Stalin responsible for Hitler's conquests?

The British naval blockade was being very effective in suffocate Germany. In fact, it was so effective that Hitler only managed to launch his campaign in the West thanks to the commercial treaty with Stalin.

Now I ask: can the Soviets be blamed for "financing" Hitler? Far from hindsight, the conditions of Nazi Germany were much inferior than those of the Kaiser; Germany simply didn't had the resources, credit and naval power to pose a treat in the long run for the Allies. If the Soviets really wanted to not get involved, they should not have been involved at all, not making any commercial treaty with Hitler and letting him suffocate under the blockade and the Anglo-French with US help, while consolidating the Soviet defenses.

 

Stalin didn't really have any idea that Hitler was going to attack him even after a German solder defected and warned him and numerous occasions where luftwaffe recons lanes crossed the soviet border. Also stalin didn't like the west at all and was more than happy to help Hitler, although as far as the soviets wanting to stay out of the war? I think not especially after signing the pact with Hitler and invading poland.

 

Indeed but that was not their intention. Have the capitalists/fascists bleed each other white and conquer them all! That was Stalin's plan but he was screwed over by his partner in crime.

 

I think the various citations in Main Kampf, and the parallel negociations for an Anti-Hitler alliance with the West, are indicators this was not the case. Also, the pact didn't make any sense even for the general public; you went in any corner cafe of the time and would find people doing beats about who would outwit the other first.

 

It is the opposite :Hitler was responsible for Stalin's conquests

 

No ,Hitler did not need the food and raw materials from Stalin to launch his campaig in the West :after 22 june 1941,he received nothing more,and still was going to Moscow and the Wolga

 

The Ribbentrop pact Aug 1939 made it possible for Hitler to take care of Poland and then turn to West. The pact removed the possibility of a two-front war. Without the pact would Hitler have attacked? In Spring 1940 the Soviet fuel in the tanks made it possible to make the Sichelschnitt etc. My view is that the Ribbentrop pact made the world war possible and removed the last hurdle from Hitler to start the war.

 

From Wik:

In February 1940 Karl Ritter, who had brokered huge pre-war barter agreements with Brazil, visited Moscow and, despite finding Stalin an incredibly fierce negotiator, an increased trade deal was eventually signed between Germany and Russia. It was valued at 640 million Reichmarks in addition to that previously agreed, for which Germany would supply heavy naval guns, thirty of her latest aircraft including the Messerschmitt 109, Messerschmitt 110 and Junkers 88, locomotives, turbines, generators, the unfinished cruiser Lutzow and the plans to the pocket battleship Bismarck. In return Russia supplied in the first year one million tons of cereal, ½ million tons of wheat, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, ½ million tons of phosphates, one million tons of soya beans and other goods. Although the Germans had been able to find numerous ways of beating the blockade, shortages were now so severe that on 30 March 1940, when he was gearing up for his renewed Blitzkrieg in the west, Hitler ordered that delivery of goods in payment to Russia should take priority even over those to his own armed forces. After the fall of France Hitler, intending to invade Russia the following year, declared that the trade need continue only until the spring of 1941, after which the Nazis intended to take all they needed.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany_(1939–1945)
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I agree with Kai-Petri. Germany was facing severe shortages despite the first commercial treaty. If Stalin really wanted to avoid the war, it would only be necessary to let Hitler suffocate under the blockade and military attriction. France and Britain would deal with him.

Another thing that the pact caused was the ruin of the Polish plan for the Romanian Bridgehead:

