According to Danny S Parker " To win the winter sky" Patton was about to start a major offensive on Dec 19th 1944 but the German Ardennes offensive halted Patton. ANyone know a book/site with info on this operation? Patton also seems to have been eager to continue the attack and hit deep into Germany behind the attacking German troops. Has it been discussed anywhere how successful this kind of option could be and would it cause total destruction of the German front?
From "The Battle of the Bulge" US Army Official History from the CMH website. "To accomplish this the Supreme Commander gave permission for the Third Army to mount an offensive along the Saar front on 19 December and directed Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the 6th Army Group commander, to support the drive with elements of the Seventh Army. In the meantime these two armies continued heavy local attacks, Patton driving on Saarlautern while Lt. Gen Alexander M. Patch’s Seventh Army turned north into the Saverne Gap" I think Patton hitting behind the attack front would have been dangerous, the forces used to seal the southern edge of the Ardennes would not have been in place. The weather was crap, all Airpower committed to stopping the Germans and the terrain not suitable for a breakout. It may have caused the Germans to halt their attacks, and not caused the drain on their resources which the Ardennes caused.
What a pain in the butt query you’ve come up with this time Kai, it’s kept me digging about since you posted it . Like your author hasn’t gone into detail, just about no one else appears to? It was an operation planned in the Lorraine offensive, hence it should be detailed in a good memoir, (Patton, Bradley?), or study of the offensive? I’ve only found two direct references, one on the American Air Force History site, and an RAF file in the PRO - AIR 14/1423? The USAAF mention online only runs to notes on chapters of the documents they hold. However, something can be gained from these pdf notes as follows: https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/spires/09endnotes.pdf#search=%22operation%20tink%22 (Presume ref to ‘Weyland’ is Brig. Gen. Otto P. "Opie" Weyland, commander US Tactical Air Command) 92. Weyland, “Diary,” Nov 19, 1944; XIX TAC, “Combat Ops,” p 62. Although the Merzig bombing was second among the four joint operations in Lorraine, both XIX TAC and Third Army considered it less significant than the other three, the abortive Operation Tink. 105. Weyland, “Diary,” Dec 6, 1944; XIX TAC, AC/S, A–3, “Operation Tink: Air Plan in Support of Third US Army 111. Weyland, “Diary,” Dec 16, 1944. The only problem that surfaced was whether XV Corps would receive air support at the expense of XII Corps. General Eddy apparently had reversed an earlier agreement that provided XV Corps the air support in question. Weyland wisely sidestepped the matter, explaining that Third Army should notify XV Corps because it was not an air force matter. In any event, Operation Tink, his plan to break through the Siegfried Line, was to proceed as originally designed. German Ardennes offensive started 16 December. On Patton and the Lorraine offensive, I found a very interesting comment on the US Army Command and General Staff College site. Not exactly what devotees of General Gorge may want to read. When you go to the page below (you will get warnings re the site certificate), scroll down to the ‘Maps’ list and click on “Third Army Operations, 19 November”. This will skip you down to one of the tiny maps(#13), and suggest reading from the first paragraph above this map. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp#Third%20Army%20Operations,%2019%20November%201944 If you need a large map of essentially ‘who was where’ just before the Ardennes, there’s one at: http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Pics6/wwiie70a.jpg In his book ‘Crusade in Europe’, Ike says: ”In early December, General Patton, with his Third Army, was making preparations to renew the attack against the Saar, the assault to begin December 19. Patton was very hopeful of decisive effect, but, determined to avoid involvement in a long, inconclusive, and costly offensive, Bradley and I agreed that the Third Army attack would have to show tremendous gains within a week or it would be suspended.” Ike goes on to say if successful it should draw German forces away from the weaker points on the front (he admits only having 4 Divisions on the Ardennes was his decision), but if they allowed it to bog down and threw in more resources it would dramatically effect their ability to counter any German offensive elsewhere. Hope these bits help? No.9
Thanx Guys! Have to digest these things for a while! ANyway, I can understand Patton´s temptation to carry on the attack right behind the Germans because it was looking a bit like the attack at Mortain turning into the Falaise pocket.
