Like Butter!

Regarding Operation Lüttich. Talmander and Zetterling claim that only 46 German tanks was knocked out during the action. So... 46 extra wrecks in tha Falaise pocket if you ask me.

Erich what do you mean? The losses discounting the ones that were recovered? Or what it meant for the British to loose all those tanks?

 

Trouble is, the two sides have tended in the past to differ in the way they have listed tank losses.
The German practice was normally to list only tanks which were total write offs as losses, while on the Allied side it was normal to list tanks which were out of action at the end of the day, even if the damage was minor and could be repaired within 24 hours.

But using the same benchmark, total write offs, we get some interesting figures ( source the poster MKenny ).

In the Battle of Normandy for the month of June, 374 Allied tanks were total write offs, against German losses of 244.

For the month of July, the figure is 522 losses for the Allies against 288 for the Germans.

A total of 896 for the Allies, against a figure of 532 for the Germans. However the Germans also lost a further 120 Stug assault guns in these two months.

I know these figures don't show us how many tanks were Ko'd and then repaired, but it is extremely difficult to find German records detailing this, so it is impossible to compare them in this way

anyway I hope it is of help

 

Personally I think the Lüttich was the reason Falaise pocket took place. If Hitler had not ordered the offensive the panzer divisions could have been used to other operations. So I am not talking about Lüttich itself but where it led to.

So far the Falaise pocket has been considered almost the end of German Army in the West (??):

"Although anywhere from 20,000 to 40,000 Germans had managed to escape across their remaining crossing at St. Lambert before the Falaise salient closed completely on August 21, 10,000 had been killed and 50,000 taken prisoner. In addition, nearly all of their tanks and artillery pieces had been left behind."

TheHistoryNet | World War II | World War II: Closing the Falaise Pocket

 

Kai

I don't think that is the case. Patton was chewing miles south of the germans. He was virtually unopposed and could do as he pleased.

My point is that the germans had shot their bolt, and by the time Lüttich got underway there was no escape for them. (Germans)

The roads were clogged with traffic, and the 3rd US army set up it's guns for the Turkey shoot.

I have read a few accounts by people inside the pocket and outside the pocket. The Germans don't list the Jabos as the worst enemy, but artillery spotter planes. This fits in nicely with Talmander and Zetterling's writings of the over-estimated close support from USAF and RAF. But then again I have read the direct opposite from others...

What there is little doubt over is that the Falaise pocket meant the death of an army.

 

Alte Hase

I must have irked you in some way, and for that I am sorry. If I have conveyed an arrogant message that the British were superiour and that the German armour was pants. Then can assure you that it was not my intent.

Friends?

 

Ooooooooh, so cute!

 

Exactly.

WWII tank warfare was not a one versus one medieval tournament with the 2 knights facing each other at a settled distance and starting to engage at the sound of the trumpet.

 

I have always considered the tank best as an infantry support vehicle. There is no need to sacrifice one tank against another if the use of artillery, traps, or aircraft can accomplish the same desire. With air superiority, the trick is weather and locating the target. Without air superiority, what use can having the best tanks be? It becomes a question of attrition. Can you get enough tanks to push the enemy forces back before they get destroyed? During WWII, the lack of ability to fly in bad weather was the only time that the Germans had an advantage in large scale tank attacks, but bad weather can work both ways.

 

So you ( and T.A ) would still choose Sherman over Pershing even if you were aware of German Panther and Tiger tanks?? Is that what you mean?

M26 Pershing - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Military History: Patton's view of US tanks

 

I did not meant that I'd rather ride an sherman than a pershing.

It was just a reminder that there are different scales for comparing 2 tanks, ranging from the "how big is your gun – how thick is your armor" to crew "comfort" (ease of operation/visibility/inside space/radio etc.), quality of optics, tank adapted or not to the doctrine, quality of the doctrine itself, crew training, serviceability, easy or hard to maintain, easy/cheap/fast to mass produce or not etc...

If you take into account all these factors, I think that the Sherman was, at worse, only slightly inferior to its late war Panther and T34/85 counterparts in their main role : mobile exploitation of breakthroughs.

But the sherman was not a breakthrough tank like for example the Tiger, or a tank killer, like for example the Su-100.

Panthers and T34/85 were slightly more polyvalent and faired better than the Sherman in the tank killer and breakthrough roles.

The fact that the US army had no dedicated tank killer nor breakthrough tank, meant that the Sherman had to be used in these roles as well, and I think that's the reason why it earned this undeserved rather bad reputation.

 

What about Kursk? Air power,more or less equal. The Germans put their "best" tanks[Tigers] forward to take out the PAK fronts. How long would Shermans hang around
attacking such a front?
The 'toughest' defence line the Allies faced was a makeshift West Wall. IMO, breaking
through the opponents front and taking out his artillery and communications would come before supporting the infantry.

 

Pardon if my memory about the battle of Kursk is limited. As I recall it, the USSR knew that they were going to attack and where, months in advance. With parity in the air, then you exploit the enemy's weakness and draw them into a trap. In the case of the Germans, this would probably be their supply lines. Draw the tanks deep into your territory and flank them to attack their ammo and fuel sources. Have prepared revetments hidden where your tanks and destroyers can do a lot of damage, and then move to another one. Where possible, have choke points that can allow your artillery to take out as many as possible. Each battle is unique, but with the proper leadership, well trained troops will have a chance. The key, as usual, is whoever has the best communications and intel are ahead of the game. The main thing is if you are going into battle with medium tanks and the enemy has heavies, you do not go head to head.

 

Slightly O/T, but thanks to a little place in Bedfordshire, if I remember rightly....

 

FramerT and Seadog.

Now you are discussing doctrine not the armour in question. By Kursk the 'Panzerkiel' tactic was obsolete. No tank was built to break-through 22,000 km of trenches.

Seadog. Infantry support is not ideal use of armour. Integrated combined-arms fighting calls for combined-arms formations. In Normandy the first (Commonwealth/British)operations, and the infamous Goodwood, saw the tanks operate without their infantry to conserve manpower. A horrible failiure. By Bluecoat the Armoured divisions were fighting with a mixture of 1:1. 1 infantry battallion and one armoured regiment. A battlewinning recepie.

The 8th Army had deviced a special break-in formation that worked very well in the desert. (can be produced if you want to) But after that formation came the independant tank brigade. This system did not work in Normandy, since the allies were constantly running into kampfgruppen and other units before manouvre was possible.

FramerT

[The 'toughest' defence line the Allies faced was a makeshift West Wall. IMO, breaking
through the opponents front and taking out his artillery and communications would come before supporting the infantry.[/QUOTE]

A tank is blind as a bat and deaf as a pole. It cannot negotiate rough terrain and spot entrenched AT-guns, Minefields, AT-Infantry and other tanks.

The result of using the Tank as you describe is evident in Goodwood.

 

I probably should have phrased it differently. However, I do think that it was Patton that stated something similar. It is my opinion that you cannot win any battle with an over reliance on any one discipline. Tank against tank is not effective unless you have an obvious advantage in power projection. But against something like the tiger and panther, the sherman is out gunned. There is no reason to go tank on tank in a confrontation from the allied perspective. Sometimes you have no choice, but winners take advantage of their strengths and protect their weakness.

As ex-military, I have a preference for the strengths of the infantry. After the artillery, tanks, and air forces have pounded a target, it is the grunts that finish. No matter how much they punish a target, it is rare that there is not a force left capable of resistance. Ground pounders can get into places that no other weapon can reach. And they have much better ability to react and hide as circumstances dictate.