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US army 1944 and problems?

Discussion in 'Information Requests' started by Kai-Petri, Jan 31, 2006.

  1. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/manpower.aspx

    In late 1944 a severe problem in the U.S. Army in general was the manpower shortage. Plans to expand the Army to 213 divisions were never met and it was proving difficult to maintain the 89 divisions then in existence - even though almost one-quarter of them had yet to see combat. Furthermore, the prewar planning for replacements was found to be totally inadequate. The causes were manifold: U.S. industrial and agricultural demands could only be partially met by bringing women into the workforce; the Army was fighting a two-front war; fear of the blitzkrieg had resulted in an over-expansion of the antiaircraft and tank destroyer arms; the requirements of the massive expansion of the U.S. Armed Forces in general had reduced the manpower pool; and, perhaps worst of all, segregation meant that a large percentage o the available manpower, African-Americans, were restricted to service support organization and a few separate combat units.

    Unfortunately, the poor initial planning Army-wide was exacerbated by the general replacement policy in effect. Simply put, once a soldier was separated from his unit by wounds or illness, there was little chance of him returning to that unit. Instead, he was sent to a replacement depot, a repple-depple in Army slang.From the depot he would then be reassigned as needed to whatever unit had a shortfall in his particular MOS (military occupation specialty).It wasn't until 1945 that the individual replacement system was modified to allow a majority of sick and wounded soldiers to rejoin their unit after recovering.

    ...As casualties left, replacements came in. However, the reality became that replacements came in, and with no combat experience and no one in their new unit looking out for them (the "I don't know him and don't want to know him, he's only gonna be a casualty" syndrome), they quickly became casualties.

    The original War Department replacement-planning factor for infantry was 64.3 percent of total casualties. Following continued pleas from Europe the factor was raised to 70.3 percent in April 1944. However, the fighting in Normandy soon showed that this was still much too low. By mid July the ETO estimate was that 90 percent of total casualties occurred in the infantry. Infantry divisions saw 100 percent losses in rifle strength in the two months after D-Day. The lack of Infantry replacements soon approached near disastrous proportions. For example, on 8 December 1944 the Third Army was short 11,000 infantrymen.

    Intense combat and heavy losses in 1943 meant that in 1944 many divisions still in the United States were stripped of trained men to build up the replacement pool. Some divisions were stripped of available manpower a second time later in 1944. This in turn affected the training cycle of the divisions, causing some to deploy late and requiring most to have some problems with their initial combat deployment. Four armor, one airborne, and seventeen infantry divisions (nearly one-quarter of the total formed) were eventually subject to large scale stripping of men (nearly all of the other divisions in training also had smaller numbers of personnel stripped out prior to deployment). Fourteen of the seventeen infantry divisions were stripped twice. The aggregate affect was tremendous the 69th Infantry Division lost 1,336 officers and 22,235 men, nearly enough personnel to form two divisions.

    Another fundamental doctrinal belief espoused by General McNair was that pooling and standardization in the organization of the combat arms would facilitate the cross-attachment of units into combined-arms teams. Here too the realities of wartime experience proved to be somewhat different. It was discovered that the close cooperation required of combined-arms teams required extensive training and combat experience to be effective. Unfortunately, the infantry division training program involved extensive practice in infantry-artillery coordination, but no training in armor-infantry-artillery coordination. In most cases the first armor-infantry-artillery combined arms operation for an infantry division was conducted in combat and not in training. Furthermore, pooling meant that most of the infantry divisions did not have tank or tank destroyer battalions attached until after they had entered combat. The result was predictable; the introduction of "green" infantry divisions into combat often resulted in disaster rather than success.

    German small arms utilized ammunition which gave off little flash or smoke. American ammunition had a pronounced signature, giving off a distinctive puff of blue smoke and an intense flash. The result was that German infantry could fire with a good chance of not revealing their position, American infantry could not. All American ammunition had this characteristic to a degree; tank and artillery rounds also gave off a prominent flash.

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    Opinions?
     
