Did the Southern Press Have a Negative Effect on the Confederate War Effort?

Two incidents stand out in my mind. Both of these had a truly negative impact, and are prime examples of why newsmen are treated so dimissively by modern high commands.

The first is the effect that the Southern Press had on the mind of one of it's foremost soldiers, General Albert Sidney Johnston.

Many have noted that Johnston's reputation existed as only a rumour outside of collegues like Jefferson Davis. But, his undoubted sucess in rallying William O. Butler's division of volunteers at Monteray in 1846 certainly impressed a certain Captain Joseph Hooker, so Johnston certainly had admirers outside of Davis's circle, on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. A.S. Johnston's appointment as Commander of "Confederate Department No. 2", (i.e. Parts of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, Kansas and Indian Territory) seemed to Davis that Johnston was "the only man who seemed equal to it." The press agreed...at first. They called him "The Lion of the West"...

But, along came Grant, and seeing an opportunity, he swiftly captured the twin forts of Henry and Donelson. It was seen as something of a catastrophe for the Confederacy, and "the Southern people placed the blame for the loss squarely on the shoulders of Albert Sidney Johnston." Delegations to Jefferson Davis demanded Davis cashier him, and even his troops lost confidence in him. But, it was the press who were most virulent, particularly in middle Tennessee.

Pierre Beauregard and Braxton Bragg were to greatly assist the rebuilding of Confederate morale in Johnston's army, with Beauregard actually lobbying governers of the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama to supply vital reinforcement of troops and supplies. Jefferson Davis could, apparently, spare little or nothing from the Eastern theater, and Braxton Bragg occupied himself as never before to build the army back up to fighting trim, gaining him a reputation with the troops that was to bear bitter fruit later on.

So, with the press leading the campaign to remove Johnston, and Davis unable to come to terms with the ongoing situation in the Western theater, Albert Sidney Johnston knew that he needed something special to restore lost confidence. In appointing Beauregard as second in command Pierre actually turned down Johnston's attempted resignation. And for the only time in his career, Braxton Bragg had the confidence of the troops in Johnston's army sown up so much that Johnston retained him as "Chief of Staff", and a Corps commander to boot. Having lost confidence in himself, Albert Johnston wanted to create a big impression at the coming battle of Shiloh....

And he did.....Johnston left the actual command of the Army at the General level to Bragg and Beauregard. Johnston then spent most of the morning of Sunday 6th of April doing the job of a lowly Captain, herding troops forward, participating everywhere he could, almost suicidally disdainful of enemy fire. Bragg, as ever, was unimaginative in battle, and his series of bayonette charges caused Johnston to be well occupied in gathering the men together, leading them back into "The Hornet's Nest" time after time. Johnston seemed to be reckless, as shown by his manner, and the fact that he detached his personal surgeon away to treat other wounded men.....

When spent rounds thudded into his boot, Johnston laughed, as at the end of one surge, he playfully flapped his torn boot sole around, laughing at it......then officers saw him "swoon in the saddle".

Albert Sidney Johnston had, in fact, been hit in a major artery. His boot was full of blood, and as they got him down of his horse, he lost consciousness and died around an hour or so later. His surgeon, had he been there, would have applied a simple tornique; but he wasn't there, and Johnston blead to death.

So......here is the first example of how the press and their attitude pushed a Confederate commander into actions designed to fix his public image, to atone for his previous failings. Was the Press justified? Did they, in fact, push Sidney Johnstone to a reckless death? The press, most certainly, swung the other way after Shiloh, stating quite clearly their belief that Johnston's death was the cause of the defeat, for it was P.G.T. Beauregard that ordered a 'halt' to the Confederate offensive drive at Shiloh, late in the afternoon, to the utter disgust of Braxton Bragg, who felt forever after that he had thrown away a certain victory. And with Beauregard absenting himself from the army to return home without informing Davis or anybody else, Braxton Bragg was left as the man in charge, and he was to bedevil the Army of Tennessee with his arrogant and choleric relations with his senior officers, and his wonderful habit of turning decisive Southern victories into strategic retreats...

All this stemmed from the public criticism of Albert johnston, lead by the caustic comments of Southern newspapers, egging him on. After his death, they tartly remarked, lead by the Natchez Weekly Courier, (April 8, 1862), "Thank God, he has rescued his character."


The other example of this same process are the Richmond newpapers that canned James Ewell Brown Stuart for being "caught napping", at an engagment called Brandy Station in 1863. The press referred to J.E.B. and his command as "Puffed up Cavalry", and this was to have a profound affect on the mind of Stuart, a dandy whose image, up to that point, had been awe inspiring. Stuart decided to have the bulk of his command attempt another "Ride Around the Union Army", which left him completely out of contact for the upcoming engagement at Gettysburg. Robert E.Lee fought the Gettysburg Campaign 'blind', which totally disabled his ability to prevent the 'meeting enagement' to escalate into a contest of attrition. It's one of the great "What Ifs" of 1863...."What if Lee had his cavalry for the Gettysburg Campaign?

So, my question for discussion is what other examples can we turn up of Southern strategy being affected by newspaper columns?.....and what might have happened had Jefferson Davis 'gagged' the press from the beginning, only allowing 'official communiques' to tell the story of a battle for public consumption?....would it have made a difference? Could it have prolonged the war? Or even given the South it's best chance of achieving independance through martial efforts, capturing Washington and forcing terms on Mr. Lincoln, with foreign naval vessels arriving offshore to guarantee the newest nation on earth?

What say The Rouges?

Mr Price, what do you think on this?

