Allied Commando Raids

I am starting this thread to show Allied Commando Raids and to remember the soldiers who gave their lives. Some operations have been remembered.....others haven't. Hope you enjoy reading.

[ 29. July 2003, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Jet ]

 

Dieppe : The Tragedy

The Allied situation in the spring of 1942 was grim. The Germans had penetrated deep into Russia, the British Eighth Army in North Africa had been forced back into Egypt, and in Western Europe the Allied forces faced the Germans across the English Channel.
Since the time was not yet ripe for mounting Operation Overlord, the full-scale invasion of Western Europe, the Allies decided to mount a major raid on the French port of Dieppe. Designed to foster German fears of an attack in the west and compel them to strengthen their Channel defences at the expense of other areas of operation, the raid would also provide an opportunity to test new techniques and equipment, and be the means to gain the experience and knowledge necessary for planning the great amphibious assault.

Accordingly, plans were drawn up for a large-scale raid to take place in July 1942. It was called Operation Rutter. Canadians would provide the main assault force, and by May 20 troops of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division were on the Isle of Wight to begin intensive training in amphibious operations. When unfavourable weather in July prevented Rutter from being launched, it was urged that the idea of a raid should be abandoned. However, the operation was revived and given the new code name Jubilee. The port of Dieppe on the French coast remained the objective.

The attack upon Dieppe took place on August 19, 1942. The troops involved totaled 6,100 of whom roughly 5,000 were Canadians, the remainder being British Commandos and 50 American Rangers. The raid was supported by eight Allied destroyers and 74 Allied air squadrons (eight belonging to the RCAF). Major General J.H. Roberts, the Commander of the 2nd Canadian Division, was appointed Military Force Commander, with Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N. as Naval Force Commander and Air Vice Marshal T.L. Leigh-Mallory as Air Force Commander.

The plan called for attacks at five different points on a front of roughly 16 kilometres. Four simultaneous flank attacks were to go in just before dawn, followed half an hour later by the main attack on the town of Dieppe itself. Canadians would form the force for the frontal attack on Dieppe and would also go in at gaps in the cliffs at Pourville four kilometres to the west, and at Puys to the east. British commandos were assigned to destroy the coastal batteries at Berneval on the eastern flank, and at Varengeville in the west.

As the assault force approached the coast of France in the early hours of August 19, the landing craft of the eastern sector unexpectedly encountered a small German convoy. The noise of the sharp violent sea fight which followed alerted coastal defences, particularly at Berneval and Puys, leaving little chance of success in this sector. The craft carrying No. 3 Commando were scattered and most of the unit never reached shore. Those who did were quickly overwhelmed. One small party of 20 commandos managed to get within 180 metres of the battery and by accurate sniping prevented the guns from firing on the assault ships for two-and-one-half vital hours before they were safely evacuated.

At Puys the Royal Regiment of Canada shared in the ill-fortune. The beach there was extremely narrow and was commanded by lofty cliffs where German soldiers were strategically placed. Success depended on surprise and darkness, neither of which prevailed. The naval landing was delayed, and as the Royals leapt ashore in the growing light they met violent machine-gun fire from the fully-alerted German soldiers. Only a few men were able to get over the heavily wired seawall at the head of the beach; those who did were unable to get back. The rest of the troops, together with three platoons of reinforcements from the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, were pinned on the beach by mortar and machine-gun fire, and were later forced to surrender. Evacuation was impossible in the face of German fire. Of those who landed, 200 were killed and 20 died later of their wounds; the rest were taken prisoner the heaviest toll suffered by a Canadian battalion in a single day throughout the entire war. Failure to clear the eastern headland enabled the Germans to enfilade the Dieppe beaches and nullify the main frontal attack.

In the western sector, meanwhile, some degree of surprise was achieved. In contrast to the misfortune encountered by No. 3 on the east flank, the No. 4 Commando operation was completely successful. According to plan, the unit went in, successfully destroyed the guns in the battery near Varengeville, and then withdrew safely.

At Pourville, the Canadians were fortunate enough to achieve some degree of surprise, and initial opposition was light as the South Saskatchewan Regiment and Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada assaulted the beaches. Resistance stiffened as they crossed the River Scie and pushed towards Dieppe proper. Heavy fighting then developed and the Saskatchewans, and the Camerons who supported them, were stopped well short of the town. The main force of the Camerons, meanwhile, pushed on towards their objective, an inland airfield, and advanced some three kilometres before they too were forced to halt.

The Canadians lost heavily during the withdrawal. The enemy was able to bring fierce fire to bear upon the beach from dominating positions east of Pourville, and also from the high ground to the west. However, the landing craft came in through the storm of fire with self-sacrificing gallantry and, supported by a courageous rearguard, the greater part of both units successfully re-embarked though many of the men were wounded. The rearguard itself could not be brought off and, when ammunition ran out and further evacuation was impossible, surrendered.

