Hitler's summer pause 1941

I know one of Eisenhower's intelligence staff members made a statement that 40 German divisions were smashed, destroyed and they lost some 400,000 men from Normandy thru the breakout thru France.

 

That's possible,but,40 divisions destroyed do not mean the loss of 400000 men .Besides,all the Allies had was a number of German POW: they didn't know the number of German KIA and WIA .OTOH,the Germans had almost no information on the number od KIA and MIA: all they knew was the number of MIA (which could be POW,dead,remaining MIA,some of the MIA returned to the German side of the front).
After the battle of Normandy (and,there is still dispute among the historians when the battle of Normandy did finish),the Germans tried to obtain a picture of their losses and created the Abwicklungsstab West/Normandy,but, in march 1945,they still had only incomplete figures .

 

Just an addendum - Paulus wasn't a VON.

 

Interesting thread and discussion here. I will share some of my views on these topics.


Pause of army group center was forced on it due to over extension, logistical problems, unexpected continued soviet resistance and operational and strategic trilemas. Hitler as early as 19th July ordered the armor of AGC to redeploy for operations against Leningrad and Kiev. Hitler believed ,as was laid in plan for Barbarossa, in Clausewitz's principle of paramount necessity to destroy enemy's armies even before capturing land,symbols or resources. As AGC created a bulge in the center of the front while other army groups were still far behind and losing momentum in face of soviet resistance, opportunity presented itself to take those soviet forces from the back against limited resistance; - maximum damage to the enemy for minimal attrition. Furthermore,there were economic aspects and a question of widening uncovered flanks, and very dubious situation with logistics should AGC advance on Moscow. When after Smolensk encirclemet in stead of open road to Moscow new row of soviet armies engaged overextended panzer groups on the outer ring of encirclement, Fuhrer's stand to employ precious (and already depleted to about 50%) mobile forces against softer targets was only reinforced. Thus on conference on 4th August in Novi borisov Hitler personally declared to his commanders that it was going to be Leningrad,Kiev ,than Moscow and to execute the plan without delay. Many german generals supported Hitler activly including Rundstet,Kluge,Keitl,Jodl.., and others more quietly like Leeb,Kleist,Hoepner ,Richenau and others.

Panzer comanders of AGC, von Bock heads of OKH and the army, Halder and Brauchitsch were opposed to the motion, especially loud being those at AGC. They wanted to go strait for Moscow in mid August(Guderian said he was ready to start on 15th and Hoth on 20th), arguing that Moscow was nerve center and main transport hub of soviet state and also place of huge political and moral boosting potential.
In reality IMO main value of Moscow was it's force generating potential as literally the only place in USSR where economical,industrial,infrastrucural, manpower and other means were so concentrated to allow 15 new armies to be raised in 6 months of war. If somehow AGC could have taken Moscow in August or early September they would preempt creation of 8! new armies in Moscow wider area in October-December period alone. Those armies were the ones that led ( with reinforcements from far east, which didn't make more than 15 % of forces involved, plus some forces from central asian republics.) soviet winter counter offensive that finally crushed german dreams of quick victory,or probably any victory. Without those forces to shutter AGC in the winter,the whole game could've gone the other way. On the other hand that early attack on Moscow was a huge risk(IMO to high) ,which if backfired would mean the end of the war.
In this light I don't understand the position of Guderian,Bock and others since Germans couldn't even dream about level of organization, devotion and militarization of soviet rear - which enabled such galactic mobilisation results and therefore main advantage of Moscow calculation wasn't even in their sight. Yet they (mostly Guderian and to lesser degree von Bock) were ready to go so far to enforce their views, that they misused their prestige to openly disobey orders and sabotage the war effort laid down by OKW and OKH. First they didn't start preparations in mid July when Hitler first declared his intentions, but prepared for drive for Moscow which they thought Hitler would sanction at conference at Novi Borisov on 4th August.More than two weeks lost here. After the conference they still openly disobeyed direct orders about relocation of objectives and justified this with necessity of conducting local operations to secure flanks,while in reality those were still preparations for hoped attack on Moscow and flanks could've been secured by infantry. Only on 23.! of August does Guderian obey Hitler and agrees to go south, but insists he won't split his panzer group fearing his victories would be less spectacular or that he wouldn't get some units back. Part of his group was supposed to stay in central area for refitting so to be ready for later drive on Moscow. Because of his vanity Guderian weared down entire PG 2 in his southern march.He also did this by taking the matter (of not splitting the group) directly to Hitler over Bock and Halder, which Halder never forgave. IMO if primadonas in AGC could have overcome their arrogance, suck it up and act as ordered by committing both panzer groups with full force early in August (in stead of one panzer corp of PG 3 first,then later second, and 2nd PG as late as 23.of August) there would have been good chance to take Leningrad and Kiev much earlier and create prerequisites for successful attack on Moscow later or even next year. Besides vanity I don't see real reason for their conduct, and yet in their memoirs they presented it almost as a fact that Hitler was mistaken and that because of his wimps victory eluded them. In reality Hitler( and OKW,Rundstet,Kluge etc) were playing safe and professionally while some others were ready to risk everything for their personal ambitions.