 

I think it would have been impossible for Davis to "gag the press" in the Confederacy. After all, they had seceded due to their opposition to federal powers over the states. No southern state would have allowed or obeyed such an edict since it violated the very principles which had caused them to secede in the first place.

As for the press having too much influence over war matters, that was probably true and for the same reasons noted above. The confederacy was very much a voluntary confederation of states and if a newspaper in say, Atlanta, influenced popular opinion in Georgia then Davis had to concede to their will because the state might very well withhold troops and supplies from that army until their wishes were fulfilled.

 

The inability of Jefferson Davis to do anything about the caustic and virilent comments levelled at his senior staff officers should, therefore, be viewed as a MAJOR cause of the subsequent defeat of the Confederate State of America. When public comments by amatuers with no military training begin to affect strategy, and to cause high ranking officers to demonstrate their prowess purely for public consumption, you have to wonder why it was allowed at all.

I don't think this aspect of the American Civil War gets anything near the attention it deserves. The South's best chance of bringing the war to a negotiated settlement was in 1862, but that year was also the beginning of a concerted effort by southern newspapers and journalists to let their President know exactly how they thought the war ought to be fought and won; people and journalists often criticized Joe Johnston for a series of strategic withdrawls, but given Johnston's lack of resources, there were times when he could do little else, really, that would result in anything more than dead soldiers. Johnston knew, as others did, that husbanding precious manpower was the safest path to prolonging the war, and dragging it out on Southern terms, toward the holy grail of a negotiated settlement.

The Campaigns of Robert E. Lee were costly endevours in terms of human resource expenditure. While a excellent strategist, Lee was gambling that a battlefield result may well lead to some kind of talks later on. In this assumption, he was broadly mistaken. Prolongation of the war was the ONLY path to an election of another president. Lee gave battle after battle, and got popularity and acclaim for himself, and the Southern military. But Lee's path lead ever downward, making larger and more desperate gambles each time, with a pool of resources dwindling, rather than getting larger.

The true path to victory for the South lay in the "Fleet in Being", preserving the size of the vital Confederate Army, teasing with movements rather than trying to bludgeon their way to Washington.

The battle for the hearts and minds of the people was far to focussed on pleasing Southerners and their conception of how a war should be fought, rather than trying to turn the minds of northern civilians around with threats of conquest, which would have been more deadly than the actual campaign's themselves. The Southern hierarchy listened to much to journalists, and not enough to their own advisors, who were trying to preserve Southern strike power for as long as possible, rather than frittering it away in military campaigns of dubious worth, not changing the minds of the people whose opinions mattered most.....the Northen voter.

 

Loving this one already!

 

I don't disagree, but given the voluntary nature of the confederacy there was little Richmond could do about it. A state like North Carolina could shift its troops to another front or even withdraw them completely if they didn't like how things were being handled, and journalists held the balance of public opinion.

Albert Sydney Johnston was a Kentuckian, a border state that held little sway in the confederacy, so replacing him with a North Carolina (an important state) native like Bragg was a matter of political expediency.

Running the Confederacy must have been like herding cats. Worse, herding cats through a pack of yapping terriers (journalists).

 

Kodiac Bear wrote:

I agree. I would add that the North had to deal with this issue also. The northern states were also very independant during this period.
As an example of the independance of the state and local governments from their respective national governments. Dade County Georgia, one county west of where I live (Walker County Georgia) had strong unionist sentiment initially. When the State of Georgia seceeded fron the Union, Dade County seceeded from the state. When Lincoln called for troops to put down the insurrection, Dade County feeling the action unconstitutional then itself seceeded from the union. Dade County was symbolically re-admitted to the Union in 1945 by Harry Truman. (Local legend has it that Dade County seceeded from the union and the state of Georgia prior to Georgia's secession because Georgia was hesitant to seceede. This version of events has been effectively debunked by historians and there is no historical evidence to support this version of events. There is also ample historical evidence that Dade and Walker Counties were strongly anti-secessionist prior to the call for troops by Lincoln.)

The Union also had to depend upon the cooperation of individual states to support the war effort. State governors had a tremendous amount of power over where and how their troops were utilized, especially early on when they were also almost solely responsible for the arming, equipping and supply of their state forces.

Now as to the proposition that the newspapers caused the south's loss because of things they wrote about A.S. Johnson and J.E.B. Stuart, I don't buy it. Successful Generals dealt with the same issues. Lee himself made the comment:
"We made a great mistake in the beginning of our struggle, and I fear, in spite of all we can do, it will prove to be a fatal mistake. We appointed all our worst generals to command our armies, and all our best generals to edit the newspapers."

Thomas Jackson also had to deal with an adversarial press, he didn't become a universally acclaimed southern hero until after his death.

In reply to the points made in the original post.
1.) A.S. Johnson was "thought" to have had a great potential as a general, it was never adequately demonstrated. His potential as a commander was greatly exagerated after his death. The original post does not supply anything more than supposition that Sidney Johnson's actions at Shiloh were a direct result of newspaper coverage.
2.) Stuart's response to the Brandy Station fight has often been attributed to be the cause for his actions during the Gettysburg campaign. There is evidence to support this view, there is also a good deal of evidence that he was acting within his orders and a combination of bad timing, better union cavalry, and being tied to a captured union supply wagons led to his delay. Either way there were enough mistakes and lost opportunities at Gettysburg to account for the result, even if Stuart's performance had been flawless.

Volga wrote:

We have that today. Would you recommend that we muzzle the contemporary press?

