Realistically, what WWII German secret/advanced weapons programme had the best chance of being a gam

For the Allied bomber offensive to fail, the Germans need to produce somewhere around 6 to 8% losses with say, 12 to 18% damaged aircraft, per sortie. That is, overall Allied losses exceed those numbers for every mission they put up. That happens and the Allies simply cannot replace the losses and the campaign collapses because it's too expensive to continue it for the results obtained.

The other game changer I've mentioned would be in civil engineering. The Germans produce cheap, modular buildings that can be erected by troops in the field easily. They mechanize railway repair and construction speeding these up considerably. By adopting methods and equipment early in the war that can do construction faster, the Germans gain a huge advantage in N. Africa and Russia when those campaigns open up. Of course, historically, the German military ignored this because their focus was on wars in Western Europe with short campaigns so this sort of thing wasn't really expected or needed in their planning.

But you could get it if the civilian world started doing this sort of thing pre-war to reduce the cost of building the grandiose projects Hitler wanted as well as make their completion faster.

 

Pre-fab huts make for target rich environment for the Soviets. Since the Napoleonic Days the Russians were masters of artillery and above ground huts would be levelled during a preparatory bombardment that preceded an attack. There are numerous books that describe how horrible it was to withstand a Soviet bombardment. Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier is but one of them.

I agree that improved RR would have facilitated the movement of supplies. If they had pre-fabbed tracks and a crane like today all they would need are the USN Sea-Bee like construction crews to prepare the gravel beds in advance along with guards to protect the track and trestles after they're completed. I remember the German quartermaster stating that they could only supply Barbarossa for thirty days and then resupply would be uncertain. A RR that followed the advance could alleviate the strain on supply. Rollbahns with German quality roads would have helped too.

A third element for RR to work is it requires protection from bombers and jabos. Rommel lamented that in Africa the RAF shot up anything and everything that moved.

Shipping containers, pallets and forklifts for victory!

US Army had Port Companies that specialized in loading and unloading of ships. They were the equivalent of dockworkers and stevedores vital to the war effort.

 

So did the Royal Engineers- Docks Operating Companies.

 

No.

 

The Germans didn’t KNOW how to build a bomb…they worked on a few areas hoping they would crack it in the mean time.

General George Marshall didn't seem to think they didn't know how to build a bomb.

General George C. Marshall. 1 September 1945 (publicly released 10 October 1945). Third and Final Biennial Report to the Secretary of War. In George C. Marshall. 1996. Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939–30 June 1945. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. pp. 132, 210. https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-57/CMH Pub 70-57.pdf

Victory in this global war depended on the successful execution of OVERLORD. That must not fail. Yet the Japanese could not be permitted meanwhile to entrench in their stolen empire, and China must not be allowed to fall victim to further Japanese assaults. Allied resources were searched through again and again, and strategy reconsidered in the light of the deficiencies. These conclusions seemed inescapable: France must be invaded in 1944, to shorten the war by facilitating the advance westward of the Soviet forces. At the same time German technological advances such as in the development of atomic explosives made it imperative that we attack before these terrible weapons could be turned against us.

Why did Marshall write this in September of 1945?

 

Marshall was writing about policies and decisions made during the war, mainly prior to the campaigns of 1944. At that time, nobody in the entire world knew how feasible atomic weapons might be, let alone what progress Germany might have made. Everything from Nazi propaganda to Hitler's highest level discussions was suggesting that some sort of super weapon might turn the tide and save the day for Germany.

Small grammatical quibble: "That must not fail" reads as though it was written before Overlord; in 1945 it might have been better phrased as "That could not be allowed to fail".

 

Yeah, except Marshall didn't say "some kind of super weapon", did he. He said, quote, "At the same time German technological advances such as in the development of atomic explosives made it imperative that we attack before these terrible weapons could be turned against us", unquote. What German "development of atomic explosives" did he mean here?

This recently declassified (in 2006) US intelligence report from 1946 also has some interesting things to say.

HQ CIC, USFET, Region Munich IV, Munich Sub-Regional Office, 25 April 1946. Subject: Wilhelm Voss. Declassified 2006 [NARA RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 133, File Voss, Friedrich Wilhelm].

