could Germany have beaten Russia I dont know the answer but just remember Germany didnt get into full wartime production until 1942/3.Whem Speer took over he improved things but much too late and a lot of the invading army was on foot or horse drawn.
You are right SgtBob, but as of december 8th 1941 Hitler took over overall command of the German armed forces in his own terms, meaning that he was now in command of all levels. If he wanted he could move divisions, army groups or platoons; something he wasn't able to do before that date. As far as I know he gave directives, objectives and timetables but hardly ever interfered with the course of events until the Germans were defeated for the first time at Moscow. The examples you name are the only ones I've heard of, and they are obviously isolated events that show just how incompetent Hitler was as commander of the German army. I think Hitler wouldn't have taken over command of the Wehrmacht directly if the Germans had continued to win over the Russians. Therefore the German victories kept coming and the Soviets would eventually be defeated and beaten back over the Urals. That, as I see it, is as far as the Germans could ever hope to get with their limited resources of men and their incompetently organized industries.
There is no debate about Dunkirk, he wanted to try and make Churchill grateful so to make Britain a friend rather than foe. With britain as a friend he could trade and control the British Empire, hence controlling more of the world.
All the same, in the winter of 1941/42 Hitler DID do something right. In contrast to his army generals who wanted to fall WAY back from Moscow and put up some kind of defensive belt, Hitler oredered that all German divisions stand firm and hold in the face of the advancing Red Army. This they did in early 1942 and it resulted in halting the Red Army's winter offensive and Germany keeping a major foothold in northern Russia. No doubt this defensive success resulted in Hitler being convinced about defending Stalingrad and other major situations until late in the war. Well, that's my take on things anyway. 8)
The reason why the Germans stood fast after the Moscow debacle was Heinrici, not Hitler. He was in command of the Fourth Army when it happened, and unlike all other armies at his flanks he didn't fall back even in the heat of the Russian counteroffensive. The Soviets thus blunted a large part of their assault force, and Heinrici's positions provided the other German armies with an aim and immediate flank protection on arrival.
Roel, Most of the army commanders wanted a complete withdrawal but Hitler sacked three army group commanders and several army commanders in the first month of the Soviet offensive. This even included Guderian. Hitler then took direct command of the situation. It was on Hitler's orders that the 'hedgehogs' were established and these defensive actions led to the relative stalemate which lasted until the spring muds came. I would say that Hitler's orders were mainly responsible the 'success' in stopping the Soviets from throwing the Germans completely back. This 'success' was the reason why Hitler so stubbonly refused most withdrawals later on.
Which brings up a BIG POINT on the Nazi that arrived in Czeckslovakia and was a very very close friend and advisor to Hitler. Tha Allies feared him so much that they sent assassins to kill him. Think of this man as the leader of the Third Reich, if Hitler was knocked off. War material production, logistics, war industries better organised because he knew the wisdom behind bypassing large towns, cities and of fortifications and starving out the resisting forces. Forward, also forward with the armour and aircover. Let the infantry and artillery finish off the surrounded enemy, like the Germans did in the begining of the invasion into Russia.
Oh, right... That, too. I love that word, "sacked", just can't get enough of it. So it al boils down to the old Barbarossa question: would the fact that Hitler didn't need to worry about the West provide enough extra punch to the operation to ensure that the Russians were defeated before the first winter? In any case the Russians had to be prevented from being able to organize any possibly succesful counterattack; the only way to do this was to take Moscow from them and continue the drain on Russian troops the way it had been in the first few months of the offensive. So indeed, like German High Command had reckoned, it had to be over by December 1941. The question of this thread really is, could the lack of a Western Front provide the strength needed to accomplish that?
Well, personally I think so. I'm sure if the advance on Moscow hadn't been left until later when it was then hampered by mud then the snow then I believe the Germans would have taken the city before the end of 1941. What I'm saying is that the Germans almost managed to defeat Russia even while having a second front to worry about so I'm sure without this second front then it would have been case closed. Like I said, at least to the extent that the Russians would have been forced back to a line beyond the Urals. With no other theatres to really worry about I'm sure the Germans would have kept the Russians from ever getting the land back. That's my take on things.