The main attack was to be made across the pebble beach in front of Dieppe and timed to take place a half-hour later than on the flanks. German soldiers, concealed in clifftop positions and in buildings overlooking the promenade, waited. As the men of the Essex Scottish Regiment assaulted the open eastern section, the enemy swept the beach with machine-gun fire. All attempts to breach the seawall were beaten back with grievous loss. When one small party managed to infiltrate the town, a misleading message was received aboard the headquarters ship which suggested that the Essex Scottish were making headway. Thus, the reserve battalion Les Fusiliers Mont Royal was sent in. They, like their comrades who had landed earlier, found themselves pinned down on the beach and exposed to intense enemy fire.

The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry landed at the west end of the promenade opposite a large isolated casino. They were able to clear this strongly-held building and the nearby pillboxes and some men of the battalion got across the bullet-swept boulevard and into the town, where they were engaged in vicious street fighting.

Misfortune also attended the landing of the tanks of the Calgary Regiment. Timed to follow an air and naval bombardment, they were put ashore ten to fifteen minutes late, thus leaving the infantry without support during the first critical minutes of the attack. Then as the tanks came ashore, they met an inferno of fire and were brought to a halt stopped not only by enemy guns, but also immobilized by the shingle banks and seawall. Those that negotiated the seawall found their way blocked by concrete obstacles which sealed off the narrow streets. Nevertheless, the immobilized tanks continued to fight, supporting the infantry and contributing greatly to the withdrawal of many of them; the tank crews became prisoners or died in battle.

The last troops to land were part of the Royal Marine "A" Commando, which shared the terrible fate of the Canadians. They suffered heavy losses without being able to accomplish their mission.

The raid also produced a tremendous air battle. While the Allied air forces were able to provide protection from the Luftwaffe for the ships off Dieppe, the cost was high. The Royal Air Force lost 106 aircraft which was to be the highest single-day total of the war. The RCAF loss was 13 aircraft.

By early afternoon, Operation Jubilee was over. Conflicting assessments of the value of the raid continue to be presented. Some claim that it was a useless slaughter; others maintain that it was necessary to the successful invasion of the continent two years later on D-Day. The Dieppe Raid was closely studied by those responsible for planning future operations against the enemy-held coast of France. Out of it came improvements in technique, fire support and tactics which reduced D-Day casualties to an unexpected minimum. The men who perished at Dieppe were instrumental in saving countless lives on the 6th of June, 1944. While there can be no doubt that valuable lessons were learned, a frightful price was paid in those morning hours of August 19, 1942. Of the 4,963 Canadians who embarked for the operation only 2,210 returned to England, and many of these were wounded. There were 3,367 casualties, including 1,946 prisoners of war; 907 Canadians lost their lives.

http://users.pandora.be/dave.depickere/Text/dieppe.html

 

Dieppe Raid : A Poem

Young men across the sea
Motherland yes! But not their country.
A mother! A farther! across the sea?
A young wife there waiting for thee?
Perhaps a young girl, who you called friend!
You had her picture you looked at now and then.
But no hand to hold, the picture was cold, not like the hand you used to hold.

They laughed, they played, they cried some days,
not unlike you and me these young lads across the sea.
They had been to the circus, what a strange sight indeed, not an animal there to see.
They had been to Dover but wanted it over, for it was home where they wanted to be.

The butcher, the baker, the farmer's son,
the doctor, the lawyer, the preacher's son,
everyone a mother's son. Not unlike you and me,
but in a far away land across the sea.

5000 young lads began the attack, 907 would never come back.
907 died for thee, 907 that we might live free.
907 not fourteen, 907 but mere teens.
907 with tears not seen, 907 not fourteen.
The Spiral of Hate is so obscene.

5000 began the attack, 907 never came back.
They gave their lives so readily that you and I might live free.
In future would there be, such lads as these
who would give so much that we might live free?

And the boots were told to march,
one step forward, not one back
one sept forward, they began the attack.
They could not run for at the end there would be fighting to be done.

One step forward, a friend hit, Why!
One sept forward, would that friend die?
One step forward, one must pass him by.
One step forward through the screams of friends,
and they thought Oh! God please! let there not be a mine waiting for me.

One step forward, a friend torn clear to the thigh.
One step forward, they must pass him by.
One step forward through this man made hell
would future generations do as well?

One step forward, never one back
one step forward they pressed the attack.
One step forward they walked the beach
only to find a machine gun there to greet,
several more friends cut down.
One step forward life passed death by.

One step forward through satan's game of Hate
God said Love! satan said NO!
Onward, onward through the Spiral of Hate they go
One step forward trough the Spiral of Hate,
the spiral that was stopped far too late.