Joe Johnston could be brilliant on the defensive, actually almost as good as Lee. What he lacked was the ability to counter-punch. Lee knew that when facing superior forces the end result is determined if you don't take the initiative away from your opponent. A good case can be made that Joe Johnston lost the war by allowing Sherman to reach the outskirts of Atlanta. He missed many opportunities to strike Sherman during his campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. Tactically, his defensive actions were superior, but as long as Sherman retained the initiative he would eventually make each suceeding defensive position untenable. Johnston did trade space for time, just too much space for too little time. Sherman's capture of Atlanta has been attributed as the major factor in Lincoln's re-election in 1864. If Johnston had been able to delay him longer in north Georgia this may have occurred too late to have had an effect. As it was Davis relieved Johnston and replaced him with Hood, and you had just the opposite problem, too much offensive and not enough defensive. The loss of Atlanta and opening the door to the deep south also had a huge effect on Lee's operations. The losses to his army from desertion and the loss of the deep south as a producer of supplies hurt him more than his combat losses did. His troops deserted in droves because Sherman's armies were looting, pillaging, raping and burning their way through the deep south. The fear that their families were dead, starving, homeless or ravished was more than the soldiers could take and they deserted in droves to go home and try to salvage and protect what they could.


Trivia: Up until 2010 when a statue to J.E. Johnston was dedicated at Bentonville, NC, the only statue of the General was located in Dalton Georgia, one county south west of here.

And you might be right if wars were won by accountants and statisticians. You also don't appear to appreciate the practical factors that went into many of Lee's decisions, and appear to be repeating an opinion expressed by several modern writers that ignore a number of facts about Lee's campaigns.
1.) Lee was not just an offensive minded commander, he was really just as adept at using the defensive. In fact a couple of his early nickname's were "The King of Spades" because of his prediliction for building fortifications, and "Granny Lee" because he at times was too patient and not viewed as aggressive enough.
2.) Lee was one of the earliest employers of extensive field fortifications. His defensive tactics, which are often underplayed were an important part of his battleplans. Did you know that he spent the first three weeks as Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, strengthening Richmonds defensive works? He would use field fortifications to enable small portions of his troops to delay and block his opponents forces while he made his offensive maneuvers to strike his enemies where they were most vulnerable. In Lee's Chancellorsville victory, it was Early, left at Fredericksburg with a small force to tie down Sedgewick's Corps that enabled Lee to go after Hooker with sufficient troops to have a chance at success. If you look at most of Lee's battles, it was good defensive ground, adequately fortified that allowed him to split his forces in the face of a numerically superior enemy that led to many of his successes.
Then these same writers beat him up for the overland campaign of 1864 citing statistics. "Well he he couldn't afford the losses". What were his options? Retreat into the Richmond defenses? The war would have ended a year earlier, Lee realised that once he was forced into a seige situation the souths days were numbered. In the 1864 Overland campaign Lee inflicted more casualties on the Federal army than Lee's total force strength at the beginning of the campaign. At the end of the campaign, even though he had received minimal reinforcements, Lee's army was almost the same size in relation to the Federal army as it had been when the campaign commenced at the Wilderness. The Federals, even with their enormous manpower advantage had been forced to strip troops from other areas to maintain their forces strength. That's why you see heavy artillery regiments stripped from Washington used as infantry.


This picture is of a heavy artillery regiment at Petersburg. The 1st Maine Heavy Artillery took the highest number of casualties suffered by any Union Civil War Regiment in a single day at Petersburg. The regiment lost 67% of their 900 man strength that day.
3.) Lee was an officer serving a civilian government, he could not act in a manner not approved by his cililian and military superiors. He could not just decide to fall back and surrender territory without approval. Lee did not become General in Chief of the Confederate Armies until 31 January 1865, too late to have any impact. It does illustrate that up until then he was only commander of his army and answered to superior officers in addition to the civilian authorities.
4.) One of the deciding factors for undertaking both the 1862 and 1863 invasions of the north was to move the spring and summer campaigning out of Virginia to allow for food production and to allow the army to obtain supplies from northern sources. Should he have stayed in Virginia and allowed his army and the civilian population to starve? How many more of his men would have died due to malnutrition and disease (malnutrition makes the individual more susceptible to disease and more men died from disease, 2/3rds of all deaths, in the Civil War than died in combat).
5.) You seem to have a high opinion of Joe Johnston, an opinion I share BTW, let him put it in perspective. When Johnston was meeting with a group of anti-administration politicians, one, Senator William Lowndes Yancy, rose and proposed a toast to Johnston. "Gentlemen," he said, "Let us drink to the only man that can save the Confederacy. General Joseph E. Johnston." Johnston arose and responded, "The man described is already in the field, in the person of General Robert E, Lee. I will drink to his health."

One more bit of trivia: The Army of Tennessee that Johnston took over from Bragg after Chattanooga, had lost a huge number of it's regimental colors during the rout at Missionary Ridge. When Johnston assumed command on December 27th, 1863, Johnston set about rebuilding his army and it's morale. During the spring he had new colors issued to it's units. This oblong version of the ANV battle flag (their version was square) is the version most people today recognize as a "Rebel Flag". Many of the AoT units that had not been routed during the fighting around Chattanooga refused to surrender their old colors, particularly units carrying the "Hardee" flag. Johnston was forced to back off and let them retain their flags. Patrick Cleburne's troops that fought a brilliant defensive fight against Sherman's troops at Ringgold Gap being among these.



Hardee Flag.



Another Hardee Flag.


And one more.

 

I'm not so sure that the appointment of Braxton Bragg was due to political expediency. Bragg was, simply, the best man for the job....at the time.