1. Dr. Wilhelm VOSS reported to this office 24 April 1946. Subject was the director of the Skoda Works and Bruenner Waffenwerke in Prague, Czechoslovakia from 1939–1945. Subject claims that he has valuable information on atom bomb research in Germany. He also states that he has information on a new type torpedo which is radar controlled and leave no trace in water.

2. Dr. Wilhelm VOSS was born 1 July 1896 in Rostock, Mecklenburg. [...] He was one of the founders of Reichswerke Hermann Goering and in 1938 became its commercial director. In 1939 VOSS was appointed director of Skoda and Bruenner Waffenwerke by Goering.

3. Subject states that the two men that were responsible for research on the most secret weapons at Skoda were SS Gruppenfuehrer Prof. KAMMLER and his deputy SS Oberfuehrer PURUCKER. On the 10 May 1945 VOSS and PURUCKER were in Schimelitz, fleeing in the direction of the American troops. PURUCKER was driving a large civilian car which contained many of the plans on the atom bomb. This car plus material fell into the hands of the Russians, and VOSS was separated from PURUCKER. VOSS at present does not know where PURUCKER is located.

What "plans on the atom bomb" were being described here? "Kammler" was SS General-Engineer Hans Kammler, whose multiple "deaths" as described by postwar western "historians" were all supposed to assure us that he was safely gone and buried. But then he turned up alive in American captivity until at least 1947, per other documents. Kammler ran the entire late war underground SS secret weapons empire, including ballistic missiles and numerous other advanced military tech. In this and other reports he is mentioned specifically in connection with German nuclear weapons. Nothing to see here?

Next we have a transcription of a recording by British intelligence of a conversation between two captured German Army generals in January 1945.

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) S.R.G.G. 1118. [Recorded conversation of two German prisoners of war held in the United Kingdom. AFHRA A5415 electronic pp. 284–285] M 159—General der Panzertruppen Von THOMA (GOC German AFRIKORPS) Captd MIDDLE EAST 4 Nov 42 CS/981 Generalleutnant KITTEL (Comd. METZ and Comd. 462 Volksgren. Div.) Captd METZ 22 Nov 44

Information received: 10 Jan 1945

TRANSLATION

KITTEL: (Re atom bomb). It’s a perfectly horrible thing.

THOMA: A technical man has written about it, saying the problem has been completely solved theoretically, but that the process can’t be controlled(?).

KITTEL: That’s the question. At the passing-out parade of an officer’s course the FUHRER—I ¨ sent for one of the officers personally, for they were the ones who were at METZ—

THOMA: He’s lying. There’s absolutely no such thing as the atom business.

KITTEL: Unfortunately there is.

THOMA: Then he would have used it long ago.

KITTEL: No; he isn’t using it, because the others have promised to retaliate with chemical warfare. [...]

THOMA: But there’s no such thing as an atom bomb.

KITTEL: The experiments with it are carried out on BORNHOLM; the island has been evacuated and no-one may enter or leave the place.

THOMA: What do they do there?

KITTEL: They carry out their experiments there. Apparently they’ve got another trump card up their sleeve.

Note that Kittel specifically states that "there is" such a thing as "the atom business", that is, that a German atomic bomb exists as of January 1945. Why did he say this?

 

He was rightly concerned about the possibility of Germany developing atomic weapons. He was discussing Allied strategy for 1944; the possibility was one of several reasons why "France must be invaded in 1944"

claims. And again, all he claims is that atom bomb research was being conducted in Germany, which we all know,

Something else which never existed. Apparently this fellow was an expert in both atomic weapons and naval torpedos.

So a general who spent a distinguished career commanding troops in the field, winner of the Knight's Cross, talking about such a thing as "the atom business", proves that a German atom bomb existed? Once again, no one disputes that "the atom bomb business" existed. The bomb didn't.

 

"This fellow", Dr. Wilhelm Voss, was the top man at the Skoda Works, one of the largest armaments manufacturing sites on the planet at that time.

So, "we all know" research was being done on atomic fission. Uhh, yeah. What about the description of actual German atomic bomb plans being captured by the Soviets? You've got nothing to say about that, evidently.

General Heinrich Kittel specifically said, quote: "....he (Hitler) isn't using it, because the others (the Allies) have promised to retaliate with chemical warfare", unquote. What was "it" that Hitler was not using, and to which both Kittel and von Thoma were referring?

