the name itself brings sorrow to many a UK household, it was debacle and a slaughter unmatched in British and American military history. I walked amongst the graves in the British War cemetary there and read epitaphs sent in by ""mum"" or the wife until I read this one and could read no more epitaphs "to the world he was but one, to me he was all the world""
but what the heck was monty thinking. that he could blitzkrieg his way over all those rivers?? monty was way to slow in his advance. after the capturing of the bridge in Nijmegen (about 25 kilomters south of Arnem) , 30th corp holded for the night. in stead of advancing and come the Britisch airborn to an aid. and who decided to let the Britisch landing so far away from the bridge?? one word FUBAR
Yes, by securing those bridges beforehand using paratroopers. It worked in Normandy, and according to Monty's intelligence the Germans were routed, disorganized and unable to mount any serious resistance. Moreover, onty's forces would enjoy complete air supremacy and vast amounts of artillery and logistical support. However, I agree that planning an attack 90 kilometers ahead over a single road with six major crossings is sheer lunacy and cannot be justified. The British had encountered resistance (10th SS had moved into the area), the leading British unit was exhausted and badly in need of resupply. This supply was not forthcoming because the road behind them was utterly jammed, and at some points even in German hands. Finally, the armour at the column's spearhead needed infantry support to advance and this support was even further away down the corridor. Major General Robert Urquhart of the 1st British Airborne Division decided on the drop zones. He chose them 10-12 kilometers away from the Arnhem bridge in order to avoid having to drop his men onto a city, which would result in an estimated 10% casualties in the drop alone.
well you got a point on al three things. but still, it wasn't a battla for monty. monty is moving slowly and takes his time, doesn't move untill everything is on it's place. to win at arnem, you need someone who's willing to take risks, someone who has the guts to race to ernem and doesn't care about the losses and leavin the enemies for the main force that's moving behind a fast assault force. at least, that is my point of view
Genral Patton it is then Althoh his troops were further south and he disapproved of the battle thinking he could use the resources better.
Well, Patton dissaproved of Monty fullstop, and not without reason. Whatever Monty's strongpoints, making friends - especially with Americans - was not one of them. :roll: I do wonder if Patton would have made any difference at all to Market Garden. When faced with determined opposition his units did no better or worse that any other. Things that would have helped Market Garden: 1) Radios with a decent range 2) Paratroops dropped nearer the bridges 3) Better weather in the UK to allow for the reinforcements / supplies to reach the paras 4) The advance being pressed on over the first night Now, 3) is obviously impossible to change, as is 1) (unless you can design & produce new radios at the drop of a hat). Point 4) is not really acheiveable unless the guys who attack at night are fresh troops who move past the guys who had been attacking all day. Which would have been bloody tricky to co-ordinate given the conditions on the ground, and would most likely have been a fair tragedy. Only 2) would have been achievable, and even then it would not mean any significant change in the outcome of the operation, aside from the bridges being in Allied hands for a little longer, before the Germans took them back.
Arnhem We have been down this road before, in more ways than one, and don't forget we did stop for a few tea breaks!!not forgetting, fuel, ammo, resistance etc. Oh yes, we did relieve 82nd. Airbourne at Nigmegen on the way, and just a few burials. No more from me on this.
I don't see arnham as the huge failure it is often made out to be. Yes it was poorly planned and the motivations behind it seem more political than strategic, but the principal idea was sound. To punch a hole through the german lines, capturing key bridges intact and forcing the axis to retreat back due to the rivers and canal defences being flanked. I would like to point out that what the base plan and strategic planning lacked, the ground application of those plans was carried out with superb skill and resolution with the limited resources available. A testimony to those who jumped into the unknown. Even XXX core performed resonably well having to attack a superb and tenicious enemy up a very narrow corrider and road. All against a ticking clock. But the end result was that several key bridges were captured, several difficult rivers were crossed and the line moved forward a fair distance in a short period. The alternative was to slog the way to the rivers, see the bridges demolished and carry out multiple river assualts which would have been time consuming and almost as costly in troops. As a matter of interest, weren't some key reinforcements delayed or abandoned due to weather? FNG
Perhaps, but those operations while probably costly and time-consuming would at least have been feasible. Operation Market-Garden as proposed by Montgomery was simply not feasible at all, a tactical nightmare and a logistical impossibility to be executed in a ridiculously short timeframe against resistance stiffening by the day. A series of single assaults on single rivers would probably have destroyed more German troops in the process, and it would have given the Allies time to regroup and resupply before every assault instead of risking them without support or proper organization. Yes, most notably the 4th Parachute Regiment of the 1st Airborne and the 1st Polish Parachute Regiment.