The Romanian Bridgehead (Polish: Przedmoście rumuńskie) was an area in southeastern Poland, now located in Ukraine. During the Polish Defensive War of 1939 (at the start of World War II), on September 14 the Polish Commander in Chief Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-Śmigły ordered all Polish troops fighting east of the Vistula (approximately 20 divisions still retaining cohesion) to withdraw towards Lwów, and then to the hills along the borders with Romania and the Soviet Union.
The plan was a fall back plan in case it was impossible to defend the Polish borders, and assumed that the Polish forces would be able to retreat to the area, organise a successful defence until the winter, and hold out until the promised French offensive on the Western Front started. Rydz-Śmigły predicted that the rough terrain, the Stryj and Dniestr rivers, valleys, hills and swamps would provide natural lines of defence against the German advance. The area was also home to many ammunition dumps that were prepared for the third wave of Polish troops, and was linked to the Romanian port of Constanţa, which could be used to resupply the Polish troops.
This plan is one of the reasons the Polish-Romanian Alliance was not activated by Poland. Poland and Romania had been allied since 1921 and the defensive pact was still valid in 1939. However, the Polish government decided that it would be much more helpful to have a safe haven in Romania and a safe port of Constanţa that could accept as many Allied merchant ships as required to keep Poland fighting. The Polish Navy and merchant marine were mostly evacuated prior to September 1 (see Peking Plan); they were to operate from French and British ports and deliver the supplies through Romania.
However, the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17 (following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) made all those plans obsolete. As a result, Polish units were ordered to evacuate Poland and reorganise in France.
Up to 120,000 Polish troops withdrew through the Romanian Bridgehead area to neutral Romania and Hungary. The majority of those troops joined the newly formed Polish Armed Forces in the West in France and the United Kingdom in 1939 and 1940. Until the United States entered the war and Germany attacked the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the Polish army was one of the largest forces of the Allies.[SUP][1][/SUP]
The Romanian government also received the treasury of the National Bank of Poland in 1939. One part of it, consisting of 1,261 crates containing 82,403 kg of gold, was loaded aboard a commercial ship in the port of Constanţa, and transported to Western Europe. The transport was escorted by ships from the Romanian Navy, in order to prevent an interception by Soviet submarines in the Black Sea. The second part of the treasury, totaling 3,057,450 kg, was deposited in the Romanian National Bank. It was returned to Poland on September 17, 1947. A fictional portrayal of the gold's evacuation from Warsaw forms part of the novel The Polish Officer, by Alan Furst.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_Bridgehead

If the Poles were able to put more resistance, together with the blockade, the situation of Germany would be much worse. If France had just a little more time, it would have it's chances of stabilize the front much improved. And after that, Hitler would be doomed.

But like in aerial accidents, Stalin cannot be blamed as the sole responsible for the war happened. certainly not. But I conclude that he was definately one of the responsibles.

 

The red army had to fight various entente expeditionary forces after the end of ww1, and they were not invited to Versailles where huge chunks of former Russian territories were allocated. Stalin had very good reasons to distrust the west. Until Hitler started his expansion the USSR had mantained a very low profile. besides support of the Spannish repubblicans they did very little until 1939, and by then it was a question of getting there before Hitler did.

 

1) From what I have read ,the oil deliveries were 600000 tons
2) I disagree with the use of raw figures out of context ,this is the same (but opposite) mistake as inthe LL discussions :giving some impressive figures and conclude that they were decisive .
What would be the importance of 100000 tons of cotton,unless we know what the German production and stocks of cotton were ?
It is the same for oil,etc ...
About the oil :in 1939,Germany received 5.100 ton ,totally negligible,and the attack in the west was scheduled for januray 1940 :the Germans planned to attack without Soviet oil .
In 1940,they received 617000 tons of oil=50000 per month ,that mean they had 200000 tons on 1 may,was this indispensable for an attack in may.Btw :the Germans attacked Poland without Soviet oil
Grain :in 1939 200000 ton,in 1940,820000 ton (=almost 70000 per month):would Germany be starving without the 65000 ton grain of the last quarter of 1939 and the 275000 ton of the first quarter of 1940 ?

 

That sounds logical to reasonable people but what were Stalin's options? The Russo-German treaty was an offer he couldn't refuse! By refusing an offer he would have just risked to be attacked first and, besides, why would have he risked his country just to defend unfriendly western nations. There was nothing in the world that would shake Hitler's intention to fight and win the war. He has started his Amoklauf in 1933.

 

I don't think so. First of all Poland was in the way and would bear the brundt of any German attack with the guarantees offered by the allies to Poland a German attack would have been unlikely.

 

Stalin also could have entered in an indirect alliance with the Allies, saying he would not tolerate a German occupation of Poland.

There was any strong possibility that Poland would enter in Hitler's sphere? If yes, then things are different for Stalin...