He had performed well in charge of the garrison covering Pensacola. The training and dicipline he provided were much needed. Bragg even offered to send his four units to a 'hot' battle area in exchange for four units that were new and untried. This type of action was unprecedented in the Confederate ranks, and Bragg gained much to add to his reputation from it.

On the other hand, Bragg's arrival at the Army of the West stripped away much of the goodwill he had gained. "Although maintaining 'cordial' relations with A.S. Johnston, he found the Western Army in "wretched" condition and said so. Some of his first observations hinted that Beauregard was responsible for the lack of discipline and habitual plundering by new recruits. Bragg began a fatal split with General Leonidas Polk by personally accusing Polk of participating in the looting.

Braxton Bragg should never have been given command. He should have stayed where his talents lay, with organizing and training.

 

Great Price Mr Post....sorry! Great post Mr Price...

I was hoping to grab your attention with this post. As you may have gathered, I'm reading a rather interesting book called"Leaders of the Lost Cause", a collection of essays concerning 8 confederate generals and their performance in the ACW. It makes for great reading, but the chapters on A.S. johnston and Bragg got me thinking about the role of the always astounding Southern press. I wondered what might have been had they not been so harsh with Albert Johnston before Shiloh. Seemed to me that Johnston was doing a fine job with the meager resources Jefferson Davis was allowing him, and the thousand miles of frontage he had to cover, as well as policing the two most vital arteries into the South, the Tenessee and Cumberland River systems.

Seemed to me that too much was asked of Johnston with too little, Davis merely assuming that Johnston's natural ability would somehow make everything better. U.S. Grant touched off events that lead to Albert Johnstons virtual suicide....nothing less than that, really. If he had survived April 6th, he may well have altered the course of the war in the West.

 

Excellent post! I was planning to offer some input but after reading USMCPs post, my little offering would pale in comparison. I'll just save up for another time!

 

I feel this is a pretty fair assesment of Bragg. He was not beloved by his troops because of his personality, but he was liked because he kept them reasonably fed, his strong discipline kept them occupied and cut down on deaths due to disease. He could not and did not get along with his subordinate commanders. He was a fair tactical planner, but always managed to squander the advantages he gained in battle due to a combination of poor coordination (due to the relationship with his subordinate commanders) of his units, an apparent inability to react to fluid situations, and I think a lack of self-confidence. He never saw that his army was doing as well as it actually was when engaged in a fight. As a young officer he did display a good deal of tactical acumen, and his relationship with Davis was good. Both having served together in the Mexican War.

"Bragg played a key role in the defense of Fort Texas (May 3-9, 1846). Effectively working his guns, Bragg was brevetted to captain for his performance. With the relief of the fort and the opening of the Mexican-American War, Bragg became part of Major General Zachary Taylor's Army of Occupation. Promoted to captain in the regular army in June 1846, he took part in the victories at the Battles of Monterrey and Buena Vista, earning brevet promotions to major and lieutenant colonel.During the Buena Vista campaign, Bragg befriended the commander of the Mississippi Rifles, Colonel Jefferson Davis."

He shone particularly well during the Battle of Buena Vista where the skillful handling of the U.S. artillery allowed Taylor to defeat a much larger Mexican force.

"Though supported by artillery under Lieutenants George H. Thomas and Samuel French, they too were overwhelmed and forced to fall back. With the American left collapsing, only the 2nd Illinois stood firm, conducting a slow, fighting retreat. To support them, Wool shifted Captain Braxton Bragg's battery, the 1st Illinois, and the 2nd Kentucky to plug the breach. Firing into Lombardini's exposed flank, they inflicted heavy losses and halted part of the Mexican drive."

"...Overwhelming the Americans, they began forcing them back. While O'Brien worked to save his guns, the 1st Illinois was forced into a ravine where the Mexicans fired down on them. Understanding the critical nature of the situation, Taylor summoned Bragg's fly artillery to the scene. Unlimbering in the face of the approaching Mexicans, Bragg's guns opened fire with double canister as Davis' men and dragoons rushed to his support. Three quick salvos shattered the Mexican attack and sent the Mexicans reeling. The trapped 1st Illinois was soon rescued by the arrival of Washington's guns which drove off their antagonists."

I will not bore you with the negative things said about Bragg, they can be found easily and in abundance. Here are a couple of positive quotes:

"Captain E. John Ellis had written disparagingly of Bragg early in the war, but later had concluded: "It was an unbending justice Bragg meted out to his generals, his colonels, his captains, and privates alike that brings the ire of officers high in the rank down upon General Bragg."

"...a major in the Confederate service suggested: "The future Historian in chronicling the events and the lives of our great men, will hoist on high the name of Braxton Bragg, as synonymous with cool courage, consummate bravery, and determined devotion to the cause he espoused and served so well."

 

Actually you didn't. A friend of mine Bobby/A-58 made me aware of it. Hey, Bobby Chickamauga and Chattanooga's 150th is this year. Remember you're always welcome to come up!

I have not read that particular book, though I did go out to Amazon and read the reviews after you said you were reading it. I would like to point out that while A.S. Johnston could be described as having meager forces, that was pretty much the situation all across the Confederacy in 1861-early 1862.

