1938: When The Time Is Right ... ?

The tides of war had begun to shit against the Axis in 1940, and by 1942, had clearly manifested themselves. Over the course of 1943, they would become more clear, and consume much of the strength of Japan, Italy, and Germany, thus preventing them from acting capably after that same year's conclusion. From 1944 to 1945, it was merely a matter of time. Berlin's gambles became ever more outrageous, while Japan could no longer effectively project any sort of power.

In order to rectify problems such as this, changes would have to be made to German policies as early as 1936. From that point until the official start of the war with the blitzkrieg of Poland - in 1939, the Italian armies should have been better-trained.

Germany did not gain the capacity to throw armored divisions at its opponents until after the capture of the Czech industries (notably Skoda), and similarly never focused on any one design. Although its tanks were of excellent quality, the small numbers produced by the Germans, and the attrocious state of Berlin's supply situation, prohibited a more successful prosecution of the war.

The war should have begun in 1938, even before the Germans were entirely ready. They should have begun their operations with the invasion of first Poland, then France. Mars El Kabir should not have been lost, and instead been the victim of an Italian land assault, in conjunction with the 4 German armored divisions later required to overrun the Middle East.

With some capable naval strength - including two carriers of the Joffre class, Germany could at least have projected more effectively into the Mediterranean.

The war in that theater should have begun with heavy German strikes at Malta, Marseilles, and Gibraltar from bases throughout Italy and now-occupied France. The German divisions should have swept through the Middle East to occupy the Suez. This completed, one motorized and three regular divisions should have been left in Egypt and Cyranaeica, while the remaining 3 divisions of armor swept through the Middle East and captured the supplies of oil - or at the very least, deprived burning fields to the British, who might have been hard-pressed to commit to a scorched-earth policy anyway, considering the rebellious state of the Arab population in the region - which would have delivered Iraq, in complete, to Germany.

Turkey would have been convinced to join the war. Having been given 1 armored division in 1938, it might have been better able to prosecute against the Caucasus in an invasion of Russia in 1941. Barbarossa was not ill-timed. The Germans were hardly ready, and Stalin was at least preparing to face down Hitler - though not quite so soon as the invasion date.

Britain should have been left to its own devices. The Luftwaffe strength lost there would have been put to better use elsewhere. Again, Germany should have deployed the following:

Eastern Front: Panzer: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Reserve: 1 pzr 1 mtr 6 inf 8 ttl
Group North: 3 pzr 2 mtr 23 inf 28 ttl
Group Centre: 6 pzr 5 mtr 39 inf 53 ttl
Group South: 5 pzr 2 mtr 38 inf 45 ttl

Other Theaters: Panzer: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Southeast: 7 inf 7 ttl
Afrika Korps: 4 pzr 1 inf 5 ttl
Denmark: 1 inf 1 ttl
Norway: 10 inf 10 ttl
Other Theaters: 2 pzr 57 inf 59 ttl
Total, German: 21 pzr 10 mtr 163 inf 194 ttl

Eastern Front: Armored: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Rumania: 2 arm 1 mtr 18? inf 21? ttl
Hungary: 2 arm 2 mtr 10? inf 14? ttl
Slovakia: 1? arm 1? mtr 2? inf 4? inf
Lithuania: ? ?
Finland: 1 arm ? inf ? ttl
Italy: 3 arm 2 mtr 8 inf 13 ttl
Turkey: 2 arm 1 mtr 8 inf 11 ttl
Spain: 1 mtr 8 inf 9 ttl

Assuming the Ukraine, Baltic, and Polish nations were treated as something more than human, Hitler might have gleaned signifigant numbers of divisions from collaborators only too happy to turn against their Soviet masters. It was this mistake of seeking the complete annihilation of the Slavs that lost Hitler valuable time and stability of supply lines, thus hampering - and perhaps even dooming - his campaign.

Turkish and German pressure on the Cacasus, and the solidarity of Italy's African army might have opened further options to the Axis, who could then apply a pincer movement previously unknown.

Again, better supply of the Finns, and better deployment of the Luftwaffe - whom would not be commited to the Battle of Britain - might have aided the Germans signifigantly.

Similarly, Japan doomed the Axis by attacking the United States, and Germany again doomed herself by first declaring war on Washington.

Italy made a strategic blunder in attacking Greece, while Hitler made a strategic blunder in focusing on varied and myriad projects with precious funds.

Spain, other than the contribution of a few divisions, would never "move off the fence." The best one could hope for is limited support for Barbarossa by "volunteers", and a half-hearted strike on Gibraltar, perhaps supported by 1 German Panzer and 1 Airborne division.

[ 12 May 2001: Message edited by: Desert Journeyman ]

 

Thank you for the warm welcome and kind words. They are appreciated.

[ 12 May 2001: Message edited by: Desert Journeyman ]

 

Two problems did come to light during review of my previous post this evening, the first being the question of French North Africa, wherein 120,000 colonial troops of excellent quality were stationed during the battles for Paris.

I believe that while losses would be signifigant, a competant assault could present a viable threat to the French, where supported by Stuka diver bombers and Junkers firepower. Messerschmidts would ostensibly be required as well, and the presence of a German submersible screen may have further presented trouble to French efforts at resupply.