About southern theater. Stalin was determined to hold Kiev at all cost for several reasons.Predominantly those were political reasons,which always held high place in his decision making process. Loss of Kiev and especially without a fight was unacceptable loss of Stalin's personal prestige in dangerous time when one disaster came after another, many of those due to Stalin's mistakes like stucking his had in sand in face of german invasion preparations or army purges that rendered Red army helpless. This was main reason. Stalin probably wishfully hoped that Timoshenko's offensive in the center would tie entire AGC there and prevent it from turning south, or maybe that sacrifice of SW front is worth the delay they would cause for Germans. These reasons were faulty. Maybe it is justified to sacrifice over 100 000 men in fortress city like Sevastopol,which could be supplied from sea,and tie large enemy forces for almost 10 months, or to sacrifice 250 000 man at Stalingrad(again with power to even partly supply them),because they tied 5 soviet armies for two and a half months during critical period for the survival of two german army groups (A and B ) and maybe entire German army, also it was worth risking 101 airborne in Bastogne as they became major obstacle for german supply effort. Yet throwing away one million man without any chance of resupply once surrounded was complete folly and all for several days it took Germans to slaughter or capture them. Here I'm going to mention Zhukov ,even though LJAd warned against it , who understood this all to well and suggested withdrawal as early as 29th of July for which he was sacked from the post of chief of staff. Zhukov didn't panic as it was also suggested,(from when suggestion means panic?) he was just warning in timely fashion to start preparations for orderly withdrawal to more defensible lines.He concluded that in situation where bulge of AGC is looming over SW front and resistance in Smolensk pocket was faltering thus freeing the infantry to relive panzer groups on outer ring lines, risk was great that these panzers now free and ideally positioned will turn the flank of SW front.Also on 29th encirclement of Uman was slowly coming to it's conclusion which ment loss of mobile and armored forces of entire southern direction as well as liberty for PG 1, which can mean only crossing of thinly held Dnepr line by the panzer group in near future. In such situation it wasn't early at all to begin planing about alternate defense positions, for when PG 1 found a way to cross the Dnepr and forces of AGC appear on the right flank, the game would be already over.. If those forces(SW front) could've been even partially saved,that would mean vast reserves that were used to seal consequential hole in the front, about 400 km wide could have been sent elsewhere for huge difference. .And what Stalin did? He sacked Budeny who panicly requested to withdraw on 11th September, only to reconsider on 17th. By that time all soldiers could do was to die fighting as Kirponos did or die in german POW camps as those 650 000 did. This also shows that Stalin wanted to save the forces in the end, but was blinded with political reasons and wishful thinking. Even Germans were in the end astonished that entire front stayed exactly were they needed them to be destroyed.

