Hitler believe that a Japanese-American war was in the cards. Japan was only looking to move south against the British and Dutch colonies, a move hardly likely to bring the US into the war. Japan herself at that point was not planning to attack the Pacific Fleet or the Philippines.

 

I was always under the impression that the Japanese outnumbered the Soviets during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol which made the Soviet victory even more impressive. I always wondered if the German High Command knew of such a battle ever taking place and the commander of the Soviet Army at the battle, Georgy Zhukov? It probably would have been helpful. I believe Zhukov lead the counter-attack and the overall Soviet Commander ended up being executed.

I am also under the impression the Germans have very little respect for Allied and Soviet Commanders and wouldn't bother knowing their names or tactics. Funny because Soviet generals like Zhukov, Chuikov and Rokossovsky were excellent tacticians and knew how to undo all Blitzkrieg and Panzer tactics. Hell the Russians practically invented such tactics in 1916.

 

I recall reading that actually Hitler had some respect for the Red Army and was amazed "positively" by the footage of the Revolution day parades that he saw. Then again, once the Winter War showed that the tactics, morale etc were really poor, Hitler had a change of heart. Of course Hitler would have attacked the USSR at some point but would it have been 1941 without the Winter War?

 

Albert Speer said Hitler was impressed by footage of the Red Army Parades in Moscow when the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal went down. Then when German forces met with the Red Army in Poland in late September '39 they were reported to be poorly equipped. Then you have the Winter War. But Soviet successes against the Japanese in Mongolia may have been ignored. Speer claimed that reports from Poland and the Winter War persuaded Hitler to go with the invasion. He may have been convinced that Stalin would keep his forces in Siberia in case of a Japanese Invasion which they later conclude will never happen.

 

excellent tacticians these men might have been, but they spent the first six months of 1941 and most of early to mid 1942 controlling an Red Army with what can only be described as ABYSMAL staff work that cost the lives of many Red soldiers.

The Red Army had the advantage at Khalkin Ghol in the critical catagories of tanks and other vehicles, and command of the air by a whopping majority. They were facing an enemy who had split it's resorces, deploying over a bend in a wide river, with their backs to that river, and out of contact with their larger supporting elements. The Soviets simply attacked on both flanks with large amounts of the new T-34s.

If you look at Khalkin Ghol objectively, most competent commanders with all the advantages the soviets had would have gotten a similar result. Zhukov's casualties were appalling, as the Japanese had dug in, and were fighting isolated from their own supporting assets, unable to reinforce once the Soviet moves were underway.

All in all, Khalkin Ghol should not have suprised anybody; it was as much a victory for Soviet propaganda as anything. The Japanese survivors were too few from the subsequent encirclement to learn anything lasting from it. They balked at the possibility of fighting all the way across the expanse of this endless corner of the Soviet Union, where there were no natural resources to plunder, nor any great cities to occupy to enhance the prestige of their men at arms.....so they turned to finishing the job in China, and quickly realized they did not have near enough fuel and lubricants.

Hitler's intelligence chiefs were quite aware of Khalkin Ghol, and were unimpressed. They got a far better look at what the Red Army was like after it's post Purge reorganization from the 'Winter War' than any other single event. If they had just upped their intelligence effort to cover Soviet PRODUCTION capacity, rather than concentrating on keeping track of military units already in existence, they would not have launched Barbarossa with so little advance preparation.

 

And,what would they have done ? Or:could have done ?

 

And,as Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,the Soviet production capacity was irrelevant.