The four horsemen waiting there,
see them prance! see the nostrils flare!
the four horsemen will get their chance
when satan calls, and we dance.
Ride! horsemen, Ride! Spurred on by Hate,
before you are through would be the death of six million Jews.

They could not go to ground
One step forward amidst the artillery rounds.
One step forward passed the parts of friends.
In future would there be such boys as these
who would give so much for liberty.
One step forward, why must there be
such a price to pay for liberty?

One step forward to the center of town
once there to be turned around
for it was just a raid, there for the day, 907 would pass away.

Where! Oh where, is the glory of war?
There is no glory it is but a whore
907 would be no more.

What did they learn that terrible day
that they had not learned so long ago.
"into the valley of death road the 600"
What did they learn, but young men must die
when artillery and mortar fall from the sky.
What they learned was from Mr X,
that deception was by far the best.

The four horsemen waiting there,
see them prance! see the nostrils flare!
for satan will call, we will dance
the horsemen know they will get their chance.

http://www3.ns.sympatico.ca/goldens/diep.htm

 

Operation Chariot : St Nazaire Raid

The early months of 1942 were one of the darkest ever periods in Britain’s history. Her armies were being driven back in almost every major theatre of war. Whether in North Africa, Burma, or Malaya, the news was every- where the same. Critically short of supplies she depended for her survival on the vulnerable, lumbering convoys which brought her succour from America.

Already ravaged by U-boats this vital lifeline faced a new and mortal threat when in January the German super-battleship ‘Tirpitz’ sailed north to Trondheim. This was the traditional first move of surface raiders preparing to break out into the wastes of the North Atlantic, and it prompted an immediate response from the Admiralty, who took urgent action to forestall her.

Larger, faster and better armed than the very best ships the British could send against her, ‘Tirpitz’ was vulnerable only in that the very size which made her so feared also imposed limits on her operational use. Only a handful of ports throughout the world possessed dry docks large enough to house her should she, like her sister-ship ‘Bismarck’ ever be damaged in battle: and of these only one, the western French port of St. Nazaire, could be accessed directly from the Atlantic. Destroy the massive dry dock built there to house the liner ‘Normandie’ and ‘Tirpitz’ would be forced to return all the way to Germany for repair. Require her to run the gauntlet of air and sea patrols, and of the waiting Home Fleet, and it was judged that her masters might well rethink their plans to sail her.

Far too precise a target for heavy bombers, it was quickly realised that the ‘Normandie’ dock could only be destroyed by landing a force of men and several tons of explosives from the sea. A daunting operation at best, its planning and execution were entrusted to Lord Louis Mountbatten, who as head of Combined Operations was a specialist in mounting raids on enemy territory. Drawing his resources from all three services he was asked to sail a task force more than 400 miles through hostile waters, land his troops against spirited enemy resistance, support them while they carried out their demolitions, and then take the survivors off again. Already at the limit of the resources then available, planning was further complicated by the fact that St. Nazaire lay six miles inside the estuary of the River Loire and was safely approached only by means of a narrow and very well defended deep-water channel.

With time at a premium Mountbatten’s staff produced a scheme which was as risky as it was audacious. Code named Operation Chariot, it relied upon surprise and the judicious use of captured enemy signals to sail the attacking force as close as possible to its target before it was spotted and identified as hostile. Eschewing the guarded channel it was planned to take advantage of the high spring tides and send a force of light ships into the estuary across the extensive shoals which were believed to make much of it unnavigable. The force would consist of an obsolete and specially modified destroyer - originally the ‘USS Buchanan’ and now in British service as ‘HMS Campbeltown’ - whose bows had been packed with explosives, and a fleet of Fairmile Motor Launches drawn from Coastal Forces. All of the ships would carry parties of highly trained Army commandos, the majority of them lying flat on the deck of the old destroyer. Approaching the port at the head of two parallel columns of Fairmiles, Campbeltown’s job was to wrest every knot she could from her ageing engines, ram the outer gate of the dry dock and then scuttle herself with her charge placed tight against it while her commandos stormed ashore to do such damage as they could. The starboard column of launches would land their troops in the old Entrance, while those of the port column would be put ashore at the old Mole. The surviving ship would then wait in the estuary until the commandos had completed their demolitions, after which the survivors of all parties, including Campbeltown’s, would be taken off again. As the launches raced for home they would leave behind the old destroyer secure in the knowledge that her charge would explode and blow the lock gate to smithereens, long after they were out of range.