And ASJ did manage to bluff Sherman into inactivity with a series of raids. I do think Johnston could have done a better job, despite his lack of resources. His command up until Shiloh were a series of mis-steps and lost opportunities. He may have developed into an outstanding commander, he just, IMHO did not display exceptional abilities prior to his death. As to Shiloh, I don't know that Johnston's actions can be fairly attributed to his trying to redeem his reputation. First, his command was made up of several smaller, up until recently seperate commands. The plan of battle was not well conceived. The confederate assault quickly became disorganized, and it didn't help that many green soldiers, lacking in discipline stopped to loot the Federal camps. He had gained the advantage, but more needed to be done to destroy the Federal force. He had run up against a strong point in the Hornets Nest, they had been trying to reduce it for several hours. They were driving the Federals back on the flanks leading to the Hornet's Nest becoming increasingly more isolated. I am sure Johnston was thinking, he could lead a coordinated charge and the salient would collapse. It was not unusual during the Civil War for Generals to go forward and attempt to rally the troops, restore order, or to coordinate the assault. I would suggest that Gen. Johnston was where he should have been, and doing what he needed to do, if his army was to win. Sherman was doing exactly the same thing over on the Federal right flank, after having been surprised and routed earlier in the morning.

"Sherman, who had been so negligent in preparation for the battle, became one of its most important elements. He appeared everywhere along his lines, inspiring his raw recruits to resist the initial assaults despite staggering losses on both sides. He received two minor wounds and had three horses shot out from under him."

Jackson was doing something similar when he ws killed at Chancellorsville. Attempting to reorganize his units for a continued assault the next morning and attempting to discern the location of the enemy. Lee on at least two occasions attempted to rally and lead troops at critical junctures leading to the "Lee to the rear" incidents. Basically, he went forward to rally and lead troops, they calmed and told him go to the rear, we've got this. Hood was attempting to coordinate the Confederate breakthrough at Chickamauga when he was severely wounded. Longstreet had left him to coordinate that portion of the Confederate force while he went off to have a lunch of "Nassau bacon", when Hood went down the assault fell apart becoming piecemeal and the shattered federal Army had a chance to regroup and set up a defensive line.

The one thing i am curious about is what their take on Hood was. he is an officer that I think is unfairly maligned. Not that his performance as an army commander was anything, but terrible. Just that why he performed so poorly is seldom addressed. Hood was a stellar regimental, brigade, division and (temporary) corps commander and showed great ability. The Hood after his wounding at Gettysburg was not the same Hood as before. Then two months later, after losing the use of an arm at Gettysburg, he loses a leg at Chickamauga. A leg wound requiring amputation that high up towards the hip was almost never survived.

"Hood was once again wounded severely, and his right leg was amputated four inches (100 mm) below the hip. Hood's condition was so grave that the surgeon sent the severed leg along with him in the ambulance, assuming that they would be buried together. Because of Hood's bravery at Chickamauga,"

So ten months later they put Hood in charge of an army. Health wise he could not have been fully healed from his wounds. He was on laudanum for pain. He was not the same Hood as prior to his wounds and his naturally reckless tendencies were exacerbated by the lack of clarity of mind that comes with a healthy body and further hampered by the opiate he was taking for pain.
Another officer that I think gets short changed is Ewell. The Ewell that served under Jackson was superb. The Ewell at Gettysburg after having earlier lost a leg to wounds suffered at Groveton was not the Ewell of previous battles. Another factor is that Ewell operated best with precise instructions, he and Jackson had worked out their differences in command style and had become an effective team. Ewell had not had time to adapt to Lee's command style prior to the battle of Gettysburg.
Jubal Early was another officer that showed great talent. His reputation in modern times has suffered because of his post war fights with James Longstreet.
Well I could name dozens more, but I'd bore you. Here are your illustrations for today:


Wounding of Hood at Chickamauga



Hornets Nest Shiloh



Lee to the rear, Wilderness.

 

I'm not so sure that the meager situation that existed with Johnston was mirrored by events in the Eastern theater. If I look at my campaign game reinforcement chart for Victory Games design "The Civil War", it shows me that for most of 1862, reinforcement levels in the Western theater were roughly equal to those of the East. Now, purely counting beans, yes, Johnston was getting an equal share, but, when we look at the size of the territory covered by the Eastern theater, and compare it to the sheer amount of real estate that Sidney Johnston was expected to 'secure' with his allocations of manpower and supplies, Johnston comes up very short indeed.

Furthermore, the move by Grant's Army to Pittsburg Landing was the very first serious incursion into southern territory anywhere in the Confederacy at the time. The movements of Grant and Buell were made directly possible by the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. So, in blaming Johnston for the mess, his critics were actually blaming him for the very presense of Grant at Pittsburg Landing.

With his force concentration at Corinth, Mississippi, and no more reinforcements possible, for whatever reason Davis could come up with, the circumstances dictated that Johnston had managed to scrape together every soldier he was likely to recieve for the moment, and they were all sitting ready to go, only thirty miles from Pittsburg Landing.

With the Critics echoing in his ears, and the first major incursion into Confederate home territory, Johnston knew it was now or never. Corinth, too, was proving to be an biological trap for the Army of the West, with the sicklist climbing higher every week. Poor drainage and unusually large spring rains had transformed the surrounding countryside into torrents. Dysentary was rife at Corinth, (in fact, post Shiloh, Army wags made aweful latrine puns about the "Evacuation of Corinth", and the similarities between the velocities of both movements, bowel and army).

Bragg was unimpressed by the march to contact, claiming that the Army of the West was too disorganised by the move, pleading a postponment of the attack to maximize his strength. Johnston was having none of it, a further indicator of his state of mind.

Against the odds, the Confederates achieved suprise at Shiloh, with Bragg pulling out an old trick, depriving his troops of breakfast, and actually catching Yankee camps to his front lined up for theirs.

