lack of efficient recon at Pearl

Volume 17...pg 2507-2529.

I've used it as a reference several times.

 

Damn, for the life of me I remember reading those differently before...weird. The memory is the first thing to go.

 

they were in pre-war--''non-war''- 'war' time mode
1. they were on bankers hours-as Opana stated
2. for real war time mode, battlestations would've been manned near dawn every day-weapons locked and loaded
3. alert pilots would've been in their planes or near them/ would've been dawn CAP
4. after the war was declared, the real war mode was martial law, black outs, evacuations, etc
there was a huge difference after the attack and they realized -''OOO--this is real-we better and can find better ways''

http://pearl harbor defenses after the attack

looks like there were a lot more aircraft available....anyone see other data, please advise....the original link says over 50 'available' on 7 Dec.....

above link states:
''The Army managed to hold back 18 of its heavy bombers as a striking force ready for action on 30-minute notice. The reconnaissance, though far superior to anything attempted before Pearl Harbor, was admittedly a good deal less than perfect- low visibility in the patrolled lanes could cut its effectiveness to near zero, and about one-fifth of the circle surrounding the islands had to be left virtually unpatrolled each day. To make the patrol fully effective would not only require a good many more planes but also radar to eliminate the hazards of visual observation''


so, looks like I'm asking why not more/organized/etc recon? and all of you have given the reasons and answered the question.....I've always stated in other threads, it's not that easy to find an enemy task force

bold for emphasis only.....thanks all replies

 

In that regard it's worth noting when black outs were enforced on the East Coast.

 

1. The Army wasn't from 23 November until 7 December when they were stood down for a rest. The Navy also wasn't, except for being in port, which they were anyway most of the time, because they were building up fuel reserves on Oahu for the fleet...and they didn't have enough oilers to sustain at sea, something which constrained battleship operations well into 1943.
2. They were...until 7 December. The real problem was the messaging from above on what threat they potentially faced. If sabotage is assumed to be your primary threat then that is what you defend against and the remote possibility a conventional attack exists gets reduced down to they will come from the NW, W, or SW and it will likely only be a submarine attack.
3. Why? Who are you cap'ing against?
4. Sure, because reality tends to dispel biases and assumptions...for a while. Look at Challenger. All fixed when it was realized what the oversight was. But what happened 17 years later? A new oversight.

Something very odd there. USAAF on Oahu had the following bombers operational/non-operational on 7 December.

B-17 6/6
B-18 21/12
A-20A 5/7
B-24A 0/1

Only the B-17 and B-24A were "heavy" bombers. Only 32 "bombers" were "available".

 

much thanks for links... so, they were saving the planes for when 'needed'[ for when war was commenced..?] .... lack of spare parts is not an 'uncommon' problem
to make my question more clear: they had some planes available....why not use them?
to add what was stated in post 32, ..not much recon because:
3.
a. the recon would be 'almost useless' --because no threat was felt, unlike Midway 1942......did they not increase recon at Midway 1942 because they 'knew' the enemy was coming? if they thought there was a credible threat to PHarbor, they would've sent out any and as much recon as possible.....??
but Opana's link said a carrier attack was a possibility ...! ?

 

2. they were manning every gun at dawn everyday? Monday through Sunday? with ammo in the guns?blackouts, evacuations, etc?
3. during WW2, did not the carriers usually always have CAP up in combat areas, to guard against attack?
the were not in 1 Jan 1942 war mode......there was a huge difference from before 6 Dec 1941...this is undeniable....

 

2. Yes, until the evening of 6 December the US Army in Hawaii were on full alert. All mobile AAA was deployed with ammunition, all the fixed AAA and coastal defense guns were manned with ammunition ready, all beach defense positions were manned, all the MG positions around the airfields were manned, aircraft were dispersed with crews at the ready. No, there was no "ammo in the guns" if you mean artillery, AAA, and coast defenses, which would be problematic anyway. Blackouts? Why? The country was not at war, there was no martial law in the territory, and so no legal authority for the military to impose such a thing. Ditto "evacuations". BTW, who do you plan to evacuate, to where and why?

3. Not when they were in a fleet anchorage they didn't. Under the division of labor agreed to, in Oahu it was the Army's responsibility, except see before, 7 December was a day of rest after two weeks at high alert, during which it was decided the threat must be sabotage.

 

Weren't at least some of the B-17s on there way to the Phillipines? May have been the ones that landed during the attack or just planned.

 

Yep. Ellis, Moffat, Mitchell...

Another part of the problem was the focus on the known threats identified to Malaya, Guam, and the Philippines. Yet even there the defense was fumbled.

 

You are forgetting Murray & Halsey...But, they were at sea with more freedom of action, and Halsey knew of the War Warning.

Battle Order #1, November 28, 1941.

Battle Order #2, same date

Memorandum For Supervisors, same date

 

No, I was just recounting those who read the tea leaves in the 20's.

 

bold mine
you said it exactly--they were on alert status--not war mode...and most importantly, they were not in 'war mode' frame of mind and/or no threat felt.......they might have even called it 'war status''--but it was nothing like after the attack per link in post # 45....they were bombed out of their ''sleep'', -figuratively and literally --and only then, did they start to think in war mode
so even if they did have more forces for recon-would they have put it up, before the attack?

http://www.vp44goldenpelicans.com/VP-44%20Ford%20Island%20&%20Midway.htm

VP 44 on arriving at Pearl after the attack. in war mode
""The squadron began flying patrols immediately and I was placed in crew 6 as a mechanic/gunner.""

at Midway in war mode
''The squadron immediately began flying 700 mile patrols in pie shaped sections of 600 miles outbound and inbound with a 100 mile arc''.
italics mine

war mode is more like Takao's last link except for this

''' 3. Fire against aircraft, or vessels other than submarines, will not be opened without reference to the Captain, except when it is evident that an actual attack on ENTERPRISE is being made.''

certainly in war mode they would fire at a Japanese aircraft without informing the captain....?