With planning virtually complete, the various elements of the ‘Chariot’ force began to assemble at Falmouth, their chosen port of departure. At this point it consisted of the ‘Campbeltown’, 12 Fairmiles, an HQ gunboat, an MTB and 2 Hunt class destroyers who were to act as an escort till almost within sight of the estuary. Only as the time for departure drew near was it realised that enemy vessels might be met within the estuary itself and that the force as it was presently constituted was too lightly armed to deal with them. To give it some teeth a last minute addition was therefore made, of half a flotilla of torpedo-armed Fairmiles based in Dartmouth. comprising 4 boats of the 7th ML flotilla, each mounting 2 torpedo tubes, this small but important formation was to become the ‘Chariot’ striking force and acquit itself with distinction in the coming action.

Joining the main force just in time to take part in a dummy attack on Devonport dockyard the Dartmouth boats, MS 156, 160, 177 and 270, found that their peculiarily garish form of camouflage stood out like diamonds in the glare of searchlights, necessitating a hurried repaint prior to departure.
MLs 160, commanded by Lieutenant Tom “Lizard” Boyd and 270 commanded by Lieutenant C.S.B. Irwin, were stationed with the gunboat in the van of the force. Carrying no troops, their primar function was to clear the way of enemy ships and give covering fire to the Campbeltown as she ran in to ram the gate. MLs 156, commanded by the film actor Lieutenant Leslie Fenton, and 177, commanded by the gallant but ill-fated sub-Lieutenant mark Rodier, were stationed at the rear of the starboard column. Acting as troop carriers, their commando complements together comprised the assault group of captain Richard Henry Hoopeoper.

At two o’clock on the afternoon of Thursday, March 26, the Chariot Force left Falmouth at the start of its long voyage south. Now consisting of 21 vessels in all, and carrying a total of 246 soldiers, it was jointly commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Newman, and Commander R.E.D. Ryder, R.N. Apart from one inconclusive action with a U-boat whose captain wrongly reported both their course and composition, they enjoyed an uneventful voyage, arriving off the estuary mouth just after midnight on the 28th. Adopting their attack formation they stole across the shallows and when finally challenged from the shore pretended to be a German convoy returning to port. Flashing genuine German call signs provided by Intelligence, they confused the enemy for long enough to penetrate close to their target, then all hell was let loose.

Swept by fire from dozens of gun positions, both in the port itself, and on the north and south shores of the estuary, the ships began to take casualties immediately. Fuelled by petrol, several of the Fairmiles blew up when their tanks were pierced, while others took hits to their flimsy wooden hulls that forced them out of the line. Ahead of them all, held in the glare of many searchlights, the elderley Campbeltown, drew the worst of the German response. Her sides rippling with explosions she surged toward the lock gate while ahead of her the gunboat and the Fairmiles of Boyd and Irwin duelled with guns ashore. Boyd’s 160 engaged and damaged the shoreline batteries to the east of the dock which would enfilade the destroyer’s starboard side when she struck: Irwin’s 270 meanwhile took on the searchlights which were fixed upon her bridge and armoured wheelhouse. At 20 knots and with her commandos in position to immediately storm ashore, the ‘Campbeltown’ hit the gate at 0134 hours. She struck dead centre and was hurriedly evacuated - no longer a ship but a time bomb ticking her way to destruction.

With the destroyer stuck fast in the gate the full fury of the German guns fell upon the hapless Fairmiles. Boyd, who took his 160 upstream in search of targets initially escaped the worst of it, but would later win the D.S.O. for his daring rescue of survivors from a burning boat. Irwin on the other hand was quickly hit and disabled. Forced to drift beneath the German guns while her emergency steering was rigged, the 270 nevertheless survived to limp to the open sea where she was later scuttled.

Of the intended landings at the old mole and old Entrance, little could be achieved in the face of withering defensive fire. only a handful of men were landed - far too few to be effective. Of the two Dartmouth boats carrying Hooper’s party, Rodier’s 177 did manage to pierce the German defences and put her men ashore; however Fenton’s 156 was hit early, disabled and forced to retire. with her steering shot out, only one engine working fitfully, and with both naval officers as well as Hooper wounded, it would have been suicide to go on. She too was scuttled later.

Nosing away from his landing point Rodier was hailed from the Campbeltown, and ordered to come alongside to take off survivors. While most of the destroyer ratings evacuated forward onto the dockside, her officers and a number of others, including wounded, waited on her stern to board the launch. Amongst the men taken off were the captain of the Campbeltown, Lieutenant Commander Beattie, her First Lieutenant, Chief Engineer, Surgeon, and perhaps most notably the brilliant young officer Lieutenant Nigel Tibbits, who had graduated from Dartmouth head of his term in 1930. It was Tibbits whose hands had been on the wheel when ‘Campbeltown’ struck, and it was Tibbits who had devised the means by which the destroyer had been turned into such a potent weapon of destruction.

