The Czech crisis

Where to start.

How about April 1943 when Britain contemplated abandoning Convoy's due to extreme shipping losses, fuel stocks were very low and talk at high levels about the ability to continue with the war?. Things changed in just a month of course but you can't use that since your decree that 'hindsight' is a invalid argument.

What you fail to take in account the RN was much weaker in WWII than it was in WWI and that Germany did not get better ports till after Britain lost the French Fleet (World's 4th largest), something she didn't in the First War, nor did she have to also contend with another major Fleet like the Japanese.

 

How do you get 10 years?

It was 11 months between Munich and the start of the European War.

Of course you could ask the Israeli's, they had no problem with a pre-emptive strike in 1967.

This also conveniently forgets that American strategy rested upon the implied massive use of Atomic/Nuclear weapons to render any Soviet attack pointless.

 

I don't get that 'vibe' about Britain losing the war in 1943 at all. . . . . . . . . What on earth makes you think convoy was likely to abandoned? Someone might of suggested it but it was never going to be a viable idea. As for the Oil Crisis (the 4th Crisis) of the winter of 1943 the roots of the problem lay in poor administration by the US Navy. You may refer to the HMSO official history 'Oil'

Quote. . . . .

Clearly administrative arrangements in New York were in urgent need of reorganisation. It was becoming increasingly obvious that a civilian body like the Shuttle Office, which lacked official standing, was not the most appropriate medium for day-to-day contacts with the American naval men in New York and other ports. In October 1942, at the suggestion of the British Merchant Shipping Mission, the Ministry of War Transport Office in New York set up a new Intelligence and Movements Control Section. This was fed with information about the movements of British-controlled ships from every British source up and down the American coast and removed the risk of delays going unnoticed. Then, in November 1942, the head of the New York Shuttle Office, Mr. B. P. Coppinger, joined the Ministry of War Transport’s New York office as head of its Tanker Division; he took many of his staff with him. Later, in February 1943, two assistant directors for the division were recruited from the oil industry. Thus in New York, the Ministry of War Transport Office was put in a position to do its job effectively; and the Shuttle Office, relieved of its responsibility for tanker movements, was left to organise cargo arrangements.

This still left unsolved the problem of liaison with the Navy Department in Washington. The main difficulty here was that convoy plans were secret, and the American Services disliked sharing secrets with civilian bodies. The Navy Department did, however, have a close working relationship with the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, and through this delegation the British Merchant Shipping Mission was able to keep itself informed about convoy arrangements. However, the Mission could not relay this knowledge to the Ministry of War Transport Office in New York. What it could and did do was to organise a system of regular consultation through which that Office could receive informed advice in specific cases. This arrangement did not entirely rule out the risk of New York giving wrong movement orders; but it made this more unlikely.

These improvements in British organisation in the United States were rounded off by bringing the supervision of tanker turn-round in American ports directly under the authority of the Ministry of War Transport in New York. Hitherto this work had also been left to Shell-Mex House which, since 1941, had had marine superintendents at all the Caribbean oil ports and in Halifax. In October 1942 Shell-Mex House moved its Halifax superintendent to New York, now the major port of call for British tankers; later other superintendents were added, both to New York and elsewhere in the United States. From 1st March 1943 all these tanker superintendents in American ports were attached to the Ministry of War Transport, New York.16 This new status gave the superintendents more authority with tanker skippers, and better standing with the United States naval authorities. An indication of the kind of work they faced can be gathered from instructions given to the Principal Tanker Superintendent early in 1943. He was told to make ‘full investigations into any case where it appears a master has deliberately thrown away tanker days’, and make a report to the New York office. This ‘could form the basis of any higher enquiries’.

These British steps to improve tanker performance on the western side of the Atlantic were accompanied by American measures to reduce tanker delays in New York—likely to increase in January 1943 when the HX convoys were to change to a ten-day cycle, with the coastwise convoys remaining on an eight-day one. In order that tankers arriving in New York could join either a coastwise or trans-Atlantic convoy at the earliest opportunity, the Americans prepared to establish in New York a pool of petroleum stocks under control of the United States Navy. Into this pool any tanker arriving from loading points in the south would be able to immediately discharge its cargo; and any tanker arriving in the western hemisphere to load cargo could draw it straightway out of the New York ‘pool’—without waiting for a southbound coastwise convoy—if a trans-Atlantic convoy were ready for the return trip. Thus each tanker arriving in New York had a choice of either loading or discharging there, whichever course involved it in the least delay.