I do not agree that Albert Sidney Johnstojn was "right where he ought to have been." Showy scenes like his antics at the Hornet's Nest were strictly for the lower, divisional generals. You certainly would not see Beauregard or Bragg exposing themselves in this manner. Johnston paid the price for his bravery, and deprived the Army of momentum after the Hornet's Nest was taken. In the confusion, with nobody quite sure what to do next, Johnston's death most probably DID cost the confederates the fruits of their suprise, for it was precious daylight that ticked away, while the command was reorganized. I don't believe that the rank and file had much of an idea, because Sam Watkins claims that Johnston's death was "withheld from the troops". It was Bragg and Beauregard that were 'disorganized" by Johnston's death.

William Tecumseh Sherman was a divisional commander at Shiloh. He was most definately in the correct place during the battle, compensating for the mess that his morning dispositions had left his division in. It was his division that clustered around the high ground at Shiloh Church. It wasn't much of a rise, but to an old pro like Sherman, it was enough of a position to rally around, and stop the momentum of the Confederates to his front. Unfortunately, his left flank caved in, as Peabody's Sixth Division broke and ran, with their commander squashed flat.

Contrary to popular belief, it was the remenants of Peabody's division that were mostly present at the "Hornet's Nest". Furthermore, modern historians have questioned the likelyhood that the famous 'sunken road running along the Peach Orchard's southeast face was there at all. On April 6, 1862 there was no 'sunken road'. Generations of battlefield tourists have worn away the road itself. As time goes on, it gets deeper, and the Hornet's Nest looks far more sinister than it actually was. Further to that, Bragg's Third Corps were attacking here, and Braxton's tactical accumen was far from cutting edge, with a series of old fashioned bayonette charges given short shrift, repulsed one after the other.

Without Johnston's personal presense, it's difficult to see how they could have kept up the pace against such a fiercly held position. Johnston's moment had arrived....the one he had been working up to since the fall of Donelson.......Recklessly, Johnston participated in more than one charge, where just one might have achieved the same result.

This is what leads me to believe Johnston was too 'fixated' to operate as he should have. Swept up in the excitement of the moment, he surged forward one last time....


The Confederate retreat from Shiloh gave cause for William Tecumseh Sherman to quip...."We'd had quite enough of their society for two days..." The Union victory was not attributed to Grant at first. He was a target for the press, accused of drunkeness, once it became known that his army had been caught by suprise. Rumours flew about raw recruits bayonetted in their tents. Lincoln ignored such carping, and swept aside objectors to Grant with the comment... "I can't spare this man, he FIGHTS!"

Without Lincoln, the press would have deprived the Union of much that was to come from Ulysees Simpson Grant.

But, by God, they certainly did for Albert Sidney Johnston.

 

BTW...I've played the campaign scenario of "The Civil War" MANY times, (an old favourite of my old gaming circle.

Using the "no offensive conservation" startegy, I have an unbroken string of victories as the Confederate player. You prolong the contest until that 1864 election, and win it there and then, or God 'elp ya! I have frustrated my gaming buddies to no end playing the Confederates. Every time they got a hold of the South, flashy offensives aimed at Washington blead the C.S.A. dry, and usually terminated the game a little before the election.

That game was one of the best designs to ever come out of the United States, a very playable and realistic effort.

Much of what I surmise as possible, strategically speaking, come from my observations concerning this game....as well as reading books on the subject.

There is nothing like a good wargame as an historical tool to flesh out "might have beens' and make alternatives come alive.

While I admire Robert E. Lee as a tactician, I also criticize his lack of strategic vision.

Lee is the war's bloodiest general. The stats tell no lies concerning that piece of trivia. The best general of the war he may have been, but the best strategist?

I seriously doubt it. Lee was aiming for a pipe dream.

Grant was looking to box him in, and he achieved it. With the territorial heart of the country ripped to shreads by Sherman, and the political seat of the war in the Carolina's a smoking ruin, the contest was over.

Only the retention of the strength of the Army of the C.S.A. could have changed this. But Lee had already spent them.

 

Very educational posts! I hope you gentlemen will continue to enlighten me!

I remember reading that some in the Army of Northern Virginia had what can only be described as a "crisis of conscience" during the Pennsylvania foray, feeling that their role was to defend the south, not to invade the north.

 

That sentiment would find an echo in the North as a considerable number of Unionist's had no great enthusiasm for emancipation of the slave's, Just the preservation of the Union.

Getting back to the original question, a factor somewhat overlooked was that this war was something of an anomaly. War's between two fully democratic nation's is a rarity when you think about it. Both sides had local, regional and national leaders subject to a form of free election's. In such a matrix, draconian steps to muzzle the press would have repercussions that would force a democracy to unravel or for the 'people' of that nation to reject its own government.

A Dictator would not overly worry, simply employ more security personnel or greater terror internally.

Another factor was that while it might be easy to censor newspapers in the capitol and perhaps the leading cities, it would be nearly impossible to control the press nationwide without the apparatus of a police state.

 

War games are good for some things, poor for others. They do not do a very good job of modeling public sentiment, hardships on the public, political factors, etc. Wars do not occur in a vacuum. Belasar made a very good point when he noted that this was a war between two democracies and subject to the whims of the politicians and public. It's nice to say you can "play" the war and win with the south, but that does not necessarily make your strategy viable in a real world sense.