On the other hand much more was done to defend aproaches to Moscow as it's importance was well understood. Alan Clarke says that there are evidence that planing and force generation for winter counter offensive began as early as late July but they needed peace and time in Moscow region to create those forces. That is the reason why AGC was hastly and uncoordinatedly attacked in mid July around Smolensk,because it was feared that they would drive straight for Moscow and this couldn't be allowed. Therefore after AGC defeated forces of second strategic defensive echelon(in central sector forces defending lower reaches of Dvina , Dnepr and Smolensk) , three more rows of armies of third echelon were eventually thrown in their way in front of Moscow.
Germans started Typhoon with well defined and elaborated objectives for destroying Vyazma and Briansk grupations,but afther that was done,further objectives were vague because it was unknown what laid behind, because of logistical limitations and hope that Soviets had nothing else. After great success at Vyazma and Bryansk the best thing IMO would've been to stop, defeat with relative ease oncoming soviet winter offensive and take Moscow in spring.In these defensive and offensive operations again IMHO 1.5 million man would have been removed from Red army order of battle and victory would be within reach. Yet they didn't stop. In a month or so as Soviets generated and brought forward new forces Moscow became a trap for overextended Germans. They were lured in this trap by Zhukov ,and I don't claim this was done purposely, but this was a result of his masterful defense with commitment of minimal forces while harbouring reserves for counter offensive. This minimal forces gave Germans false hope that Soviets are scraping the barrel and that it's worth it to advance in spite of bad weather, tenuous supply lines and exposed forward positions. The gamble backfired and probably cost them the war. There was IMO a window of opportunity in October for Germans to quickly take/encircle Moscow before it could harbour it's reserves. That chance was lost due to mud and protracted resistance of the encircled forces.

 

Personally I see the big problem was that Hitler wanted and believed that the Red Army would be destroyed in the 8 weeks or so, even Halder wrote in July in his notebook that victory seems imminent. As we have seen the German prediction of the Soviet divisions at most was a very faulty one. And as you faced more and more units, Hitler refused to mobilise factories to produce tanks etc. I even read that the German staff in July evaluated the number of Germans needed to guard the portion of Russia they would take was 750,000 men, which was again calculated in September to +50% which is close to 1,1 million. The rest would be sent home. At the same time the machine was planning new offensives and downgrading the military force in Russia. Simply C****.

Hitler was also famous for his meetings, but the things that changes things is that Hitler was the only one who was informed about the situation everywhere. The commanders only knew their section. So Hitler could lie as much as he would, like that the General asking for new troops was getting more than the others etc. The decisions of the Generals was based on the info Hitler/OKW gave, and they did not know the real situation and thus their decisions were based on a narrow field of info they received.

During the whole eastern campaign Hitler kept on saying the Russian is dead. More divisions popped up everywhere. The offensives of Germans turned to defensive ones.And Hitler blamed the Generals were lazy and did not do their job properly.

Moscow was important to the Russians. I think the fact that Stalin held his reserves to guard Moscow in summer 1942 proves that, and also the many offensives to destroy the Rzhev salient.

 

I couldn't agree more with this. The main problem was that Hitler first decided that he MUST get living space in the east and exact realization of this idea was of secondary significance. Therefore he indulged in wishful thinking,over optimistic planning and predictions or simply dismissed facts and reports that were in the way of fulfillment of his obsession. It seems also that his arrogance, 'Zieg Euphoria' , and loath for Slavs clouded his judgement even in those aspects that could've easily be done better. For example there are things you mentioned, another small but revealing example is outright ignoring of non existing german anti tank gun capable of taking on soviet modern tanks appearing in ever greater numbers, only in December if I remember correctly, request was given for development of modern AT gun. Another comic/bizar example is that production of weapons for the army dropped from July to December for some 30%! instead of rising at maximum pace, which as we saw later could have been significant.I mean maybe I would understand this behavior(decrease of production) in July due to faulty intelligence, in August not any more, but December?!? When Hitler, Halder and others allowed for their rotten racist paradigm to spill over to what should've been rational and professional decision making process, it was rather poetically their undoing.

Yes, my point exactly. Panzer commanders were soldiers and should've listened to their superiors even if they were wrong. By sabotaging communal effort for sake of their selfish goals and vanity, none of the aims was fulfilled completely or in timely fashion,as otherwise might have happened.

 

The drop in army production was to allow a greater production of the Luftwaffe

 

Yes, production was increased for the Luftwafe and of the submarines. This shows how much did high command underestimate the soviet state and was already planing ahead as if Soviets were beaten.

 

Interesting point: In 1940 Germany spent an estimated $6,000m on weapons , Britain $3,500m.Yet britain produced over 50% more aeroplanes, 100% more vehicles and almost as many tanks as Germany in 1940.

p 251

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ksK_tW1qYRQC&pg=PA230&lpg=PA230&dq=hitler+and+orders+and+1941+and+production+figures&source=bl&ots=4GMgzrj549&sig=u6dSr1kDvP4QPsjcQYD0rALInuI&hl=fi&sa=X&ei=11zoVIukOuf-ywOmyIKIAQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=hitler%20and%20orders%20and%201941%20and%20production%20figures&f=false

 

The problem for Stalin was that while he could evacuate factories and the government he couldn't evacuate the road and rail network or the land line telephone network.
Moscow in 1941 was infinitely more important than in Napoleon's time because it was by far the single biggest logistics and communications hub of the entire country. To deploy and support forces you have to have the means to move the men, weapons and supplies. That means trains and trucks and therefore requires railroads and roads. Moscow was the rail centre not just for moving on an east west axis but lateral as well. It radiated the rail lines in all directions like a web supplying every part of the central front and laterally most of the northern front's needs as well. It even radiated out lines that supplied much of the northern part of the southern front.
Then there's telephones. Moscow land lines radiated out to provide communications up and down the front enabling the Red Army to stay off the radio waves. This was important because German radio monitoring of the Red Army in 1941 was very good.

So if the Soviets lost Moscow they would have lost the means to bring up and deploy new troops and then supply and sustain them and enable secure communications for forces on the central front, much of the northern front and part of the southern front. To put it in perspective their supply capability would have then fallen on Gorkhi 300 miles further east and with less than 10% of Moscow's rail and telephone infrastructure, especially for lateral needs.

So Moscow was the absolute heart of the Soviet Union's ability to move and support the forces needed to fight the invasion. I don't believe Moscow falling would have ended the war, but I do believe it would have crippled the Soviets ability to launch winter counter offensives in 1941 and therefore they would have had no means to retake Moscow with fresh armies. They would have had to build Gorkhi into a communications nexus ten times as big as it actually was and would have needed to spend the whole winter doing that. Basically it would have been a massive setback for the Soviet Union.

 

When regarding the soviet railroad net in 1941, Moscow looked like a spider in the middle of the net. Without it, no more fast lend&lease supplies via Murmansk. A fall of Moscow in autumn 1941 may have ended in the decision not to support Stalin by Roosevelt and Churchill because it was a lost war. Which was already a widespread opinion at the time.

Remember how France was abandoned when only relativly small parts of the country were occupied.

 

Moscow- like in Stalingrad in 1941?

 

If the Germans resumed the advance on Moscow in late August 1941 instead of supporting and reinforcing the flanking Army Groups at that time like they historically did then they would have been in Moscow by late September. They would have captured Moscow by about the time that Operation Typhoon historically began.

The resources that went to enabling 3rd Panzergruppe to drive toward Leningrad and 2nd Panzergruppe to drive south to link with AGS in the Ukraine could have been used against the Soviet central front instead. And it still would have been high summer with hard ground and perfect weather for air support. The mobile troops of AGC would also have been less worn in late August than they actually were in late September 1941 after they had been helping the flanking Army Groups before Typhoon historically was launched.

We know that in mid October when the Germans had destroyed the Soviet western front Moscow was in panic. Huge numbers of people fled the city. People in responsible positions both military and civilian were trying to get away. When mud halted the Germans order began to be reestablished but as long as the Germans had been racing towards Moscow through Orel, Vyazma and Briansk the disntegration of morale and order had just got worse with every day.