  2. bigiceman

    bigiceman Member

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    This all sound consistant with what we have heard in the past about US infantry training and manpower utilization. There were a few new things to explain some of the shortages but it all sounds reasonable. The US Army had its share of problems and probably more than its fair share of mistakes.
     
  3. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    A book to read about this subject is S.L.A Marshall 'men against fire'
     
  4. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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  5. T. A. Gardner

    T. A. Gardner Genuine Chief

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    Let me give you a couple of titles you are not familiar with on this subject that make Marshall look like an amateur:

    Beebe, Gilbert W. & Appel, John W. Variation in Psychological Tolerance to Ground Combat in World War II, National Academy of Sciences contract DA-49-007-MD-172, Medical Research and Development Board, Office of the Surgeon General, Washington DC, 1958

    Beebe, Gilbert W. & DeBakey, Michael E. Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality and, Logistic Considerations, Charles C. Thomas Co., Springfield, IL, 1953

    Beebe is very dry reading but the guy is a statistical genius. Except in the ETO in France the US system did work. Even in Italy the system was successfully modified to ameolerate the worst problems it had.

    As a more accessable source I recommend:

    Rush, Robert S. GI: The US Infantryman in World War II, Osprey Publishing, Wellingborough, Northants, UK, 2003

    On the whole, the "reppel-deppel" stories are urban myth that greatly exaggerate the actual events.
     
  6. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    T.A.

    I allways found Marshalls books easy to read, and works very well as a 'primer' to the subject.
     
  7. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Thanx T.A.!

    Actually more like my cup of tea as I due to my job have to read ca. 5 study articles/day and know and learn about statistics as well..
     
  8. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Opinions of today´s members?
     
  9. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    There is a Napoleonic adage that states no battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy, this is particularly true in a extended setting. The ability to adapt has to be considered a part of any overall strategy, both to take advantage of unexpected opportunities but also to overcome unexpected problems. The enemy will not always do as you expect, nor will your equipment always work as intended
     
    Last edited: Sep 15, 2020
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  10. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    While I revised the complete article last fall and had it posted at MHO, my overall opinion has not changed since I first wrote that in .c 2000. :D
     
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  11. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Napoleon won wars by "blitzkrieg". He moved his troops faster than expected and got the surprise effect. Untill....
     
  12. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    I honestly wish I had a clue as to how that relates to "US army 1944 and problems?", but WTF, who cares?
     
  13. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Another problem that hasn't been mentioned was our junior officer training. Our OCS program was horrible and ROTC grads weren't much better. Junior officers, especially 2nd Leutenants, had a very high casualty rate. Many were killed or maimed trying to learn their job. We were always short of good captains and leutenants.
     
  14. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    This is like deja vu all over again, but before it was the replacement system that was "horrible". :D

    How was it "horrible"? It was "necessary". The OCS program was required to generate the number of junior officers required for the expanded Army. The RA, ORC, and CMTC simply didn't have the numbers required. Wartime ROTC grads, like my father, also went through OCS. It was considered to be one of the most rigorous training programs the Army created. Prewar CMTC training was minimal, while ORC training was slightly better.

    The main shortcoming was found in the OCS Infantry training program, but was a product of poor tactical doctrine, but at least it taught the vast majority how to be a platoon leader, which is why so many became casualties...they had to lead to be effective. The rifle platoon leaders in all armies had similar casualty experiences.

    Meanwhile, the OCS system created plenty of fine junior officer leaders for the other Arms and Technical Services.

    BTW, the German army was also chronically short of good lieutenants and captains, which is why so many of those positions were filled by NCOs. They also discovered to their horror in Poland and France that much of their prewar junior officer and NCO infantry training was "horrible" and took numerous steps to correct it, based upon the experience of those two campaigns, during the "lull" from June 1940 to spring 1941...the American Army didn't have the luxury of revamping and retraining its junior officer and NCO corps based upon combat experience. It's priority was expanding and fielding units.
     
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  15. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Post nine referred. Napoleon made his troops march 24/7 and hit the enemy where they never expected. No combat contact until it was favourable to Napoleon. He did not stop for battle unless he was winning in those positions. Kph


    .
     