 

Indeed he was, and all he claims is that he has valuable information on atom bomb research in Germany. Did his Allied captors assess these claims? The war was over, they had plenty of time to study such claims. I expect you're familiar with Operation Paperclip, in which we sought to learn everything we could about German advanced technology.

 

Alright, so we agree that there was some kind of "MAD" (mutually assured destruction) angle going on with some kind(s) of WMD's during WWII. Obviously the Germans possessed incredibly lethal nerve gas in the thousands of tons, while the Allies had phosgene and mustard gas in the tens of thousands, along with enormous quantities of anthrax.

Regarding German nuclear weapons, there were a number of participants in the conflict who believed that they did exist. Here are some of them. Note that many of these either did not speak for the record until years or decades later, or else made certain that their statements on this matter did not appear in print in public sources until after they were dead.

Otto Hahn, 1968, Mein Leben, p. 200:

Professor Staudinger wrote me that an officer had given him his word of honor that three German nuclear bombs had been ready for deployment in the Lüneburg Heath shortly before the end of the war.

Benito Mussolini, 20 April 1945 interview. Gian Gaetano Cabella, 1948, Testamento politico di Mussolini, p. 45:

The famous destroyer bombs are going to be prepared. I have, still a few days ago, received very precise news. Perhaps Hitler does not want to strike the blow except in the absolute certainty that it is decisive. It seems that there are three of them, these bombs, and of astounding effectiveness. The construction of each is tremendously complicated and time-consuming.

Erwin Bartmann, 2013, Für Volk und Führer, pp. 160–161, 231:

‘As you know, I am responsible for making the telephone connections when calls are made to and from the Air Ministry. Listen to this—the other day I made a connection between Göring and the Führer. […] Göring asked the Führer for permission to use three special bombs but he refused. “If I use them in the east they will get us from the west,” said the Führer.’ […]

After the war, I became friends with Rochus Misch, a fellow Leibstandarte veteran and communications officer in the Führerbunker until the final days of the Reich. The topic of the special bombs came up in conversation. ‘Three bombs,’ he said, ‘where did you hear that? There were nine.’

Henry Picker, 2009, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, 2nd ed., pp. 42, 493:

[…] the small-pumpkin-sized “uranium bombs” (with their full destructive energy in a 3-km radius), which according to (Hitler's adjutant Julius) Schaub’s information had been developed to ready prototypes at the Reichspost’s research office in Lichterfeld […] According to Schaub, the “terrible weapons” meant above all the “uranium bomb” with the size of a small pumpkin which was to be produced in an underground SS plant in the southern Harz region (with a production capacity of 30,000 workers). The plant was relocated to the USSR by the Red Army in 1945 after Germany’s unconditional surrender.


Edmund Tilley. Brief Operational Report on [censored] and Other Germans and Italians Connected with Project Abstract. 19 August 1947. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134A, Box 29, Folder Operation Oberjoch:

25. Prof. Dr. NIELS [Walter Nielsch?], now said to be in the United States, was, according to [censored,] concerned with chemical and atomic problems at TUCHELER HEIDE and produced a number of atomic bombs, weighing from 1 to 5 kilograms. NIELS should be traced and questioned in detail. (Tilley was essentially a native German speaker because he spent much of his youth in Germany. He was probably the top British interrogator of captured German military personnel in WWII. Obviously no atom bomb weighs between 1 and 5 kilograms but there are many fission pits---bomb cores---that do.)


Werner Grothmann, 2002 interview, Jonastalverein Archive, pp. 31–32:

It is known to me that there were four atomic tests. The first still in 1943 in the autumn in the North Sea, which failed. Then two in 1944 in the autumn and the late autumn. One of them on the ground, that is on a small stand, the later one in the atmosphere on a parachute. That one in winter 1944 in the air was highly explosive and the charge [fuel] was also larger. That could have been in November. The last test was then again with a small charge in March 1945. […] I can definitely declare that I was told of six atomic bombs that came from three different research installations. All were prototypes. In addition, there were some very small devices that were intended for laboratory experiments. (Grothmann was Himmler's top wartime adjutant and spoke extensively and in considerable detail about the German nuclear weapons program in a series of interviews he gave to his neighbor Wolf Krotzky between 2000 and Grothmann's death in 2002.)