Lee is the war's bloodiest general.-You can use statistics to try and prove many things, but they always don't prove the truth. One reason Lee can appear to be the bloodiest General is because most of his opponents were fired relatively quickly, none served in a similar position as long as him. So if you total all his casualties over his entire career and compare them against McClellan, Pope, Meade, Burnside, Hooker, etc. he will come out with a greater number of casualties, he fought more battles as the Commanding General. Then you have the oft thrown out bit about casualty percentages, if you have the smaller force, even if you perform exceptionally, you will end up with a higher casualty percentage. The overland campaign of 1864 well illustrates this. Lee's army killed almost twice as many Yankee's as they lost, but the Federal army was twice as big. Statistically, Lee had a higher percentage of casualties, but it doesn't give an accurate picture of each sides performance. The casualties vary by source, but the most oft quoted and generally considered most accurate would give the following rough totals for each of the major engagements (total casualties would be somewhat higher due or smaller engagements not listed):
Wilderness: Grant-18,000. Lee-11,000.
Spotsylvania: Grant-18,000. Lee-12,500.
North Anna: Grant-2,600. Lee-1,600.
Cold Harbor: Grant-13,000. Lee-5,000.

Lee though he performed well, is criticised by several modern writers because his casualty rate was higher. He is faulted by the same writers because Grant could make good his manpower losses, while the south couldn't. This last analysis ignores the fact that at the end of the campaign the relative sizes of the two armies remained the same. Grant had replaced more men than Lee, but Lee had lost less. If you want to play the statistics game and if you really want to confuse the issue, look at proportional losses per battle. Lee only has one in the top ten and that's Gettysburg! Then look at the ten most costly battles for the Union, Lee commanded the Confederates in each of the top five and has seven of the top ten!! (Chickamauga would be 6th, Atlanta 9th and Shiloh 10th). You have to take each campaign and each battle within the context of the overall strategic situation, sometimes it is necessary to take great risks to prevent certain defeat. These writers who like to prove their point statistically, also fail to address what Lee's options were. Davis and the civilian government demanded that the Confederate capital be protected, Lee did this. Richmond and northern Virginia also contained most of the south's manufacturing capacity. Lose it and where is your warmaking capacity going to come from? Richmond also had a huge symbolic value, just as Washington did for the north.
I also made the point in my earlier post that many of Lee's offensive actions were based upon keeping areas of Virginia relatively Yankee free in order for them to produce the food and commodities that his army and the civilian populace needed. Failure to do this and the army attritted in camp, just wasting away from malnutrition and disease.

If you really want to understand the American Civil War you need to get past just the battles and campaigns and understand why they fought over certain ground, many times repeatedly.

Finally, you have the responsibility of an army to protect its citizens. Lee's army stood between the Union army and the civilian populace of Virginia. It also protected the route south into the Carolina's and east Tennessee. Sherman broke the south's will when he broke loose from his lines of supply and rampaged across the deep south. With their families threatened, soldiers from those areas, perviously staunch and dependable men, deserted in droves. If the Federal armies had been allowed to occupy large areas of the south and threaten the civilian population, even if you managed to drag the war out by trading space for time, the army would melt away on its own without fighting battles.

 

More so during the 1862 Maryland Invasion than in the 1863 Pennsylvania one. I don't remember the exact estimates of the number of troops that deserted Lee's Army when they crossed over the Potomac River into northern territory during the Sharpsburg campaign, but I think it was around 10,000 men or about 20% of his effective force. Virtually all these men returned to the ranks when the ANV returned crossed back over to Virginia in its retreat. People today don't realize how fiercely many of these men held on to certain principles. Today we think the south all went out as a group. This is not true, several states including Virginia initially voted against secession. It was only after Lincoln's 15 April, 1861 call for troops that Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee left. Even more interesting is that these four states accounted for over 45% of total southern manpower. Virginia being the most populous, then Tennessee. Had Lincoln not required the governors of these states to provide troops to invade their neighboring states, it is quite likely they would not have seceeded.

The movie Gods and Generals did a good job of portraying the sentiment of the time with Jackson's speech to the men of the Valley:
GODS AND GENERALS~Jackson's Speech - YouTube

By 1863 there had been numerous examples of depredations against southern civilians and property, particularly the "Rape of Fredericksburg" the previous December. They were not nearly as hesitant to take the war to Union soil.

 

Just for a little balance, I'm going to include the concluding tracts of Mr Gary W. Gallagher's essay, "A Great General is So Rare: Robert E. Lee and the Confederacy". This essay while much sourced, is also dry history, without the benfit of running "Lee Like" strategy time after time through the human computer of gameplay. In my experience, opponent after opponent went down trying to emulate this strategy for the successful prosecution of the american civil War. And they fail every time for the simple reason that they run out of everything before the election can do what they are really trying to achieve, the removal of abraham Lincoln and his replacement with a compromise President that would leave the Confederate States intact, rather than reuniting with the 'old' union.

"In terms of losses as a percentage of his command, Lee must rank as the Civil War's bloodiest general. Did Lee's results justify such immense loss? Except for the easy repulse of Burnside's unimaginative assaults at Fredericksburg, each of the campaigns conveyed to the Confederate people a sense that Lee was taking the war to the enemy, rather than simply awaiting the next Federal move. Even during the protracted defensive fighting of 1864-65, Lee retained his reputation as an audacious commander who would sieze any opportunity to smite the enemy. This was precisely the type of effort the Southern populace demanded of their generals and government. Confederates mourned the thousands of killed and wounded soldiers in 1862-63 but leveled remarkably little criticism toward Lee as the officer responsible for the effusion of blood.