Any signifigant move could have been aided by the Spanish Army of Africa in 1936, just prior to the Spanish Civil War. At the time, desperate for outside aid, Franco may have been more open to Berlin's manipulation and coercing, thereby opening routes towards alliance between Berlin and Madrid early on.

Again, there is the issue of the Tiger and its variants. Beyond the Panther, no further German designs were required. The cost to build one Tiger was already prohibitive, and later models of the Panzer IV could face T-34s with confidance.

Germany produced miscellanous numbers of models of tanks during the war, and could probably have accounted for greater strength in the numbers of proven variants had she entered wartime production at an earlier date, and focused on a finer issue of mass output rather than experimentation out of desperation.

 

I agree, VERY well said.

Spain contributed to what you know as the Wehrmachts 350th I.D. to Russia. The Spanish or Blue Division.

This unit was 50,000 strong. A normal compliment in a German division is between: 13,000 and 17,000, and is some cases could be as high as 24,000.

Spain could never have been a full ally of Germany-due to world political pressures. Franco certainly would have been a bigger contributer to the German cause, if he really thought Germany could have pulled it off and at least won a stalemate.

Creidt has to be given to them as they were extremely tough fighters. Russia took a big toll on their unit-but not in spirit. The 350th was nearly destroyed more than once but the Spaniards were game players.

Some chose to stay and fight after the Blue Division had to be pulled out of the fight. Many of these Spaniards were incorporated into different units of the Heer and the Waffen SS. There were some who were noted for fighting in the later East Front battles--especially in the near end. There were perhaps a company sized unit fighting in the bitter last days in Berlin.

Some of these men had actually fought in unitl liks SS Sturmbrigade Langemarck (Not my imaginating but the words of the units only Knights Cross Recipient and my personal friend).

I know im not contributing to what your implying as being a "what if". I just wanted it to be known that there is so much more to learn about these guys as we all know, but so much is unknown. I'm also not sure on how to answer your post on this one because I think you basically said it all. (I also can't fully concentrate here today as kids are running aroung here)

I agree with your post and I will say again--VERY WELL SAID! I hope to have some nice future conversations with you.

 

Excellent point, Evans, and thank you again for the compliments.

The Spanish were indeed tough fighters, and proved a difficult obstacle for the Red Army to overcome in the long run. This does not mean that Franco would have come easily "off the fence", however.

His demands for foodstuffs and medicines to Hitler were in the words of the Furher himself, "absolutely ludicrous." Madrid realized its tedious position, and therefore always admitted it would join the Axis were it to gain these benefits - which the Germans and Italians could never, even at their greatest extent, supply.

The issue of Spain must be solved either previous to the 1936 Civil War, when Franco required outside aid, or during the first months of Barbarossa, when the operation might not have consumed so many German lives.

 

The timing may have worked but personally do not believe Hitler had all of this in his original plan. I definitely do not believe he could have ever controlled the Med because the Brits would not allow him to ever bring his navy to the same level.

Hitler became an opportunist. Scandanavia was practically handed to him by the Brits. The Med and Balkans were forced unto by Ill Duce. Turkey, I do not believe would ever have gotten involved.

Spain would have been high maintenance due to the circumstances after a civil war. There have been alot of contributions made along the "unofficial" lines. Yes, volunteers have even served in the wehrmacht and Waffen-SS after the recall of the Blue Division. I also personally knew someone who had served in the Waffen SS. Given the proper equipment, I venture to say the Spanish would NOT have been another Itallian, Rumanian or Hungarian satellite division. They would have more like the Wollonian (spell) division.

In summary, I don't think attacking earlier would have altered the course by much. The Germans would have been "not" just as ready as the allies.

Just my .02 worth.

 

Had the Germans earlier massed Luftwaffe squadrons in Italy, and properly succeeded in their capture of Mars El Kabir, factors may have been considerably different. Again, if Italy were to secure a reliable source of coal before the war, perhaps in the Danae (Balkans), her fleet may have been a more viable threat to British interests, as it fielded far more submarines than Germany could muster in 1939.

Hitler was prepared to strike as early as 1939, and perhaps could have made a real effort in 1938, sans the Panzer III or IV. Again, Czechslovak opposition would dictate much of German's future at this point. Had Berlin opted to enter wartime production before the conflict, however, she might have been able to marshall considerably more in the way of men and materiél, lending these munitions nicely to the war effort.

There is no doubt that Sicily would have proven an excellent base for Stuka divebombers, Messerschmidt fighters, and Hitler's U-Boat menace. Again, with Italian strength, an earlier drive in North Africa, and perhaps the raising of vessels in Alexandria and Port Said, things might have gone very differently until at least 1940. Hitler's allies would have been similarly equipped.

Rumanian and Spanish units were never "sub-par", and they included excellent formations within their major contributed deployments. The question remains supply, without which neither could effectively fight.

 

Thank you and glad to spout off.

I agree with your points also. I would go into detail tonight but, computers will be down shortly.

I think Franco would have still teetered to the axis more than he did had he not ben pressured as much as they were.