R. P. Linstead & T. J. Betts (U.K. & U.S. CIOS chairs). 15 September 1945 final report. The Intelligence Exploitation of Germany. AFHRA A5186 pp. 904–1026.

Certain items have been omitted because of security considerations. […] Of particular significance were the statements, made by German experts in the rocket and controlled missile field, that much of the priority accorded their work by the German High Command was in anticipation of the use of atomic explosives. These authorities stated that KWI had repeatedly assured Hitler that an atomic explosive would be available for use within a comparatively short time. During the last months of work by the Peenemünde staff, V-weapons were designed with much smaller war-heads. Quite possibly this trend was in anticipation of the successful development of a German atomic explosive.


Erich Rundnagel, in: Gerhardt Remdt and Gunter Wermusch. 2006. Rätsel Jonastal. 2nd ed. Meiningen: Heinrich Jung. pp. 125-126.

I was mainly involved with Dr. Rehbein and engineer Rackwitz, with whom I came into a kind of relationship of trust. […] Then he told me that something was being developed here that had a greater explosive power than anything I could imagine as an old pioneer. Rehbein just smiled and said the whole bomb was only a few decimeters tall, but weighs about eight kilograms. When I asked him if I could see the thing, he waved it off: “That could cost us both our heads.”


OSS. 19 September 1943. NARA RG 226, Entry 125, Box 6, Folder 78.

Our sources claim that there are large explosive factories in Hiltersheim, Magdeburg district. These factories are said to have been moved here from Ludwigshafen. They are in underground, bomb-proof spaces. They are making a high-density explosive here that is supposed to have an enormous explosive effect. […] With one kilogram, everything should be literally razed away, or disintegrated to dust and ashes, within a radius of approximately four kilometers.


Marshal Georgy Zhukov. 2 October 1945. Report to Joseph Stalin. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fund 93, Division 77 (45), List 4-11.

Based on the collected materials, it can be concluded that the German scientists in the field of theoretical and practical research and application of atomic energy have achieved good results up to the creation of the atomic bomb. (Zhukov's much longer report is now publicly available and it is quite detailed.)


Allen Dulles, 1 April 1945, Cable IN 9061 from Bern, Switzerland to Office of Strategic Services, NARA RG 226, Entry UD-90, Box 6, Folder 64 SUNRISE:

In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call “Verzweiflunge” weapon [Verzweiflungswaffe: desperation weapon]. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command.

What was the "desperation weapon" to which Kesselring was referring here?


FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. Margaret L. Suckley Papers. Journal Group E. JE 208. 9 Dec. 1944.

He [FDR] spoke very seriously at dinner about the German menace. He has just had a secret report from a German source which has been quite reliable in the past, to the effect that the Germans have a V3 bomb which will kill by concussion everything within a mile. They are planning to use it on New York for morale purposes—again, not seeming to realize that it will have the exact opposite effect to that which they expect. The entire Atlantic seaboard has relaxed all its dim-outs and air-raid precautions, etc. & the Pres. sent word to the Gen. staff that all previous preparations of that sort should be reviewed on the chance that the report about the V3 may be true. He said that in the next war, the side which first uses these new explosives will undoubtedly win. The Germans are way ahead of us in that direction, though we are doing a lot of research trying to catch up to them.

What were the "new explosives" with which "the Germans were way ahead of us"?

 

Reminds me of IRAQ - WMDs - We went to war on the back of them...None ever found.

 

In terms of nuclear weapons Germany:

Had ZERO means to produce plutonium in usable quantities for a nuclear weapon. That would require graphite moderated fast fission reactors. A heavy water fast fission reactor won't cut it. Since Germany's graphite manufacturers never figured out how to remove neutron poisons in graphite, like boron, they couldn't produce the necessary grade of material to make such a reactor.

This means, in turn, the only--ONLY--way Germany had forward to a nuclear bomb was mass enrichment of uranium and building a uranium bomb. That too wasn't happening. Germany lacked any means of enrichment beyond small laboratory scale equipment that at best might have created a few grams of highly enriched material.

But for argument's sake, let's assume they somehow enriched the necessary uranium. How many bombs could they realistically build going this route, one? Two? Without knowing about Plutonium and how to mass manufacture it, they aren't getting a nuclear weapon that can change much of anything even if they make them.