 

Another point I would like to make is that Stalin could not give a damn for the democracies, but vice versa was not truth. Hitler was a problem, that however would be a much greater trouble had he conquered the Soviet Union and obtained it's resources. So, the Russian survival was critical for the West, and factually the reason they formed the Grand Alliance.

 

In Four Year Plan memorandum of August−September 1936 Hitler was very specific:

I. The German armed forces must be ready for combat within four years.
II. The German economy must be fit for war within four years.

The increased extent of re-armament significantly increased the likelihood that Germany would be at war by 1940.

Major General Friedrich Fromm of the Army’s Central Administrative Office concluded: ‘Shortly after completion of the rearmament phase, the Wehrmacht must be employed, otherwise there must be a reduction in demands or in the level of war readiness’.

Hitler knew in 1936 that there will be a war by 1940 with or without the treaty of which significance was greatly exaggerated. There were also other pacts of equal significance that never received such attention as a Russo-German treaty.

 

If he goes to war with Poland without the agreement with the Soviets but with the historical allied agreements what happens if the Soviets come to the aid of the Poles? There's much for them to gain by it and it leaves Germany in a two front war from the start making the elimination of France in 1940 essentially impossible.

 

For Hitler, the secret part of the treaty was important for military reasons: to drag the Red Army as close as possible to destroy it with swift encirclements before the counterparts may retreat. He wasn’t worried that Russians might come too close, quite opposite.

 

Something that seems to be ignored here is that Nazi Germany knew full well it was a fuel, food and fiber importing nation. They saw the British blockage of WW1 as one of the main reasons for "public unrest" (stab in the back) and did what they could to lessen the effect, starting before war was even taken up.

Here is something that most on the “allied side” don’t realize, but was been pointed out in William Shirier’s Berlin Diary. As a foreign journalist he was given the double ration of "hard laborer", which was designed to keep the foreign press from realizing the rationing shortages. He (Shirer) however had many, many friends in Germany outside of the "normal" channels and shared his double rations with them which alerted him to the shortage of fats, butter, eggs, shoes, fabrics and meats. He saw the rations decrease in major numbers before he left in Dec. of 1940. One of the most telling entries he made was when he found out that all German children under age two had to have their own ration cards for fabrics as well as dairy products. His comment was; "a nation which has to ration diapers cannot be too stable a war-time economy."

Rationing in Nazi Germany started in late ’39, before Poland was invaded, or the “non-aggression pact” was even announced. Hitler and the Nazis knew full well that a British blockade would be a disaster for their food, fuel and fiber stocks.

On 28th August 1939 the German people were surprised by the introduction of ration cards. Main food (meat, lard, coffee and sugar) were only to be obtained by using ration cards. From 25th September that year, bread and eggs were rationed as well. The NSDAP officials hoped to prevent a famine as seen in World War I by starting this rationing scheme well in advance.

In the first part of World War II, the "Normalverbraucher" (average consumer) received for example up to 700 grams of meat or items made from meat like sausages; 280 grams sugar; 110 grams jam; 2400 grams of bread; 270 grams lard/cooking oil and 1/5 liter of milk a week. 20 grams of tea and 62,5 grams of "Ersatz-Kaffee" could be obtained monthly.

Potatoes and vegetables could be obtained without a ration card.

As the war progressed the ration amounts continued to decline, and since they had always imported 100% of their cotton, and 75% of their wool even fabric was rationed to the point where one had to decide if he/she would buy a pair of pants or a single shift for the entire year. The military wasn't "rationed" in that draconian a fashion, but even they eventually saw their own food, fabric and shoes decrease to the point where new recruits were clothed in ersatz fabric made of wood pulp, or a simple arm-band over their own civilian dress.

Goto:

www.bills-bunker.de

 

About the Soviet oil supplies :the following is from the AHF :Germany and oil P4
1939:home crude production :888000 ton,home synthetic production :2.2 million ton,import :5.165 million (of which,following Wiki :5000 from the SU),mostly from Mexico and Romania
1940:crude:1.465 million,synthetic :3.348 million,import:2.O75 million
Thus in 1939,the Soviet oil was inexistant,in 1940,it was less than 9 % of the total :617000 on a total of 6.8 million
BTW:in 1940,Britain was importing 11.2 million ton of oil