    Last edited: Sep 15, 2020
  16. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Why was OCS horrible? Jeez, where do I start?
    First of all, it was only 90 days long. It takes a lot more time and experience than that to make a good officer.
    Secondly, It took soldiers just out of training, who seemed to be good material, and made them "looys" without much service time and no combat experience.
    Third, related to your comment re. tactical doctrine: Apparently, they didn't evaluate that doctrine. Tac training was by formula. Trying to apply the standard formula to every situation got a lot of people killed along with the Lt.
    Fourth: While OCS may have been OK for "...other Arms and Technical Services" but those can be filled from ROTC. The biggest need was for infantry officers. The reason the Germans revamped their training was because none of their jr. officers and non-coms had seen combat. No one knew how they'd perform under stress.

    What would have made more sense would have been to have OCS an in-theater organization, based on real-world experience. That is, combat vets. Nobody knows who's going to be a good leader and who's going to be a dud until the shit hits the fan. ( good example: Audie Murphy). Then, selection to OCS would be for soldiers who had battlefield experience/survival instincts and had shown leadership potential. That way the chances of a quality product coming out would have been much greater. The idea we couldn't have done that is BS. We could have, we didn't because, I suspect, bureaucratic intertia.
     
  17. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Harolds, you are missing the point of OCS, it is not quality, but quantity...To churn out as many "leaders" as quickly as possible, as the Army was expanding at an astonishing rate. Early on, it was known that ROTC would not be able to graduate the necessary numbers of lieutenants that would be needed.
     
  18. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    Actually, 84 or 91 days depending on the Branch program. The "90-day wonder" tag actually was the "Plattsburg" CMTC, which was so inadequate it led to Marshall developing the OCS program.

    In any case, OCS was post Basic Training, so they already had a minimum of 84 days in service as enlisted, and for most of the initial intake in fall 1941, they had between 12 and 18 months service as National Guard inductees or Selective Service selectees and in many case years of RA experience, often as senior NCOs. If they were selected from ROTC, most of them had three years-plus of military education, most of the college ROTC programs were cadet programs like VMI, VPI, LMI, and so on, not far different from the "formal" military training at West Point.

    Um, forgive me, but where was the supply of officer candidates not "just out of training" and with "combat experience" that the U.S. Army could draw on in 1941-1943 to mke "looys"?

    They didn't "evaluate" it? Really? Why did they need to evaluate it any more than did the Germans? German infantry doctrine in 1939 was based upon their experience of 1917-1918, modified according to how they saw the effects of improved communications and mobility via wireless and motorization. American infantry doctrine was based upon their experience of 1917-1918, modified according to how they saw the effects of improved communications and mobility via wireless and motorization. British infantry doctrine...and so on. That doctrine was then modified based upon new experience. The Germans were lucky and were able to revamp doctrine and training nearly universally from late June 1940 to late June 1941 in most cases, and from June 1940 to February 1941 for those units committed to the Balkans. The American Army never had that luxury.

    So the solution was to have no infantry officers until they had seen combat? Seriously? BTW, ROTC fed to OCS, no one thought it was a good idea to direct commission ROTC, only West Point was direct commission. Prewar, ROTC fed the ORC through Regular Army Inactive unit training.

    Okay, then who leads this army into battle to gain this real-world experience? BTW, Audie Murphy was a battlefield commission, not OCS, the 3d Inf Div couldn't afford losing his services for 84 or 91 days.

    Um, so describe to me how this works, please. How are operations sustained in 1942-1943 when the units are being stripped continuously of their "soldiers who had battlefield experience/survival instincts and had shown leadership potential". Oh, and how can those units even get into combat in the first place when you don't have the junior leadership generated by OCS to enable them to deploy? I'm all ears.
     
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  19. harolds

    harolds Member

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    Oh, I understand all right, and that argument could hold water in 1942 but not in '44 when we've had two years of war and thousands of soldiers who've been at the tip of the spear and not only lived but also had leadership qualities.
     
  20. harolds

    harolds Member

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