The British were wary of this idea at first. They suspected it as a device to bring the movements of British-controlled tankers off the American coast under American direction. They had reason to be apprehensive in view of the admitted shortcomings of their own methods of tanker handling. Reassured on this score, however, the British saw the advantages of the new system, and the New York Navy Pool came formally into operation on 15th December 1942. Although taking its name from New York, the Pool, from its early days, included storage at other north-east American ports, eventually including the Shuttle storage that Shell-Mex House had been renting at ports other than New York since 1941. Into the Pool were discharged cargoes carried by the Kurtz Plan ‘Greyhounds’; by convoy-speed tankers which, for one reason or another, could not be used for Atlantic crossings; by tankers proceeding to the north-eastern ports to dry-dock; and by new vessels on proving runs. From the Pool cargoes were drawn by tankers carrying the Kurtz Plan supplies to Britain in the regular HX (ten-knot) and SC (eight-knot) trans-Atlantic trade convoys; and tankers taking oil to the United States forces in Torch in American-directed UGS (nine-knot) and UGF (13,1/2-knot)17 convoys. Ships calling at north-east American ports also bunkered at the Pool.

The New York Navy Pool began as a device to speed up tanker handling at New York and other north-eastern seaboard ports. But its name and operation became associated with another innovation which actually preceded it in point of time. In the autumn of 1942 the Office of the United States Petroleum Co-ordinator decided that some of the oil supplies being carried mainly by rail from the Gulf coast states to the states of the north-east to meet domestic requirements there should be diverted for ‘offshore’ lifting. By the end of November 1942 the Office had arranged to set aside some 100,000 barrels (roughly 12,500 tons) a day from these railborne deliveries. When the New York Navy Pool was inaugurated, in mid-December, these railborne supplies supplemented the supplies it was getting by sea. By that time the overland movements for offshore lifting had already reached a rate of 140,000 barrels (17,500 tons) a day.

The flow of this ‘overland’ oil into the New York Navy Pool was to make the major contribution to oil movements across the Atlantic during 1943. It cut the distance by sea between Gulf coast oil sources and Britain while by-passing what was far and away the most time consuming leg of that journey—the slow eight-knot convoys up the United States coast to New York. The British welcomed this contribution from the Petroleum Co-ordinator’s office with open arms. They saw that oil would now be made available at New York for onward-lifting in British-controlled tankers not, as with the Kurtz Plan, by utilising precious ‘Greyhounds’, but without calling on shipping resources at all.

 

The German KM was also much weaker in WWII than in WWI .

 

The massive use of nuclear weapons which was possible in 1947 was no longer possible in 1957,because in 1957 the SU was able to retaliate:in 1957 the SU could destroy American cities,which it could not do in 1947,nor in 1949 .

 

British shipping losses were not extremely high in april 1943: they were lower than the average monthly 1942 losses.

The import problems were not caused by shipping losses but by the fact that the war in NA claimed more GRT,which had as result that less was available for imports .

When the U Boats were defeated (following the traditinal history in the summer of 1943),this did NOT result in mre imports:

Dry-cargo imports (in millions of GRT )

1940 : 41.9

1941 : 30.5

1942 :22.9

1943 :26.4

1944 :25. 1

In 1941,the losses by U Boats were on the same level as in 1940,but the imports were going down by 26 % compared to 1940.

In 1944,the losses by U Boats were only a slight fraction of the 1941 losses,but the imports were going down by 15 % compared to 1941 and almost 40 % compared to 1940 .

And about the convoys:unless we know how much Britain was depending on imports in april 1943 (probably less than before the war ) and how much of these imports were resulting from convoys (a lot of imports were done by ships not sailing in convoys), speculation about the result of a temporary halt of convoys is meaningless .

About fuel reserves : that they were low is not relevant , the needed amount of stocks is always varying and depends on things as military operations,etc ..

