Could Britain have repelled Germany without American Aid?

What about moral? What good is the body when the will to figth isn't there. Even if a small attack of german troops (say paratroopers) can hold on an area for long enough (One or two days), what would it do for the moral? If the moral collaps shortly after an invasion, the german troops could push straigth through Britain, only to be opposed by a few that are still willing to fight.

 

The germans had a total of 30 Sboot in the channel region that sank a grand total of 6 ships on D Day???Thats at most 0.2 per sortie that day. But over the course of he next two months they were only able to sortie and sink a 15 ships and damage a dozen more. So over a two month period they managed about 1 enemy ship sunk or damaged per Sboot present. Whats that 27 out of 5000 over 2 months? Not much of a threat to any one.There was no real threat of the KM or LW ever stopping the DD invasion in 1944.

UK defence in 1940 were a very pale shadow of what the Germans did in D Day. Dads army had only enough ammo for a couple of days of fighting before they would have to give up, while the bulk of the Territorial troops were raw recruits with little or no training and very limited arms. Against the crack veterans of the Wehrmacht , even with limited arms, they would not last long.

Again warships and planes of this period were very ineffective at sinking other ships. In Crete 1941 the RN had the advantage of Ultra decrpts to know when and where the Axis were heading and arrange ambushes for them. All of these RN warships had radars in 1941 and they ambushed several groups of Italian ships carrying German troops. In the first instance 5 merchants and 3 Italian destroyers [with no warning or radar] were allowed to walk into a trap and destoyed by the 1/2 dozen Cruisers and Destroyers. In the next days, two seperate Italian barge fleets were attacked by 15 RN cruisers and destroyers.

In the first attack they sunk 10 out of 20 barges plus the lone escorting Italian torpedo boat, while the rest got away. It was in this incident that some barges were reportedly swamped by near collisions with RN destroyers. In the second group they sank a single barge but were driven off by the loan counterattacking Italian Torpedoboat , while they lost 3 warships to Luftwaffe attacks . At this point , with his ships 400km from home in enemy waters surrounded by RN warships , the Italian Admiral orders his barge fleet home. Later that week they did sneek a smaller invasion group through to Crete. So the RN achieved 0.8 kills per sortie against the barges, while if you average in the other sunk ships its about 20 ships sunk by 15 cruisers and destroyers over a period of several days.Thats about 1.0 kills per sortie, with more than 3/4 of the barges/boats going unattacked.

In the channel one year earlier the UK didn't have the benifit of Ultra Decrpts and only a few warships had radars and those were with the "Home Fleet" not the "Anti Invasion Fleet. Finding even groups of ships at night in the 'channel' without the benifit of Radar or Ultradcrpts is a needle in a haystack search. The RN would be very lucky if they were able to average more than 0.8 kills per sortie. Whats more no German admiral would have ordered the balance of the fleets home only 50km away...so the 3/4 of the boats unattacked , would have gotten through.

The RN could count on ~ 2000 motorboats to patrol the entire british 18,000km coast line with another 850 trawlers & minesweepers patroling the 3300km coasts seas, with maybe 1/2 armed. This force would be backed up by ~ 90 Cruisers and destroyers . Of this force 50-60% was deployed in the channel region, with only about 1/3 to 1/2 at sea at any given time due to the need for rotation. So the standing patroling force facing the Germans across the channel might only be ~ 200 armed trawlers /minesweepers plus 400 motorboats/yachts with a couple of dozen warships.

The RN Home Feet would be decoyed away by German battleships and a flood of Uboats attacking the North Atlantic convoys routes before the invasion even began. That should keep them a way for several of weeks due to the KM replenishment at sea ability. Such a maneuver would have been greatly enhanced had Norway operation been delayed until after Sealowe as this would have ensured a couple of surge flotillas of several battleships and cruisers each. This was one of the first mistakes that blessed the UK. Besides Churchill forbade risking his battleships to Luftwaffe attacks in the channel.

The Germans had 3500 boats, ferries, sloops & trawlers etc of which 1/3 had to be towed by tugboats. This armada was to be escorted by about 400 coastal and auxiliary warships backed up by 30-40 cruisers , destroyers , Torpedoboot and Geleitboot plus a couple dozen Schnellboot. Meanwhile ~ 20 auxiliary minelayers would be sowing hundreds of mines per day in the channel and in RN ports. Had Norway been delayed until after Sealowe and this invasion planned from the start of the war, this force would have increased to 60-70 Cruisers, Destroyers, Torpedoboot and Geleitboot, while at most 10% of the amphibious fleet would have been towed and the rest powered. This was another of the many things that blessed the UK.

Clashes between KM and RN warships in the first couple of years of the war, showed the losses were even on both sides. Dunkirk showed that airpower could damage bargefleets with ~ 300-400 Luftwaffe bombers sinking about 250 in a week or about 0.6 kill per bomber per week. But many of these were Stuka with 30m CEPs, while level bombers had CEPs of 300-500 meters even at low altitude. So they were lucky to sink one enemy ship for every 30 sortie. The RAF had about 600 bombers mostly level bombers that could be available on a dayly basis. They would be lucky to sink more than 200 german barges/ferries/boats per week. However escorting these bombers would strip off critial RAF fighters to defend the country . In the first weeks of the BoB the kill ratio were 1:1 . When the Luftwaffe shifted its targeting from military to London, the kill ratio changed to 2:1 in favor of the RAF.