Losing Moscow would have denied the Soviets most of their rail network (most tracks were routed through / centred on Moscow), so if Germany had taken Moscow, the Soviets would have a tough time logistically. Being as they depended heavily on weight of numbers... I reckon the Germans could have held the Urals well enough. Look what a good job they did holding the mountains in Italy with little preparation time & little or no effective air cover. If they'd had the chance to properly dig in into the Urals, and with no 'distractions' out west, could the Soviets have shifted them? Maybe...
Back to the original question, yes no doubt the germans would have managed to defeat the red army. there would have been no need to secure the balkans and would have invaded 6 weeks earlier. there would have been no lend lease deals for the russians, no threat of bombing of german industries. also wot no one has considered is whether if the germans had captured moscow and beyond whether or not the japanese would have chanced their arm again against an already weakend russian state thus producing the russians to fight a war on 2 fronts.
Good point - it was the Soviet realisation that the Japanese would not attack that allowed them to pull back troops from Siberia in order to launch the winter offensive that let them hold on to Moscow. If the Japanese had decided to wait & co-ordinate with Germany...
Yes, very! Actual co-ordination between the 2 countries was very minimal, and never seemed to progress beyond the Germans sending a few plane- and submarine-loads of useful stuff. Obviously they were only allies of necessity, and their differing racial ideologies meant that they would effectively have not co-operated much at all...
I disagree. In his book, Panzer Leader, Guderian lays out how he and many other commanders wanted to shorten the line (nowhere near abandoning Russia), establish good defensive positions, and most of all have the opportunity to establish a mobile reserve which could cut off any Soviet offensive, much like Manstein did at Kharkov. The 'hedgehog' idea bought some time, but at a considerable price that wasn't necessary. Distasteful as a temporary withdrawal is, sometimes it is necessary. That's something Hitler never could understand.
But now you're counting the French and British out completely. They might just start something at some point during the demise of the Soviet Union, and the Balkans had to be secured to prevent them from using that against the Germans. Also, the Germans needed the Rumanian oil fields and the other resources the area offered. So while I agree with all your other points, I think the Balkans really had to be cleared and that the rearguard held back in Germany needed to be strong and mobile enough to counter a threat from that direction.
Hmmm, given that Chamberlain would probably still be in power in the UK, I'm far from convinced that we would have got involved. Even if we had, the combined British & French Regular armies could potentially have been held by the Siegfried Line. After all, our tactical doctrines were a touch lacking, and the neccessary heavy armour was scarce (at least on the British side). Would we even have launched an offensive? I was always under the impression that the Germans only invaded Yugoslavia because they had to get to Greece, and they only invaded Greece because Italy was being pushed back into Albania! Had Britain & France not been involved in the war, the lack of security on the Balkan flank would probably not really have bothered Hitler. The performance of the Italians might still have tempted him south. If I remember rightly, Britain did not send troops to Greece until the Germans arrived (or declared that they would, whichever came first!). Rumania, along with Hungary and Bulgaria, had allied with Germany before the attack on Yugoslavia, so no disruption for that oil supply. Plus, had Germany captured Moscow, Soviet demoralisation & the buggering up of the Soviet's logistics could have allowed them to capture the oil wells in the Caucauses. Possibly!
Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that the German commanders wanted to withdraw from Russia. I meant that most of them wanted to fall back quite some way from the Moscow area to a line more manageable. Hitler would not allow this and this stubborn refusal for total withdrawal was responsible for the situation not becoming more desperate in my view. As can be seen from later battles, this thinking of Hitler never really worked again. Manstein argued for a complete withdrawal to the Dneiper river after the Kursk offensive failed but again Hitler would not listen. As a result hundreds of thousands were sacrificed trying to hold onto too much ground.
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