as bad as it sounds, war is often about risks. Had the plan fully succeeded it would have shortend the war, reduced the costs to the governments funding it and saved lives elsewhere. As it was the plan partially succeeded and probably reduced the period of war by a notionally short period. I think the main problems behind where political not military. Monty was being pressured to do things to shorten the length of the war was bankrupting the british government, he was conscious of US advances, worried that Russians would get way past Berlin before the allies got anywhere near it. and on top of that he was being told by intelliegence that the back of the german army was broken and that bomber command had reduced germanies industrial capacity to virtually nil. FNG
Much has been written, movies etc. I have to agree that many good objectives were accomplished, though many lives were lost and the ultimate objective was not met. Timing, bad luck, questionable intelligence, acts of extrordinary bravery, lessons painfully learned and re-learned. The flanking accomplished by the river crossings vere valuable and strategic for sure. I hope all the lives lost were indeed justified. I wish I knew--for certain--more of the character of Field Marshall Montgomery. He and Gen Geo. Patton were always adversarial in nature. Much has been written in comparing their styles in 'campaigning.' Do the Bntish people remember Montgomery as a brilliant commander? Was his plan based upon a sound concept? If not why then did it proceed forward? Was it not approved by various Allied commanders and the Supreme Commander as well? Tim
Market-Garden was based upon a flawed concept, namely that of establishing a frontline as wide as a single road for 90 kilometers, while all of the country around that corridor was in enemy hands. This amazingly retarded idea was further complicated by the six major crossings in the path of the corridor, each of which was a major choke point and a potential cause for the entire operation to fail completely (if one bridge was lost, the entire plan would have to be abandoned - as it did). In hindsight we can say that the operation at least gained the Allies a substantial amount of ground in the Southern Netherlands, and forced the Germans back across several defensible river lines; however this is primarily due to the efforts of the two flanking operations of 2nd Army, set in motion in support of the main operation. All this could have been accomplished without the destruction of 1st British Airborne, which was therefore undeniably a senseless waste of men. It proceeded forward mostly for reasons of politics, logistics and a percieved "need for speed" now that intelligence indicated that the German army was routed but could recover if given enough time. Eisenhower gave Monty the operation because he knew that the lack of fuel that stopped Patton and Hodges would ultimately make his own Broad Front strategy untenable, and that a Single Thrust operation such as proposed by Montgomery might prevent this from happening or might provide an alternative way of breaking through into Germany proper.
It worked for the germans in russia so I doubt it was that flawed, plus you said yourself that the germans pulled back becuase they were flanked by armour and paratroopers and being attacked from the front by infantry. FNG
In Russia, where one can manoeuver, it is merely risky but doable. In the Netherlands, in between all those rivers, there is no option but to go straight on down the road, and the enemy knows this. Market-Garden had to fail. True enough, the Germans realized that they could not hold back a full British army corps with a single depleted Volksgrenadier division. I agree that this worked for five out of six waterways after some hard fighting every time, but the failure to secure the final crossing made the operation an utter failure.
I'm not a historian when it comes to market garden but to me it seems like Monty & Browning ignored alot of intelligence about what kind of troops, armor, new air feilds etc.. were in the area. I think that so many operations had been canceled up to that point that it didn't matter what kind of intelligence was found Monty would preceed. There may have not come another time that IKE would cut all other resources off to the other feild commanders and give him all resources and command of american troops so monty saw this as his shot to make himself a hero and win the war. The chances for him to have total control over suchan operation again would be slim, so he took the chance.
Pretty much. It's known that Monty ignored warnings by air reconaissance that SS Panzer divisions were in the area, and that he chose to ignore all information passed to him by the Dutch resistance for lack of trust in them. On the other hand, the SS divisions were severaly understrength and the Dutch countryside had many collaborators, so on both counts there was a good excuse for ignoring intelligence.
All this talk inspired me to buy A Bridge Too Far on DVD. The vehicles are a bit of a let-down from what I remember from years ago, but it's definately still a movie worth watching, both for the very nice score and the fact that the people actually speak in the language of their nationality.