This makes the whole discussion of a German nuclear weapon a moot point in any case. Germany gets a uranium bomb or two, and the US returns the favor in spades ten times over with much more powerful plutonium bombs.

 

Actually, it didn't. Not even close.

Goudsmit claimed---laughably---in his 1947 book that only ALSOS was quote, authorized, unquote, to investigate the WWII German nuclear weapons program on behalf of the Allies (or at least the western Allies, ie, the UK and US). I cannot emphasize strongly enough that this is entirely false. Egregiously so. There are literally thousands of intelligence reports and other papers located today in various national archives which contain voluminous information about the German nuclear program. This data was gathered by a multitude of Allied militaries, intelligence agencies, underground agents, and on and on. Just off the top of my head, these included: the OSS, MI-6, US Army Ordnance, USAAF intelligence (A-2), US Army intelligence (G-2), US Navy intelligence, Manhattan Project foreign intelligence, Red Army GRU, Soviet technical intelligence (SMERSH), the French, Dutch, and Danish underground, and a number of others. ALL of these produced documents that you or anyone willing to do their homework can obtain from NARA, Kew Gardens, Dutch, French, and Danish national archives and so on. There is also a great deal of corroborating evidence in the former Axis nations' libraries (archives) as well.

But since you have brandished this seeming quote a number of times prior to today, and since you seem to think it sweepingly authoritative, well then.

On what date was the "Mother never pregnant" message sent?

From whom was it sent, and who was the recipient?

In what specific archive and archival location can it be found today?. Or failing that, in what scholarly history book or primary source(s) is the message quoted in its entirely, or at minimum where is it properly described? If you have endnotes that include a proper archival citation, and/or a hyperlink to one, that would be helpful as well.

Meanwhile, as before you steadfastly ignore the numerous quotes and primary sources (and there are many more) that I posted above. Other than your apparent quote, what is your explanation for what these people and sources say?

 

Regarding the efficacy of heavy water reactors in producing plutonium there is this.

Plutonium: The First 50 Years

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). 1996. Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 through 1994. Washington, DC: Department of Energy. Ch. 9

"Five heavy water production reactors were built at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina between 1953 and 1955. The production reactors used heavy water as a moderator primary cooling medium. The primary coolant was completely contained in the reactor building. Heat was extracted through the use of heat exchangers cooled by water from the Savannah River.

Through 1988, the Savannah River reactors produced 36.1 metric tons of plutonium."

 

That was in the US 10+ years later, not during WW 2. The Germans didn't even have correct geometry for the one reactor they started to build. The blocks of uranium were randomly positioned. Aside from that, the US had far more heavy water in WW 2 available for use than the Germans did.

Captured supplies of heavy water in Germany the US obtained represented about 1 month of US production in the P-9 Project.

 

One more for now.

Edward Teller’s request for Siegfried Flügge’s assistance. [NARA RG 330, Entry A1-1B, Box 43, Folder Flügge, Siegfried]

EXOS:ONR:N421:UL:kcm Serial No. 14654

NAVY DEPARTMENT Office of Naval Research Washington 25, D.C.

July 18, 1947

From: Chief of Naval Research
To: Chief of Naval Intelligence
Subj: Foreign Scientists, Request for assistance on.

1. Professor Edward Teller, Physics Department, University of Chicago, is supervising under contract to this Office a research program on various phases of research in physics of the solid state. This program is of interest and importance to the national security. Professor Teller is very desirous to obtain the services of the German physicist, Dr. Siegfried Flügge, who can be of marked assistance in carrying out the aforementioned program.

2. Professor Teller has requested the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce, to obtain Dr. Flügge from Germany. It is requested that the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency be informed of the Navy’s interest in this case, and asked to provide such assistance as is possible to Professor Teller in aiding Dr. Flügge to come to this country.

C. M. Bolster

-------------------

Raise your hand if you know who Flugge was or anything about his wartime work in Germany. I had never heard of him prior to reading Dr. Todd Rider's book, Forgotten Creators. It turns out that Flugge was at least arguably the single most important man in the German nuclear weapons program; he was certainly their top theoretical physicist or very nearly so (Kurt Diebner, Erich Schuman, Wilhelm Groth and Georg Stetter might want a word).