Market Garden

And I just asked what it is you are blaming anybody for in regards the D-Day airborne performance? To put it bluntly, under the circumstances, it was stellar. And yet you continue to damn with faint praise, despite never clearly saying what it is in their performance you find so lacking.

Okay, so it has been a while since I last visited the ACSDB files, but I still don't ever recall anything standing out in my mind regarding a Gavin 82d vs. Hobbs 30th feud? The situation was highly fluid and intell was poor on the locations and strength of the Germans (and often of other Americans) throughout this period. One consequence was the initial attack on Cheneaux with two lightly equipped Parachute companies attacking the better part of a German mechanized battalion-sized kampfgruppe. It also led to the needless withdrawal of the 504th PIR that enabled Peiper's withdrawal, as well as other problems...but poor intell is hardly a division commander's fault.

Anyway, the "feud" I well remember between the silk hankie guys and the doggies was actually between Matt Ridgway and Bob Hasbrouck over the withdrawal from St. Vith. It took the intervention of Montgomery to get the 7th AD and its attachments out of that trap. As late as fall 1987, a few months before he died, Bruce Clarke was still pissed at Ridgway, telling me that "Montgomery saved our division" from Ridgway's idiotic notion of forming a "fortified goose egg" and that airborne simply had little conception of the requirements faced by mechanized formations.

 

Ironically, airborne troops were not really in tune with mobile warfare once on the ground. Their modus operandi was to land on or near their objective, secure it, and hold until the arrival of ground or amphibious forces. Being surrounded for a bit didn't trouble them.

An airborne landing was part of a planned offensive, in which our side had the initiative and could expect to link up with paratroopers fairly promptly. The Bulge was a completely different situation. The Germans had the initiative and were advancing with strong forces, largely controlling the pace of operations. We were in reactive mode, trying to limit the damage and prepare for a counterstroke some time in the future.

I consider St. Vith a model of good defensive fighting. We held the road junction long enough to rally our troops which were falling back from the front lines, inflicted losses and imposed delay on the enemy, and fell back in good order when we had gotten as much benefit as we could from the situation.

One could wish we had done the same at Bastogne. It made sense initially to secure key communications centers, until we got an idea what was happening, and again it helped to extract friendly troops who might otherwise have been cut off; but a well-managed retirement would have allowed the Germans to thrust themselves further into a trap while precluding any dangerous developments on the southern flank. While McAuliffe does not seem to have been terribly concerned about being surrounded, the situation caused Patton to direct his offensive on Bastogne instead of further east, where it might have done a better job of cutting off the Germans deep in the Bulge.

 

To an extent I agree, but access to the Bastogne road junction would have certainly improved the German communications and movements. However, Patton did intend his counteroffensive be directed further east, which was the whole intent of the XII Corps initial movements and attack. IIRC, it was directives from 12th Army Group and SHAEF that forced him to commit the 4th AD further west to open communications with the 101st.