A mass German arrival in Moscow would have most likely encountered pockets where people fought hard, areas of terror and total disorder and areas of even being welcomed by people just wanting to survive. They would have encircled the city, something they couldn't do at Stalingrad, and concentrated on destroying the factory militias and others who put up a fight. Most Soviet forces would have been destroyed in encirclements on the road to Moscow. Remember on October 16th 1941 Zukhov informed Stalin that he had 65,000 troops left on the central front. I doubt if the situation would have been any different in mid September 1941 if AGC had been attacking toward Moscow for 2 or 3 weeks by then.

And Stalin of course would most certainly have had to leave the city for Gorkhy or Perm and that would have become known in the city as the Germans poured in. So I don't think it would have been a Stalingrad situation, more a giant mass of confusion with some areas seeing fighting and others not. Basically like sparks being stamped out across the city as more and more Germans arrived and with the Soviets unable to sustain the fight as they would be cut off.

The Soviets would have lost the political centre, logistical heart and communications hub of their country. And their leader would have had to flee.
I have no doubt the war would have gone on, but the Germans would have achieved all that they actually could with Barbarossa. And I actually think they would still have lost in the end. Hitler's leadership and Soviet recuperative powers jointly would ultimately have seen to that.
Basically 1942 just would have been even worse for the Soviets than it actually was because the rebuilding of their logistical capabilities would have taken quite awhile.

 

Except, then the German flanks would've been about as strong as wet paper, and with their logistics in front of Moscow in worse shape than they were historically.

It would've been a gamble, as to whether the Soviet leadership was going to crumble, and risk losing AGC.

 

I get that AGC would have had long flanks but remember the flanking Army Groups while not wiping out their opposition like AGC did through to Smolensk were still well and truly engaging them. The huge Soviet army in the Ukraine was still there but the 6th Army was just 18 miles from Kiev in late August and 1st Panzergruppe was crossing the Dniepr south of Kiev. This was just before Guderian began his drive. Without Guderian driving south the Soviet South Western Front would not have been bagged and wiped out but it would still have had to withdraw back across the Dniepr as 1st Panzergruppe drove further up behind it. There would have been a massive mauling of it during that operation as AGS was heavily attacking it and placing it under great pressure. Withdrawing back across a river while under intense pressure and with armored forces increasingly blocking main roads in your rear is a pretty bad position to be in and that's what the South West Front would have been enduring over September if Guderian had not come south. The Soviet commanders in the south had already asked Stalin for permission to abandon Kiev and withdraw across the river before Guderian moved. Stalin had refused because he hadn't yet learned to listen to his commanders like he came to do later.

Also Guderian had lashed out southward in early August killing 10,000 Soviet troops and taking 38,000 prisoners on his immediate southern flank even while the AGC resupply was still going on. No doubt he would have hit southward again before wheeling north eastwards when the offensive on Moscow resumed. The Germans also would have been used AGC to attack the rear of the Soviet northern and southern flanks after the fall of Moscow and probably would have had a couple of weeks to do it before the mud shut everything down. Attacking south toward Kharkov would have hastened the Soviet South West Front's retreat across the northern Ukraine quite a bit. Also remember the fall of Moscow would have put the Soviets back to Gorkhi, Kharkov and Saratov as their main supply bases. This means that their ability to launch and above all sustain really large offensives in that first winter would have been reduced a lot compared to what they were actually able to manage.

Basically I think the disasters for the Germans would have come later at the end of 1942 when the Soviet logistics capabilities had been fully restored and with the Germans no doubt overstretched again due to some ridiculous goal having been set by Hitler. The Red Army might well have retaken Moscow that second winter.

 

This is based on the wrong assumption that the capture of Moscow would be decisive for the outcome of the war in the east ,which is not so .

The German plan was to defeat the Red Army (which,they hoped, would result in the collaps of the Soviet regime) and than advance as quickly as possible, to the AA line . If the plan succeeded, the capture of Moscow would follow automatically,it din't and Moscow was not captured .

Other point : the mud did not stop the Germans,they still advanced and finally were stopped by the Soviets .

 

I agree that the German plan was to liquidate the Red Army in vast frontier battles and thereafter wipe out it's reserves piecemeal as they arrived during a general advance to the AA line. Apparently Hitler thought getting there would take 16 weeks.