Backing away from the destroyer’s port quarter the heavily laden launch picked up speed as she headed seaward, a long trail of phosphorescence streaming out behind her. Almost within sight of safety she was first bracketed by salvoes of heavy shells, and then hit and stopped. Afire amidships, with petrol swilling about in the scuppers, and with wounded everywhere, she eventually burned to destruction while the few who survived the onslaught took to the water. Of the men so very recently taken from the ‘Campbeltown’ only a handful, including Beattie, survived to be plucked from the sea in the morning. Most, including the gallant Tibbits, were lost.

Returning to the fray at the end of his sortie upstream, Boyd was met by the sight of boats burning and sinking in the fire-swept waters off the dockyard. He loosed a torpedo at a suspected enemy warship, and then proceeded seawards. Arriving off the old Mole he found the burning motor launch of Lieutenant T.D.L. Platt, which still had men on board. Ignoring the danger to his own boat, Boyd took the 160 alongside and held her there while Platt’s boat was searched for survivors and evacuated. Only when the last man was taken off did he attempt his own escape.

Missing the appointed rendezvous with the escort destroyers, Boyd teamed up with MLs 307 and 443, and turned north in the direction of home. When they finally berthed in Falmouth it was to find that they were the only vessels of the whole ‘Chariot’ force to return.

Of the 611 soldiers and sailors who took part in Chariot, 169 were killed and 200, most of whom were wounded, were taken prisoner. Only 242 returned immediately to British shores.

When the ‘Campbeltown’ exploded the following morning, carrying with her the massive outer gate of the ‘Normandie’ dock, the destruction for which so many young men had sacrificed their lives, was finally complete. so well had they done their job, the dock could not be used again before war’s end.

http://www.stnazairesociety.org/Sections/chariotstory.html

[ 29. July 2003, 06:08 AM: Message edited by: Jet ]

 

Bruneval Raid : 1st Airbornes 1st Drop

The first Parachute Operation undertaken by the British 1st Airborne Division was a Company size raid on a radar installation near Ste. Bruneval, France. They inserted by parachute, patrolled to the objective, stole the radar equipment and were evacuated from the beach by landing craft of the Royal Navy.

In the winter of 1941/42, Britain was on the defensive. They had survived the Battle of Britain but could not hope to invade the continent for another two and a half years. Their only form of offensive action lay in their Bomber Command. The biggest danger to the Bomber Crews was the new German radar network that had been deployed along the coast. They had to find a way to defeat the radar to protect their crews.

In January of 1942 Royal Air Force reconnaissance planes discovered a "Wuerzburg" radar installation at an isolated house near the village of Bruneval, France. The "Wuerzburg" was a very sensitive short-range radar used to pick up RAF Bombers as they crossed the channel. A whole string of them had been placed along the coast and the RAF was very interested in how they worked and how to defeat them.

Photoreconnaissance also showed a beach at the bottom of the nearby cliffs so the idea for a raid was born. French resistance forces were sent to confirm the location of the radar. They reported a German garrison of about 200 Operators and defence troops in a farmhouse called Le Presbytere about 150 meters to the north. They also reported that the beach was not mined.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations approved Operation Biting as an Airborne Raid because the strong beach defences made a sea landing dangerous. Major John Frost commanded "C" Company, 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade, and they were selected to go.

Preparation For Battle

The company started training under the cover story that they were going to put on a demonstration for the Royal Family. The RAF Photo Interpretation Section built a scale model of the installation site based on air photos. Finally the Officers were let in on the secret and they used the model to develop their plan.

The raiding force would all jump onto the same Drop Zone about a kilometre inland. They would break into three parties, named "Drake", "Nelson" and "Rodney" after the famous sailors. Drake, under Major Frost, would secure the isolated house and the radar unit. Nelson, under Lieutenant Euen Charteris, would assault and neutralize the beach defences. Rodney, under Lieutenant John Timothy, would act as a blocking force to prevent reinforcements coming from the farmhouse. Once the "Wuerzburg" was secured it would be dismantled and carried to the beach where Royal Navy landing craft would come to pick up the paratroopers. A radar expert, Flight Sergeant E. W. F. Cox, was attached to Frost's party to supervise the dismantling of the radar unit. He was rushed to Ringway to complete five jumps and earn his wings before the mission. A party of Sappers from 1st Para Field Squadron was also attached.

By February 23rd everything was ready to go. The only thing to delay the mission was the weather. By the night of February 27/28 conditions were excellent. There was a full moon and the tide was right.

The Jump

Taking off from RAF Thruxton, in twelve Whitley bombers from 51 Squadron, they flew across the English Channel toward Le Harve. As they approached the coast they encounter flak. Some aircraft were hit but little damage was done. Two of the planes went off course taking evasive action. Lt. Charteris and his party were dropped two and a half kilometres off the DZ. They found their bearings and ran toward the beach. The rest of the raiding party landed on the snow-covered Drop Zone at about midnight and quickly assembled.