Historically the shift in attacks was supposed to be on to the channel ports and coastal airfields to prepare for the invasion. But Goreing and Hitler had other ideas, which was another of the mistakes that blessed Britain. When the RN ports where attacked , those ports were usually out of operation for days afterwards, which could be crucial at the start of any cross channel invasion, neutralising the RN temporarly. This is also consistant with Luftwaffe doctrine, to use the airpower to supress the opponents forces and allow forced entry into the country.

Given such diluted RAF fighter missions , the RAF/Luftwaffe kill ratio should remain at 1:1 or shift in Germans favor. This is need for the germans since the UK had shifted their economy into high gear and were out producing the Germans 2:1 in fighters. Hitler had gambled on a limited war economy and hesitated repeatly to shift into high gear until after Stalingrad at the end of 1942. Another of the happy mistakes for the Brits and the soviets.

Needless to say the lack of range of German fighters limited there ability to bomb through out England, but this would not have prevented channel bombardments in support of a crossing. As it was the Germans had been developing drop fuel tanks to extend the range of their fighters since the Spanish Civil war. But these were not perfected or didn't recieve the needed attention until the BoB and thus were not ready until after the battle...another lucky break for the home side.

If doctrine had been followed this would be when the invasion would have commenced.

Channel RN forces could count on sinking ~ 400 german barges/boats/trawlers etc in the first week , while RAF bombers should sink another 200 a week. Meanwhile KM escort warships should account for 300 British ships while the Luftwaffe should sink another 70-100. With 3/4 of these flottilas getting through, thats 1/4 of the entire German invasion force across plus supplies.

In the second week 3100 German troop ships/barges escorted by 400 warships and auxiliary warships , should cross the channel. The RAF/RN should account for another 600 axis boats/barges/warships etc, while the KM/Luftwaffe should acount for ~ 350 RN ships. At this point about 1/2 of the German invasion force & supplies should be across and bridgeheads firmly established along the south coast plus Luftwaffe squadrons transfered across the channel operating from English soil.

This would leave the Germans with ~2400 invading boats escorted by ~300 auxiliary/warships ships facing ~ 800 RN boats; 300 trawlers and 40 warships reinforced with another 100 RN warships from overseas commands. In the third week the RN warships should be able to account for 350-400 German ships/boats [depending on how much they want to risk their battleships], while RAF would be lucky to get more than 200. Meanwhile the KM/Luftwaffe should sink another 300 -350 plus RN warships, reducing the RN fleet to about 900 boats, trawlers and warships facing 2100 German barges; ferries; warships and Auxiliaries.

At the end of the third week 3/4 of the German invasion armies & supplies should be ashore occupying southern England including London , while a Panzer corps breaks out into central England. From this point on RN sorties would have to range from northern ports further and further away reducing the number of warships that can sweep the English channel at any given time. Meanwhile with the Germans in control of British industrial base in southern England would mean RN and RAF supplies and ordnance would dwindle, crippling operations. With the Luftwaffe ranging from southern airfields this should result in collapse of the UK defensive , command and control, and bringing about a 'fight or flight' syndrome. Since it had already been decided to move the gold , government and crown to Canada to continue the fight, thats what would happen while they still could get out. No doubt the RN and RAF would follow across the pond to continue the fight from Canada.
:kill:

 

Could you please list the KM warships that were operational in July / August 1940? After the Norwegian campaign, the KM was in disasterous shape, with the vast majority of CA or larger damaged and under repair. Churchill has a list at the end of Volume 2 and it makes grim reading (for Germany). Uboats will have some success but there is a big difference between firing at an 8 knot convoy (limited to formation zigzags) and 25-30 knot warships which are free to maneuver.

Also please remember that this will be an "all or nothing" affair for the RN. Unlike Crete, where the decision could be made to withdraw the fleet, there would be no incentive to stop attacking Sealion until all warships were lost or out of ammunition.

What basis do you have for saying no Ultra? I will need to check Hinsley but AFAIK there was some success decrypting Ultra in '40. Also why would shipborne radar be such a factor. According to the German planners it would probably take nearly 24 hours to get all the first wave barges out of port, let alone across the Channel, so their chance of non-detection would be very slight (radio intercepts as well as air or ground recce). Once in open water, star shell and searchlights would be the main sighting tools.

Under these circumstances, the Home fleet would certainly be brought south and used in the Channel. Maybe one BC would be left north to evacuate the Royal Family if needed but I suspect the King would have insisted on using all forces to defend his country

Tom

 

You missed my point - The incident I referred to was not on D-Day and demonstrated how even a small naval force relatively unmolested can mess-up a landing plan. Of course the KM had no effect on D-Day against a massive naval force - the Germans would have faced a much more formidable force if they had tried to invade and would have been severely sunk.

I will read the rest of your reply if I can arrange the time off work one day but I expect it to be full of oodles of numbers applied with more spin than a massé shot in snooker.

