Looking for a good book for research purposes.

Dear Dudes, I am looking for a book or other publication that studied the performance levels (the good, bad AND ugly of course) of US combat divisions in WW2, from both the ETO and the PTO. Little trivial things like that always interests me. Why I don't know. Thanks, looking forward to your suggestions.

 

Same here, I'm always wanting more data. I, a few months ago got on a Korea kick. Particularly the 31st/32d Infantry in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign, now 18 books, 5 military studies/papers on PDF, 1 online military publication, three online interviews with major figures and one detour into the "Revolt of the Admirals", and an expansion of the topic into the years leading up to the war, Pusan and Inchon. I'm now waiting on a translated copy of "Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53 by Shu Guang Zhangto to finish up. What little residual respect I had left for MacArthur is gone. He should have been cashiered and Courts Martialed. A lot more respect for what the Chinese managed to accomplish, and a more thorough understanding of why and how they intervened.

 

I would recommend this one: http://www.amazon.com/Hell-H%C3%BCrtgen-Forest-American-Infantry/dp/0700611282/ref=sr_1_11?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1430862441&sr=1-11&keywords=huertgen+forest

22nd Infantry in the Hürtgenwald battle

 

You are not asking for much are you? On what basis are you going to compare the performance of different formations in the same army operating in different theatres against a changing enemy? What is the basis for comparison? Is it the subjective assessment of their different higher commanders?

Who in the immediate aftermath of a war would wanting to start a massive fight amongst its soldiers by announcing some dumb ranking. Who in their right minds would make an assessment of the Big Red one against the 101st Airborne or the 3rd Infantry Division versus the 1st Armoured Division.

Sure, it is an interesting discussion over a beer, but note the absence of any academic work in this area

 

Some of Dupuy's works may be of interest although you have to be careful with them. Some have gotten pretty expensive as well such as:
http://www.amazon.com/Opposed-Advance-Forces-Europe-ORALFORE/dp/B00B06S4VA/ref=sr_1_44?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1430915565&sr=1-44
and
http://www.amazon.com/Soldier-Capability-Effectiveness-Historical-Analysis/dp/B00BVD8AGG/ref=sr_1_46?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1430915565&sr=1-46
copies of this one can be fairly cheap or not:
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_1?ie=UTF8&field-author=Trevor+N.+Dupuy&search-alias=books&text=Trevor+N.+Dupuy&sort=relevancerank#/ref=nb_sb_ss_i_1_16?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=numbers+predictions+and+war&sprefix=numbers+predicti%2Cstripbooks%2C166&rh=n%3A283155%2Ck%3Anumbers+predictions+and+war

 

After the war, I believe it was Ike who asked for a study on US divisions and their performance during the war. I just want access to that study and others like that. The particular study that Ike asked for had the 30th ID as the number one performing US infantry division. I don't believe the study covered airborne and armored divisions, or the lone mountain infantry division that served in Italy. Also, I have read in the past that the 90th Infantry Division was the poorest performing US division deployed in Northern France, and that later it started performing better with a change of leadership. Also I've read that the 35th Infantry Division was one of the toughest units operating in Italy. That's what I am looking for, information like that. It has to exist somewhere, where would authors get these tidbits of information to put into these excerpts regarding the divisions in question.

 

My emphasis!

Prove Ike asked for a documented study and I'll look for it. I find it hard to believe that Ike, and astute politician and experienced soldier would have commissioned sucha can of worms,unless he really hated his successor. If the document exists it might be in the CARL digital library.

Of course people debate which soldiers were "better" or had a tougher time. Its a popular topic when soldiers get together, sometimes with rumbustious results. . . The German Panzer Inspectorate West had a ranking of the standing of the panzer troops in the west as of 1 June, based on the German assessment of combat readiness. . But this was a view at a single instant in time. Paddy Griffiths in his book on the British army's tactics on the Western Front made an estimate of the British formations which were considered good at the time. But these are partial individual opinions, not an official ranking..

War is not a sports competition. There is no objective scoreboard or common basis for evaluating team or individual performance. There are some statistics available. They can tell you that the 3rd infantry division suffered 25,977 battle casualties over 531 days of combat in the Mediterranean theatre, while the 32rd suffered 7,268 over 654 days in the pacific. These were important facts for veterans, their families and help to understand the significance of their achievements and sacrifices. There was no need or positive benefit to make an arbitrary decision that one was better than the other. What would be the point of making a judgement on the relative value of the contribution and sacrifices of one mother's son over another.
.
What the US Government did publish was The Army Almanac: A Book of Facts Concerning the Army of the United States; Order of Battle, U.S. Army, World War . It is here http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/cbtchron/cbtchron.html
They also published a report into casualties http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html

 

You're interpreting what I am asking about all wrong. The study was not to see what division was the best, and rank them like teams in the AP Poll during football season. It was to list the combat effectiveness of ALL US divisions. That's all. A combat narrative that listed the good, bad and the ugly performance during the war. That same study or one similar put the 30th Infantry Division as the best performing US infantry division in the ETO. Even the Germans rated the Old Hickory Division (the same 30th ID) as a tough opponent, and gave them the name of "Roosevelt's SS". If I could prove that Ike (or who/whomever) ordered such a study I wouldn't have to come here and ask if anyone knew of or could point me in the right direction so I can find it, you think? This just a request for such a publication of information, that's all.

 

And the division that I listed as the 35th that served in the Italian Campaign was really the 34th Infantry Division. My mistake there. Sorry about the confusion. The 35th ID served in France, the Kelly's Heroes division.

 

1. Ranking of 30th ID is made by S. L. A. Marshal in his private correspondence with Leland Hobbs, CO of 30th ID in which he named [edit: 10] top U.S. infantry divisions in ETO (the other divisions nominated for the honor were 1st, 5th and 9th ID, plus a number of divisions written in illegible script). Given to whom it is addressed to, you might want to take it with a grain of salt, though the 30th did perform well. A typed duplicate of that letter is reproduced somewhere on this forum.

2. Russel Weigley discussed the 90th ID's initially disappointing performance in Normandy in his book, Eisenhower's Lieutenants. You might want to check his footnotes, if available. IIRC, the worst day in the history of the division was when a small KG of the 17th SS PGD, with a battery of StuGs, routed a battalion of the 90th. After several sackings, [edit: McLain] took the reins of the Tough Umbres and the unit performed up to expectations thereafter. I recall no screw ups of any kind recorded in the green books after Normandy, and take it that the good reputation the 90th ID achieved had a solid foundation. Amusing anecdote: McLain supposedly shared the same last name of, and bore a physical resemblance to, an inept officer whom George Marshal took a disliking to, and his career suffered until Marshal realized there were two McLains.

3. 35th ID? I am sure you meant the 45th ID. Supposedly Guderian considered one of the 45th ID's regiments the most tenacious American infantry unit of its size, though I have not been able to source that claim; perhaps foreign military intelligence archive or where ever NARA file the interrogation reports is where you should look.

 

Thanks TC, I guess what I was looking for doesn't exist as one complete study of the US divisions as a whole. I've been reading a little about this division, a little about that one over the years and thought that there was one definitive study bound together in one nice book, like the recently disgraced Stanton and his WW2 OOB. I like reading about what the Germans thought about the American units that they faced too.

Maybe Slipdigit needs to write another book....

 

No one is saying it is....

(Bolded my emphasis) Yes, there is, and the military does make those types of studies. Normally, it is in order to help identify those factors that make particular divisions more effective, so that they can incorporate the lessons learned from such studies to improve the combat effectiveness force wide. It can also identify the factors that led to poor performance so that they can be rectified/avoided. It has nothing to do with if one man's sacrifice was of any less valuable than anothers. It is all about ensuring that "the next time" lives are not wasted needlessly.

 

While not exactly what you're looking for this book looks like it may contain some of the information you're seeking. For the price it would be an interesting read even if it doesn't give you exactly what you seek.

http://www.amazon.com/The-GI-Offensive-Europe-Divisions/dp/0700612262

Heres a review, emphasis mine:

Peter Mansoor's "The GI Offensive in Europe" is a fascinating reexamination of the performance of American infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during 1941-1945. Contrary to a commonly-held theme that the US won in Europe through sheer weight of material advantage, Mansoor's thesis is that American infantry was in fact better than its vaunted German counterpart.

Early in the book, Mansoor addresses the mobilization and training of a mass army that simply did not exist prior to 1939. The urgent need to deploy forces beginning in 1942 meant that some infantry divisions entered combat indifferently trained and paid the price. Readiness was further undercut by the gutting of later deploying divisions for trained personnel to provide infantry replacements to divisions already in combat.

Mansoor is of two minds about the individual replacement system in use in the ETO. On the one hand, the system succeeded over time in keeping US infantry divisions at close to required strength. On the other hand, integrating individual replacements into units in contact usually led to high casualty rate among the newcomers.

A concurrent theme of the book is the impact of the strategic decision to limit the size of the US Army to just 90 divisions. The demands of the Pacific War meant the ETO lacked a rotation base for its infantry divisions, which tended to remain in contact for extended periods of time. The cap on the number of divisions contributed to a chronic shortage of infantrymen, addressed by the above mentioned individual replacement system.

It will be left to the reader to decide whether Mansoor carries his point that US infantry divisions were better than their German counterparts. Mansoor spends the bulk of the book discussing the actual performance of US infantry divisions in the ETO. He has harsh things to say about operational level leadership, but there seems no doubt that many infantry divisions had good tactical leadership and performed well. Final victory is indeed a good metric. However, Mansoor rather glides over the implications of the fact that German units were losing effectiveness due to prolonged combat and a lack of replacements at something like the same rate as American units were gaining experience and lethality while maintaining their overall strength. American losses during 1944-1945 were horrific; German losses were catastrophic. By 1945, the German Army was a shambles.

"The GI Offensive in Europe" is highly recommended as a thought-provoking read for the military professional and for the student of the Second World War. This edition contains a useful selection of photographs, maps, and charts.

 

While looking for what you wanted I came across this interesting Command and General Staff College paper on the 30th Division at Mortain. Thought you might like to save it for reference.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a147218.pdf

I always look through the bibliographies for the source materials, they are often a gold mine when searching for obscure information that is lost over the years. When doing the Korean War research I mentioned earlier, I saw mention several times of a Top Secret report on the operations of 8th Army and X Corps during the CCF 1st and 2nd Phase Offensives. Apparently, the paper had fairly wide distribution within the upper echelons of the US Army immediately after publication. General Smith, the CG of the 1st Marine Division was never given access to the report, but one of his "friends" managed to get him a copy of it back-channel. Now, 65 years later the report is little known and almost impossible to find. In an Army C&GSC paper I was reading it was obliquely mentioned in the text, but footnoted. Once, I knew the book the information had been published in, it was just a matter of tracking it down. Found a used, like new copy on Amazon for around 15 bucks and bought it. Couldn't wait for it to arrive. When I got it I was well pleased, the report in it's entirety was reproduced in the book as an annex. Some very informative reading.

 

Great, thanks for the suggestions and personal narratives! Going to have to get these publications into my library as well. Appreciate the help to all.

 

Here's a good paper on the effectiveness of the US 4th Armored Division vs the German Panzerlehr. (I've got a copy saved for myself) I think it will help you in your quest is because it does address the overall subject and has references to sources. The author also goes into what he terms, the "Cult of the Wehrmacht", and argues that the group of historians falling into this category have a less compelling argument for their interpretations of historical facts than authors/historians such as Michael Doubler, Keith Bonn, Peter Mansoor (whose book I linked to earlier), and Russel Hart. Interesting stuff. He also goes into how "combat effectiveness" was determined and why these types of analysis are valuable.

From the referenced document, bottom of page 11 to top of page 12:

Shortly after the war ended, General of the Army George C. Marshall instructed Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower to prepare recommendations for those divisions deserving of recognition for outstanding service in the ETO. Eisenhower instructed Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, the ETO Chief Historian, to evaluate the combat records of the divisions that fought in the ETO to determine those units whose "performance has been consistently strong and meritorious and in particular operations has been outstanding." 29Eventually, Eisenhower recommended only three of the sixteen armored divisions in the ETO to the War Department for commendation: 2nd, 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions.30

...pay particular attention to footnotes 29 and 30 as they give the cited source and additional information that pertains to your search. Both cite the book I recommended earlier as the source and I just came across this paper this morning! Also 30 states-Additionally, only seven of the forty-three infantry divisions and the 101st Airborne Division were recommended.

Any errors in the above quoted excerpts are mine, couldn't get the text select tool to work with this paper so I just re-typed it. Anyway, this is proof that the report you want does exist, and you can determine the top three armored, and top seven infantry (plus the 101st) by who were issued Distinguished Unit Citations around this time. Again, the book I originally recommended, though I've never read it, cites this report and may have additional information on how to get the report in it's entirety.

http://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/GraduateDegree/MADMSTheses/files/2003BobWillis.pdf

Triple C's comment

So apparently there was more than just a letter between Marshall and Hobbs, there was a report ordered so depending upon what Bobby finds we may can give more weight to the letter, and possibly find the actual report!

Sheldrake wrote:

See above quote from linked paper. While not definative proof, it is a strong indicator that such a report was ordered and used to award DUC's to a number of units. We would all appreciate your assistance in the search.

 

Good find, and interesting paper. I am finding the paper a delight in the amount of secondary research it perused and cited, though I am not convinced of the overall revisionist interpretation that it supports due to issues in methodology and argumentation. I might write what I think about the manuscript later, if I have the time, as work is becoming hectic lately.

Also, a minor error in p58; I am very certain that M18 tank destroyers supported the 4th AD since [edit:] the breakout and certainly by Arracourt battles. C. McDonald's monograph that the author cites is in error. [Nick-picking mode off]

 

I will comment on the paper when I am done reading it and if I have the time to respond. Right now, I just want to point out the issues in the combat power debate as a whole that strikes me as problematic. Emphasizing the role of logistics as a rhetorical tool to diminish the achievements of allied armies as a whole (or to de-emphasizing it in order to glorify said armies) makes little sense; the mastery of logistics has been long since recognized as key to wage modern war effectively. Trying to divorce that from war fighting serves no useful end. Like wise, it is bizarre that the achievement of material superiority or the failure thereof is used as way to explain away successful performance or defeats. Building up material superiority in arms and equipment, and wielding material strength to maximum efficiency is an essential aspect of modern military planning. Having quality troops and high tactical skills are only a part of of warfighting.