The Battle

Major Frost led the charge into the house as Lieutenant Young attacked the radar unit. Several Germans were killed and one Operator was taken prisoner. Flight Sergeant Cox and the engineers examined the radar as bullets flew around them. The vital parts of the radar were quickly removed. Some parts were literally ripped off the apparatus by the paratroopers using crowbars.

The enemy fire was increasing from the farmhouse at Le Presbytere and engine noises could be heard coming from the east. Lieutenant Timothy's blocking party opened fire on the reinforcements as they arrived and Major Frost decided it was time to get out of there. The action at the objective had taken just over fifteen minutes. The paratroopers picked up the radar parts and started for the beach.

Ahead lay the beach defences. They were still in place owing to the poor drop of Lieutenant Charteris and his party. Major Frost was about to organize an assault when out of the darkness the missing paratroopers appeared. They had run almost all the way from their landing point.

The assault went in and the beach defences were cleared. It was just after 02:00 hours. As the paratroopers gathered on the beach the wireless operators reported that they could not contact the Navy. A few tense minutes were spent trying to raise the boats. Verey lights were fired and, just when it looked like the German counterattack was about to come, out of the gloom the landing craft arrived firing at the Germans on the cliffs above. The Paras loaded the boats and made their escape.

The operation was a spectacular success. Most of the vital parts of the radar were captured as well as three German prisoners, one of whom was a qualified radar operator. Losses to the British were two dead, seven wounded and six missing.

Lessons Learned

From examining the radar parts and interrogating the prisoners British Intelligence learned a great deal about the German radar system. At first the "Wuerzburg" looked impossible to jam, but eventually it was discovered that, by dropping thin metal strips of varying lengths, it could be effectively blinded. Thus was the concept of "chaff" discovered.

http://www.standto.com/qorbruneval.html

 

Operation Anklet : 2nd Raid of the Lofoten Islands

Background

The Lofoten Islands lie off the Norwegian coast about 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. In appearance and size they resemble the Outer Hebrides off the north west coast of Scotland. They were selected by Combined Operations HQ as a relative safe diversionary target to coincide with the main Vaagso raid some 300 miles south.

Planning & Preparation

Since the first Lofoten Raid in March 1941 the German forces in Norway had been strengthened including air cover (as Churchill had expected). Feints and major raids were now a legitimate tactic to divert attention, confuse the enemy and to promote the idea in the collective mind of the German High Command that Norway was a serious option for the launch of an invasion of mainland Europe from the UK.

The Raid

300 men from No 12 Commando and a number from the Royal Norwegian Army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel S.S. Harrison landed at 06.00 hours on Boxing Day. The planners had timed the raid in the expectation that the German garrison would be caught off guard. This was especially likely after the Christmas festivities of the day before.

The landings were unopposed as the men, wearing white hooded overalls, entered two harbours on the westerly island of Moskenesoy. The towns of Reine and Moskenes were soon occupied and a small number of German prisoners and quislings were taken including those manning the wireless station at Glaapen. A large supply of French chocolates and cigarettes was found and distributed to grateful locals. However there was concern about reprisals and many locals wanted the British forces to stay.



Admiral Hamilton on his Cruiser HMS Arethusa, with 8 destroyers in support, was tempted to consider a prolonged stay. There was after all no sunrise in these latitudes between the 10th December to 3rd January so the risk of attack from the air was much reduced. However a bomb dropped by a German seaplane on the 27th fell close to the cruiser so Harrison decided to withdraw having completed the mission successfully.

Outcome

Two radio transmitters were demolished, several small German boats captured and a few Germans and Quislings taken prisoner - and there was disruption of sea communications in the area. The raid had served its purpose and all men and equipment returned safely. However this was the last time such a raid was undertaken without air support. The nature of this form of warfare was changing as both sides assimilated past experiences into future planning.

http://www.combinedops.com/lofoten_2.htm

 

Belgian SAS Operations

Operation Trueform

On the 16th August 1944 80 soldiers from the Belgian SAS parachuted behind the German lines at Falaise. Their mission was to harass German units attempting to cross the Seine in retreat. They were also tasked with identifying the direction the enemy forces were retreating in and to radio back to England the direction.

Operation Benson

This was a very small operation in which a small team of Belgians parachuted near Beauvais. After they dropped they found documents showing the location of German units deployed along the Somme.

Belgium : Home

A team of Belgian SAS dropped behind military lines into Belgium to await the arrival of fresh troops. They were the first Allied troops to step into Belgium since the country was invaded in 1940.

Germany : Miss-drop

A group of Belgian SAS were accidentally parachuted into Germany while on their way to accomplish a mission. After realising where they were they marched from Germany back over the Belgian Border and accomplished their objectives.

(when I recieve more operations that involved the Belgian SAS I will post them)

 

Interesting posts Jet! I had never heard of the Belgian SAS operations! Keep them coming.