:kill:

 

People aways seem to loose sight of the fact that invading across the English Channel (in either direction) doesn't just mean just mean getting troops across, it means holding a corridor of water indefinately. While the Germans stand some small chance of achieving the first point the second is a no go.

Remember in 1940 the following applies:

1) The German Navy tops out at over gunned Heavy cruisers (the Pocket Battleships, the Scharhorts are both damaged and the Bismarks haven't been commissioned).

2) The weakest British battleships (the R Class) could slap seven kinds of snot out of any surface ship the Germans have.

3) Submarines of this period are basically semi mobile minesfields, their ability to get into striking range of fast moving ships is limited.

4) The German airforce is neither armed or trained for anti ship work. Plus if its bombing ships it isn't supporting ground troops.

5) The German Navys estimation of time needed to land the first wave across a narrow front was a week +

6) British shore defences are weaker than the Atlantic Wall but so are German bombardment capablities. The Germans have a grand total of two PreDreadnoughs for such work.

7) If the navy can't keep the English Channel open then the German army isn't receiving: ammo, fuel, food, animal fodder. None of which are optional.

8 ) Post WW2 German and British officers wargammed sealion as a map exercise. The Germans got a kicking.

 

Yes - there was understandable fear of an invasion in 1940 but it was never viable and probably always impossible - the Battle Of Britain just sealed it.

PS. The Two pre-dreadnaughts mentioned would have been 5 star hotels for conger eels in no time.

 

In addition to what Ebar wrote above, I'd like to expand the analogy with D-Day a little bit more.

Because of American production the Allies posessed about 5,000 landing craft for Operation Neptune; the Germans simply did not have anything like this troop transport capacity. With these 5,000 ships and the aid of 11,000 aircraft the Allies managed to land 176,000 men in France on D-Day. How many men would the Germans be able to land on the first day, considering the amount of transport ships and planes they had?

Almost half a million British Regulars escaped from Dunkirk. Admittedly they had lost most of their heavy equipment but they were trained and they had seen some action. If you add this number to the Territorial divisions, even considering their lack of weapons and training, you get a force of such a great number that the small amount of troops the Germans could land on the beaches of Britain on one day or even a few consecutive days would still not be too big a problem. They don't even have to use Russian infantry wave tactics, since they know the land and enjoy the many pleasures of being supplied regularly.

 

Using american tanks (unless the British had gotten enough of their own tanks there by then

 

They mostly relied on their own tanks, but since they kept being lost in massive numbers in the harsh environment of the desert (and to the DAK) the supplement of American tanks recieved were more than welcome.

I don't know for sure, but I think the Matilda II, the Valentine and the Crusader were the most numerous Allied tanks in North Africa until the Americans themselves arrived.

 

ni invasion

IMHO the brits would have been starved into sueing for peace within a year and hitler wuold have given them very good terms. hitler had a dream of britan joining his fight against the USSR and he needed all of his forces for that. without US help there was no way the U boats could have been beaten or the country supplied. as it was there for a while it was a close thing. IIRC at one point they were down to something like a month's worth of food and fuel with all the aid they were getting.

 

That seems to oppose the actual terms that Hitler would have offered the UK. Death lists were drawn up of anti-Nazi individuals for the attentions of the Einstatz-Gruppen, and requirements made for UK males of fighting age to be sent to Germany for labour purposes.

Do not try to make too much sense of Hitlerism or Nazi ideology, much of it was nonsensical at best.

 

I don't think the brits would have surrenderred.Just look at the fans during soccer matches.

Ok that was random

 

I thought were actually the plans for a conquered UK - not an independent UK that had sued for peace.

 

Re: Could Britain have repelled Germany without American Aid

The answer to that is yes.
Because in the actual battle, the only US equipment used by the RAF was the Lockheed Hudson light bomber used by Coastal Command in small numbers.
American supplies only started to make a difference from early 1941 when Lend-Lease came into force.

 

It depends on how you define American aid.

As has been said, Britain was critically dependent on the trans-Atlantic trade to survive, so without the US merchant fleet braving the U-boats and the US shipyards churning out more ships than the U-boats could sink, then Britain would have been forced to surrender.

Military equipment - and even less so direct military aid - was less critical to Britain's survival. The most vulnerable period was the summer and autumn of 1940, when the Wehrmacht was on a roll and the British army was at its weakest. The consensus is that Sealion wouldn't have succeeded, and the more the Germans delayed an invasion, the more the British recovered from Dunkirk and got their army back into shape again.

The turning point was of course mid-1941 when Germany invaded Russia. After that, the effort required in that battle meant that Britain was safe from direct defeat, as long as the convoys of food, fuel etc kept flowing.

The key question then becomes: would the USSR have still received US aid? If so, then I think there is little doubt that Britain could have continued to survive without US military assistance - but could not have mounted a successful invasion of Europe. So the outcome of US non-assistance would have been the Russians sweeping through Europe and not stopping until they reached the Atlantic coast - leaving Britain in a very uncomfortable position.

The next question becomes: could the USSR have survived without US aid? That's much more difficult to answer...

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum