Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

I'd like to see a source for that. In any case the broad front strategy was better designed for stressing the entire German military. It also made any German counter attack very risky as history shows.

 

No. The main objective was not Moscow. The main objective was destroying the Soviet state. Initially the German plan was to do so by inflicting prohibitive losses on the Red Army. The loss of key cities and territory would also aid in achieving this aim. When the losses inflicted up through August had yet to result in the failure of the Soviet state some looked at reprioritizing the means of achieving that goal. Whether or not taking Moscow would have achieved it is an open question but trying and failing or even taking it and not holding it was a sure road to defeat.

 

Spot on LJAD and this leads us to the roots of the failure off Barbarossa: false assumptions, not the planning itself and subsequent adjustments.

Ignorance, false pride, prejudices and exaggerated confidence are at the roots of all plans considered by both OKH and OKW. This is something that existed even before the decision has been made to attack the USSR. The Nazi ideology clouded judgement of otherwise capable soldiers.

 

Execution of such a plan would have ended the war already in winter 1941. You simply fail to realize that such a rapid advance creates extremely long and vulnerable flanks and inevitable almost endless virtually unprotected supply line for German carts, horses and mules. The end result would have been two gigantic Kessels (cauldrons) isolated at the Baltic and the Black sea coasts waiting for an airlift supply by the Reichsmarshal, Göring. This is a science fiction suicidal plan.

 

Just like that - a personal relationship with Mannerheim? Not very many Finns had a "personal" relationship with him, since he used to keep the distance. Being an ex-general of the Imperial Russia in WW1 he was also not too keen on the Germans.

And although Mannerheim at that time was the most influential individual in Finland, he still was only that - an individual. Finland was not a dictatorship but a democracy. During the wartime the limits of the democracy were sometimes stretched, but there was always a limit on how far the leaders could go. Convincing the Finnish parliament of the benefits of an "unprovoked" attack would probably have been too much to swallow - even after the Winter War.

All those reasons you give for an united pre-emptive attack are very valid, except:
- politically it was essential for Finland NOT to be associated with the Nazi-Germany and her objectives
- joining a German plan under the German leadership would have made Finland a German ally - both de facto and de jure
- by doing that Finland would have made herself also an was of the West - which Finland wanted to avoid at all costs

True, but see my reasoning above.

Also in 1941 before the Barbarossa nobody could see that Germany was NOT going to win the SU.

Actually in politics matters are often taken how they seem to be, are explained for and/or are preferred to be understood.

Reasons Finland gave for what you wrote were good and true enough. Only the British Empire - after much soviet pressure and 6 months - and Czechoslovakia ever declared war on Finland. After the war Finland was not considered to be nor treated as an Axis country.

That all sounds excellent, except for what I just wrote before.

 

I'm afraid you missed the point. Germany was prepared to deal with 250 Soviet Divisions NOT 600. There is absolutely no way the German Intelligence could have known that the Soviet Union was able to raise 600. It is for this reason after the first six months of the war the Ferman Army began to shrink while the Red Army began to grown. The Germans never solved this issue.

Had Hitler not sent Guderian to secure the Kiev encirclement there is a chance that many Soviet Divisions would escape and plague von Bockes flank.

Again, Moscow was categorically NOT the main objective. The destruction off Soviet forces in the field was which would allow the Germans to simply march into the Soviet capital with little or no resistance once the armies have been defeated.

Had there been no boot camp for the civilian population than the Soviet Union wouldn't be able to replenish the depleted ranks of her army with such lighting speed. How can this be overlooked?

This is the view of historians such as Nagorski, Jones, Glantz, Beaver etc.

May I ask which historians share your view? Where are you getting this info?

 

The ideal person to command the small, but crucial Kandalatsha offensive is Kesselring, who will have 9 days to perfom the link between Salla and the 2 airborne operations and to halt any counter attacks. On the 10th day of Barbarossa he will take command of the LW 2nd fleet covering the Baltic and the thrusts from Latvia and Leningrad to Moscow. Nobody was better for rapid troop deployment and optimal use of limited resources.

Thanks for your contributions, this is my last post, bye.

 

More opinions with little or nothing to back them. Still ignoring valid and important questions. Much hand waving no sources or real logic. Hopefully you will return when you've learned how to construct a decent case/argument.

 

It is true, that the Finnish neutrality was often compromised - as was the case with the other neutral countries too. However allowing the German troop transit did not compromise it, since the German ally USSR already had bullied the same right for her troops before - through the Finnish capitol Helsinki! That's compromising, if anything was!

Naturally neutral Finland was not going to start a new war to get her lost land (homes of displaced 12 % of the Finnish population) back. Of course, while war was going on in Europe and the SU preparing herself to finish her plan with Finland, Finland had to be prepared for everything - a new war with the soviets included.

Actually the West had lifted some fingers in order to help Finland in the Winter War. Unfortunately those fingers just were not enough.

Except that the Finnish government most likely is not going to allow that.

Perhaps, except that...
- there was not going to be the 6 Finnish divisions of your plan. Lapland was not the preferred Finnish theatre and those divisions were needed elsewhere
- in Platinfuchs (Geb.K. "Norwegen" in Petsamo, towards Murmansk) tanks and such were useless. That's why they didn't have any. More troops would have been nice, but they would have needed more supplies - using more mules.
- in Polarfuchs (XXXVI Corps and the Finnish 6. ID in Salla, towards Kantalahti) supplying troops was also difficult and done by a single, bad and narrow road. Having more troops and tanks might have been counter-productive. Half-tracks probably would have been useful, but the terrain did not favour tanks. The Finns did not have any there but performed better than the Germans

 

Let's not forget operation Silver Fox...

 

?

Silberfuchs = (Rentier) + Platinfuchs + Polarfuchs

 

Karjala,
You speak of the route Salla-Kandalaksha as if it were the Grand Canyon, the Caucasus, NW Burma, New Guinea, the USSR during the rasputitsa or the Amazonian jungle. However, there was a RR line between them and the Soviets deployed tanks in the Salla counter attack, which routed the Germans (who captured it again, destroying many Soviet tanks).

A stronger force from Salla would not have stalled (taking heavy losses to strong Soviet forces and wasting invaluable time, which the Soviets used to reinforce the area) and airborne forces supplied by planes in Kandalaksha and half way would have certainly caught the Soviets completely by surprise.
I wonder why the Germans used mules at all in Silberfuchs, since reindeer are much lighter, have wider hooves and make better food and since halftracks and planes are infinitely better to transport and to fight the strong Soviet forces. If the terrain is difficult, the side using airborne troops, air supplies and bombers to thwart enemy troop movements and supplies by land and counter attacks has a distinct advantage.

Deploying and supplying 2 small airborne forces so close to Salla and to each other, with many lakes in the area and the Sea in Kandalaksha for a few weeks and with air dominion in late June and early July is infinitely easier than deploying and supplying completely by air a large German force in Crete (fighting a large British force) or supplying a large German force, fighting a huge Soviet force in Damyansk for months, during the winter of 1941-42 or having to even fly in fuel from Sicily to extremely distant Libya for Rommel to advance to el Alamein orespecially, than attempting to supply a whole army in distant Stalingrad (with many of the Ju 52 having been redeployed to Tunisia).in the winter of 1942-43.

Of course, a large force requires more supplies. However, a small force can hardly fight against strong opposition (taking heavy losses), while it builds and secures a supply route.

I explained that Finnish divisions are better in the north and German division are better in south Finland. ATL Gertmany can easily provide 10 well equipped divisions in order to release the 6 Finnish divisions required for Silberfuchs. A Finnish batallion is deployed by Ju-52 with floats each to Kandalaksha and half way, to fight alongside German paratroopers and infantry, providing invaluable experience.

OTL during Barbarossa scores of German infantry divisions wasted weeks marching long distances slowly and consuming a lot of food, etc, without fighting. Likewise, Romanian, Finnish and Hungarian divisions did not fight for several days. Italian and the Spanish divisions did not fight for months

ATL infantry divisions starting from Finland have a short distance to the front and start fighting immediately (clearing the Soviet NW flank), so they are much more productive. With German forces advancing from Romania and Finland and the forces of these countries fighting from the first hour of the invasion and with heavy German support, axis forces are much more effective and cause even more damage on and confusion in Soviet lines. Manstein also manages to receive a Spanish, 3 Italian and 2 Hungarian divisions in mid July of Barbarossa and deploys them to reinforce the central front in S Poland and N Romania. Spanish troops are much more effective fighting in the South, during the summer than fighting during the winter in Leningrad (after a long march).

OTL Romania deployed more field guns than Germany during early Barbarossa (nearly 8,000 Vs. 7,200). However, Romanian guns depended even more heavily on horses for transportation and for munitions supplies than German guns, so they saw little fighting in the long time en route to the moving front in the first days. ATL many of these guns are emplaced in strong positions in liberated Bukovina & Bessarabia and cause heavy Soviet casualties during the ill conceived Soviet offensives, without wasting time redeploying by horse. Those Romanian guns which advance with the German thrust are pulled and supplied by trucks (which have been reserved for the thrusts, while most horses are left in the central defensive line) so they remain at or near the front and are more useful.

 

Kandalaksha is only 145 km from Salla. Therefore, an airborne force halfway between the two can be very easily supplied and if it advances west toward Salla and east toward Kandalaksha, all forces can link up in several days, provided Salla and Kandalaksha fall rapidly and their forces also advance to meet the halfway force.

Polarfuchs was by far the worst planned operation, within poorly planned Silberfuchs, which was in turn the worst planned planned operation within poorly planned Barbarossa.

The SS-Nord division was well equipped, but it had absolutely no training (it was the worst German SS division of the war, yet it was used for a small but crucial operation, against strong forces in a difficult area. Any WM infantry division would have performed much better). Incredibly, although it was intended to attack Salla, it was not transported by sea to Oulu on the baltic, but it had to advance from Kirkenes on the Arctic south a very long distance to Rovaniemi (close to the Baltic!) and then towards the border, near Salla. It is incredible that a division without training would be forced to travel gratuitosly a long distance and then be used to attack strong defenses. It's no wonder that the Finns were disappointed with German forces early in the war and did not attack in force the USSR and rapidly withdrew from the Loukhi area (where they had ventured far east from the former Finnish border).
I ownder what a Finnish or a WM division would have done with the equipment of SS-Nord.

Moreover, instead of attacking on June 22, simultaneously with the rest of Barbarossa, it did not strike until July 1, long after the war had started and the Soviets redeployed.
When it finally attacked the 20,000 Soviets (who had good fortifications and plenty of artillery and tanks in the border and in Salla), it rapidly crumbled and fled, leaving a gap in the front.

 

Someone isn't keeping promises here. How can we take him seriously?

 

I think the USSR divisions from winter wat in 1939-40 can tell why attacking in force with full division powers does not work in the forest.... I guess on map it seems easy but soldiers who are not taught to fight in the forest are totally lost in them, the SS Nord must be the only SS division that got lost in the forest. The Red Army got lost,too, and was never found again.

 

The SS Division Nord was a ad hoc formation with the strength of a brigade .


About the Spanish division (mentioned in post 132) it could not fight in the summer in 1941 in the south, because it arrived at the front only in the autumn (ha) , besides why should a Spanish division fight better in the summer ? It seems that certain people do not know that there is a winter in Spain,who can be very cold :Spain is not Marbella or Benidorm (haha) .

 

The winter war tells about Stalin's absurd decisions to kill his best leaders and then to attack in the winter with a force led by clowns. However, in the north (where there were fewer Finns and more ground to maneuver) the Soviets were far more successful than attacking in a fortified bottleneck covered by coastal guns . The Finns attacked with divisions and were quite successful liberating their territory and penetrating dozens of km into the USSR to capture Loukhi during disastrously planned Polarfuchs (too far south of Kandalaksha)

 

Strange way you have of measuring success...


Scene of carnage is not from the "fortified bottleneck", but one of the many "motti".

 

The Finns simply knocked out the first and last vehicle of the convoy and then piece by piece destroyed the division. The Red Army soldiers had no way to escape, and if they tried, they were shot trying that.

 

Did that pay-off?