A few "requests": There were Dutch commandos used in Market Garden. Quite a few things are known about that. At home I have a link (Dutch language though from the official Dutch Commando site) with stories about them.

There were also the "Jedburgh" teams.

Also about 300 French para-commando's jumped into the province of Drenthe, Holland in 1945, supported by a X-number of SAS I believe. The operation in itself was a failure, but little is known about it. A Dutch Lt.-Col. wrote a book about that but that is very hard to get.

 

Someone mention Jedburgh?

http://www.jedburgh.demon.co.uk/

 

http://freespace.virgin.net/arthur.brown2/index.htm

Good Jedburhg site.

 

Operation Abercromby : Hardelot

On 21/22 April 1942 an operation took place to reconnoitre the beaches off the village of Hardelot, to capture prisoners and to inflict as much damage as possible on the German defences including the destruction of a searchlight battery. Chosen for this task were 100 men from No.4 Commando and 50 from the Canadian Carlton and York regiment, under the overall command of Major The Lord Lovat, 2nd in charge of No 4 Commando. The first planned attempt was on 18-19 April. This was aborted due to rough weather when the ALCs, under tow by MGBs, took in water. The bad weather prevented a second attempt planned for the night of 20/21 April. The following night the raid took place using LCS (Landing Craft Support) fitted with two machine guns and a mortar.) The northern landing by Lord Lovat's own group was achieved without opposition but, due to a navigational error, the Canadians failed to get ashore.

Lovat's party, once they reached the sand dunes, were caught by search lights, parachute flares and Very lights, and were slowed by a mass of wire entanglements. Enemy machine guns opened up from the flanks but fire from the two LCS's partially neutralized them, and several empty bunkers were subsequently discovered. The searchlight battery was located by a fighting patrol, but time ran out and the attack was called off.. The party withdrew and re-embarked without incident.

http://www.combinedops.com/no_4_commando.htm

 

Dutch Commandos : Nunc Aut Nunquam (now or never)

After serving in the Far East the all Dutch No 2 Troop from No 10 Commando were redeployed to Europe at their request.

EINDHOVEN: Five Dutch commandos were assigned to 101st (US) Airborne Division. Five commandos assigned to 52nd (Lowland) Division, with the intention to be flown into the area from Deelen Airport, eventually ended up in the Staff of 1st British Airborne Corps.
Before operation ''Market Garden'' five commandos already had been assigned to the Staff of Prince Bernhard as his personal bodyguards. On 11 October 1944 the remainder of no 2 (Dutch) Troop met in Eindhoven. They were given the choice between enjoying a well-earned leave or participating in the next mission. They chose the latter! In the meantime four commandos were already on a mission in the occupied part of the Netherlands.
They belonged to a group of eight commandos predestined to give weapon training and lessons in sabotage and to co-ordinate the resistance in occupied Holland by order of the Special Assignments Office. Three commandos were assigned to the Regiment Stoottroepen as instructors in the liberated South Netherlands. To be able to use the harbour of Antwerp the allied forces had to control the Schelde estuary. Since the German troops defended themselves fiercely it was decided to carry out amphibious landings at Vlissingen and Westkapelle.

NIJMEGEN: Eleven Dutch commandos were assigned to 82nd (US) Airborne Division and three commandos were assigned to 1st British Airborne Corps' headquarters.

ARNHEM: Twelve Dutch commandos were assigned to 1st British Airborne Division. Two Dutch commandos each crashed with a glider in Noord-Brabant and Schouwen-Duiveland. Four Dutch commandos were taken prisoner of war and commando August Bakhuizen Roozeboom was killed in action in a brave effort to reach the bridge across the river Rhine by jeep.

VLISSINGEN: In the early morning of 1 November 1944 No 4 Commando, French Troop and eleven Dutch commandos landed on the frontlines.

WESTKAPELLE: The landing at Westkapelle took place that very same day with the assistance of fourteen commandos assigned to No 47 (Royal Marine) Commando. Nine Dutchmen were wounded in the extremely heavy fights.

On 3 November 1944 Walcheren was liberated and the seaway to Antwerp was free. In the meantime in the liberated South Netherlands soldiers were recruited for the commando training in Scotland. Seventy out of 107 participants who left for Achnacarry on 19 November 1944 managed to obtain the Green Beret. At the end of April 1945 together with No 2 (Dutch) Troop they were deployed for two weeks at the front between Moerdijk and Geertruidenberg. Beside the four commandos who had been assigned as secret agents, two other commandos were parachuted over the Veluwe and Drenthe at the beginning of April 1945. After the liberation of the Netherlands, the Troop was assigned with guarding German prisoners of war for a while. In October 1945 No 2 (Dutch) Troop was disbanded.

http://www.korpscommandotroepen.nl/english/commandostichting/history/no2.html

 

Excellent links, guys! Very interesting information on the Jedburgh and SAS teams in ww2!!! I will bookmark these and collect the info on the KIA's for my research.