Fuel imports (also in millions of GRT )

1941 : 13.6

1942 :10.7

1943 :15.1

1944 : 20.5

 

Thus clearly illustrating that at best you have a very odd understanding of the word "appeasement".

 

All the answers can be found in 'Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War', 'Civil Industry and Trade' 'Oil' and the other books in the UK HMSO Civil History series.

Sorry to go on folks, but this story is at the real core of WWII. . . . . You can't understand the figures without taking into account the vast improvements in shipping turnaround, tactical loading, improvements in British agriculture and the removal of luxury goods from the import schedule.

A simple techinque technique like the disassembly trucks and motorised vehicles before transport increased shipping space by 50% and these sorts of improvements in ship loading and turnaround were seen across a wide range of imported commodities.

If you read Speer's 'Inside the Third Reich', he refers to bombing of cities being an advantage because it removed the luxury goods industy from the German war economy. Control of imports and shipping by the UK government had pretty much the same effect.

When we talk about 'Imports' to the UK in 1943 we are mostly talking about raw materials, not luxury manufactured goods which take up valuble shipping space.

As for appeasement - it might best be described as 'buying time'. The 1936 -37 war budget and the war mobilization clearly indicated that Chamberlain and his cabinet were planning for a major war and trying to get the infrastructure into place. It inevitablly took time and to buy time the UK and France had to grovel to Nazi Germany. There was no other option.

When the UK did go to war in 1939 it was - surprisingly - vastly more prepared than Nazi Germany in terms of the mobilisation of industrial capacity.

 

Appeasement was not about buying time;Chamberlain was NOT planning for a major war :he tried to avoid ,to prevent a major war .


Appeasement started almost immediately after Versailles :In 1925 (12 years ! before Neville became PM) Austin Chamberlain said in the Commons :the work of Locarno will not be complete until it is followed up by further steps of general pacification and APPEASEMENT.....we regard Locarno not as the end of the work of appeasement and reconciliation, but at its beginning .

Source :Legacy of appeasement : British Foreign Policy since 1945 by R.Gerald Hughes .

And from the same source :

In 1976,Paul Kennedy said the following about appeasement : "it is the policy of settling international /domestic quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through ratio
nal negociation and compromise,therefore avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possible very dangerous . "


The alternative to appeasement was perpetual war for perpetual peace .

For than 20 years,appeasement succeeded,to fail finally, because there was a factor against which appeasement was powerless = German nationalism,which had become more critical and dangerous after the fall of the Austrian/Hungarian Empire . which liberated Slavonic nationalism .

WWII was not caused by Hitler,it would have happen even if Hitler did not exist .

Appeasement could not redress the mistakes committed at Versailles,for which the headmaster of Princeton bears a big part of responsability .

 

Trying to avoid a war is an entirely different thing from expecting a war and planning for it.

As long as there is no military threat it is a waste of time and money to prepare for a military threat that does not exist. Right? (Ok so the USA is somewhere 'out there' with defence expenditure compared to the rest of the world)

By 1936 it was clear to Chamberlain and the UK government that AH was rearming and and preparing for war. The building of the UK air defences system, the ordering of very large scale ammunition factories, and move towards the production of modern fighter aircraft were made in 1937.

It is in the defence budget for 1937. . . . . HMSO Grand Strategy Vol 1 and 'Factories and Plant'. . . . .

 

When did such a situation exist, at least for any significant length of time? Not sure exactly what you are implying by the OT reference tot he US defense "expenditure".

 

Germany was beaten, and as long as it was not trying to break the peace agreement not threat. So why have a huge military? Once your neighbour starts to go exerciseing down the gym and take lessons in combat sports - its an entirely different thing.

The current US defence expenditure is ludicrous. . . .if you can't see why. Ask me.

 

Why is it ludicrous ?

 

Ah I see. Lack of temporal effect comprehension. Your preferred policy is a prescription for defeat. Such an approach will be playing catch up through significant periods of time and may create windows that actually encourage ones opponents to engage in active confrontations.

As for the latter that's an opinion and one that is by no means universal or even well supportable but it's also off topic in this thread. If you want to see what others think about it PLS start a thread in the stump.

 

If we are going to discuss US defense spending please start a new thread in the Free Fire Zone, otherwise lets stay on topic.