Yamamoto

,,,,what was the mission--what were the orders? to damage/destroy the US fleet and the tanks/docks? --or just the fleet? ....if just the fleet--mission was accomplished

 

So you switched on me...I was speaking globally, and you picked out a specific. I guess we're both right

But yeah, his order to hold 50% of the strike force in reserve was not too bright. Number one, that's micro-managing. Number two, you always want your field commander to have the maximum flexibility because its never going to go the way you planned. Nagumo's biggest mistake that day was following that particular order.

 

I don't know why there's so much hubbub about Yamamoto's ambush. Online articles keep glorifying the fact that more than a dozen P-38s were used against three bombers and just a handful of escorting fighters (or were there?) In any case, the articles and videos keep saying it's in revenge for Pearl Harbor. My guess is a bit different. The Americans were afraid the guy might still manage a second, more devastating surprise attack of some kind, so he had to be killed.

 

I thought the Americans knew of the attack before it happened? Well in any case, a move like Pearl Harbor can only emanate from the top level.

 

2 G4M bombers and 6 A6M Zero escorts...Yes, there were escorting Japanese fighters.

What is glorified, and you ignore, is the fact that Army pilots flew over 600 miles, over open water, found, and intercepted their target. It is akin to finding a needle in a haystack.

The Americans were afraid of the guy that gave them Midway & Guadalcanal? Pearl Harbor was Yamamoto's one success, all his other operations were draws or failures.

 

Knowing an attack is coming is entirely different from actually knowing where the blow will fall. The Philippines was expected to take the hit.

US naval intelligence did not believe that the Japanese fleet could steam to Pearl Harbor & back.

 

Well then looking for a mediocre needle in a haystack is really glorious. Midway was an operational failure, with too many possible opposing outcomes. Guadalcanal, maybe. No clear plan on how to deal with the problem.

 

Wasn't it Yamamoto himself saying that for six months he would be succesful, after that not.

I recall that FDR due to Japan's actions in China stopped practically most if not all Fuel selling to Japan, and the Japanese calculated their Navy would be immobile in 6 months. I cannot understand who would not understand that there would be two choices for Japan : go for peace or war during that period.

 

There seems to be an unspoken assumption that a third wave targeted against the naval base and oil farms would have obliterated those facilities and thereby crippled Pacific Fleet operations for the next year or two.

A third wave, like the first two, would comprise about half of Nagumo's attack aircraft, less those lost or damaged beyond repair in the morning attack, at best about 120, carrying about 100 tons of bombs, comparable to about 40 B-17s. Now let us recall how many times, mainly in Europe, factories, oil refineries and the like were struck by hundreds of heavy bombers, rarely totally destroyed, and usually back in operation within a few months.

We just can't assume that "third wave" equals "naval base eliminated".

 

It wasn't such a bad idea, keeping an anti-ship strike ready until the morning reconnaissance could confirm whether or not there were American ships in the vicinity.

Nagumo followed the order to the extent of having torpedoes mounted on Akagi and Kaga's B5Ns, but he ceased following it almost immediately upon receiving Tomonaga's message that a second attack on Midway would be necessary. They had started rearming with land-attack bombs when the sighting report of American ships came in. Nagumo might have been better off if he had stuck to Yamamoto's instructions a bit longer.

Side note, the dive bombers on Hiryu and Soryu were not as critical an issue. They were generally not armed until they were spotted on the flight deck, and the 242kg GP bombs would have been effective against either land targets or ships other than heavily armored battleships.

 

Something else occurred to me about the question of a third strike - the discussion among Nagumo and his staff is generally portrayed as taking place after the morning attack was complete, as if they just started thinking about it. It doesn't seem like the sort of decision that should be made on the spur of the moment. An attack on shore facilities would not seem to depend on the results of the morning attack on ships. @bronk7 poses a good question; the need for or desirability of attacking the naval base should have been considered in the planning for the operation and direction provided to Nagumo and his team.

 

"Cripple the US Pacific fleet" is not the same as "Pulverize Pearl Harbor for keeps."

 

That certainly would have been desirable; but if the American carriers were not in Pearl Harbor, they could have been anywhere from the Marshall Islands to the West Coast. Nagumo & Co. had no way of knowing how close Enterprise was, or that the pugnacious Halsey was looking to engage the vastly superior Japanese force.

One option for the Japanese might have been to head for their bases in the Marshalls, about 2000 miles from their December 7 position, sweeping the area west of Hawaii (if the American carriers were somewhere east of Hawaii, searching for them was essentially pointless). In 20/20 hindsight, this would likely have enabled them to engage Enterprise and possibly Lexington. They could also have hit Midway and/or Wake on their way home.

The key issue was probably refueling. Historically of course they fueled on the way home from the same oilers as on the way out. In the Marshalls scenario, there would be three options:

1. They had the fuel to cruise to the Marshalls, but there would be little reserve for high-speed operations - like launching aircraft - especially for the escorting destroyers.

2. The oiler group could steam roughly southwest to rendezvous with the carrier force en route to the Marshalls.

3. The original oiler group - with a few fewer ships - could return home after the last refueling on the outbound voyage, and another group could head out from the Marshalls to meet Nagumo.

2. and 3. would involve the oilers steaming through the same area in which Nagumo was hoping to find American aircraft carriers. 2. raises the prospect of Lexington and her escorts encountering and destroying the Japanese oilers, leaving Nagumo in a bit of a fix.