However during their resupply phase after Smolensk it became obvious that the Red Army was effectively replacing it's losses and still maintaining large armies versus AGN and AGS. So they then had a choice between taking Moscow for it's logistical importance or the resources of the Ukraine for their obvious long term benefit to the German war effort. Hitler dismissed Moscow as a geographical expression and went for the resources that he considered essential for Germany's war effort.

As for the mud no you're right it didn't stop the Germans. I should have said that by making it impossible for their wheeled transport to bring up supplies rapidly anymore it greatly aided the Red Army in halting the Germans.

 

The most important point is not mentionned : distance .

After the battles of Briansk and Viazma,the German vanguard was still 140 km away from Moscow (Guderian was even farther away) and it would take the Germans at least a week to advance to Moscow under the ideal conditions of good weather and weak Soviet resistance,meanwhile the 65000 Soviet soldiers that following Zhukow were remaining (a very questionable statement,for obvious reasons) would very quickly increase to several hundreds of thousand (what happened in the OTL).Distance would (and did) defeat what remained of German mobility

.

 

Distance did defeat German mobility in the mud. The film of German columns in the mud shows their trucks, cars and motorbikes stuck completely fast and vehicles even being dragged out of the mud by tanks that were nearly stuck themselves. Without that flypaper effect the Germans would have been moving over that final 90 miles and yes it probably would have taken a week even while engulfing Soviet forces as they arrived in front of them.

After the battle of Kiev the armored spearhead of the 6th army in the Ukraine engulfed new Soviet forces as fast as they were dumped in front of it all the way to Kharkov. 6th Army claimed 400,000 prisoners this way from Kiev to Kharkov. Even if that was an exaggeration they no doubt were still just sweeping around and sweeping up masses of them while rolling forward. In the end that stopped when they too hit the mud and only advanced into Kharkov along a railway embankment. But as long as they had been able to roll their mobility, their vehicles, had held out and worked and they had rounded up new Soviet armies like clockwork. AGC could well have done the same over those last 90 miles and without the mud to cripple it at the end.

 

Hello Bob,

It seems that most of the points have all but been mentioned so I will try to summarize. Germany's primary objective in the East was to destroy as many Soviet Divisions in the open field of battle as possible. 1 million Red Army troops in Kiev was just a fruit that could not be passed up. As the Germans advanced ever further into Russia, the resistance only stiffened. Prior to Hitlers decision to order Guderian to the South, German army group south ran into its first massed Soviet artillery barrage. It was devastating. While ultimately a failure, it did scare the advancing Germans and inflicted very large casualties and delayed the advance. This encounter played a role in convincing Hitler to reinforce the Southern flank in order to take Kiev. Had the encirclement not occurred many Red army troops would have escaped. Had no advance on Kiev been made, than Von Bock would have an additional 1 million men to worry about plaguing his flank.

Moscow was also the most fortified city on the planet and far larger than Stalingrad. How many casualties might the Germans have suffered taking it? What would be the next move? Reinforcements would be needed. Where from? Glantz asks if the Germans had a difficult time protecting their fairly short supply lines, how would they fair protecting longer ones with an additional 1 million men on their flanks?
Scortched earth policy would have left nothing for Von Bock and his men in the city and they would have entered a shell just as Napoleon had... How would they fair? What would prevent them from being surrounded? With Kiev not have being taken, Ukraine is not secured. The Romanian oil fields are now within range of the Soviet Air Force. Bye bye oil. Where would the Germans get their food?

Moscow was actually expected to fall and much of it was booby trapped, such as the Moscow Hotel, the Balshoi theatre and many Governemnt building within the Kremlin (all which the German high command would have almost certainly visited). Partisan groups were already established and given orders in such a scenario.

Still not sure how Moscow effects Leningrad. Morale, almost certainly but nothing of material importance. I imagine that the Germans within Moscow would be concentrating of defense and would hardly have any additional manpower for Von Leeb?

Just imagine Army Groupe Centre now inside Moscow preparing for confrontation with the soldier from Kiev, when the Siberian reinforcements come in from the East.... Perhaps a Stalingrad on a far larger scale?