I checked Operation Amherst (The French para drop in Holland, april 1945) but couldn't find a good website. Did find a book about the operation. A French book, translated into Dutch by that Lt. Col.

I was surprised to find out that beside the French casualties there was also a Syrian paratrooper KIA!

 

SAS : Hitlers SAS Order

General Rommel reported to Hitler that the "commandos" were causing much nervousness among the Italians. Hitler responded with the Commando order which commanded the execution of each and every commando captured. Not all Generals took notice of the order such as Rommel ignored it and treated the SAS and other commandos as normal soldiers.


1: For some time our enemies have been using, in their warfare, methods which are outside the International Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called Commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter, as prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes, or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2: For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum to the Armed Forces report Of 7th October, 1942, that, in the future, Germany in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear

3: I therefore order: From now on, all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case, full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. For publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4: If individual members of such Commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories, for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the S.D. Any imprisonment under military guard, in P.O.W. stockades, for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5: This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations, are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after air battles.

6: I will hold responsible, under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or asked against this order when it was to be executed.

Adolf Hitler 18th October 1942

 

I would be very interested to learn who’s making this statement, especially as a month before the SAS failed miserably in a major attack (for them) on Benghazi?

Hitler’s Commando Order is very simple in its sentiment, Commando captives were to be killed, but not so why he bothered to explain his reasons when one sentence would do? He took some elements of fact and misinterpreted, twisted and augmented them to fit his convolution.

Re ‘info’ about the SAS on the web, there’s a lot of stuff that belongs in a ‘Boy’s Own’ comic rather than history.

Examples from the web:
Paddy Mayne was an extreme and daring person and he wanted to join the toughest regiment he could find, so he joined the Royal Marines No 11 Scots Commandos.
Reality – The Commandos were never regimented. No.11 Commando was an Army Commando, not Royal Marines.

While on leave in the Commandos, Paddy got into a drunken argument in the pub, and punched a Commando on the nose. Chasing after the man with his Colt pistol, he then began shooting at him. This resulted in Paddy's arrest, but before his court marshal, he was discovered and became one of the first recruits to David Stirling's new unit.
Reality – Mayne struck his CO, Geoffrey Keyes (son of Roger Keyes) after being rebuked for his conduct in the mess.

After the Germans captured Sir David Stirling in 1943, the job of taking command of the SAS was passed down to Paddy. Mayne was given commend of the Special Raiding Squadron, D Squadron which later became 2 SAS and at present, it became the heart and formation of the SBS.
Reality – Mayne was given command of the SAS infantry units only as he wasn’t competent enough to command a brigade. The SBS was part of the brigade formation for a time but it never originated there and predated the SAS. It was developed from Roger Courtney’s Folboat Section idea while in No.8 Commando. He in turn got ideas from the success of Italian harbour raiders.

He died in 1950 after crashing his car while drunk.
Reality - He died in 1955 and Veterans have advised me he was not attended properly at the time of the crash. People were so wary of his abusive and violent disposition when drunk, no one would go near him!

No.9

 

Just a few comments about Operation Biting...this is still thought of as the ideal Combined Operations plan. As well as the RAF who dropped them, the Royal Navy took them off and the Army did the business. This was in spite of several potential pitfalls. When Major Frost was 'offered' the chance to lead the raid, he was told the plan couldn't be changed-apparently Browning at Airborne Forces HQ had a hand in it and if Frost didn't like it they would find someone who did. Frost didn't like certain aspects of the plan but at hte time kept them to himself. It could have been a disaster. For example he was meant to lead the attack on the chateau himself..not the best place for command and control!
The other point is that as well as C Company from the 2nd Battalion, medics form 181 Airlanding Field Ambulance RAMC were sent on the boats to help with any wounded and around 30 men from the Royal Fusiliers and South Wales Borderers also went to cover the withdrawal to the landing craft. For more details see the book Red Berets and Red Crosses.

 

Hi,
www.combined-operations.com is worth a look.
Didn't the Commando order come about as a result of a botched raid on the Channel Islands early on?
I remember reading that during the raid, the commandos captured some Germans and tied their hands to keep them out of trouble. While they weere being guarded, one decided to be a hero, and the guard shot them all. Next morning, the Germans found the bodies and assumed they had been executed.

Regards,
Gordon

 

I have to admit i am finding this thread interesting as i am writing a paper at the moment argueing that Raiding was actually a failure in Grand Strategy and that more time should have been spent concentrating on a second front rather than these pin prick raids.

 

I am interested if anyone knows details of a British Commando raid at St Laurent (Omaha Beach) in 1942 or 1943 called the Aquatint Raid. THANKS FOR YOUR HELP