Civilians and soldiers alike saw in Lee a daring and resourceful general who gave them splendid victories during his first year in command. He alone proved to be a reliable source for good news from the battlefield, and the Confederate people came to trust him almost blindly. John H. Claiborne, writing on July 30, 1864, from the office of the Senior Surgeon in Petersburg, captured the depth of feeling most Confederates felt for Lee: "No man on this continent or any other now fills so large and important a place to so many people. I verily believe, under God, our whole cause in his hands; and he goes down the hope of the nation is extinct. If there be a genius elsewhere, there is no confidence-the people and the government untie on him only." Similarly, a British visitor to Richmond wrote in March 1865 that "Genl R.E. Lee.....(is) the idol of his soldiers and the Hope of His Country.....(T)he prestige which surrounds his person & the almost fanatical belief in his judgement and capacity....is the one idea of the entire people."
Lee fully understood that the key to victory lay in the civilian sector. Well attuned to intersections between military and political affairs in a war between two democratic peoples, he grasped the ways in which his campaigns and battles bolstered Confederate and depressed U.S. morale. Equally aware of the staggering toll his style of generalship exacted, he hoped to win enough victories to convince Northern people that the war was too costly before Confederate manpower had been exhausted. More than once his generalship brought the confederacy to a point where independence seemed possible, most especially in the late summer and autumn of 1862, the late spring and early summer of 1863, and the summer of 1864. Lee and his army became the most admired national institution in the nascent slaveholding republic. inspiring the Confederate people to resist long past the point at which they would otherwise have conceded their inability to overcome Northern numbers and power."

Now, this traditional view is all fair and well, but, it wasn't the Southern people and soldiery that were going to vote Lincoln OUT, and replace him with a President who was sympathetic to the idea that the C.S.A. was an enduring concept.

Only the minds of the northern voting populace could do that.

In assuming that the war could be won by foriegn intervention, rather than simply getting rid of Abraham Lincoln, Robert E. Lee played the game at the behest of amatuer strategists and journalists, trying to please everyone with sparkling victories on the battlefield. His theater of operations gained or lost only Virginia. Economically, as well as politically, Tennessee was worth as much to the confederate war effort, and the fall of New Orleans, and Georgia, and the Carolina's, meant that the war was SEEMING to be won in the East, a mirage that Lee kept conjuring with battlefield victory.

But, the war was won and lost by the territorial conquests in the WESTERN theater, not the East. Had the Western theater been allocated proper resources and men from the beginning, had a firebrand general like Sidney Johnston been in control, and had Braxton Bragg remained as the quintessential organizer of this department, the Confederacey would have found that Northern voters would have delivered victory to them in 1864, by turfing Mr. Lincoln out of the Whitehouse, leaving the Confederate States of America to survive.

The telling line is the one above...."This was precisely the type of effort the Southern populace demanded of their generals and government...."

Unfortunately, pandering to the wants of the populace does not necessarily bring a conflict to a successful conclusion. Lee may well have been doing just what was demanded of him. But, if he had looked at the problem objectively, he should have been able to ignore "The wishes of the populace, ..." as espoused by the always critical SOUTHERN PRESS....

I say again....The Southern Press had a negative effect on the outcome of the American Civil War. It's a lesson that every soldier and stateman should draw from this terrible conflict. Leave the strategy to those that KNOW.....you can't just serve up to people that which they most want. It could cost you the war itself, for it is not the individual battle that wins a war.

Remember why the Empire of Great Britain ENDURED.....simply for the reason that she had a long history of losing battles....and winning wars. The C.S.A. should have followed her example.....

 

"Lee fully understood that the key to victory lay in the civilian sector...."

Trouble was, Lee was attempting to please the SOUTHERN element of the civilian sector. Southerners could not participate in the election of 1864. ONLY the Northern population could, and therefore, it is only the opinions of the Northern population that Lee had to alter.

Holding onto territory in the Western theater was clearly the path to achieving this.....aiming for some airey fairy concept that the capture of Washington would bring foreign intervention was not.

It is a simple as that.

 

Just something small concerning Robert E. Lee, before I turn my attention to John Bell Hood, (at the request of the good Mr Price, whose opinions are not to be taken lightly), I must draw your attention to something else i noticed, concerning the death of the famed Lee.

Lee ia always portrayed, on his deathbed, as sinking into a rambling coma like state. It is said that he called for A.P. Hill to "rally the troops" at one point, and then "gathered himself", before clearly uttering the words, "STRIKE THE TENT", then death. Mr Gallagher tells it differently....

"Lee and his daughter Agnes toured Southern States in the spring of 1870. Instead of finding relaxation, Lee endured a procession of dinners, receptions, and public appearances that taxed his waning strength. At about the midpoint of his Southern travels, he described his physical condition to his wife: "The warm weather has dispelled some of the rheumatic pains in my back, but I perceive no change in the stricture of my chest. If I attempt to walk beyond a very slow gait, the pain is always there."
In 1870, Lee passed a final summer and watched autumn bring it's colors to Lexington. On the rainy evening of September 28, he slowly walked home from a vestry meeting at his church. Once inside the house, he removed his wet cape and went into the dining room. Mrs Lee greeted him, but he sat down at the table without answering. He had been stricken with an unusual stroke that inflicted no paralysis but left him largely incapacitated. He lingered for two weeks, uttering an average of just one word a day until on October 12, with family nearby, he died peacefully.".....(source from the notes of the essay Marvin P. Rozear, E. Wayne Massey, Jennifer Horner, Erin Foley and Joseph C. Greenfield Jr, "R.E. Lee's Stroke," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography No. 98, April 1990)

So, you can see that, even in death, the journalists got the last word on Robert E. Lee. Even at this stage, Lee was being made to live up to everyone elses expectations.